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ALVMNVS BOOK FVND





ABRAHAM LINCOLN.

From a drawing from life by F. B. Carpenter.

67

The Fight for the Republic

A Narrative of the More Noteworthy Events
in the War of Secession, Presenting the
Great Contest in its Dramatic Aspects

By
Rossiter Johnson

With Maps and Battle Plans

Every war is long, though it end to-morrow; every battle is terrible, though only your son perish.—*George William Curtis.*

G. P. Putnam's Sons
New York and London
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1917

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INTRODUCTION

THE Civil War of 1861-'65 in the United States was a gigantic drama, with no mummery, no painted scenery, no limelight illusion, no artificial thunder, no guarded sword-points, no imaginary daggers, no simulated passions; it was all dead earnest—powder and steel, destruction, blood, suffering, and sorrow—triumph in the end, but triumph with nameless graves in the foreground and desolate homes beyond. This drama was set forth on a stage of a million square miles; and with its distinct motive, its clash of theories and interests, its critical situations, its development of latent powers, its alternations of expectation and disappointment, its plotters and its heroes, its undercurrent setting steadily in the same direction and finally bringing to a decisive conclusion—with all these elements involved, it was as perfect a drama as poet ever penned and players ever presented.

The causes that brought it to pass are all plainly written in open history. If it were desired to limit these causes mainly to the action of individuals, three men must be mentioned—a certain sea-captain, a Connecticut inventor, and a South Carolina statesman. In 1619 a Dutch vessel sailed into James River with a cargo of African slaves, which was the beginning of a large and continuous importation. In 1793 Eli Whitney invented the cotton-gin, which increased by three

thousand the facility of preparing a great staple for the market, thus augmenting the value of every slave and of every acre of cotton land. In 1829 John C. Calhoun first distinctly set forth the doctrine of nullification, which involved the theory of State sovereignty and the privilege of secession. The first attempted application of it was in 1832, when South Carolina refused to pay duty on imported sugar; but a far more extensive and determined use of it appeared in repeated threats to dissolve the Union whenever the special interests of the Southern States (where slavery remained after it had disappeared in the North) might thereby be subserved. This led to a series of compromises for averting such a disaster, the most important of which was the Missouri Compromise of 1820. The Ordinance of 1787 had excluded slavery from the territory northwest of the Ohio River, but as a compromise slave-owners were permitted to recapture slaves that escaped into this territory. A two-years' struggle in Congress over the application of Missouri ended in her admission in 1821 as a slave State, with the proviso that all territory lying north of a continuation of her southern boundary ($36^{\circ} 30' N.$) should thenceforth be free. The next compromise came in 1850, when California was admitted to the Union as a free State, and at the same time a stringent law was enacted for the return from the North of fugitives. This went so far as to give free negroes little chance of escaping capture and reduction to slavery, and provided for transportation of recaptured negroes to the South at the expense of the Federal Government.

Still the South was not satisfied. There was a steady stream of desirable immigrants, from the northern countries of Europe, and as they nearly all were toilers

for their own living they naturally entered the free States and pushing westward where land was cheap, developed the Northern Territories into States. This was alarming to Southern statesmen and slaveholders, who realized that the Congressional balance of power was slipping from their hands. They assumed that they must hold that balance or their prosperity would be imperilled; and apparently did not realize that they were contending against inexorable laws of political economy and did not dream that the law of natural boundaries was the ultimate arbiter for every permanent peace. One of the ablest of the Confederate commanders, General Longstreet, appeared to arrive instinctively at this last consideration when he recorded his opinion that if the Union had been dissolved by the war, the sections would some day come together again.

Besides these material considerations, there was a moral element that entered into the causes of the war and excited and intensified the passions that became largely its motive force. Even in the convention that framed the Federal Constitution, certain Southern delegates gave distinct and emphatic notice that the Southern States could not be expected to ratify it unless their peculiar interests were protected; and this brought the retort from several Northern delegates that slavery was an unrighteous institution that ought to be abolished in any case. But all was settled on business principles, and the three famous compromises of the Constitution were adopted—equal representation of the States in the Senate; three fifths of slave population to be counted in the basis of representation; and oversea slave trade not to be forbidden for twenty years. The denunciations uttered in the Constitutional

Convention by Rufus King and Gouverneur Morris had a multiplied echo half a century later, when William Lloyd Garrison, Wendell Phillips, and their followers demanded the immediate abolition of slavery as an unjustifiable outrage against liberty and humanity and a curse to the nation. Anti-slavery societies were organized, anti-slavery presses were set up, anti-slavery lecturers went through the free States, with intemperate zeal reiterating their denunciations against the slaveholders and their sarcasm against the Constitution, while at the same time the greater number of them refused to vote or to do anything practicable toward a final, though perhaps distant, riddance of the institution. All these preachers and their followers were but a small part of the population; but the people of the Southern States supposed they were a majority, seriously menacing to their peace and prosperity, and libelling their morality. Mr. Calhoun said: "The war they wage against us is not against our lives, but our character." The natural result was that "abolitionist" became in the South a term of contemptuous reproach, and all Northerners were held under suspicion. Northern newspapers were not permitted to circulate in the South unless they were distinctly pro-slavery in their utterances, and everything in the mails was subject to examination and censorship. Still hoping to save the vanishing balance of power, Southern legislators attacked the Missouri Compromise as unconstitutional; and a Northern Senator introduced and carried through a bill to repeal this and to throw open the Territories to what he called "popular sovereignty." He meant by this term that when a Territory had population enough for representation in Congress a majority of its voters should determine whether its

soil should be dedicated to slavery or to freedom. By this measure a majority of the people of the free States were made to realize the aggressive spirit of the slave power, and determined to check such aggression. A great new party was at once organized in the North—not for the abolition of slavery, but for preventing slavery from spreading over any more territory; and of course it was accused of cherishing the purpose which it did not hold.

The Kansas-Nebraska act, of which the repeal of the Missouri Compromise was a necessary feature (1854), opened those Territories to immigration for all settlers. And this was followed by the Dred Scott decision, delivered early in 1857 by Chief Justice Roger B. Taney, declaring that the negro had no rights which the white man was bound to respect. The inevitable result, which any one might have foreseen, was a bloody conflict in Kansas between free-State men and slave-State men. Not only did armed Missourians cross the border with no intention of settling, but with the purpose of controlling the elections for slavery, but in one instance an organized military company, under its own banner, came all the way from South Carolina for the same purpose. Presidents Pierce and Buchanan used the power of the Government, so far as they could, to assist the pro-slavery cause; and on the other hand the free-State settlers were furnished with an abundance of improved rifles by their friends in the North. The struggle there—with conflagrations, sieges, sackings, and murder—was really the beginning of the Civil War. "Bleeding Kansas" was a familiar expression, uttered sometimes in brutal derision and sometimes in sorrowful sympathy, but always with truth.

These conditions of misunderstanding, distrust, and

suspicion, intensified by false and opprobrious catch-words coming constantly from the throats of the ignorant, led inevitably to the great Civil War.

In that sorrowful chapter of our history there were twenty-four hundred military engagements of sufficient consequence to bear a name; and the loss of life was a daily average of four hundred for the four years. The purpose of the present volume is simply to set forth clearly such of the greater events as either constituted turning-points or distinctly advanced or retarded the general movement toward the end.

The Proclamation of Emancipation, apparently incidental to the contest, changed it from a war for a temporary peace to a war for a permanent peace; and the surrender of the Confederate armies so far affected our syntax that no American henceforth may say, "The United States *are* a confederation," but must say instead, "The United States *is* a nation." Nobody denies, or ever has denied, that the States have rights; but the theory of State sovereignty died on those historic fields and is buried out of sight for ever.

R. J.

NEW YORK, May, 1916.

CONTENTS

	PAGE
INTRODUCTION	iii
THE INAUGURATION OF PRESIDENT LINCOLN	1
THE CAPTURE OF FORT SUMTER	12
THE FIRST BATTLE OF BULL RUN	28
THE CONQUEST OF THE COAST	42
THE CAPTURE OF FORTS HENRY AND DONELSON	55
THE BATTLE OF THE FIRST IRONCLADS	66
ISLAND NUMBER TEN	77
THE BATTLE OF SHILOH	80
THE CAPTURE OF THE CRESCENT CITY	90
THE CAMPAIGN ON THE PENINSULA	102
POPE'S CAMPAIGN IN VIRGINIA	128
THE MARYLAND CAMPAIGN	141
EMANCIPATION	156
THE BATTLE OF FREDERICKSBURG	169
THE BATTLE OF CHANCELLORSVILLE	174
THE BATTLE OF GETTYSBURG	185
THE SIEGE OF VICKSBURG	209

	PAGE
THE BATTLE OF CHICKAMAUGA	222
THE BATTLES AT CHATTANOOGA	228
THE RED-RIVER EXPEDITION	237
GRANT'S OVERLAND CAMPAIGN	246
SHERMAN'S ATLANTA CAMPAIGN	267
THE BATTLE OF THE "KEARSARGE" AND THE "ALABAMA"	280
THE BATTLE OF MOBILE BAY	285
THE BATTLE OF CEDAR CREEK	292
THE DESTRUCTION OF THE "ALBEMARLE"	300
SHERMAN'S MARCH TO THE SEA	305
THE BATTLES OF FRANKLIN AND NASHVILLE	313
THROUGH THE CAROLINAS	327
THE FINAL CAMPAIGN IN VIRGINIA	338
THE GRAND REVIEW	364
THE MEASURE OF VALOUR	367
THE FEDERAL FINANCES	384
INDEX	391

ILLUSTRATIONS

	PAGE
PORTRAIT OF ABRAHAM LINCOLN	<i>Frontispiece</i>
MAP OF CHARLESTON HARBOUR.	14
THE FIELD OF BULL RUN, JULY 18, 1861	32
THE FIELD OF BULL RUN, JULY 20, 1861	34
SKETCH MAP OF THE COAST	42
KENTUCKY AND TENNESSEE, FEB. 6, 1862	56
MAP OF FORT DONELSON	60
THE "MONITOR" AND THE "MERRIMAC"	70
THE FIELD OF SHILOH	82
MAP OF THE PENINSULA CAMPAIGN	104
THE ROUTE OF STUART'S RAID	114
POSITION OF THE ARMIES IN VIRGINIA, AUGUST 27, 1862	134
POSITION OF THE ARMIES IN MARYLAND, SEPTEMBER 16, 1862	144
THE FIELD OF THE ANTIETAM	146
THE FIELD OF FREDERICKSBURG	172

	PAGE
THE FIELD OF CHANCELLORSVILLE, MAY 2, 1863 .	176
THE FIELD OF CHANCELLORSVILLE, MAY 3, 1863 .	180
POSITIONS AT GETTYSBURG, JULY 1, 1863 . .	188
POSITIONS AT GETTYSBURG, JULY 3, 1863 . .	202
GRANT'S CAMPAIGN IN THE REAR OF VICKSBURG .	212
THE SIEGE OF VICKSBURG	218
THE FIELD OF CHICKAMAUGA	224
THE FIELD OF CHATTANOOGA	232
BAILEY'S DAM—FOUR VIEWS	244
MAP OF GRANT'S GRAND CAMPAIGN	248
THE FIELD OF THE WILDERNESS	252
THE FIELD OF SPOTTSYLVANIA	260
MAP OF MOBILE BAY	286
THE FIELD OF CEDAR CREEK	296
THE ROUTES OF SHERMAN'S ARMY	308
GRANT'S CAMPAIGN AGAINST RICHMOND—BY PER- MISSION FROM CHURCH'S "LIFE OF GRANT" .	340
GENERAL ULYSSES S. GRANT	360
GENERAL ROBERT E. LEE	362

The Fight for the Republic

The Fight for the Republic

The Inauguration of President Lincoln

March 4, 1861

THE repeal of the Missouri Compromise, in 1854, and the opening of the Territory of Kansas to immigration in a way that practically invited fierce contention between the pro-slavery and the anti-slavery men, gave rise to the Republican party. The distinctive principle of that party was, that the system of slavery should not be disturbed in the States where it existed, but that Congress should prohibit its extension into the Territories. Several years earlier Abraham Lincoln had clearly set forth this principle as his own view of the contest that so long agitated the country, and he consistently adhered to it.

On the other hand, Presidents Pierce and Buchanan, representing the extremists of the South, did their utmost to force the system upon Kansas; while Senator Stephen A. Douglas, author of the Kansas-Nebraska bill, which abolished the compromise, endeavoured to introduce a supposedly conciliatory policy by means of his doctrine of "popular sovereignty." This was to the effect that a Territory should be thrown open to

2 The Fight for the Republic

immigration, and the settlers, when they had become numerous enough, should determine by popular vote whether its soil should be devoted to slave labour or to free labour. This proposal ignored the fact that, after such an election, those who were in the minority would be practically compelled to abandon their investments and leave the State. The only alternative was an armed conflict, and such a conflict, reddening the soil of Kansas, intensified political feeling throughout the country, converting much of it into implacable hatred.

The Presidential election of 1856, in which John C. Frémont, the Republican candidate, received a very large vote—and perhaps would have been elected but for the American or “Know-nothing” party, which polled nearly a million ballots—increased at once the alarm of the pro-slavery men and the confidence of the anti-slavery men, and appeared to fire the whole land with passion and prejudice. Statesmanship was degraded and journalism was vulgarized to an extent that makes a serious blot on our history. If the Republican ticket had been successful, the revolt of the South would have come then, instead of four years later.

In the whole discussion the most notable event was a joint debate between Lincoln and Douglas, in seven Illinois towns, which took place midway between two Presidential elections (1858). The power that Lincoln displayed in this debate and in subsequent speeches in the great cities, together with the fact that he had enunciated over and over again the proposition that became the central principle of his party, made him the logical candidate in 1860, and he was nominated at Chicago, in May, on the third ballot. Hannibal Hamlin, Senator from Maine, was nominated for Vice-President.

The Democratic convention, held first in Charleston, S. C., was unable to make a nomination, because of its rule that, to be its candidate, one must receive the votes of two thirds of the delegates. It then adjourned to Baltimore, where, on the second ballot, Stephen A. Douglas received 181 out of 194 votes cast (many refusing to vote), and became the candidate of the moderate wing of the party, on a "popular sovereignty" platform. Herschel V. Johnson, who had been Governor of Georgia, was nominated for Vice-President.

The extremists seceded from the convention and nominated John C. Breckinridge, of Kentucky (at that time Vice-President), on a platform that denied the right of Congress to exclude slavery from any Territory. Joseph Lane, Senator from Oregon, was nominated for Vice-President.

A party whose platform was briefly expressed in the words "the Constitution and the Union" nominated John Bell, of Tennessee, for President, and Edward Everett, of Massachusetts, for Vice-President. Mr. Bell had been chosen Speaker of the House of Representatives in 1834, and in a long public career had steadily opposed extreme pro-slavery measures.

The campaign that followed was the most exciting and spectacular since the so-called "hard-cider" campaign that elected William Henry Harrison in 1840. The story that Mr. Lincoln, in his youth, had performed a notable feat in splitting fence-rails was taken for illustration to appeal to voters who entertained crude ideas about "a man of the people." In the numerous processions it was common to include a float on which a tall man, in his shirt-sleeves, with his trousers tucked into his boots, was working with axe and wedge to split a log. Bands of young men were organized, who wore

oilcloth caps and capes and carried torches, marching nearly every evening in military fashion, preceded by music, and visiting the halls and tents where Republican meetings were held. They always entered after the meeting was in progress, creating an enthusiastic interruption. They were called Wideawakes, and they contributed much to the excitement of the occasion, if little to its logic.

On the other side, Mr. Lincoln and his party were constantly assailed with opprobrious epithets, not good to be repeated.

In the joint debate Lincoln had forced Douglas to say—in accordance with his doctrine of popular sovereignty—that the people of a new State had the same right to vote to exclude slavery as to admit it; and this made him unacceptable to the extremists of the South—if, indeed, they had not predetermined to split their party in any case, so as to secure its defeat and create a pretext for secession. Their threat to dissolve the Union had been repeated many times and constantly held in readiness since the nullification trouble of 1832, when South Carolina defied the revenue laws.

The election, November 6, 1860, gave Lincoln 180 electoral votes, Breckinridge 72, Bell 39, and Douglas 12—a majority for Lincoln of 57. The House of Representatives that was elected at the same time contained a majority politically opposed to President Lincoln; but when the members from the seceding States vacated their seats the Republicans were left in control.

South Carolina, the State in which the disunion sentiment had always been the most pronounced, did not wait for the new President to be inaugurated, but adopted an ordinance of secession on December 20th. The other cotton States—except North Carolina, Ar-

kansas, and Tennessee—followed in rapid succession till by February 1st they were all declared out of the Union. In South Carolina alone was the vote of the convention unanimous. In Texas the ordinance was submitted to the people for ratification. Early in February delegates from the seceding States met in Montgomery, Alabama, and formed the Confederate States Government, choosing Jefferson Davis and Alexander H. Stephens President and Vice-President provisionally for one year.

All United States property within those States—forts, arsenals, custom-houses, etc.—was seized by the Confederate Government—all except one fort in Charleston harbour and one at Pensacola, Florida. The greater part of the United States army was in Texas, commanded by Gen. David E. Twiggs, who at once surrendered it, together with more than a million dollars' worth of military property; and the navy had been largely sent to distant seas. While the Southern Senators and Representatives withdrew from Congress as soon as their States seceded, President Buchanan took the ground that no State had a right to secede, but the Federal Government had no right to prevent such secession. The Southern States were raising armies, finding in the arsenals large quantities of arms that had been transferred from the North during Buchanan's administration. The Federal treasury was empty and the Government was obliged to borrow money at twelve per cent.

Such was the condition of national affairs when the day for Mr. Lincoln's inauguration approached. And besides all these internal difficulties there was a serious danger from without, which the secessionists confidently relied upon and which impended for more than two

years of President Lincoln's term. This was plainly hinted at in Jefferson Davis's address when he was inaugurated as provisional President of the Confederacy in February. He said:

Our industrial pursuits have received no check; the cultivation of our fields progresses as heretofore; and even should we be involved in war there would be no considerable diminution in the production of the staples which have constituted our exports, in which the commercial world has an interest scarcely less than our own. This common interest of producer and consumer can only be intercepted by an exterior force which should obstruct its transmission to foreign markets—a course of conduct which would be detrimental to manufacturing and commercial interests abroad.

This was the same idea that, four years earlier, David Christy had promulgated in his terse expression "Cotton is king," which had found wide acceptance at the South.

On the 11th of February Mr. Lincoln left his home in Springfield, Illinois, and set out on his journey to Washington. In a brief address to his friends and neighbours he said:

No one not in my situation can appreciate my feeling of sadness at this parting. To this place and the kindness of these people I owe everything. Here I have lived for a quarter of a century and have passed from a young to an old man. Here my children have been born, and here one is buried. I now leave, not knowing when or whether ever I may return, with a task before me greater than that which rested upon Washington. Without the assistance of that Divine Being who ever attended him, I cannot succeed. With that assistance, I cannot fail. Trusting in Him who can go with me and remain with you, and be

everywhere for good, let us confidently hope that all will yet be well. To His care commending you, as I hope in your prayers you will commend me, I bid you an affectionate farewell.

His route was by way of Indianapolis, Cincinnati, Columbus, Pittsburg, Cleveland, Buffalo, Albany, New York, Trenton, and Philadelphia, and he spoke briefly at each of those cities and at some of the intervening stations. At the five State capitals he addressed the legislatures. These speeches were somewhat longer and more studied than the others; but of several attempts to induce him to declare what would be his policy none were successful. He came nearest to it in his address to the Assembly at Albany, when he said:

I shall endeavour to take the ground I deem most just to the North, the East, the West, the South, and the whole country. I take it, I hope, in good temper, certainly with no malice toward any section. I shall do all that may be in my power to promote a peaceful settlement of all our difficulties. The man does not live who is more devoted to peace than I am, none who would do more to preserve it; but it may be necessary to put the foot down firmly.

Here, indeed, tersely expressed, was the philosophy of the whole situation as he viewed it, and the keynote of his consistent conduct of the great war that ensued. His audience received it with tumultuous cheers and applause that lasted several minutes.

It had been learned that there was a conspiracy to assassinate the President-elect while he was on his way to Washington; and a skilful detective, Allan Pinkerton, was employed, who, with carefully chosen assistants, traced it to its source and could have placed his hand on every one of the conspirators. When Mr.

Lincoln arrived in Philadelphia the facts were laid before him, and he was advised to go thence to Washington in some disguise and by a train other than the one he was expected to take. This was on February 21st. After listening to the story, he answered that he had promised to raise the Stars and Stripes over Independence Hall the next morning (Washington's birthday), and had accepted the Legislature's invitation for a public reception at Harrisburg in the afternoon. "Both of these engagements," he said firmly, "I will keep, if it costs me my life. If, however, after I shall have concluded these engagements you can take me in safety to Washington, I will place myself at your disposal."

Mr. Lincoln was loath to believe there was any serious intent to murder him, and he would not adopt a disguise. But the friends who felt responsible for his safety omitted no precaution. In the evening they disconnected the telegraph wires, so that there could be no heralding of his movements, and he left Harrisburg quietly for Philadelphia, accompanied only by his old friend Ward H. Lamon. There the night train for Washington was held for them, they at once entered the sleeping-car, and at 6.30 in the morning they arrived in the capital, where Elihu B. Washburne, member of Congress from Illinois, met him at the station and took him at once to Willard's Hotel, where William H. Seward was waiting to receive him.

The alleged assassination conspiracy was ridiculed at the time; a graceless correspondent—afterward imprisoned for an impudent forgery—invented a story that represented the President-elect as sneaking through Baltimore disguised in a Scotch cap and a long military cloak; and on the strength of this many journals opposed to Mr. Lincoln accused him of cow-

ardice and an unbecoming lack of dignity. But the evidence of such a plot is so strong as to leave no room for reasonable doubt. Independently of the work of the detectives, General Scott and Mr. Seward learned of it, and Seward sent his son to warn Mr. Lincoln. In every State capital and large city that the Presidential party had passed through there was a cordial reception by the authorities and by citizens of all parties; but no word of the kind from Baltimore. In that same Baltimore in 1812 there was a political riot to suppress a newspaper, and the rioters killed General James M. Lingan, seriously injured General Henry Lee, who were assisting their friend to protect his property, and beat and tortured other men. But none of the rioters were punished. In that same city, again, two months after Mr. Lincoln passed through it, a bloodthirsty mob attacked a Massachusetts regiment that was hurrying to the defence of the capital, and killed three men. And again the rioters were not punished.

Not long afterward a regiment commanded by Colonel Isaac F. Quinby, a West Point classmate of General Grant's, passed through Baltimore with loaded muskets and with the first and last companies deployed across the roadway from curb to curb. The same cowardly mob was on hand; but they saw the caps on the guns and understood the purpose of the formation, and sullenly refrained from any active hostility.

As soon as Mr. Lincoln was fairly in Washington the usual calls of official courtesy were exchanged, with the same punctilious show of cordiality as if there had been no opposition to him; and many who were without official rank paid their respects and gave assurance of loyal support.

On Monday, March 4th, the outgoing President, in

accordance with custom, called for the incoming President, and they drove together to the Capitol. In the Senate Chamber the oath of office was administered to the new Vice-President, Mr. Hamlin. Mr. Lincoln was then escorted to the east portico, where several of his predecessors had been inaugurated. His family were with him, and accompanying him were a Senate committee of arrangements, the justices of the Supreme Court, and as many officials and guests as the platform would accommodate, while an immense throng stood on the ground in front. Ample preparations against any possible murderous attempt had been made, not only with detectives in the crowd but with a military force (infantry and artillery) commanded by Colonel Charles P. Stone, under the direction of Lieutenant-General Winfield Scott.

Mr. Lincoln was introduced to the people by Edward D. Baker, an old friend of his in Springfield, who had just been elected Senator from Oregon, and who, seven months later, fell mortally wounded in the battle of Ball's Bluff. He then read his carefully prepared inaugural address, a document of about 3500 words, one of the longest ever delivered by an incoming President. He reiterated his oft-expressed declaration that he had no purpose to interfere with the system of slavery in the States where it existed; declared that he was about to take the oath of office with no mental reservation; that, in contemplation of universal law and of the Constitution, the union of the States was perpetual; that the central idea of secession was the essence of anarchy; that if secession were successful the foreign slave trade would be ultimately revived without restriction in one section, while fugitive slaves would not be surrendered by the other; and that he should take

Inauguration of President Lincoln 11

care, as the Constitution required of him, that the laws be faithfully executed in all the States. The address closed with this paragraph:

We are not enemies, but friends. We must not be enemies. Though passion may have strained, it must not break our bonds of affection. The mystic chords of memory stretching from every battlefield and patriot grave to every living heart and hearthstone, all over this broad land, will yet swell the chorus of the Union when again touched, as surely they will be, by the better angels of our nature.

The peroration was greeted with cheers. The clerk of the Supreme Court then presented the open Bible, and Mr. Lincoln, standing face to face with Chief Justice Taney, laid his hand upon it and took this oath:

I, Abraham Lincoln, do solemnly swear that I will faithfully execute the office of President of the United States, and will, to the best of my ability, preserve, protect, and defend the Constitution of the United States.

The inauguration had culminated in a notable dramatic climax. It was the duty of Mr. Lincoln's most powerful rival for the office, Mr. Breckinridge, to make the official announcement of his election; another contestant, Mr. Douglas, good-naturedly held Mr. Lincoln's hat while he spoke; the outgoing President beheld stern logic and the highest civic courage taking the place of his own timidity and helplessness; and Chief Justice Taney administered the oath that brought in an administration by which his most famous edict was to be for ever nullified and set at naught. This was indeed a historic triumph.

The Capture of Fort Sumter

April 13, 1861

WHEN Federal forts, arsenals, and custom-houses in the Southern States were seized or demanded by State or Confederate authorities, they were easily obtained, either because the officers in charge of them were Southerners "going with their States," or because there was no adequate force to defend them. But there were two notable exceptions.

Captain Adam J. Slemmer was in command of Fort Barrancas at Pensacola, Florida. Knowing that this work was comparatively weak, and that the navy yard had been surrendered, he removed his garrison to Fort Pickens, on Santa Rosa Island, where he defied any force that could be brought against him. In April he was succeeded by Colonel Harvey Brown, in June the garrison was strongly reënforced and provisioned, and the work was held by Federal forces throughout the war.

On November 7th, the day succeeding the Presidential election, the United States flag was replaced by the Palmetto flag in Charleston, and on December 20th South Carolina declared herself out of the Union. To these proceedings there was no serious protest on the part of the National administration. A few weeks later, John A. Dix, who had succeeded Howell Cobb as

Secretary of the Treasury, finding that two revenue cutters at Mobile and New Orleans were being surrendered unnecessarily, telegraphed to the Treasury agent at the latter city: "If any one attempts to haul down the American flag, shoot him on the spot."

Fort Moultrie, on Sullivan's Island, east side of Charleston harbour, was built by Colonel William Moultrie in 1776, and in June of that year it sustained a bombardment by British men-of-war, which were seriously damaged by the fire from the fort. It had been constructed hastily, largely of palmetto logs, and many of the enemy's balls merely sank into the soft wood. In this action Sergeant William Jasper performed his famous exploit of leaping from the parapet and, under the fire of the hostile ships, restoring the flag which had been shot down.

In 1860 this fort was garrisoned by about seventy men, commanded by Colonel John L. Gardner, who had been in the military service of the United States nearly fifty years. He was a native of Boston, and had declared that he would defend the fort to the last. Therefore John B. Floyd, President Buchanan's Secretary of War, transferred him to a post under General Twiggs in Texas, and in November gave the command of the fort to Major Robert Anderson, a Kentuckian.


If Secretary Floyd thought that Major Anderson, coming from a slave State, could be relied upon to surrender the fort at the first summons, he did not know his man. Seeing the storm that was coming, and knowing that Fort Moultrie could be reduced easily from the land side, on Christmas night Major Anderson quietly removed his command to Fort Sumter. As there were spies on every hand, and he

hardly knew whom to trust, he did not let even his officers know of his intention to make this move till twenty minutes before the actual embarkation. The families of the officers had been sent to Fort Johnson near the city, whence they were afterward sent to the North. Several vessels which had been chartered for their removal by Quartermaster Hall were now used to carry the supplies from Moultrie to Sumter. Both these forts were in an unfinished condition, and when Major Anderson had asked for materials and workmen to complete and strengthen them, the Secretary of War promptly gave him all he required, but refused all requests for reënforcement of the garrison. The reason for the distinction is obvious. While the transfer was taking place, the guns of Moultrie, shotted and trained, were ready for sinking anything that should attempt to interfere. If the officers of the State's guard-boats, which patrolled the harbour, saw the moving vessels, they must have supposed they were only ferrying over some of the labourers, many of whom were at work on the fort.

Most of the workmen at Sumter were from Baltimore and were secessionists. When they showed a disposition to oppose the landing, they were at once driven into the fort at the point of the bayonet, and an hour or two later were sent ashore in the vessels that had brought over the garrison.

Besides Major Anderson the commissioned officers were: Captains Abner Doubleday, John G. Foster, and Truman Seymour, Lieutenants Jefferson C. Davis, George W. Snyder, Theodore Talbot, Norman J. Hall, and Richard K. Meade, and Surgeon (afterward General) Samuel W. Crawford. All these remained true to the Union except Lieutenant Meade, who was a

May 9th
1861





Virginian, and five of them became major-generals. Snyder and Talbot were promoted, but died early in the war. Hall became Colonel of a Michigan regiment and was thrice brevetted for gallantry. Meade was commissioned in the Confederate army, but died in 1862.

The next day, when the Stars and Stripes were raised over Fort Sumter, and the sixty soldiers appearing on the parapet gave rise to a rumour that the garrison had been reënforced, there was intense excitement in Charleston. On the same day, three commissioners sent by the State Government arrived in Washington to open negotiations for the transfer of all the forts and other property. It is not probable that President Buchanan, weak as he was, would have yielded to them to that extent; but the news of Anderson's prompt strategic move met with such instant and hearty commendation all over the North, that no President could have disregarded the popular sentiment. The commissioners were not officially received. Meanwhile the garrison were hard at work mounting heavy guns and doing what they could to strengthen the defences and put the fort in condition to resist assault or endure bombardment.

Fort Sumter was built on an artificial island near the centre of Charleston harbour and was intended to protect the city against the approach of hostile fleets. It had perpendicular walls of brick, with accommodation for two tiers of guns, besides guns *en barbette*, and bomb-proof casemates. Its weakness lay first in the inability of brick walls to resist the fire of heavy rifled guns, and secondly in the fact that in the enclosed quadrangle or parade-ground were wooden buildings for family quarters and storage of materials. Fort Pickens was of similar construction.

The other fortifications in the harbour were Castle Pinckney, very near the city, Fort Ripley, and Fort Johnson, which was on a point of Morris Island. The Confederates had possession of all these; and on Cummings Point of Morris Island, the nearest point to Fort Sumter, they placed a powerful battery of rifled guns, and on a point of Sullivan's Island another. It was a curious fact that while they were evidently preparing all these works for an attack on Sumter, they were in courteous, not to say friendly, relations with Major Anderson and allowed him to get fresh provisions daily from the city markets.

President Buchanan was requested by the State authorities to order Major Anderson to return with the garrison to Fort Moultrie, which he declined to do. Then the work within Sumter went on. The workmen had left derricks, tackle, gun-carriages, and masses of material; and the little company was constantly employed protecting the casemates with flag-stones, setting up ten-inch columbiads in the parade ground to be used as mortars, carrying heavy shot to the upper tiers, and rendering the quarters more comfortable. Every serviceable gun was carefully aimed as it should be for greatest efficiency in replying to any attack; the wharf was mined; on the esplanade were piles of paving-stones with charges of powder in the centre, which could be fired if an enemy should land; barrels filled with broken stone and powder were made ready to be rolled down to the water's edge, with a lighted fuse; and on the parapet were many metal-lined boxes to protect men using rifles and throwing down hand-grenades. All these preparations were well known to the enemy, and there was no thought of taking the fort except by bombardment at long range. It was

mortifying to the Carolinians—in fact, to all the South—to see that fort standing in their harbour occupied by a force that they looked upon as foreign. Yet they were loath to attack it, because they cherished the hope of getting it by negotiation and avoiding war, or at least escaping the responsibility of firing the first shot.

Early in January the Administration resolved to attempt relief of the fort. But instead of sending a war vessel, a merchant steamer, *Star of the West*, was chartered for the service. She took on board recruits and provisions, and steamed down from New York, arriving off Charleston January 9th. When she attempted to enter the harbour she was fired on by the guns of Fort Moultrie and the batteries on Morris Island, and was helpless to do anything for her own defence. The guns in Fort Sumter were promptly manned, but Major Anderson would not give the command to fire, and the steamer put out to sea and abandoned the enterprise. The first shot aimed at the *Star of the West* was the first gun fired in the war.

Another month passed before the Confederate States Government, with Jefferson Davis as President, was formed at Montgomery, Alabama, and meanwhile there were daily rumours, conjectures and alarms, conflicting counsels and constantly growing irritation, excitement, recrimination, and passionate appeals. There was doubt whether some of the cotton States would remain in the Confederacy unless matters were soon brought to a crisis, and more doubt whether the border States could be induced to enter it at all. The radical element at the South was represented by Mr. Gilchrist, of Alabama, when he said to the Confederate Secretary of War: "You must sprinkle blood in the

faces of the people. If you delay two months, Alabama stays in the Union."

The little band of faithful soldiers in the fort suffered uncomplainingly pretty severe hardships. They had little fuel for any purpose, and rations were short, while the necessity for work was constant. For a time Major Anderson had full market privileges in the city, and his mail was delivered to him regularly. After a time, the State Government withdrew the market privileges for a while, and when it restored them the market men refused to sell to the garrison.

There was wonderment and criticism at the North, that Anderson should permit the construction of batteries all round the harbour which evidently were intended for the reduction of the fort—an impatience corresponding to that of many at the South who wished to have it fired upon at once. But the ruling powers on either side were reluctant. If war was to come, each wished it to appear that the other was the aggressor. This was true not only of Buchanan but of Lincoln, who said in his inaugural address: "In your hands my dissatisfied fellow-countrymen, and not in mine, is the momentous issue of civil war. The Government will not assail you. You can have no conflict without being yourselves the aggressors."

Over and over again a demand was made upon Anderson for the surrender of the fort, the secessionists earnestly hoping to get it without any military operation. Such surrender, if it had been made, would have gone far toward an apparent recognition of South Carolina's right to secede. The commissioners assured Major Anderson that his situation was hopeless; that the Government at Washington was rapidly falling to pieces; and that the Confederates would certainly have

the fort, even if they had to exterminate the garrison. Several commissions were sent to Washington to negotiate a surrender, but all were referred back to Anderson, and he stood unmoved.

The immediate danger from Mr. Buchanan's helplessness was past when two of the most determined secessionists—Howell Cobb and John B. Floyd—resigned from his Cabinet, and were succeeded by John A. Dix of New York and Joseph Holt of Kentucky as Secretaries of the Treasury and War. Though nothing positive in the way of repressing the insurrection could be hoped for while Buchanan was chief magistrate, all applications on the part of the Confederates for recognition or concession were useless.

When Mr. Lincoln assumed that office there were immediate indications of a vigorous policy. While he was determined not to fire the first gun, he was equally determined, as he said in his inaugural address, to obey the Constitution and see to it that the laws were faithfully executed in all the States. He had his own peculiar difficulties to deal with, not the least of which was the fact that there were numerous spies in Washington—some of them evidently occupying official places—and not a move could be made, or even proposed, without an immediate mysterious transmission of the news to the Confederate authorities. The little garrison in Fort Sumter, now living mainly on salt pork and water, but still bravely determined to hold out, were cut off from communication with the Government, and the President determined to attempt their relief without unnecessary delay. Lieutenant Talbot, of the garrison, was allowed to go to Washington, because the secessionists hoped that his story of the state of affairs in

the fort would induce the Administration to order a surrender. Instead of that, Mr. Lincoln sent him back, April 8th, to notify Governor Pickens that he would reënforce and provision Sumter.

The relieving fleet consisted of the war-ships *Pawnee* and *Pocahontas* and the transports *Baltic* and *Harriet Lane*. They sailed from New York and arrived off Charleston harbour on the morning of April 12th—all but the *Pocahontas*, which at the last moment had been transferred to a fleet for relief of Fort Pickens. It was known that everything indicating the channel had been removed, so that the vessels could not enter the harbour, and launches had been prepared, in which to send in the reënforcements in the night. But all these were on the *Pocahontas*, and when she arrived it was too late. For meanwhile General Beauregard, commanding the Confederate forces, had received orders on the 10th to attack the fort without delay. There was a special reason for desiring its capture in the fact that not only did this work command the harbour, but by removing the channel-marks the secessionists had effectually closed the harbour against even friendly merchant vessels, so that the commerce of the city must go to other ports.

In the afternoon of the 11th General Beauregard sent an officer to demand the surrender of the fort; this was refused, but the officer was informed that the garrison could soon be starved out. At three o'clock the next morning the General notified Major Anderson that he should open fire one hour later, which he did. A house on Sullivan's Island, near Fort Moultrie, was now suddenly removed, revealing one more powerful battery in addition to those that menaced the fort from other sides. This battery commanded the barbette guns,

the largest in the work, the use of which had therefore to be given up.

Apparently the most intense secessionist present was Edmund Ruffin, a Virginian by birth, an agriculturist of high reputation, now sixty-seven years of age, who was serving in the Palmetto Guard. He claimed and received the privilege of firing the first gun, and the shot from the Cummings Point battery penetrated the wall of the fort and burst inside. Two months after the war ended in the destruction of the Confederacy, Ruffin committed suicide rather than live under the United States Government.

Major Anderson, not wishing to exhaust the energies of his little garrison or use up his ammunition too soon, paid no attention to the bombardment till all had had breakfast at the usual hour. Then the men were divided into firing parties, and Captain Abner Doubleday, in command of one of them, fired the first gun, which struck the Cummings Point battery. Others were commanded by Captains Seymour and Foster, Lieutenant Davis and Surgeon Crawford, and every serviceable gun was worked in reply to the attack. But while some of the Confederate batteries had powerful rifled guns, which could pierce the brick walls of the fort, and mortars that could send shells at a high angle to fall inside, the fort itself had none of equal power except the barbette columbiads, which could not be used because they were enfiladed from Fort Moultrie. An enthusiastic sergeant, disregarding orders, managed to steal away from his company, mounted to the parapet, and fired a shot from each of those guns. With a good aim these shots would have penetrated the iron casing of any of the hostile batteries; but in the midst of smoke, noise, and excitement the lone gunner

secured no such aim and effected nothing except alarming the enemy, who then concentrated a heavy fire upon those barbette guns.

All the while the besieged garrison looked for help from the fleet outside the bar, with which signals were exchanged. And though the walls were slowly crumbling under the incessant pounding, so that in one place two port-holes were knocked into one, and the door of the magazine had been jammed by a shot and could not be opened, still the battle was continued through the day, with no sign of surrender. Because of fire near the magazine, most of the powder had been taken out a little while before, when fifty barrels were carried into the casemates and the others were rolled down into the sea. One of these stopped directly under an embrasure, and when a shot from the enemy struck it an explosion followed that dismounted the gun above.

With still enough powder for a long continuance of the battle, the garrison was deprived of cartridges when the door of the magazine was jammed. At once there was a demand for any kind of cloth from which to make cartridge-bags, and all sorts of sacrifices were made to supply it, while at the same time it was discovered that there were but six needles in the fort. These were plied as rapidly as possible, and Major Anderson gave orders to reduce the rate of firing to one shot every five minutes.

Through the night of the 12th the Confederate mortars were discharged at regular intervals, but the guns were still. Early in the morning of the 13th the batteries all opened as before, and soon it was discovered that the mortars were throwing in red-hot shot, which set fire to the officers' quarters. Cisterns in the upper stories of these buildings were pierced by the shot,

which let down a deluge of water into the fire, not enough to extinguish it, but enough to make it burn slowly with great volumes of pungent smoke, which penetrated every part of the enclosure.

Then a small boat rowed by negroes approached and landed a man in citizen's dress, who carried a sword with a white flag flying from its point. He appeared at an embrasure and asked to be taken in at once; and a gunner, first receiving his sword, hauled him in. Major Anderson being called, the stranger announced that he was "Colonel Wigfall, of General Beauregard's staff" (Louis T. Wigfall, of Texas, who a year before had become United States Senator from that State). He was intensely excited, and exclaimed, "For God's sake, Major, let this thing stop. There has been enough bloodshed already." Anderson answered, "There has been none on my side, and your batteries are still firing on me." "I will soon stop that," said Wigfall, and he was about to wave his handkerchief out the embrasure, when Anderson reminded him that it was not likely to be seen unless displayed from the parapet. At Wigfall's request, a sheet from a hospital bed was hoisted on the parapet—not for surrender, but as a flag of truce during parley. Wigfall and Major Anderson then went into a bomb-proof for conference. The firing soon ceased, and presently another boat approached, containing several Confederate officers in full uniform, who asked whether the fort had surrendered. They were told that it had not, and they expressed indignation at Wigfall's assumption of authority. A consultation followed, and as a result the bombardment was suspended till General Beauregard could communicate with his government at Montgomery. By sunset an agreement was reached, and the

fort was to be surrendered next morning, the garrison to march out with the honours of war, salute their flag, and be sent to New York.

The surrender took place, as agreed, the next morning. No person within the fort had been injured by the bombardment, and it was officially reported that there were no casualties among the assailants. But when the garrison were firing a salute of fifty guns to the flag, by the premature discharge of a gun one gunner was killed and five were wounded. Anderson and his men marched out with colours flying and the band playing *Yankee Doodle*, and were taken on a transport to the *Baltic* outside the bar, which then steamed away to New York. They found that city gay with banners displayed in every street; in many instances officers and men were borne on the shoulders of enthusiastic crowds; and often when they attempted to make purchases at the stores the goods were delivered to them and payment was declined. The Chamber of Commerce voted a bronze medal to each officer and soldier. Major Anderson was made a Brigadier-General in the regular army and was assigned to duty in his own State, Kentucky.

While the capture of Fort Sumter was hailed as a triumph at the South, it roused and united the North in a single day. Eminent men of all classes, ignoring political differences, announced their determination to stand by the Union and do their utmost to strengthen the hands of the President, who the next day (April 15th) issued a proclamation declaring that in certain Southern States the laws of the United States were opposed by combinations too powerful to be suppressed by the ordinary course of judicial proceedings or by the powers vested in the marshals, and called for seventy-

five thousand volunteers, appealing "to all loyal citizens to favour, facilitate, and aid this effort to maintain the honour, integrity, and existence of our National Union and the perpetuity of popular government, and to redress wrongs already long enough endured." At the same time he called an extra session of Congress to meet on July 4th.

In response to the President's call for troops the governors of four slave States which had not seceded—Missouri, Kentucky, Tennessee, and Virginia—returned insulting refusals. Subsequently, Virginia and Tennessee seceded. Kentucky nominally maintained an attitude of neutrality, but ultimately there were Kentucky regiments in both armies.

The responses from the North, both official and individual, were remarkably unanimous and enthusiastic. The chief magistrates of most of the Northern States rendered prompt and efficient aid to the Union cause and became known familiarly as "war Governors." These included Buckingham of Connecticut, Yates of Illinois, Morton of Indiana, Morgan of New York, Dennison of Ohio, Curtin of Pennsylvania, Sprague of Rhode Island, Andrew of Massachusetts, and Randall of Wisconsin.

Nearly every city and village held a mass meeting, to pledge adherence to the Union and the Constitution and to take measures for enlisting volunteers. Many banks at once made liberal offers of funds; those of Boston resolved to lend the State ten per cent. of their combined capital, which at that time was nearly \$40,000,000. Business for a time was suspended in many towns, and committees of public safety were organized. The national flag was displayed everywhere—from State-houses, city-halls, hotels, colleges,

mercantile buildings, railway stations, private houses, newspaper offices, and the steeples of churches.

Then sprang up, on village greens and in court-house yards, innumerable tents; inside of each was a small table with writing materials, and two or three officers, while outside were displayed in large letters legends like these: "Recruiting here for the 13th Infantry," "Men wanted here for the 1st Cavalry," "Headquarters of Mack's Battery." And all day and far into the evening men were entering, one or two at a time, to add their signatures to the enlistment rolls. Passing through any street, at almost any hour of the day, might be seen a squad of men carrying a flag and keeping step to the music of fife and drum. Ere many days, schoolhouses were thrown open to be used as barracks, and in public halls and the session-rooms of churches were women busy with sewing-machines making outfits for the soldiers, while others were scraping lint and preparing bandages. And for weeks there were frequent "war meetings" in the evening, in halls, in large tents, in churches, or in the streets before any balcony that made a convenient speakers' stand. To these was addressed every kind of argument, sentiment, and exhortation, by every kind of orator, from the most experienced and polished speaker to the officer who was raising a regiment or a company and who would only stand up for a moment and say impressively, "I don't ask you to go—I ask you to come." All this was interspersed with singing of patriotic songs, *John Brown's Body*, with special stanzas added, being the favourite. The number of volunteers called for were soon offered three times over, and within a week after the fall of Sumter several regiments were on the way to Washington.

At the same time, President Davis called for 32,000 Confederate volunteers, and similar scenes were enacted at the South.

The Confederacy was formed by the cotton States alone. The effort to annex the border slave States failed in Maryland, Kentucky, and Missouri. The Virginia convention to consider the question voted against secession at first; but on April 17th, after the capture of Fort Sumter, it passed an ordinance to be submitted to the people on the last Thursday in May. Without waiting for the popular verdict, the governor at once turned over to the Confederacy all the military resources of the State, and a few days before the election the Confederate capital was removed from Montgomery to Richmond.

The First Battle of Bull Run

July 21, 1861

THE 75,000 volunteers that President Lincoln first called for were three-months men. On the 3d of May he called for 42,000 for three years' service, and 18,000 seamen for the navy, and authorized the addition of ten new regiments to the regular army. When Congress met, on July 4th, he asked for 400,000 men and \$400,000,000; and the answer was a bill authorizing him to raise 500,000 men and use \$500,000,000. Afterward the House of Representatives adopted a resolution, introduced by John A. McClernand, a Democrat, pledging any amount of money and any number of men that might be required to restore the authority of the National Government over the whole country.

The seat of the Confederate Government, meanwhile, had been removed from Montgomery, Alabama, to Richmond, Virginia, on the 20th of May, about a week before the people of Virginia voted to ratify the ordinance of secession.

The command of the National army devolved upon General Winfield Scott, the hero of the Mexican War of 1846-7, who had been made Lieutenant-General in 1855 and was now seventy-five years of age. With thousands of volunteers at Washington, and other

regiments in process of organization, the inquiry began to be urged, "Why does not the army do something?—and when will it move against the enemy?" The educated and experienced officers answered—when they answered at all—that a collection of volunteers, however large, though armed and uniformed, was not properly an army until drilled and disciplined. And to this the reply was that the troops of the Confederacy were equally raw. The reduction of Fort Sumter in April, and in June two small, unsuccessful actions in eastern Virginia—called the battles of Big Bethel and Vienna—touched the pride and aroused the impatience of the Northern people, and when they echoed the cry of "On to Richmond," uttered by certain newspapers, the authorities at Washington found themselves compelled to put it to the test.

At Manassas, about thirty miles south-west of Washington, the Manassas Gap Railroad, coming from the west, joins the Orange & Alexandria Railroad running north-east. This junction was an important point for military purposes, and here the Confederate Government placed a strong force commanded by General G. T. Beauregard, a graduate of West Point in the class of 1838.

General Beauregard's lieutenants were Generals Richard S. Ewell, James Longstreet, Thomas J. Jackson, Jubal Early, David R. Jones, Milledge Bonham, Philip Cocke, and Bernard E. Bee.

In May, a force of National troops commanded by General Joseph K. F. Mansfield had crossed the Potomac and taken possession of Arlington Heights, beginning a cordon of defences that finally was made very strong. But for the grand movement now planned, as Mansfield was fifty-eight years of age, it was con-

sidered better to give the command to a younger officer. Major Irvin McDowell, who had been a classmate of Beauregard's at West Point, was promoted to Brigadier-General and placed in command, with headquarters in Alexandria.

The army was organized in five divisions, commanded by Generals Daniel Tyler, David Hunter, Samuel P. Heintzelman, Theodore Runyon, and Dixon S. Miles. Among the subordinate commanders were several that afterward rose to eminence in the service. These included William T. Sherman, Erasmus D. Keyes, Albert H. Terry, Israel B. Richardson, Henry J. Hunt, Henry W. Slocum, George Sykes, Charles Griffin, Ambrose E. Burnside, William B. Franklin, Oliver O. Howard, Adolph Von Steinwehr, James B. Ricketts, and John C. Tidball.

General Beauregard, seeing that it would be much easier to hold a natural line of defence along Bull Run than to construct earthworks around the junction, moved forward about three miles and placed strong guards at five fords of that stream. His line extended from the crossing of the Alexandria Railroad to that of the Warrenton turnpike, eight miles. He had about 22,000 men. General McDowell commanded, in all, about 30,000. In the Shenandoah Valley were 10,000 Confederate troops commanded by General Joseph E. Johnston, and 16,000 National troops commanded by General Robert Patterson.

The plan of attack, as arranged by General Scott, was for McDowell, feigning against the left (or western) wing of Beauregard, to strike his right wing with a heavy force. This was correct on general principles, because there lay the direct route toward Richmond, and if Beauregard's right wing were turned he would be

cut off from his base. But developments changed that plan. McDowell's only fear was that Johnston's forces might be united with Beauregard's in time to join in the battle. Scott told him that Patterson had been ordered to hold Johnston where he was, and that, if Johnston should slip away, he would have Patterson on his heels. McDowell was obliged to accept these assurances from his superior, but he appears to have been still apprehensive.

The army began its march July 16th. McDowell, a trained soldier, expressed his annoyance at the conduct of his volunteers, who could not be prevented from falling out of the ranks to pick berries and get drinks of water. It was true that they were largely ignorant of discipline on the march; but they were not lacking in courage, they were there to fight, and when the battle was joined they stood to it manfully. The Fifth Division was left in reserve at Centreville, and the Fourth Division did not reach the field.


As Bull Run was approached, on the 18th, Tyler was ordered to reconnoitre toward the Confederate right wing. He exceeded his orders, and brought on a considerable engagement at Blackburn's Ford, losing eighty-three men, while the enemy lost sixty-eight. The reconnoissance revealed the fact that the ground was not favourable for a turning movement on that wing; and this, together with another important consideration, determined McDowell to change the plan of battle and attack the left wing in force. He never had had any confidence in Patterson, and he feared that Johnston would slip away and join Beauregard. If he could envelop Beauregard's left wing, he could place his army between them. And this he might have done if he had moved promptly the very next day, the 19th.

But on the 20th, Johnston, with the greater part of his force, did join Beauregard, unknown to McDowell. The cars that brought them down were sent back, and then, Johnston complained, the train hands immediately scattered to their homes, so that the rest of the force could not be transported to the battlefield till the next day, which was Sunday.

Then, and for a long time afterward, Washington was full of Confederate spies, some of whom never could be detected; and not a move could be made or planned without information of it being transmitted at once to the enemy. Both Confederate commanders on this field were fully apprised of McDowell's plans, and conducted their operations accordingly. If Johnston had moved at once to join Beauregard, Patterson, finding him gone, might then have made a counter move by joining his force to McDowell's. But Johnston waited till McDowell had advanced so far that the battle must take place soon, and then rushed his troops by rail down through Manassas Gap.

The 19th and 20th served McDowell to bring up his provision trains and supply the men, and at the same time to make a careful study of the field. Beauregard appears to have been equally dilatory. On the 21st he planned to attack McDowell's left, but found that his own left was attacked in force. Hurrying reinforcements to that wing and his centre, he met the onset, and there the battle was fought.

John A. Logan, a member of Congress from Illinois, who had served in the Mexican War, left his seat in the capitol, obtained a musket, and joined the army as a private. Afterward he rose to high rank in the service. Another member of Congress called on General Scott to ask for information concerning the army and for a pass



AT 504
JUN 19 1961

to follow in a carriage and see the battle. Scott, while refusing specific information, assured him that McDowell had men enough and would be victorious. With this information and a pass he and several others, in carriages and on horseback, followed the troops.


The Confederate army occupied a plateau on the right or south bank of Bull Run, where it makes a bend to the north. In the night of the 20th the brigades of Porter, Franklin, Burnside, and Willcox, with the batteries of Griffin, Ricketts, and Arnold, made a long detour, crossed the stream near Sudley Mineral Springs, and in the morning came in against the enemy's left. Meanwhile, Tyler's division was marched directly, on the left bank, to a point facing the plateau, and about noon crossed by an obscure ford which General Sherman had discovered, and attacked the Confederates in front. The fiercest fighting was around the house of a farmer named Henry, which stood on a small hill near the Warrenton turnpike. This road, beginning at Centreville, where McDowell had his base, runs almost in a straight line south-west, through the battlefield.

Beauregard, in his account of the battle, writes:

General Johnston and I set out at full speed for the point of conflict. We arrived there just as Bee's troops after giving way were fleeing in disorder behind the height in rear of the stone bridge. They had come around between the base of the hill and the stone bridge into a hollow ravine which ran up to a point on the crest where Jackson had already formed his brigade along the edge of the woods. We found the commanders resolutely stemming the further flight of the routed forces, but vainly endeavouring to restore order, and our own efforts were as futile. Every segment of line we succeeded in forming was again dissolved

while another was being formed; more than two thousand men were shouting each some suggestion to his neighbour, their voices mingling with the noise of the shells hurtling through the trees overhead, and all word of command drowned in the confusion and uproar. It was at this moment that General Bee used the famous expression, "Look at Jackson's brigade! it stands there like a stone wall"—a name that passed from the brigade to its immortal commander. The disorder seemed irretrievable, but happily the thought came to me that if their colours were planted out to the front the men might rally on them, and I gave the order to carry the standards forward some forty yards, which was promptly executed by the regimental officers, thus drawing the common eye of the troops. They now received easily the orders to advance and form on the line of their colours, which they obeyed with a general movement; and as General Johnston and myself rode forward shortly after with the colours of the 4th Alabama by our side, the line that had fought all morning and had fled routed and disordered, now advanced again into position as steadily as veterans. The 4th Alabama had previously lost all its field officers. . . . We had come none too soon, as the enemy's forces, flushed with the belief of accomplished victory, were already advancing across the valley of Young's Branch and up the slope, where they had encountered for a while the fire of the Hampton Legion, which had been led forward toward the Robinson house and the turnpike in front, covering the retreat and helping materially to check the panic of Bee's routed forces.

Looking anxiously for reinforcements from the Shenandoah Valley, and meantime drawing some from his extreme right flank, Beauregard formed a strong line of his centre and left, to meet a new attack. He had there 6500 men and thirteen guns, and the expected onset of the Federals came very soon. They



BULL RUN **TROOP POSITIONS** **JULY 20-1861** **EVENING**

- FEDERAL
- CONFEDERATE

[illegible]

captured the Henry house position and another designated as the Robinson house, while the batteries of Ricketts and Griffin were pushed forward by the deep cut of the Sudley road and placed where they played with deadly effect on the Confederate lines, and three other batteries, on high ground, threw in an additional shower of shells. Five Confederate batteries, on the eastern rim of the plateau, played similarly against the Federal columns as they advanced.

The character of the fighting at this time is illustrated by an incident. A Federal battery was pushed forward to enfilade the Confederate lines, when a part of a Virginia regiment sprang forward and captured the guns, but were almost immediately driven away from them by a deadly fire of musketry.

There was another thrilling episode when Ricketts's battery, doing rapid and effective work, was approached by an unknown regiment that marched straight toward it. The guns were trained on it and in a minute would have decimated its ranks with canister, when the chief of artillery ordered the fire withheld, saying that the regiment was coming to support the battery. The real supports had just been driven over the brow of the hill; and very soon the advancing regiment, discovered too late to be Confederate, fired a volley that disabled the battery, then charged on a run, beat down the battery men, and captured the guns. Captain Ricketts and Lieutenant Ramsay lay in the midst of the wreckage, the former sorely wounded, and the latter dead. Griffin's battery, which had been doing similar work, met a similar fate. But the contest of the infantry continued with increasing intensity.

The Confederate commander now organized a grand charge with the troops of Bee, Bartow, Evans, Hampton,

and Jackson, and succeeded in driving his opponent from the open surface of the plateau. But, reënforced by Howard's brigade, the Federals soon pushed up the slope again, taking advantage of several small ravines that cut it and of numerous clumps of young trees, pressed back the Confederate lines, regained the ground and the guns they had lost, and once more held the Henry and Robinson houses. Continuing their movement, Beauregard says they were "urged forward by their commanders with conspicuous gallantry." Now finding that both his flanks were overlapped, or soon would be, and still momentarily expecting his last reënforcements, he ordered a charge by his entire battle line, including the reserves, whom he led personally. This swept back the enemy in the immediate front and cleared the plateau, leaving in the hands of the Confederates the positions about the Henry and Robinson houses and all that remained of the batteries of Ricketts and Griffin. The artillerymen had stood to their guns until most of them were shot down, and their wounded commanders were lying under the wrecks. In this conflict, near the Henry house, Generals Bee and Bartow and Colonel Fisher were killed, and on the Federal side Colonel James Cameron (brother of the Secretary of War).

The extreme right of the Federal line, undisturbed by this charge, occupied a good position on a small plateau at the angle of the turnpike and the Sudley road. The force here was Howard's brigade of Heintzelman's division, with other troops. Reënforcements brought up from Manassas were now launched against these in a frontal attack, and very soon the remainder of Johnston's troops, just arrived by rail from the valley, were thrown against the flank. Howard's men then

necessarily gave way, and presently the whole line was in retreat, the retreat became a rout, and there was a panic and a wild, disordered flight.

Just what started the panic is uncertain. General Sherman, in his official report, says of the battle in his front:

The New York 79th was ordered to cross the brow of the hill and drive the enemy from cover. It was impossible to get a good view of this ground. One battery poured an incessant fire upon our advancing column, and the fire of rifles and musketry was very severe. The 79th, headed by Colonel Cameron, charged across the hill, and for a short time the contest was severe. They rallied several times under fire, but finally broke, and gained the cover of the hill.

This left the field open to the New York 69th, Colonel Corcoran, who, in his turn, led his regiment over the crest. The fire was very severe, and the roar of cannon, musketry, and rifles was incessant. The 69th held the ground for some time, but finally fell back in disorder. All this time the 13th New York occupied another ridge, to our left, overlooking the same field of action, and was similarly engaged. Here, about half past three P.M., began the scene of confusion and disorder that characterized the remainder of the day. [According to General Beauregard, it was "about three o'clock" when he received his last reinforcements and threw them against the Federal right.]

Up to that time all had kept their places and seemed perfectly cool, used to the shot and shell that fell comparatively harmless around us. But the short exposure to an intense fire of small arms, at close range, had killed many, wounded more, and had produced disorder in all the battalions that had attempted to encounter it. Men fell away from their ranks, talking and in great confusion.

We succeeded in partially re-forming the regiments, but

it was manifest that they would not stand. General McDowell used all possible efforts to reassure the men, and by the active exertions of Colonel Corcoran we formed an irregular square against the cavalry which were then seen to issue from the position from which we had been driven. We began our retreat by the same ford by which we had approached the field of battle. There was no positive order to retreat, although for an hour it had been going on by the operation of the men themselves. . . . About nine o'clock at night I received from General Tyler the order to continue the retreat to the Potomac. This retreat was disorderly in the extreme. I reached this point at noon the next day and found a miscellaneous crowd crossing over the aqueduct and ferries. I at once commanded the guard to be increased, and all persons attempting to pass over to be stopped. This soon produced its effect; men sought their proper companies and regiments, comparative order was restored, and all were posted to the best advantage.

In the retreat Colonel Michael Corcoran, wounded, was captured, as were also Congressman Alfred Ely and some other civilians, all of whom were hurried to Richmond and confined in Libby prison. A large number of soldiers and subaltern officers had got by before General Sherman strengthened the guard, and the next day were in Washington. Many of them, having enlisted for three months, assumed that they were at liberty to return to their homes, as their time had expired.

This battle was written up and commented upon as no battle ever had been before, and very few since; and in the popular accounts hardly more than one side of its story was told. President Davis, riding to the field half an hour after the battle, saw such a stream of Confederate fugitives that he supposed the day had gone against them. "Battles are not won," he said,

"where two or three unhurt men are seen leading away one that is wounded." General Grant remarks that a position among the stragglers and fugitives in the rear of an army is not a very good place to learn what is going on at the front.

General Sherman says: "It was one of the best-planned battles of the war, but one of the worst-fought." General Johnston agrees with this and in a short passage gives the explanation. He says:

If the tactics of the Federals had been equal to their strategy, we should have been beaten. If, instead of being brought into action in detail, their troops had been formed in two lines, with a proper reserve, and had assailed Bee and Jackson in that order, the two Southern brigades must have been swept from the field in a few minutes, or enveloped. General McDowell would have made such a formation, probably, had he not greatly underestimated the strength of his enemy.

And he adds:

The Confederate army was more disorganized by victory than that of the United States by defeat. . . . Many, in ignorance of their military obligations, left the army—not to return. . . . Exaggerated ideas of the victory, prevailing among our troops, cost us more than the Federal army lost by defeat.

The most serious damage to the Union cause arose from the reports of European newspaper correspondents, who, coming with strong prejudice (if not positive instructions) against the Republic, made their readers believe that the battle of Bull Run proved conclusively the ingrained cowardice and incompetence of the men of the North, and the surpassing skill and valour of

those of the South. The impression thus produced was hardly diminished by the victories, within the next nine months, of Farragut at New Orleans and Grant at Fort Donelson; and Confederate bonds to a large amount were readily sold in England and France.

But perhaps those correspondents were not much more to be blamed than some of our most eminent men, who, in the first surprise and humiliation of defeat, wrote letters that afterward they would have been glad to suppress. Edwin M. Stanton, who next year became the most energetic and efficient Secretary of War, wrote to General Dix:

No one can imagine the deplorable condition of this city and the hazard of the Government, who did not witness the weakness and panic of the Administration and the painful imbecility of Lincoln.

General Dix himself, whose famous dispatch six months before had sounded the thrilling keynote of the war, was about to resign because of a personal grievance against the War Department. And Horace Greeley, who had originated the cry "On to Richmond!" and kept that headline standing in his *Tribune*, wrote to President Lincoln a long letter conceived in abject panic, in which he said:

This is my seventh sleepless night—yours, too, doubtless—yet I think I shall not die, because I have no right to die. I must struggle to live, however bitterly. You are not considered a great man, and I am a hopelessly broken one. If the rebels cannot be beaten—if our recent disaster is fatal—do not fear to sacrifice yourself to your country. . . . If it is best for the country and for mankind that we make peace with the rebels at once and on their own terms, do not shrink even from that. . . . I do not consider myself at

present a judge of anything but the public sentiment. That seems to me everywhere gathering and deepening against a prosecution of the war.

The wave of despair which Mr. Greeley imagined was surging through the country appears to have passed by President Lincoln, for he at once set about constructing a plan for future military movements, which he carefully considered and then committed to paper. In its general scope it bears a remarkable likeness to that which General Grant formulated when he took command of all the armies in the spring of 1864, and which finally crushed the rebellion. It was true, as Mr. Greeley wrote, that the defeat and panic at Bull Run gave the whole North a humiliating surprise; but the quickly succeeding second thought might be considered as spoken for them all by the Rev. Henry Cox, who was preaching at a camp-meeting in Illinois when news of the battle reached him. He closed his sermon with the words: "Brethren, we'd better adjourn this camp-meeting, and go home and drill."

The Conquest of the Coast


August, 1861—April, 1862

THE enterprise of blockading the coast of the Southern States, to shut off their foreign trade, presented varied problems. An isolated harbour could be blockaded effectively by a few war-ships stationed just outside. But a glance at the map of North Carolina shows that, because of its extensive sounds and their numerous inlets, something different was required.

Late in August, 1861, an expedition sailed from Fort Monroe for Hatteras Inlet, which is about fifteen miles beyond Cape Hatteras. There were seven war-vessels, carrying 143 guns, and three transports carrying troops to the number of about nine hundred. Flag-Officer Silas H. Stringham commanded the fleet, and Major-General Benjamin F. Butler the troops. The Inlet was defended by Forts Clark and Hatteras.

The expedition passed without accident around the dangerous Cape Hatteras, and on the 28th began bombarding the forts. At the same time, attempts were made to land troops through the surf; but the breakers overturned the boats and smashed them, and only three hundred men succeeded in getting ashore. Then a different scheme was tried. Two hulks had been towed down with the fleet, and these were filled with men, and then dropping an anchor off shore, and

NAVY
CHART NO. 114



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attaching the end of the cable to a windlass on board, they were allowed to drift toward the land. The plan was to keep the cable just taut enough to prevent the vessel from turning sidewise, that it might go head-on through the breakers. But a fresh east wind sprang up, and the breakers became so rough that the hulks were in imminent peril of destruction. Finally, with great difficulty, they were towed off.

The bombardment was resumed the next morning, and at noon Fort Hatteras surrendered. The commander, Samuel Barron, of the Confederate navy, said in his report:

After some practice they got the exact range of the nine-, ten-, and eleven-inch guns, and did not find it necessary to alter their positions, while not a shot from our battery reached them with the greatest elevation we could get. This state of things—shells bursting over and in the fort every few seconds—having continued for about three hours, the men were directed to take shelter under the parapet and traverses, and I called a council of officers, at which it was unanimously agreed that holding out longer could only result in a greater loss of life.

The troops that had been landed captured Fort Clark. The surrender of the forts included nearly seven hundred men, thirty-five guns, and one thousand stand of arms, and gave control of the best inlet for entrance to the sounds. In this action, for the first time, the bombarding ships were kept continually in motion, sailing round in an ellipse and delivering their fire accurately at the stationary enemy. And this plan was followed in later actions of a similar nature. The forts were garrisoned from the fleet, the force being commanded by Colonel Rush C. Hawkins, and three ships were left on the station.

These waters were too important for the Confederate authorities to give them up easily, and immediately they began operations to retrieve or offset the loss of that inlet and its commanding forts. They placed obstructions in the Neuse and Pamlico Rivers, strengthened Fort Macon near Beaufort, planned to destroy the lighthouse at Hatteras Inlet, and began the construction of strong fortifications on Roanoke Island. This island was historic and romantic ground. Here, two hundred and seventy years before, Sir Walter Raleigh had made the earliest attempts at establishing English colonies in America, and the disappearance of one of them is among the unsolved mysteries.

Colonel Hawkins represented the state of affairs to the Cabinet at Washington, and about the same time Generals Burnside and McClellan conceived and elaborated a plan for practically controlling all strategic points on the Carolina coast and holding possession of the inland waters. General Burnside describes it briefly as

To organize a division of twelve thousand to fifteen thousand men, mainly from States bordering on the northern seacoast, many of whom would be familiar with the coasting trade, and among whom would be found a goodly number of mechanics; and to fit out a fleet of light-draft steamers, sailing-vessels, and barges, large enough to transport the division, its armament and supplies, so that it could be rapidly thrown from point to point on the coast, with a view to establishing lodgments, landing troops, penetrating into the interior, and threatening lines of transportation.

The fleet was fitted out at New York, and the troops were concentrated at Annapolis. The naval part of

the expedition was commanded by Flag-Officer Louis M. Goldsborough, and the military by General Burnside, whose lieutenants were Generals Reno, Parke, and Foster. There were more than eighty vessels, all told, and they included every kind of craft—large passenger steamers, coasting schooners, ferry-boats, tugs, and transports. Some of them were fitted with water-tight compartments, strengthened with heavy planks, and protected with bags of sand, so that they could mount a few guns. They carried coal, water, lumber, tools, quartermasters' stores, and every kind of supplies.

The transports went to Annapolis harbour to take on the troops, and on the 10th of January, 1862, the whole expedition rendezvoused at Fort Monroe. Twenty-four hours later they sailed, under sealed orders. Except the commanders, not a man in the fleet knew where they were bound; and apparently for once transmission of the secret to the enemy was prevented. It is related that a man of some public prominence went to the President and demanded that he be told where the expedition was going. After vain attempts to put him off politely, Mr. Lincoln said: "I will tell you in strict confidence where it is going, if you will promise not to speak of it to any one." The man readily promised, and then the President said: "Well, now, my friend, the expedition is going to sea."

The destination was Hatteras Inlet. The weather was threatening at the start, and on reaching Cape Hatteras the fleet was struck by a storm that scattered the vessels so that hardly any two remained in sight of each other; and when again they came in sight the sea was so rough that it was not safe for them to draw very near together. Most of the deck loads had been swept overboard. On the 13th they arrived off Hatteras

Inlet, and a tug came out to pilot them over the bar. One after another the vessels went in; but the *City of New York*, one of the large propellers, loaded with supplies, grounded on the bar and was pounded to pieces by the breakers. Her officers and crew were obliged to take refuge in the rigging, and the next day they were rescued by surf-boats. A troop ship also grounded, but with great labour she was pulled over the bar into the harbour. A vessel that carried a hundred horses was lost, and another was sunk after crossing the bar. Several ships that drew too much water to cross were anchored outside. In these laborious and dangerous operations, the only lives lost were those of two officers who were in a boat that was overturned in the breakers. The vessels carrying coal and water had been driven out to sea.

Between the Inlet and the Sound there was another bar, on which the water was not deep enough for most of the vessels. Thereupon a channel was dredged by an ingenious method. The tide made a swift current across the bar; and when it was running out some of the large vessels were driven upon it under full steam, while small ones carried the anchors ahead and dropped them. This held the vessels in position, while the current washed away the sand from under them and thus set them afloat. Then they were pushed farther and anchored again, and the operation was repeated. This work was kept up for some days, until a broad channel was opened, deep enough for the fleet, which then passed into the Sound.

This passage was completed on February 4th, and the fleet moved up the Sound, to attack the enemy on the west side of Roanoke Island. There were forts on the shore, and the channel was obstructed by sunken

vessels and a row of piles, behind which lay the fleet of Confederate gunboats. The battle began in the forenoon and lasted all day, sustained only by the fleet. The bombardment damaged the Confederate fleet, causing a loss of one vessel, and drove it away; but the forts were not seriously injured. The transports had anchored three miles below, and in the afternoon seventy-five hundred troops were landed, together with a battery. This force marched the next morning and came first upon a small earthwork mounting three guns, which was protected on each side by a swamp and in front by a field of deep mud partly covered with fallen trees.

Foster and Reno with their brigades moved promptly to the attack, and the latter managed to get through a part of the swamp and obtain a favourable position on the enemy's right; while Foster, making a demonstration in front with two regiments, worked around toward the Confederate left with three others, came upon a battalion, and drove it inside the fort. Two hours later Parke came up and joined the force that was attacking the left. Colonel Hawkins, who commanded a Zouave regiment, writes:

Nearly two companies had succeeded in getting into the clearing immediately in front of the earthwork, where the mud was more than ankle deep, and where they were receiving the undivided attention of the enemy's three pieces of artillery, and getting a shot now and then from the infantry. At this point Colonel Monteil was killed. Seeing that it would be almost impossible to get through the deep mud, I made up my mind to face to the front and make an effort to charge the work, and I ordered my bugler to sound the charge. At that moment I heard a great cheer down the line, and, looking in that direction, discovered that Major

Kimball had broken the regiment in two parts and was heading the left companies in a direct charge up a causeway running through the centre of the field of fallen timber directly to the sally-port covered by a twenty-four-pound howitzer. Soon the right companies joined, and all entered the work pellmell together. As the column advanced, the men crowded one another from the causeway, and soon the whole front of the work was covered with an animated sea of red fezzes. The regiments that were sent around to out-flank the enemy's left arrived at their objective point about the time the decisive charge was made and were entitled to a fair share of credit for the successful day's work.

The Confederates, pursued promptly and rapidly by Reno and Foster, reached the extreme northern point of the island and there surrendered unconditionally. At the same time, Hawkins's command, moving rapidly to the eastern shore of the island, captured two boatloads of Confederates who were trying to escape.

The result of these operations gave the National forces complete possession of Roanoke Island, with thirty-two heavy guns and captives numbering about twenty-seven hundred. General Henry A. Wise commanded the Confederate troops on the island, but at the time of the battle he was ill on the opposite shore. He complained bitterly that the defeat was due to the fact that he was not sustained by his superior who commanded the department.

Commodore William F. Lynch, commander of the "mosquito fleet," as the Confederate gunboats were called, blew up a fort on the main land, burned his largest vessel, and then retired up Pasquotank River to Elizabeth City. Commander Stephen C. Rowan, with the National flotilla, quickly followed him, gave

battle, and very soon destroyed or captured five of the six vessels and commanded Elizabeth City. Two days afterward Edenton, on Chowan River, was captured.

Attention was now turned southward toward New Berne, on Neuse River. Three regiments were left to hold Roanoke Island, and the remainder of the forces, with the fleet, gathered at Hatteras Inlet and on the morning of March 12th sailed for New Berne. Evening found them in the river, sixteen miles below the city. Next morning the woods were shelled, and then the troops were put ashore. For some there were boats, but many impatiently jumped overboard and through water and mud waded to the land. There were thirteen regiments and eight guns.

They found that the Confederates had constructed a succession of intrenchments, one line behind another, across the peninsula from the river to and across the railroad about a mile, the last one being within three miles of the city. They mounted forty heavy guns, and there were twenty field guns besides. The defenders numbered nearly eight thousand and were commanded by Brigadier-General Lawrence O'B. Branch. The channel of the river, near the city, was obstructed by sunken vessels and a double row of piles.

The march began at one o'clock, the vessels proceeding up the river abreast of the troops. General Burnside writes:

The rain began to fall, and the road became almost impassable. No ammunition could be carried, except what the men themselves could carry. No artillery could be taken, except the small howitzers, which were hauled by the troops with drag-ropes. This was one of the most disagreeable and difficult marches that I witnessed during the war. We came in contact with the enemy's pickets just before

dark, when it was decided to delay the attack until morning. That night a most dreary bivouac followed. Early the next morning, notwithstanding the fog, the disposition for the attack was made. General Foster was ordered to engage the enemy on the right, General Reno to pass around on the extreme left, and General Parke to occupy the centre. We were much nearer to the enemy than we expected, and were soon in contact with them. General Foster rapidly closed with them, and met with severe resistance. He asked for reinforcements, but was told that every man had been ordered into action, and that there were no reserves. The contest was sharp but brief. The 4th Rhode Island broke the enemy's line near where it crossed the railroad, after which the enemy wavered, and a general advance of the whole line placed us in possession of the works. The enemy fled to New Berne, burning the bridge behind them. Our troops rapidly pursued, but the fact that they had to cross the river in boats prevented them from capturing the main body of the enemy. As it was, large numbers of prisoners and munitions fell into our hands.

In the mean time, despite the obstructions in the channel, the vessels ascended the river, and assisted the crossing, so that the city was occupied on the 14th. The National army had lost 370 men killed or wounded; the Confederate loss was about 580, including 300 prisoners.

The retreating Confederates destroyed the bridges and set fire to the town. The incoming troops assisted the citizens to subdue the flames, and General Burnside established a temporary government. To protect the city from attack on the land side, a fortification was constructed from river to river, and a part of the railroad to Goldsboro was destroyed.

The final task of this expedition was to capture Fort Macon, which defended the channel leading into the

harbour of Beaufort, N. C. That is about forty miles south of New Berne, and there is no other important entrance between it and the mouth of Cape Fear River, which is the gate to Wilmington harbour.

Fort Macon was garrisoned by five hundred men and mounted sixty-seven guns. General Parke commanded the attacking force. In the week beginning March 18th he occupied several points around the fort, including Carolina City, Morehead City, Newport, and Beaufort—all without loss; and a demand for surrender of the fort being refused, preparations were made for a siege. The fort was on the point of Bogue Island, which is a part of that long, narrow stretch of land that divides the sounds from the ocean.

A force was landed on the island, in the rear of the fort, where the sand-hills formed a natural protection to the men who worked night and day constructing approaches. At the end of a month the works were complete, a blockading fleet was in front, and thus the garrison were completely isolated; but still surrender was refused. The batteries of the besiegers consisted of eight heavy mortars and three rifled guns, and bombardment was begun on the morning of April 25th. With the assistance of men from the signal corps, the gunners got the range, and with a steady and accurate fire the walls were breached, many guns were dismounted, and large numbers of shells were dropped into the fort in the course of the day. No aid was received from the fleet, as a gale had sprung up and made it necessary for the ships to go out to sea. The next morning the fort was surrendered, and the garrison marched out under honourable terms. The entire loss, both within and without the fort, was but thirty-four men killed or wounded.

A much larger expedition than those just described sailed from Hampton Roads late in October, 1861. It consisted of more than fifty vessels of all kinds, from frigates to schooners, and carried twenty-two thousand men. The troops were commanded by General Thomas W. Sherman, and the fleet by Flag-Officer Samuel F. DuPont. Two months had been spent in its preparation, and every precaution for secrecy was observed; but as usual somebody obtained information as to its destination, which was at once forwarded to the Confederate authorities.

Several places in South Carolina were considered, and the decision was to send it against Port Royal, about fifty miles below Charleston. As soon as it sailed the Confederate Secretary of War telegraphed to the Governor of South Carolina to be prepared for it, and the commanders of the protecting forts were warned. These works were at the mouth of Port Royal Sound, about two and a half miles apart. Fort Walker was on Hilton Head, on the south side, and Fort Beauregard on St. Helena Island, on the north. They were garrisoned by South Carolina troops, commanded by Generals Ripley and Drayton.

When the fleet was fairly at sea a furious gale sprang up, and the vessels were widely scattered. One transport was wrecked, with a loss of seven men, and one storeship also was lost. One transport threw over her cargo, and one gunboat a part of her battery. When the storm was over, one gunboat was the only vessel that could be seen from the flagship. But the fleet gradually drew together again, and was joined by several of the frigates that were on blockading duty off Charleston.

Two gunboats had made soundings, under fire, and

ascertained the location of the bar and the depth of water. On the morning of November 7th, the sea was quiet, and the ships moved in to their work. Ten, led by the flagship *Wabash*, attacked Fort Walker on Hilton Head, while four were ordered to sail in to attack the Confederate vessels, firing upon Fort Beauregard as they passed.

The main column, about a ship's length apart, approached within eight hundred yards of Fort Walker, moved steadily at the rate of six miles an hour, and delivered an effective fire of shells and rifled shot. When it had passed, it turned and steamed back, now within six hundred yards, and delivered its fire from the other side. In this way it sailed three times round a long ellipse, and at every turn the fort was under fire twenty minutes. Then the *Bienville*, which was commanded by Captain Charles Steedman, sailed in still closer and delivered a fire that dismounted several guns, while at the same time three gunboats enfiladed the work, and the flagship stopped within short range and fired steadily. Every gun in the fort had been worked as rapidly as possible, and as long as possible; but the end of endurance was reached, and the lookout at the masthead reported that the garrison were leaving the fort and running away across Hilton Head. A flag of truce was sent ashore, but there was no one to receive it, and the National colours were hoisted over the abandoned work. When the commander of Fort Beauregard saw this, he also fled with his garrison. The Confederate vessels had run up a shallow inlet and escaped.

The fleet had lost eight men killed and twenty-three wounded. The commander of the Confederate forces reported a loss of eleven killed and fifty-two wounded.

But General Sherman reported finding evidence of a much greater loss, and that the road across Hilton Head was strewn with accoutrements, muskets, and howitzers. The surgeon of the fort was killed by a shell and buried by a falling parapet.

The troops were put ashore to take possession of the forts, which they repaired and strengthened and formed an intrenched camp, for permanent occupation.

The Capture of Forts Henry and Donelson

February, 1862


KENTUCKY'S refusal to secede, although it was a slave State, deprived the Confederacy of what should have been its natural boundary and line of defence, the Ohio River. This made it necessary to establish an artificial line along the boundary between that State and Tennessee. In pursuance of such purpose, Confederate forces were placed at Columbus on the Mississippi, at the Tennessee River (Fort Henry), at the Cumberland River (Fort Donelson), at Bowling Green, at Mill Springs, and at Paintsville on the Big Sandy River.

January 9, 1862, a National force commanded by Colonel James A. Garfield defeated the force at Paintsville, routed it, pursued it, and scattered it. Ten days later there was a more serious engagement at Mill Springs, where the force led by General George H. Thomas completely defeated the Confederates under General George B. Crittenden, driving them away and capturing their guns and stores. Here the loss on the National side was 250; on the Confederate, 470.

The most important posts remained—Forts Henry and Donelson, commanding the two great rivers; and early in February a force commanded by Brigadier-General Ulysses S. Grant marched against these. General Henry W. Halleck commanded the department,

and it was with some difficulty that Grant obtained permission to undertake the enterprise. He was assisted by a fleet of four ironclads and two wooden gunboats, commanded by Flag-Officer Andrew Hull Foote.

Fort Henry was on the east side of the Tennessee, near the State line, and eleven miles east of it stood Fort Donelson on the western bank of the Cumberland. Each of these works had an intrenched camp that extended about two miles from the fort. Opposite Fort Henry, on higher ground, was Fort Heiman, but this was evacuated before the fighting began. Grant with seventeen thousand troops and Foote with his fleet moved on Fort Henry and on the 6th attacked it. The fleet bombarded effectively, receiving many shots in return, but only one that was serious; this penetrated the boiler of the *Essex*, and in exploding killed or wounded forty-eight men. The fire from the fleet dismounted seven of the eleven guns, shot away the flagstaff, and did so much damage to the defences that the commander, General Lloyd Tilghman, sent over to Fort Donelson all his men except one hundred, with whom he remained and kept up a show of defence. Grant's forces had been delayed by bad roads and high water in the streams, so that when they arrived the work had been accomplished by the fleet, and Grant had only to accept Tilghman's surrender. The casualties in the fort numbered only about twenty, and about twenty-five hundred men had been sent from it to Donelson. To Donelson, also, had come General Simon B. Buckner with his force from Bowling Green as soon as he knew of Thomas's victory at Mill Springs. This made the total number of men in the fort about twenty-one thousand.



Capture of Forts Henry and Donelson 57

As soon as Fort Henry was in his possession General Grant prepared for a movement against Fort Donelson, first making a careful reconnoissance on the 7th.

That morning a group of students at a certain college were reading the news on the bulletin-board, when two or three of them said: "It isn't much of a victory; he has the empty fort, but nearly all the garrison got away." One of the professors, looking over their shoulders and hearing the remarks, said: "Young gentlemen, you needn't be troubled. I know that Grant—was with him at West Point. He is a determined fellow; and he will never let go till he gets them."

Donelson was commanded by General John B. Floyd, who had been Secretary of War in President Buchanan's Cabinet, and next him in rank were General Gideon J. Pillow and General Buckner.

Heavy rains and the necessity of waiting for reinforcements and for the arrival of the fleet made a delay of several days. Foote steamed down the Tennessee, through the Ohio to the mouth of the Cumberland, and up that stream to a position within reach of the fort, conveying transports that brought a part of the reinforcements. Grant's total force was now about twenty-seven thousand. An important element in the operation was his estimate of the Confederate commanders. He says:

I had known General Pillow in Mexico, and judged that, with any force, no matter how small, I could march up to within gunshot of any intrenchments he was given to hold. I said this to the officers of my staff at the time. I knew that Floyd was in command, but he was no soldier, and I judged that he would yield to Pillow's pretensions. I met, as I expected, no opposition in making the reconnoissance, and, besides learning the topography of the country on the way

and around Fort Donelson, found that there were two roads available for marching—one leading to the village of Dover, the other to Donelson.

The fort covered about a hundred acres, and on the north was protected by Hickman's Creek, now swollen by heavy rains, while the outworks extended around Dover, which was two miles south of the fort. There were batteries on the high ground within the fort, and also powerful batteries where places had been dug for them in the bluff, not much above the level of the water. The northerly part of the lines was well protected with abatis made from felled trees along the banks of a ravine, and throughout there were carefully prepared rifle-pits.

Grant's troops, as he brought them up and invested the fort, were in three divisions. The first, commanded by General John A. McClelland, held the right or southern end of the line and enveloped the village. The second, commanded by General Charles F. Smith, held the left; and the third, commanded by General Lew Wallace, was in the centre.

General Grant writes:

The troops were not intrenched, but the nature of the ground was such that they were just as well protected from the fire of the enemy as if rifle-pits had been thrown up. Our line was generally along the crest of the ridges. The artillery was protected by being sunk in the ground. The men who were not serving the guns were perfectly covered from fire on taking position a little back from the crest. The greatest suffering was from want of shelter. It was midwinter, and during the siege we had rain and snow, thawing and freezing alternately. It would not do to allow camp-fires, except far down the hill, out of sight of the

Capture of Forts Henry and Donelson 59

enemy, and it would not do to allow many of the troops to remain there at the same time. In the march from Fort Henry numbers of the men had thrown away their blankets and overcoats. There was therefore much discomfort and absolute suffering.

On the 13th, while Grant was delaying his attack till all the reinforcements should arrive, General McClelland sent forward three of his regiments to capture a battery that was on the enemy's main line. Of course guns were turned on them from the right and the left, and the attempt was a costly failure.


The first plan was for the troops to hold the lines while the fleet should attack the water batteries and silence them, when some of the boats could then run up the stream past the fort and the village. The attack was made with remarkable courage and steadiness, and was resisted with equal valour. The boats drew nearer and nearer to the batteries, although struck frequently, until the flagship was within three hundred and fifty yards of the enemy. Then a shot went through the pilot-house, killed the pilot, wounded Captain Foote, and carried away the wheel. That vessel had received sixty shots. Two others were disabled about the same time, and all three dropped downstream, when the other two were obliged to follow.

The next morning Captain Foote sent word to General Grant that he wished to see him on board the boat. The General went at once, and while he was gone the Confederates made a powerful attack on his right wing, held by McClelland. It was in some sense a surprise, but McClelland's men threw themselves into battle line so promptly that their fire was delivered before the enemy were fairly ready to deliver theirs. Forrest's cavalry attempted to get in the rear of McClelland,

but were driven off. As one after another of the Confederate regiments came forward into line, the battle increased in intensity. General Wallace says it continued for three hours, and

the woods rang with a monotonous clangour of musketry, as if a million men were beating empty barrels with iron hammers. Buckner flung a portion of his division on McClernand's left and supported the attack with artillery. McClernand, watchful and full of resources, sent batteries to meet Buckner's batteries. To that duty Taylor rushed with his Company B, and McAllister pushed his three twenty-four pounders into position and exhausted his ammunition in the duel. The roar never slackened. Men fell by the score, reddening the snow with their blood. The smoke, in pallid white clouds, clung to the underbrush and tree-tops as if to screen the combatants from each other. Close to the ground the flame of musketry and cannon tinted everything a lurid red. Limbs dropped from the trees on the heads below, and the thickets were shorn as by an army of cradlers. The division was under peremptory orders to hold its position to the last extremity, and Colonel W. H. L. Wallace was equal to the emergency.

The assaults of the Confederates on the right wing were fierce and persistent; but they made no real headway until Oglesby's men, at the extreme flank, had used up their ammunition and were obliged to retire. John A. Logan's regiment held its place to the last, and Wallace says Logan rode frantically up and down the line, with stentorian voice, heard above the din, entreating his boys to stand fast; but they, too, fell back when they had fired their last cartridge. Then the next in line, and the next, till all the First Division were thrown back, and the road of retreat for the Confederates, up the left bank of the Cumberland, was



PLAN OF FORT DONELSON AND ITS OUTWORKS, TENN., FEB. 15-16, 1862.

REDRAWN FROM THE GOVERNMENT ATLAS.

Capture of Forts Henry and Donelson 61

open. Why they did not promptly avail themselves of it, since that was what they had been fighting for, is a mystery.

General Grant says there was abundance of ammunition in boxes on the ground just in rear of the lines; but at that stage of the war many of the subordinate commanders had not been educated up to the point of seeing that their men were constantly supplied with ammunition during an engagement.

General Wallace offers a plausible theory to explain why the Confederates did not avail themselves of their opportunity. He says:

The real difficulty was in the hero of the morning, who now made haste to blight his laurels. General Pillow's vanity whistled itself into ludicrous exaltation. Imagining General Grant's whole army defeated and fleeing in rout for Fort Henry and the transports, he deported himself accordingly. He began by ignoring Floyd. He rode to Buckner and accused him of shameful conduct. He sent an aide to the nearest telegraph station with a despatch to Albert Sidney Johnston, then in command of the department, asseverating, "on the honour of a soldier," that the day was theirs. Without deigning even to consult his chief, he ordered Buckner to move out and attack the Federals.

Buckner reluctantly obeyed the order, while the greater part of the garrison was pursuing McClellan's men. General Wallace put a brigade in motion toward the fort, on the same road by which Buckner was coming to attack him, and at the same time Colonel W. H. L. Wallace brought a part of his forces into the same road, and a battery came up at full speed, unlimbered, and in a very few minutes was playing upon the advancing enemy. The Confederates struggled

bravely to put themselves in line, and for a short time there was furious firing, by which the brushwood on the slope between the combatants was all cut away, and then Buckner's men fell back in confusion to their intrenchments.

At this time General Grant returned from his consultation with Captain Foote, took in the situation at a glance, ordered his subordinates to retire their commands beyond cannon shot and throw up intrenchments, and then said: "Gentlemen, the position on the right must be retaken."

General Lew Wallace took command of the troops that were to retake the lost position on the right, and while they were so engaged General Smith's division was ordered to assist the movement by advancing against Buckner on the Confederate right. Smith was the oldest officer there, a veteran of the Mexican War, a most accomplished soldier. His numerous sharpshooters had been at work all day. Now he led his command against the enemy, riding in front, and from the first step they were under fire. Some of the men said the abatis looked as if it were too thick for a rabbit to get through. When the men reached this and hesitated, the General lifted his cap on the point of his sword and shouted: "No flinching now, my lads! Here—this is the way—come on!" He found a way to get through the abatis, and the men followed him. They formed their lines on the other side, and followed him up the slope toward the fort. Then the Confederates in the rifle-pits climbed out and ran away, and the colours of four National regiments were planted on the works. An attempt by Buckner to drive them away was a failure.

While Smith was thus engaged on the left, Wallace

Capture of Forts Henry and Donelson 63

was making a determined effort to retake the high ground on the right and close again the only road by which the enemy could escape. He speaks of the special advantage of one regiment that had been drilled in the Zouave tactics:

Now on the ground, creeping when the fire was hottest, running when it slackened, they gained ground with astonishing rapidity and at the same time maintained a fire that was like a sparkling of the earth.

Colonel Morgan L. Smith led his men with perfect coolness, and when his cigar was shot off close to his lips he called for a match and lighted another. The whole line moved steadily and when they were near the crest they began firing as they advanced. Very soon then the Confederates gave way and retired within their works. The task of the assailants was finished, and the remainder of the day was spent in caring for the wounded, of whom there were many from both armies.

That night a council of war was held within the fort. The commanders realized that their case was hopeless, and that surrender of the work was inevitable. General Floyd said it would not do for him to be captured; he was accused of serious misconduct when Secretary of War; therefore he would turn over the command to General Pillow and escape by two steamers that were to come down the river at daybreak and take away him and as many of his men as they could carry. General Pillow said he also must go, as the Yankees would be specially glad to capture him and Floyd; therefore he in turn handed over the command to Buckner, who said he would remain with his men.

Very early in the morning the boats steamed away up the river to Nashville, carrying the two generals and

about three thousand men. Forrest with his command escaped by going through a mass of back water and ice from the river, while it was still dark.

The lines were being formed for a grand assault on the works immediately after breakfast, when a flag of truce appeared bearing a letter to General Grant from General Buckner, in which he said:

In consideration of all the circumstances governing the present situation of affairs at this station, I propose to the commanding officer of the Federal forces the appointment of commissioners to agree upon terms of capitulation of the forces and fort under my command, and in that view suggest an armistice until 12 o'clock today.

General Grant answered:

Yours of this date, proposing armistice and appointment of commissioners to settle terms of capitulation, is just received. No terms except an unconditional and immediate surrender can be accepted. I propose to move immediately upon your works.

General Buckner then replied:

The distribution of the forces under my command, incident to an unexpected change of commanders, and the overwhelming force under your command, compel me, notwithstanding the brilliant success of the Confederate arms yesterday, to accept the ungenerous and unchivalrous terms which you propose.

The number of prisoners was about 14,600. The total loss in Grant's army—killed, wounded, and missing—was 2886. The number of killed and wounded of the Confederate forces is not exactly known. General Pillow estimated it at two thousand.

Capture of Forts Henry and Donelson 65

General Grant became famous at once, and his demand for unconditional surrender, and capture of so large a force together with an important strategic position, electrified the country and put heart into the people of the North, who had had more than enough of defeats and failures. With the capture of these two forts, the whole artificial line of defence was now swept away; the back door of the Confederacy was open, and it was only a question of time when a powerful army would march through the heart of it.

The Battle of the First Ironclads

March 9, 1862

ON April 21, 1861, the navy yard at Gosport, Virginia, was the scene of a picturesque conflagration in which ships and other property, to the value of about \$10,000,000, were destroyed. It was one of the most senseless sacrifices that occurred in the whole four years of the war, and no sane reason for the destruction and abandonment by the commandant ever has been given. He thus turned over to the Confederates twelve hundred heavy guns, which were soon placed in fortifications throughout the Confederacy, and much valuable machinery which he spared because he assumed that the war would soon be ended and then this would revert to the National government! His plan was to destroy only such things as could be of immediate use to the enemy. But he need not have destroyed or abandoned anything, for no considerable force threatened the post, and ample forces to protect it were near at hand.

The *Pawnee* came from Fort Monroe the day before, bringing a detail of soldiers to guard the avenues of approach to the navy yard while the sailors and marines were preparing the ships and property for destruction, saving only the books and papers and a small part of the stores. One who was present has described the scene:

Many thousands of arms were destroyed. Carbines had their stocks broken from the barrels by a blow, and were thrown overboard. A large lot of revolvers shared their fate. Shot and shell by thousands went with hurried plunge to the bottom. Most of the cannon had been spiked the day and night before—elegant Dahlgren guns and Columbiads of all sizes. It is impossible to describe the scene of destruction that was exhibited. Unweariedly it was continued from nine o'clock until twelve, during which time the moon gave light. But when the moon sank behind the horizon, the barracks near the centre of the yard were set on fire, that by the illumination the work might be continued. The crackling flames and the glare of light inspired with new energies the destroying marines, and havoc was carried everywhere within the limits of orders. But time was not left to complete the work. Four o'clock of Sunday morning came, and the *Pawnee* was passing down from Gosport harbour with the *Cumberland*, the coveted prize of the secessionists, in tow—every soul from the other ships and the yard being aboard of them, save two.

Just as they left their moorings a rocket was sent up from the deck of the *Pawnee*. It sped high in air, paused a second, and burst in shivers of many coloured lights. And as it did so the trains at the ship-houses and on the decks of the fated vessels left behind went off as if lighted simultaneously by the rocket. One of the ship-houses contained the old *New York*, a ship thirty years on the stocks and still unfinished. The other was vacant, but both houses and the ship burned like tinder. The vessels fired were the *Pennsylvania*, the *Merrimac*, the *Germantown*, the *Plymouth*, the *Raritan*, the *Columbia*, and the *Dolphin*. The old *Delaware* and *Columbus*, worn out and dismantled seventy-fours, had been scuttled and sunk at the upper docks.

I need not try to picture the grand conflagration that now burst on the startled citizens of Norfolk, Portsmouth, and all the surrounding country. Any one who has seen a ship burn, and knows how like a fiery serpent the flame leaps

from pitchy deck to smoking shrouds, and writhes to their very top around the masts that stand like martyrs doomed, can form some idea of the display that followed.

It was not thirty minutes from the time the trains were fired till the conflagration roared like a hurricane, and the flames from land and water met and mingled together, and darted high, and fell, and leaped up again, and by their very motion showed their sympathy with the crackling, crashing roar of destruction beneath.

But in all this magnificent scene the old ship *Pennsylvania* was the centre-piece. She was a very giant in death, as she had been in life. She was a sea of flame, and when the iron had entered into her soul and her bowels were consuming, then did she spout from every port-hole of every deck torrents and cataracts of fire. Several of her guns were left loaded but not shotted, and as the fire reached them they sent out on the morning air a frightful peal that added greatly to the alarm that the light of the conflagration had spread through the surrounding region. The *Pennsylvania* burned like a volcano for five hours and a half before her mainmast fell. At half-past nine the tall tree that stood in her centre tottered and fell and crushed deep into her burning sides, while a storm of sparks flooded the sky.

As soon as the *Pawnee* and *Cumberland* had fairly left, and were known to be gone, the gathering crowds of Portsmouth and Norfolk burst open the gates of the navy yard and rushed in.


A Senate committee appointed to inquire into this affair made a report that severely censured the officers that were responsible for it, and said in conclusion that the lesson afforded by the surrender of the Norfolk navy yard will not be wholly without value to us if we shall learn by it, as a nation, that pusillanimity in the defence of our rights may be as seriously injurious as the open assaults of our enemies.

But the most important result and far-reaching influence of that wild order of destruction is to be found in the contest between the *Monitor* and the *Merrimac* nearly a year later. The *Merrimac* was a frigate of thirty-five hundred tons, which had carried forty guns. A naval officer in the service of the Confederacy proposed to raise the hulk and rebuild it as an ironclad. The Navy Department approved the plan and authorized him to carry out the project. She was cut down to the berth deck, and over the midship section, one hundred and seventy feet long, was built a roof with a slope of forty-five degrees. This was made of pine and oak two feet thick, covered with iron to a depth of four inches. The iron was in plates two inches thick, the first course being horizontal, and the second course covering this at right angles. The ends were rounded, to give sweep to pivot guns, and on each side were four port-holes, like dormer windows in a house. Thus she carried ten guns, four of which were rifled. She had a cast-iron prow for ramming, and a pilot-house that was ironclad like the sides. She sank so low that her decks fore and aft that were not covered by the sloping armour were barely above the surface of the water. Her name was changed to *Virginia*, but her original name stuck to her and is the only one she is known by in history—probably because of its alliteration with the name of her antagonist.

The command of this novel craft was given to Captain Franklin Buchanan, who had resigned from the United States navy and entered the service of the Confederacy. With him were seven experienced lieutenants, and he had a selected crew of three hundred men. The work had proceeded slowly, and the ship was not ready for service till March, 1862. She drew

twenty-two feet of water, and her speed was not more than five knots.

On March 8th she steamed down Elizabeth River into Hampton Roads, and made directly for the frigate *Congress* and the sloop *Cumberland*, which were at anchor off Newport News. She first attacked the *Cumberland*, which bravely withstood her, firing broadside after broadside at short range, one shot entering a port of the *Merrimac*, dismounting a gun, and killing or wounding seventeen men; but most of the shot rolled off harmlessly from her iron armour. She rammed the wooden sloop, striking her fairly on the starboard side and making an opening that was said to be wide enough to drive in a horse and cart. Yet the crew continued to work her guns, using those on the spar deck when the broadside was under water, until she went down and only her topmast could be seen, with the colours still flying. She was commanded by Lieutenant George U. Morris. The *Congress* slipped her cables and tried to escape, but ran aground and was then at the mercy of the ironclad, which raked her at short range, while for more than an hour she kept up the useless fight. Then she ran up a white flag and surrendered. She was commanded by Lieutenant Joseph Smith, Jr., and when his father, Captain Smith, in Washington, read the news of her surrender he said: "Then Joe's dead, for he never would have surrendered." This was true, and the command had devolved on Lieutenant Pendergast. The *Merrimac* had been subjected to fire from shore batteries while the fight with the ships was in progress, and she suffered in all a loss of twenty-one killed or wounded. Captain Buchanan was severely wounded, and the command of the ship passed to Lieutenant Catesby Jones. Outside of the armoured



THE "MONITOR" AND THE "MERRIMAC."

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roof the vessel had been swept clean of everything that shot could cut down—railings, stanchions, smoke-stack, steam-pipes, davits, flagstaff, one anchor, all gone; the muzzles of two of her guns were shot off, and her ram was broken off and remained in the side of the *Cumberland*. When it appeared that the *Congress* could not be obtained as a prize because she was under the fire of the shore batteries, she was set on fire with hot shot and burned to the water's edge. Part of the ship's company had been taken off in boats, and the others swam ashore.

Three Confederate gunboats, known as the James River Squadron, came down to take part in the fight and attacked the *Minnesota*; but her superior gunnery drove them off after they had killed or wounded more than twenty of her crew. Yet she was aground and appeared to be the next victim; but night was approaching, the tide was at ebb, and the pilots refused to attempt taking the *Merrimac* down the middle channel. Therefore she went by the south channel and anchored off Sewell's Point, expecting to resume her destructive work in the morning, and send the remainder of the National fleet to the bottom.

But—the fact that the Confederates were constructing a formidable ironclad was no secret, and early in August, 1861, the United States Navy Department advertised for plans and offers for building ironclads. John Ericsson, who had invented the hot-air engine and other apparatus, had long considered the idea of an ironclad with its guns in a revolving turret. He had shown his plans for one to Napoleon III. in 1854, but received no encouragement. The same idea, in cruder form, had been published by Abraham Bloodgood in 1807, by a Scotchman named Gillespie about the same

time, and again by Theodore R. Timby, an American, in 1841. He also approached Napoleon III. with his invention, but had no more success than Ericsson. Meanwhile he had appealed to the United States Government, and received a little half-hearted encouragement, but none that helped him. In 1862, however, he obtained a patent for the idea of a revolving tower for guns, and thereafter a royalty was paid to him for every vessel that was built with such a tower.

Ericsson answered the Navy Department's advertisement with his plan for such an ironclad, and after he had appeared before a board appointed for the purpose and demonstrated the practicability of his plan it was accepted, and he was ordered to proceed at once. He divided the work among three establishments, giving each full detailed drawings, and work was continued day and night. So well was it done that every part, as it arrived, fitted into its place without difficulty, and the vessel was launched at Greenpoint, Brooklyn, one hundred days after the laying of the keel. The inventor and builder named it *Monitor*. In a letter to the Assistant Secretary of the Navy he gave his reasons for the name: that batteries on the banks of Southern rivers could no longer prevent the entrance of Union forces; and that this new craft would give the British Lords of the Admiralty doubts as to the propriety of completing four very costly steel-clad ships which they had begun.

The *Monitor* was so constructed that its deck was but one foot above the water, on which it lay with the appearance of a raft. Rising from its centre was a round tower twenty feet in diameter and nine feet high, with ports for two guns, and between this and the bow was a square pilot-house made of solid blocks or logs of wrought iron nine inches thick and twelve inches

deep. Between the uppermost log and the one next below there was a narrow interval through which the pilot and the commander looked for their course and their antagonist. The vessel was built with an overhang all round, so that while the upper part was forty-one feet wide and one hundred and seventy-two feet long, the lower part (the hull proper) was but thirty-four by one hundred and twenty-two feet. She drew ten feet of water. Her two guns were eleven-inch columbiads, muzzle-loading. Her entire ship's company comprised fifty-seven men. The armour of the turret was made of eight plates, each one inch thick.

She left New York on the 6th of March, commanded by Captain John L. Worden, destined for Hampton Roads. Almost immediately orders were issued that she go instead to Washington; but though a swift tug was sent in chase, those orders did not reach her. After a difficult passage she arrived in Hampton Roads on the 8th (Saturday), where she found a dismal condition of affairs. The *Cumberland* was sunk, the *Congress*, set on fire by hot shot, was in flames, the *Minnesota* was aground, and everybody was dismayed. The *Monitor* was at once anchored near the *Minnesota*, the protection of which was her immediate task; and sailors were at work nearly all night putting shot and shell on board and making her ready for battle. When the Confederates saw her, they laughed at her small size and said "a cheese-box on a raft."

Soon after seven o'clock the next morning (Sunday) the *Merrimac* and the three gunboats came down toward the *Minnesota* with the intention of destroying her as they had destroyed the *Cumberland* and the *Congress*. But the *Monitor* steered straight for them, drove off the wooden gunboats, which fled upstream,

and then joined battle with the *Merrimac* at short range. It was two guns against ten; but the shots from the *Merrimac*, though they struck the turret fairly, and dented the surface, neither penetrated it nor prevented it from revolving. Immediately after delivering a shot, it could be turned so that the port-hole was not toward the enemy.

On both vessels the guns were worked as rapidly as possible, and sometimes they were but a few yards apart. The shot from the *Monitor* so far bent the armour of the *Merrimac* as to break the wooden backing, and with heavier charges of powder would have gone clear through; but from a fear of bursting the guns her officers had been forbidden to use a larger charge than fifteen pounds. The *Merrimac* endeavoured to ram her antagonist; but the *Monitor* was the lighter and more easily manœuvred ship, and not merely avoided the ramming by turning so that she received only a glancing blow, but was able to sail round the heavier craft, looking for a vulnerable spot, and in her turn trying to ram.

In both vessels it happened that men standing too near the sides were stunned by the impact of the heavy shot against the armour. And one shell struck the pilot-house of the *Monitor* in such a way that it temporarily blinded Captain Worden, who at that instant was peeping through the opening between the logs. This obliged him to turn over the command to Lieutenant S. Dana Greene, who had been directing the work in the turret. The fight continued about four hours. The *Monitor* was struck twenty-two times, but was not in any way seriously injured. How much the *Merrimac* was damaged is not known. But it was observed that she went into battle with her bow up and

her stern down, and went out with her bow down and her stern up; that she was at once surrounded by four tugs, into which her men jumped; and that on reaching Norfolk she went into dry-dock for repairs.

The *Merrimac* never came out again to fight. She did come out on April 11th, but the contest was not renewed, because both vessels were under strict orders to remain on the defensive, as each government was unwilling to risk losing its only ironclad. The United States Government at once began the construction of other monitors, some of which had two turrets.

In May, when the National forces captured Norfolk, an attempt was made to take the *Merrimac* up James River, for the protection of Richmond; but she ran aground, and finally was blown up. The original *Monitor* was in tow of the *Rhode Island* on their way to South Carolina waters, in December, when she foundered in a gale off Cape Hatteras, and a part of her crew went down with her.

In one way the importance of this first battle of ironclads was much exaggerated; in another way it could hardly be exaggerated at all. There was a popular belief, shared for a time by the Government, that if the *Merrimac* had not been providentially met and defeated by the *Monitor* she could have visited Washington, Philadelphia, New York, and other Northern ports, where nothing could have prevented her from bombarding the cities or exacting indemnity. This was a mistake, for she was not seaworthy, a fact that not only is evident from her construction but has been attested by one of her officers. It is doubtful whether she could have ascended the Potomac even if unopposed by shore batteries. There is a place in that river called the "kettle-bottoms," where many conical mounds,

composed of oyster-shells and sand, rise in the channel till their peaks are near the surface, and at that time they were so imperfectly known that vessels often grounded on them. As it was supposed that the *Merrimac* would attempt to reach Washington, several snares were set for her. One of the most promising was devised by Captain Love, who commanded an armed tugboat. He procured a seine three quarters of a mile long, took off the floats, and stretched it across the channel, slightly below the surface, so that the *Merrimac* could hardly have passed over it without fouling her propeller.

But there is no question that the battle in Hampton Roads marked an epoch in naval warfare. It indicated the end of any dependence upon "wooden walls." When the account of it reached England, the *London Times* declared:

There is not now a ship in the English navy, apart from these two [the *Warrior* and the *Ironsides*], that it would not be madness to trust to an engagement with that little *Monitor*.

The Emperor of Russia ordered the building of twelve vessels like the American monitors; Sweden and Norway built seven; Turkey built several; and finally England adopted the turret of Ericsson's invention.

Nevertheless, there was to be one more significant battle in which wooden ships were to be victorious—only a fortnight after that of the first ironclads.

Island Number Ten

April 7, 1862

AFTER the Confederates had failed in their attempt to establish a permanent boundary on the line between Kentucky and Tennessee—that defence being swept away by the battles of the Big Sandy, Mill Springs, and Forts Henry and Donelson—they made a new effort on the Mississippi near the south-eastern corner of Missouri. Here the river makes a great sigmoid curve. In the first bend is Island No. 10—the islands were numbered from the mouth of the Ohio southward—and at the second bend, on the Missouri side, is the town of New Madrid. These places were fortified by General Polk; a floating dock was brought from New Orleans, converted into a battery, and anchored near the island; there were eight gunboats under the command of Commodore George N. Hollins; and batteries were established on the Tennessee shore, back of which were impassable swamps. This sealed the Mississippi against any passage by the National gunboats, and was intended also for the beginning of a new line of defence.

In March, 1862, a large National force, commanded by General John Pope, marched against New Madrid. He ascertained, by a reconnoissance, that the position could be carried by storm, but could not be held,

because the Confederate gunboats could enfilade it. General Pope then established his camp two miles from the river and sent to Cairo for siege guns. At the same time he despatched a force under General J. B. Plummer to a point below New Madrid, where they planted field guns and posted sharpshooters along the bank, opening fire the next day on the Confederate vessels.

Promptly came four siege guns from Cairo, which Pope carried across the river and over a long stretch of swampy ground where a road had to be made for them. In the night of the 12th the Confederate pickets were driven away and the guns were placed in position. At daylight bombardment was begun. This continued all day, and at night the town was evacuated. The position of the guns was then changed so as to command the river, and a few days later five Confederate gunboats attacked the batteries. But when one boat was sunk and others damaged they retired.

On the 16th and 17th Commodore Andrew H. Foote's fleet engaged the batteries on Island No. 10, and a hundred guns were in action at once. The shot went through the walls, which had been weakened by the wash of the river; but the artillerymen stuck to their work, standing in water while shells rained around them and one of their guns burst. In the fleet, also, a gun burst, killing or wounding fourteen men. The action was continued for several days, but the works were not reduced.

The river was high, and the peninsula formed by the great bend was several feet under water. General Schuyler Hamilton suggested that a channel be cut through the growth of timber that stood in the water, so that Foote's fleet could pass down below the island

in safety. His suggestion was adopted, and the task was given to a regiment of engineers commanded by Colonel Josiah W. Bissell. With an ingenious contrivance the trunks of trees were sawed through four and a half feet below the surface of the water, thus making a clear channel four feet deep and fifty feet wide, for the passage of transports. The whole length of the channel was twelve miles, and about half of it had to be opened in this way. The work was completed in nineteen days.

The transports passed through the channel (or canal, as it is commonly called), and two gunboats, in the night, ran past the batteries on the island. With the help of these to silence the batteries on the opposite shore, General Pope moved his forces across, and marched rapidly down the peninsula. The greater part of the Confederate force that held the island tried to escape, but were caught between Pope's army and an impassable swamp and soon surrendered. In the campaign he captured three generals, 273 officers of lower grade, and 6700 men, besides 158 guns, 7000 muskets, a gunboat, a floating battery, six steamers, and a large quantity of stores.

The Battle of Shiloh

April 6-7, 1862

WHILE General Pope was gaining an almost bloodless victory at Island No. 10, on the Mississippi, one of the fiercest battles of the war was in progress about a hundred miles south-east, on the Tennessee. At Corinth, in northern Mississippi, the Memphis & Charleston Railroad crosses the Mobile & Ohio. This fact gives that place strategic importance, and it was fortified and held by a large force. After the capture of Forts Henry and Donelson, it was obvious that the next expedition should be against Corinth, and in less than a month General Grant's army was on the way thither. He had nearly forty thousand men under his immediate command, and General Don Carlos Buell was coming from Nashville to join him with thirty thousand more.

Grant had advanced as far as Pittsburg Landing, on the Tennessee, which is about twenty miles north-east of Corinth, where he awaited the arrival of Buell. His line, two miles long, was on the west bank of the river, its left resting on Lick Creek and its right on Owl Creek, both of which are impassable and flow into the Tennessee. One of his divisions, commanded by General Lew Wallace, was at Crump's Landing, five miles farther north. The advance of Buell's army had reached

the river, opposite Pittsburg Landing, but had not crossed. Of Grant's main force, General Benjamin M. Prentiss's division was on the left, General John A. McClernand's in the centre, and General William T. Sherman's on the right. General Stephen A. Hurlbut's was in reserve on the left, and General W. H. L. Wallace's on the right. The last-named was known as General Charles F. Smith's; but that very able soldier, who made a brilliant and successful fight at Fort Donelson, was now lying ill at Savannah, Tennessee, where he died three weeks afterward.

Later in the war, no army would have occupied such a position a single day without constructing those simple but largely effective intrenchments which the soldiers learned to throw up rapidly. As it was, not a sod was turned. The ground in that region was undulating, with patches of forest alternating with cleared fields, some of which were under cultivation, while others were neglected and were overgrown with bushes. Shiloh Church, a small, log structure, stood on a ridge near the right centre of the line and was an important key-point in Sherman's front.

The Confederate force at Corinth was commanded by General Albert Sidney Johnston, whose lieutenants were Generals G. T. Beauregard, Braxton Bragg, and William J. Hardee. Johnston was not the kind of general that awaits a siege behind his intrenchments. He moved with his whole force toward Grant, and for several days there was skirmishing between the outposts. Early in the morning of Sunday, the 6th, he came within striking distance and immediately made a heavy attack.

General Grant, who had not expected battle so soon, was at breakfast in his headquarters at Savannah down

the river. Hearing the firing, he at once hurried up to Pittsburg Landing. He ordered General Lew Wallace to march without delay to Shiloh and place his five thousand men on the right of the line. Wallace took a wrong road and did not arrive on the battlefield till dusk. Nor did General William Nelson, who commanded the advance of Buell's army, put his men across the river before evening.

No army could have gone into action with more confidence in itself and its leaders than did Johnston's. General Johnston told his men that they should sleep that night in the camps of the enemy—and they did. He also told them that they would water their horses in the Tennessee—but they did not.

General Johnston's son, William Preston Johnston, records the statement that General Beauregard was strenuously opposed to fighting this battle, and advised retreating to Corinth instead. But General Johnston said to his generals in the conference, "Gentlemen, we will attack at daylight," adding, "I would fight them if they were a million." And riding into the battle he said to a friend, "We must this day conquer or perish."

The brunt of the attack fell at first upon Sherman and McClelland. Their men, many of them new to the work, stood up to it most manfully and disputed every inch of ground. But the Confederate commanders launched their men against them in heavy masses, without regard to the cost; and the cost was appalling. Thus the 6th Mississippi regiment lost 300 men out of 425, and the 18th Louisiana lost 207.


Sherman's men lost their camps in the morning, and were compelled to retire slowly upon one line after another, till they were driven back more than a mile. Yet, with all their losses, they held possession of the

THE FIELD OF SHILOH

SHOWING THE POSITIONS OF THE TROOPS ABOUT 6 A.M.

APRIL 6, 1862

-  UNION ARMIES
-  CONFEDERATE ARMIES



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road by which Lew Wallace was to come to their assistance. General Grant tells us that on this part of the field, over which many charges were made, the ground was "so covered with dead that it would have been possible to walk across the clearing in any direction, stepping on dead bodies, without a foot touching the ground." He adds that:

On our side National and Confederate troops were mingled together in about equal proportions; but on the remainder of the field nearly all were Confederates. On one part, which had evidently not been ploughed for several years, bushes had grown up, some to the height of eight or ten feet. Not one of these was left standing unpierced by bullets. The smaller ones were all cut down.

The distribution of the dead, as here described, indicates that the charges were made by the Confederates, and as each column began its charge it was played upon effectively by the National artillery.

A bullet struck General Sherman in the hand, another went through his hat, and another grazed his shoulder, and several of his horses were killed. A bullet broke the scabbard of General Grant's sword. General William H. L. Wallace, whose command withstood the assaults of the enemy for six hours, and was the last to be driven from the field, was mortally wounded; as was also the Confederate General Adley H. Gladden.

Early in the afternoon General Johnston placed himself at the head of a brigade that was unwilling to make another charge. Leading this in a desperate attempt to crush the National line, he was struck in the leg by a minie ball. The wound could have been attended to, but, in his enthusiasm, he neglected it and would not leave the field. But after a time he fainted,

was helped from his horse, and bled to death. This calamity was concealed from his soldiers, and his body was carried off the field.

The command now devolved upon General Beauregard, who continued the battle with energy. In the afternoon the left of McClernand's division was forced back, leaving a gap between that and the right of Prentiss. The Confederates promptly took advantage of the situation by rushing in through the gap, while at the same time they maintained a strong attack against his left. This resulted in disaster to Prentiss who was captured with twenty-two hundred of his men. Defeat of the whole army might have ensued, had not Colonel Joseph D. Webster, chief of artillery, quickly brought together twenty guns on a ridge near the river, covering the Landing. The steady fire of these guns checked the advance on that flank. Then the Confederates attempted to get through on the extreme left by crossing a ravine close to the river; but more guns were brought up and placed on a ridge commanding the ravine, while the gunboats *Tyler* and *Lexington* took a position opposite its mouth and sent in an enfilading fire. The result to the Confederates, despite their persistent valour, was simply a heavy loss.

This practically ended the day's operations, with nothing satisfactory for either side. Some Confederate writers speak of this day's work as a Confederate victory; in answer, General Grant remarks, "There is no victory for any one till a battle is ended, and Shiloh was a two-days' battle."

Grant's army was made up of widely varying material. Two green colonels led their green regiments from the field at the first fire. A great number of stragglers and skulkers, as they could not scatter over the country,

huddled together under the river bank at the Landing. Grant estimated that there were nearly five thousand of them. From Johnston's army there was about an equal number of derelicts; but the nature of the ground allowed them to scatter, so that they could not all be seen at one view. Grant's line was nowhere broken except where Prentiss was overwhelmed and captured, but it had been steadily forced back and thirty guns were lost.

When Beauregard discontinued the battle at evening, after his right had failed in its attempt to cross the ravine, he planned to renew it in the morning. He knew that Buell was coming, but did not know how near he was. Grant writes that, "Wallace came, Buell came, and night came; but none, except night, in time to be of immediate service."

Lew Wallace, with his five thousand men, was now in his designated position on the right; Nelson, with the advance guard of Buell's army, was in place on the left; and all night the boats were busy taking over the rest of that army. A fire in the woods had sprung up about dusk, and might have done pitiful damage among the wounded on the field, but a fortunate rain soon extinguished it, and the two armies that night lay out in the storm. The captured tents sheltered a part of the Confederates; but the gunboats never ceased to throw shells among them.

At daylight on the 7th, Grant assumed the offensive, moving first the fresh troops on his right and left. Beauregard now knew that Buell had arrived, and that only one result was probable; but he made a stubborn fight, holding the road that ran by Shiloh Church, which he needed for an orderly retreat. As to any other plans that he cherished, they were all upset by the

death of Johnston, the arrival of Wallace and Buell, and Grant's assumption of the offensive. The confusion that reigned in his army is indicated in the report of one of his brigade commanders:

I was ordered by General Ruggles to form on the extreme left and rest my left on Owl Creek. While proceeding to execute this order, I was ordered to move by the rear of the main line to support the extreme right of General Hardee's line. Having taken my position to support General Hardee's right, I was again ordered by General Beauregard to advance and occupy the crest of a ridge in the edge of an old field. My line was just formed in this position when General Polk ordered me forward to support his line. When moving to the support of General Polk, an order reached me from General Beauregard to report to him with my command at his headquarters.

On this second day the advantage was with the National army, as they were superior in numbers, were on the offensive, and were ably commanded. Sherman was ordered to advance and recapture his camps. As these were about Shiloh Church and across the road that Beauregard wished to hold, the struggle there was long and bloody.

Early in the afternoon Grant and Beauregard did the same thing simultaneously—each led a charge by two regiments that had lost their commanders. Beauregard's charge was not successful, but Grant's was. The two regiments that he launched against the Confederate line broke it and began a rout. Beauregard posted a strong rear-guard, and then withdrew his army, leaving his dead on the field. Grant captured about as many guns as he had lost on the first day; but he made no attempt at immediate pursuit, mainly

because of the heavy condition of the roads. Beauregard retreated to Corinth, and in May was besieged there by Halleck, who had taken command of Grant's army. Both armies were reënforced until each numbered nearly one hundred thousand men. Halleck was steadily making approaches, when in the night of May 29th Beauregard evacuated the place, and the next morning Sherman's troops marched in.

The official figures for the National losses in the battle of Shiloh are: 1754 killed, 8408 wounded, 2885 missing—total, 13,047. For the Confederate losses they are: 1728 killed, 8012 wounded, 957 missing—total, 10,697. But General Grant declares that this estimate must be incorrect. "We buried, by actual count, more of the enemy's dead in front of the divisions of McClernand and Sherman alone than are here reported, and four thousand was the estimate of the burial parties for the whole field." In any case, the slaughter was sufficient to carry sorrow and mourning into thousands of homes from Maine to Louisiana.

Some curious and interesting incidents of the battle are recorded by Col. Douglas Putnam, Jr., of the 92d Ohio regiment.

With the consent of General Grant, I was permitted to accompany him to the field as a volunteer aide. . . . After getting a horse, I started with Rawlins to find General Grant; and to my inquiry as to where we should likely find him, Rawlins's reply, characteristic of the man, was, "We'll find him where the firing is heaviest." As we proceeded we met the increasing signs of battle, while the dropping of bullets about us on the leaves led me, in my inexperience, to ask if it were not raining, to which Rawlins tersely said,

"Those are bullets, Douglas." We soon found General Grant. He was sending his aides in different directions, as occasion made it necessary, and he himself visited his division commanders one by one. He wore his full uniform, with the Major-General's buff sash, which made him very conspicuous both to our own men and to those of the enemy. Lieutenant-Colonel James B. McPherson, acting chief of staff, remonstrated with him, as did also Rawlins, for so unnecessarily exposing himself, as he went just in rear of our line of battle; but he said he wanted to see and know what was going on.

About eleven o'clock he met General Sherman on what was called "Sherman's drill-ground," near the old peach orchard. The meeting was attended with but few words. Sherman's stock had been pulled around until the part that should have been in front rested under one of his ears, while his whole appearance indicated hard and earnest work. The bullets were plenteous here. Sherman told Grant how many horses he had had killed under him, showing him also the marks of bullets in his clothing. . . . About two o'clock, at one point were gathered General Grant and several of his staff, including McPherson, Rawlins, and Webster. This evidently drew the attention of the enemy, and they received rather more than a due share of the fire. McPherson's horse having been shot under him, I gave him mine, and under directions I went to the river on foot. The space under the bank was literally packed with men who, from inexperience and fright, had lost their grip or were both mentally and physically, as we say, let down—only temporarily, however. To them it seemed that the day was lost, that the deluge was upon them. The Tennessee River in front, swamps to the right, and swamps to the left, they could go no farther. I remember seeing a mounted officer carrying a United States flag, riding back and forth on top of the bank, pleading in this wise: "Men, for God's sake, for your country's sake, for your own sake, come up here, form a line, and make one

more stand." No one seemed to respond; the only reply I heard was someone saying, "That man talks well, doesn't he?" But eighteen hours afterward these same men had come to themselves, were refreshed, met other troops, and were assured that all was not lost, and, being helped also by the magic touch of the elbow, they did valiant service.

A group of officers was gathered around General Grant about dusk, at a smouldering fire. The rain was falling, the atmosphere murky, and the ground covered with mud and water. Colonel McPherson rode up, and Grant said, "Well, Mac, how is it?" The Colonel gave him a report of the condition as it seemed to him, which was, in short, that at least one third of the army was *hors de combat*, and the rest much disheartened. The General made no reply to this; but when McPherson continued, "Well, General Grant, under this condition of affairs, what do you propose to do, sir? Shall I make preparations for retreat?" the reply came quick and short, "Retreat? No! I propose to attack at daylight and whip them."

The same writer tells of a conversation with General Beauregard some years after the war.

To my remark that it had always been a mystery why he stopped the battle Sunday night, when the advantage seemed to be with him, and he had an hour more of daylight, the General replied that there were two reasons: first his men were, as he put it, "out of hand." They had been fighting since early morn, were worn out, and also were demoralized by the flush of victory in gathering the stores and sutler's supplies found in our camps. As one man said, "You fellows went to war with cheese, pigs' feet, dates, pickles—things we Rebs had forgotten the sight of." "In the second place," the General said, "I thought I had General Grant just where I wanted him, and could finish him up in the morning."

The Capture of the Crescent City

April 24, 1862

NEW ORLEANS was the largest and most important city in the Confederacy. In population it surpassed Richmond, Charleston, and Mobile combined. In 1860-61 it shipped \$92,000,000 worth of cotton and \$25,000,000 of sugar; and in this trade it led every port in the world. As a strategic point it was the most valuable in all the South; for it held the lower reach of the Mississippi, where that great, navigable river flows into the Gulf of Mexico.

The many mouths, or passes, through the delta, and the frequent violent gales in the Gulf, made blockading here a very difficult and uncertain task. At the same time it was obvious that if the defences below the city could be reduced, and the city itself occupied, this operation would go a long way toward possession of the entire river, thus cutting the Confederacy in two and making it difficult for the armies east of it to draw supplies from the region on the west.

As soon as it became evident to the Government at Washington that the war was no temporary insurrection, but the beginning of a long contest, plans were laid for the capture of New Orleans. Its defences were two Forts—Jackson and St. Philip, on either bank—which were about sixty miles below the city and twenty

miles above the head of the passes. Fort Jackson, on the right bank, mounted seventy-five guns, fourteen of them in bomb-proof casemates. Fort St. Philip, on the left bank, had forty guns, all barbette. The garrisons included about fifteen hundred men, commanded by General Johnson K. Duncan. Above these, in the stream, lay at anchor a fleet of fifteen vessels, which included an ironclad ram and an uncompleted floating battery which was covered with railroad iron. A little way below the forts the Confederates had stretched across the river a heavy chain supported on a row of large logs. In the War of Independence the Americans had put a similar chain across the Hudson to stop the British fleet. A heavy freshet in the Mississippi carried away the logs, and then they were replaced by a line of hulks anchored across the stream. The chain rested on their decks, and its ends were made fast to trees. A large number of sharpshooters patrolled the banks.

The idea worked out in the Navy Department was, to send the most powerful fleet of war ships that the Government possessed, aided by great mortars mounted on schooners. Twenty-one thirteen-inch mortars were made, and each was mounted on a schooner. The concussion from their discharge was so violent that platforms projecting from the decks were provided, to which the gunners could retreat just before firing, so that they need not be deafened by being too near. The twenty-one schooners were to be anchored within range of the forts, but out of sight from them, and to fire high, on a computed aim, so that the great shells, which weighed 285 pounds, should drop almost perpendicularly within the forts.

The fleet, as finally made up, contained six sloops-of-war, sixteen gunboats, and five other vessels, besides

transports. These transports carried fifteen thousand troops commanded by General Benjamin F. Butler, to take possession of the city and garrison it after the fleet should have reduced the defences. The fleet carried two hundred guns besides the mortars.

Captain David Glasgow Farragut, at that time unknown to fame, was selected to command the expedition. He was then sixty years of age, had been in the navy since he was thirteen, had sailed with David Porter when he cruised in the Pacific in the War of 1812-'15, and from much experience afterward had become very familiar with naval life in the Gulf of Mexico. He had commanded one of the vessels that carried the bricks of which were constructed the forts that he was about to attack. Also, he had established the Mare Island navy yard in California. This officer had a remarkable equipment; he could do anything that was to be done on shipboard or in the shops, and he could have assumed the duties of any officer or seaman in the fleet, except the surgeon.

On February 2, 1862, Farragut sailed from Hampton Roads in his flagship, the *Hartford*, which was a steam sloop-of-war of one thousand tons, carrying twenty-five guns, besides howitzers in the fore and main tops. In his sailing-orders the Secretary of the Navy, Gideon Welles, wrote: "As you have expressed yourself perfectly satisfied with the force given to you, and as many more powerful vessels will be added before you can commence operations, the Department and the country require of you success."

Five other vessels of the fleet—the *Brooklyn*, the *Richmond*, the *Pensacola*, the *Portsmouth*, and the *Oneida*—were similar to the *Hartford*. The *Colorado* was larger, and the *Mississippi* was a side-wheel steamer.

The rendezvous was at Ship Island, and it was near the middle of March when all had arrived.

The first task was, to get these large, sea-going vessels over the bars at the mouths or passes of the river. The schooners were light enough to go in without difficulty. But it required the labour of two weeks to get the *Brooklyn*, the *Mississippi*, and the *Pensacola* over the bar at South-West Pass. When the *Mississippi* was dragged over, her keel ploughed a furrow a foot deep in the sand and mud. The *Colorado* could not be got in at all.

The masts of the mortar schooners were dressed with bushes, so that they could not be distinguished from the trees by the shore along which they were anchored. Lieutenant F. H. Gerdes, of the Coast Survey, prepared an accurate map, which enabled the mortar men to fire, with a computed aim, on the forts which they could not see. They began firing April 18th, and kept it up unremittingly, day and night, for six days. The men in the forts called the great shells "Porter's aërolites," which dropped among them steadily at the rate of one every ninety seconds. As the shells exploded they demolished buildings, broke the levee and let in water, and killed or wounded about fifty men. Six thousand shells were thrown, a weight of about 850 tons, sixteen tons of iron for every man that was injured. But all this furious bombardment failed to ruin the forts or silence their guns. Farragut, at the outset, had said that he had no faith in the efficacy of the mortars; but they had been engaged before he was called to the command, and he accepted them.

While the bombardment was in progress a new element came into the contest. The Confederates had

loaded several flat-boats with dry wood, over which they poured tar and turpentine, and they now set fire to them and let them float down the stream. But boats' crews were sent out from the fleet, who grappled them with hooks and either towed them to the shore or guided them past the fleet and then left them to float out to sea.

Farragut's plan was to run by the forts, pouring as much shot into them as possible while he was passing, and then attack the Confederate vessels and, after capturing or destroying them, steam up to the city and lay it under his guns. In issuing his orders to the fleet, he gave minute instructions for every contingency that could be anticipated. A few of these will indicate his minute knowledge of seamanship and his care to make every possible preparation for victory: "Trim your vessel a few inches by the head [that is, stow the contents in such a way that the bow will sink a little deeper than the stern], so that if she touches bottom she will not swing head down the river." "Have light Jacob-ladders made, to throw over the side for the use of the carpenters in stopping shot-holes, who are to be supplied with pieces of inch board, lined with felt, and ordinary nails." "Have a kedge [anchor] in the mizzen chains on the quarter, with a hawser bent and leading through in the stern chock, ready for any emergency; also grapnels in boats, ready to tow off fire-ships." "Have many tubs of water about the decks, both for extinguishing fire and for drinking." "You will have a spare hawser ready, and when ordered to take in tow your next astern do so, keeping the hawser slack so long as the ship can maintain her own position, having a care not to foul the propeller." In accordance with every wise man's

rule, to take a good suggestion, wherever it comes from, he asked his men to exercise their own wits for the occasion; and the sailors originated several wise precautions. As the attack was to be in the night, they painted the decks white, to enable them to find things. They got out all the spare chains, and hung them up and down the sides of the vessels at the places where they would protect the machinery from the enemy's shot.

The hour set for starting was three-thirty o'clock A.M., April 24th—just before moonrise. In the night of the 20th two gunboats had gone up the river, and a boat's crew from one of them, under Lieutenant Charles H. B. Caldwell, boarded one of the hulks and cut the chain, making a sufficient opening for the fleet to pass through. They were subjected to a heavy fire, but escaped without loss. At midnight of the 23d the Lieutenant went up again, to make sure that the way was still open; and this time the Confederates not only fired on him but sent down burning rafts and lighted great piles of wood which they had prepared near the ends of the chain. The hour of moonrise was no longer important, as it was light as day for miles around. At two o'clock two red lanterns at the peak of the flagship gave the signal for action, and at half-past three, after an early breakfast, the fleet was in motion.

Porter's gunboats and the sloop *Portsmouth* went upstream far enough to engage the water-battery of Fort Jackson and thus draw off some of the fire to which the fleet would be subjected.

The first division consisted of eight ships—*Cayuga*, *Pensacola*, *Mississippi*, *Oneida*, *Varuna*, *Katahdin*, *Kineo*, and *Wissahickon*. It was commanded by Captain Theodorus Bailey in his flagship the gunboat

Cayuga, to which he had been assigned when his own ship, the *Colorado*, proved too large to be taken in over the bar.

This division steamed up deliberately, in perfect order, passed through the opening in the chain, paid no attention to the fire from Fort Jackson, made direct for St. Philip, swept its bastions with a broadside of grape and canister from every ship, and in ten minutes had passed out of its range and was among eleven Confederate vessels. Three of them attacked the *Cayuga*, which sent an eleven-inch shot through one, when she ran aground and burst into flames. Another was driven off by the fire of the swivel gun; and Bailey was preparing to board the third when the *Oneida* and the *Varuna* came to his assistance. The *Oneida* ran at high speed into a Confederate vessel, cutting it almost in two, fired into others, and then went to the assistance of the *Varuna*, which had been rammed by two of the enemy and had been run ashore, where she sank in a few minutes. But she had sold her life dearly; for she had exploded a shell in the boiler of one enemy, driven another ashore, and so crippled a third that it was obliged to surrender to the *Oneida*. The *Pensacola* passed slowly by the forts, doing much execution with her rifled guns but also suffering considerable loss, the heaviest in the fleet—thirty-seven men. In the open field men can often dodge a cannon ball; but when it comes in at the port-hole of a ship it can sweep away a whole gun's crew, none of whom could see it coming. In an action like this the men are under the highest excitement, every nerve is sensitive, every muscle tense, and when a ball strikes one it shatters him as if he were of glass, and fragments are scattered over the deck. The *Mississippi*, following next, was struck by

the ram *Manassas*, and the blow injured her machinery. But she riddled the ram with shot and set it on fire, and it drifted away and was blown up. The three remaining vessels of this division—*Katahdin*, *Kineo*, and *Wissahickon*—ran by the forts, the first two putting shots into the ironclad and the ram, and followed their leaders up the river.

The second division consisted of three sloops,—*Hartford*, *Brooklyn*, and *Richmond*,—the flagship leading as they steamed upstream at a short interval after the first division. The *Hartford* swept the forts with a heavy fire, and received one almost as heavy in return. She was the special target of the enemy. In avoiding a fire-raft she ran aground on a shoal; and she was hardly off when another was pushed against her and set her on fire. Part of the crew were detailed to put out the fire, while the others continued the steady work of the guns. The fire was soon extinguished and the ship was afloat again, when, as she proceeded upstream through the thick clouds of smoke lighted at short intervals by the flashes from the guns, a steamer full of men was discovered bearing down upon her as if with the intention of boarding. At once a ready gunner of the *Hartford* planted a large shell in the steamer, which exploded and the craft disappeared. It never was known what became of her. The *Brooklyn*, not skilfully piloted, got out of her course and ran into one of the hulks, but got through the chain, and soon met a large Confederate steamer. She gave it a broadside that set it on fire, and then poured such a rain of shot across the bastions of St. Philip that they were cleared at once, and by the flashes the gunners were seen running to shelter. A gunboat that attacked the *Brooklyn* received eleven shells, all of which exploded, and then

she ran ashore in flames. The *Richmond* went through firing her guns steadily and suffering small loss because she was very well provided with splinter netting.

[The third division, led by Captain Henry H. Bell in the *Sciota*, included also the *Iroquois*, *Kennebec*, *Pinola*, *Itasca*, and *Winona*—all gunboats. The *Sciota*, after passing the forts, firing as she went, burned two steamboats and sent a boat's crew to receive the surrender of an armed steamer that was fast aground. The *Iroquois* ran by very near Fort Jackson without damage, but was subjected to a destructive fire from St. Philip and was raked by the *McCrea* with grape-shot. She then drove off that antagonist with an eleven-inch shell and a stand of canister, and then ran through a group of gunboats, giving them broadsides as she passed. Her loss was heavy. The *Pinola* steamed up regularly in line, firing her eleven-inch and rifled guns at the flashes seen through the smoke from Fort Jackson, then passed over toward St. Philip, where, in the light of blazing rafts, she was a fair mark for its guns. She sent a few shells into the Confederate gunboats, and was the last vessel that passed the forts. The *Kennebec* became entangled in the rafts, and did not get free for several hours. The *Itasca* received a shot in her boiler and was obliged to drop downstream. The *Winona* got astray among the hulks and was detained there till it was too late to follow the fleet successfully. A few shots from Fort Jackson swept away the entire crew of her rifled gun except one man, and then the water-battery of St. Philip opened on her at close range, and she was prudently run downstream out of the fight.

Captain Bailey, in the *Cayuga*, still in the lead, kept on up the river and captured a regiment that was encamped at the quarantine station. The next morn-

The Capture of the Crescent City 99

ing the Chalmette batteries, three miles below New Orleans, were silenced by fire from the sloops, and then the city itself was laid under their guns.

The fleet had lost thirty-seven men killed and a hundred and forty-seven wounded.

At noon Captain Bailey, accompanied only by his executive officer, Lieutenant George H. Perkins, went ashore, met Mayor Moore, and demanded the surrender of the city and that the State flag be taken down from the City Hall. They raised the National flag over the Mint, but the Mayor refused to take down his flag or surrender the city. Lieutenant Perkins, in a letter written at the time, gave a vivid description of the incident:

Among the crowd were many women and children, and the women were shaking rebel flags and being rude and noisy. As we advanced, the mob followed us in a very excited state. They gave three cheers for Jeff Davis and Beauregard, and three groans for Lincoln. Then they began to throw things at us and shout, "Hang them! Hang them!" We reached the City Hall in safety, and there found the Mayor and Council. The Mayor said he had nothing to do with the city, as it was under martial law, and we were obliged to wait till General Lovell could arrive. In about half an hour this gentleman appeared. He had about fifteen thousand troops under his command, and said he would "never surrender," but would withdraw his troops from the city as soon as possible, when it would fall into the hands of the Mayor, and he could do as he pleased with it.

The mob outside had by this time become infuriated. They kicked at the doors and swore they would have us out and hang us. Every person about us who had any sense of responsibility was frightened for our safety. As soon as the mob found out that General Lovell was not going to

surrender they swore they would have us out anyway; but Pierre Soulé and some others went out and made speeches to them and kept them on one side of the building while we went out at the other and were driven to the wharf in a close carriage.

At night, by order of the authorities of the city, fire was set to everything, except buildings, that could be of use to the victors. A dozen steamboats, as many cotton ships, heaps of coal, a dry-dock, fifteen thousand bales of cotton, and an unfinished ironclad, all were destroyed. Barrels were rolled out and broken open, the levee ran with molasses, and poor people carried away sugar in their baskets and aprons. The Governor asked the people of the State to burn their cotton, and in response two hundred and fifty thousand bales were destroyed.

Farragut appointed eleven o'clock of the morning of the 26th as the hour "for all the officers and crews of the fleet to return thanks to Almighty God for his great goodness and mercy in permitting us to pass through the events of the last two days with so little loss of life and blood."

The Mayor kept up a futile and apparently foolish correspondence with Farragut, the explanation probably being that he was himself afraid of being killed by the mob if he made a formal surrender of the city. But some of Porter's mortar boats in a bay in the rear of Fort Jackson and General Butler's troops in the rear of St. Philip soon compelled both forts to surrender; and Farragut sent Captain Bell with two hundred and fifty marines into the city to take possession of the public buildings and protect them. On May 1st Butler with his troops marched in, and the city remained in Federal

UNIV. OF CALIFORNIA
The Capture of the Crescent City 101

hands throughout the war. General Butler repressed the turbulence, hanged the leader of a mob that had torn down the United States flag from the Mint and trampled it in the mire, cleaned the city and averted a pestilence.

At the first news of this victory few in the North appreciated its importance—Farragut “had only run by the forts.” But when the full story became known, it was seen that in entering a river with sea-going ships, fighting forts, fire-rafts, rams, and a fleet, and conquering them all, he had accomplished a more difficult task than ever fell to the lot of Nelson or any other great admiral. It was made the theme of a noble poem, *The River Fight*—by Henry Howard Brownell, whom Dr. Holmes justly named “our battle laureate.” And Brownell was then attached to Farragut’s staff and was with him in his next great achievement, which he celebrated in an equally fine poem entitled *The Bay Fight*. He was one of the very few poets that have actually taken part in the battles they have celebrated.

The Campaign on the Peninsula

April-June, 1862

AFTER the disastrous battle of Bull Run, the President and the people looked for some one to bring order out of the military chaos at Washington and construct an army that could be used effectively against the enemies of the Republic. General George B. McClellan, a graduate of West Point, who had served in the war with Mexico, had been sent to study the military operations in the Crimea, had been successful in several small battles in West Virginia, and who stood high in the opinion of General Scott, was naturally the man to be chosen for the task. On July 27th he was placed in command of the Army of the Potomac, and on November 1st, when General Scott retired, he was made General-in-Chief, commanding all the armies. He planned to have all act in concert, so far as possible, and issued instructions to General Buell of the Department of the Ohio, to General Halleck of the Department of Missouri, to General Thomas W. Sherman at Port Royal, and to General Butler at New Orleans.

For himself he assumed the immediate command of the troops in and about Washington—not many more than fifty thousand at that time—and proceeded to organize and train an efficient army. The first thing to do was to provide for the safety of the capital; the

next, to plan a campaign against the enemy. The army was increased rapidly by the arrival of new regiments, which were formed into brigades, encamped in the suburbs, drilled and disciplined. At the same time a general staff was appointed, and the organization was complete. The means appeared to be ample, the preparations perfect, and confident expectations were entertained of a successful and probably decisive movement against the Confederate capital and its defenders in the spring of 1862.

The autumn and winter had been spent in careful preparation, yet in February General McClellan reported to the President that he was not ready. He wished to leave a large force to defend Washington, place a strong corps of observation along the Potomac, and then move against Richmond with one hundred and fifty thousand men, believing that the Confederate force there numbered as many, though in truth it was not more than half as large. Mr. Lincoln, with all his wonderful patience, grew weary of the delay. In a consultation with Generals McDowell and Franklin and some members of the Cabinet, he declared that if something was not done soon the bottom would be out of the whole affair; and if General McClellan did not want to use the army, he would like to borrow it, provided he could see how it could be made to do something.


Several routes for the march were possible—one by way of Fredericksburg; one down the Potomac, up the Rappahannock to Urbana, and thence across country about forty miles to Richmond; and still another from Fort Monroe up the peninsula between the James and York rivers, with base of supplies at West Point on the York. For a long time General

McClellan refused to disclose his plan, even to the President—if he really had any plan; but at last, in a letter, he set forth his ideas. He proposed to move his army down the Potomac on transports, land at or near Fort Monroe, and march up the peninsula to attack Richmond on the north and east sides. Mr. Lincoln did not approve this plan, principally because it would consume much time in preparation; but when he found that the highest officers of the army favoured it, he gave it his sanction—considering that any general would probably fail if sent to execute a plan that he disliked—and then addressed himself to the task of hastening the movement. Yet he himself retarded the opening of the campaign by delaying the order for collecting the means of transportation.

While this was in preparation General Johnston evacuated Manassas and Centreville and placed his army before Richmond.

Four hundred vessels were required for moving McClellan's army and its impedimenta. He had one hundred and twenty-one thousand men, with fourteen thousand animals and forty-four batteries, besides ambulances, pontoons, baggage-wagons, and telegraph apparatus. Just before the embarkation the army was divided into four corps, the command of which was given to Generals Irvin McDowell, Edwin V. Sumner, Samuel P. Heintzelman, and Erasmus D. Keyes.

Another element that entered into the general problem of the war at this time was the appointment, in January, of Edwin M. Stanton to succeed Simon Cameron as Secretary of War. Mr. Stanton, then forty-seven years of age, was a lawyer by profession, a man of great intellect, unfailing nerve, exhaustless energy, and devoted patriotism. He had some traits that made



him personally disagreeable to subordinates; but there was no question of his thorough loyalty and his determination to find or make a way to bring the war to a successful result without the slightest regard to the individual interests of himself or any one else.

One division of the army embarked on March 17th, and the others followed in quick succession. When General McClellan reached Fort Monroe, April 2d, fifty-eight thousand men and one hundred guns had arrived. With this force he at once moved on Yorktown, the place made famous by the surrender of Cornwallis eighty years before. This is about twenty miles from Fort Monroe, and, considering the deep water of Warwick River, is at the narrowest part of the peninsula, while the narrowest place in York River is between Yorktown and Gloucester Point.

The Confederates had constructed a line of earthworks from Yorktown to Warwick River, and this line was held by General John B. Magruder with thirteen thousand effective men. McClellan, supposing that Johnston's entire army was within these defences, sat down before them and dug trenches for regular siege operations by parallels. As the remainder of his army arrived, he added it to his besieging force. But at the last moment McDowell's corps and Blenker's division had been detached, to be retained for strengthening the defence of Washington, though already seventy thousand troops were there or within call. This action was caused by the erratic movements of Stonewall Jackson in the Shenandoah Valley, though he had been defeated near Winchester, late in March, by a force under General James Shields. This detention of McDowell's corps was a sore disappointment to McClellan, though in truth the forces that he had in hand were

ample for the work before him, had he not constantly and enormously overrated the strength of the enemy.

On the other hand, General Johnston had to contend with a similar difficulty. He wished to bring together before Richmond all the detachments that were then at Norfolk, Virginia, in the Carolinas, and in Georgia, that with a large army he might suddenly attack McClellan when he should have moved seventy-five miles up the peninsula. But the Secretary of War and General Lee opposed his plan, and Mr. Davis therefore rejected it.

When McClellan had spent nearly a month before Yorktown, and was just ready with his siege guns to open fire, he found (May 3d) that the enemy had quietly gone away, leaving "Quaker guns" (wooden logs, on wheels) in the works.

Pursuit was prompt and rapid, and McClellan's advance overtook Johnston's rear-guard at Williamsburg, twelve miles from Yorktown. Brisk skirmishing began at once, reënforcements arrived for both sides, and a pitched battle was fought, May 4th and 5th. The place had been well fortified long before. The divisions of Generals Hooker and Smith attacked the strongest earthwork, pushed up their batteries, and rendered it untenable. Then Hooker was attacked by heavy lines of infantry, while his left wing was menaced. He lost seventeen hundred men and five guns, but held his ground until he was reënforced. The delay was caused by heavy rain and deep mud. Later that day Hancock's brigade, of Smith's division, made a detour to the right and came upon some redoubts that were unoccupied. The Confederates had forgotten them, or those on that part of the line never had known of them; and when they advanced to attack Hancock they found his men in

these works and lost heavily in the assault. Then the Nationals, sixteen hundred of them, leaped over the works, bore down upon the Confederates in a bayonet charge, and routed and scattered them. In the night McClellan pushed forward heavy reinforcements, and the Confederates retreated to join their main army. They left four hundred of their wounded, and carried away about that number of prisoners. The total National loss in this battle was about twenty-two hundred; the Confederate, about eighteen hundred.

General William B. Franklin's division, of McDowell's Corps, was sent to McClellan, and after the battle of Williamsburg it was sent to West Point, at the head of York River, where he established a base of supplies. The main body of the army soon followed, passing West Point and going as far north as White House, on the Pamunkey, where McClellan expected to be joined by the remainder of McDowell's corps, and then move westward toward Richmond, which was about twenty miles distant. Half-way thither he reached the Chickahominy, threw his left wing across that stream, and with his right fought small battles at Hanover Junction and Mechanicsville, to clear the way for the expected arrival of McDowell. But just then Jackson made another sudden raid down the Shenandoah Valley, and McDowell was held back to go in pursuit of him. That valley is so situated that a Confederate force moving down it was brought nearer to Washington as it advanced; while a National force moving up the valley was carried farther from Richmond.

The next move for the Confederates was so obvious that a much less able general than Johnston could not have failed to see it. While McClellan's army was divided by the Chickahominy, Johnston planned to

attack the left wing, which was within six miles of Richmond; and he was favoured by a heavy rain in the night of May 30th, which swelled the stream and swept away most of the bridges, thus making it difficult for reinforcements to come from the other wing.

Johnston attacked next day, striking first General Silas Casey's division of Keyes's corps, which occupied some unfinished works. Casey's men were almost surprised by an attack so sudden that they hardly had time to drop their shovels and get their muskets. But they made a stout resistance to repeated assaults in which the Confederates suffered seriously. After a time a large detachment of the enemy, making a detour, gained a position in the rear of the works, when they could be held no longer. The Nationals had a hard struggle to hold their line at all, for reinforcements came but slowly. They would have been cut off and captured had not a part of Johnston's plan failed. He would have thrown in a heavy flanking force between them and the river; but there was a delay of several hours before it could be put in motion, and meanwhile McClellan saw the danger and averted it. He ordered Sumner to cross the river and protect Casey's right wing. That veteran soldier had seen the necessity and anticipated the order, and when this came it found his corps drawn out from camp and ready to cross at once. There was but one bridge that could be used, and even that had lost many of its supports, while the approaches were under water. Yet the column marched on unflinching. The bridge was steadied by the weight of the men, and, though it swayed and undulated with their tread above and the movement of the water below, they all crossed without accident.

Johnston led the flank attack in person, but Sumner

The Campaign on the Peninsula 109

was in time to meet it. Successive charges by the Confederates all failed, and a counter charge at dusk cleared the field and drove off the last of them in confusion. Johnston received wounds that laid him up for a long time. This battle is known as Fair Oaks and Seven Pines, the right of the National line having been at the former place, and its left at the latter. The National loss was more than five thousand men; the Confederate, nearly seven thousand.

The appearance of the field after the battle, which was then the bloodiest that had been fought at the east, is thus described by a participant, whose realistic picture brings out the sorrows of war, which too often are obscured by its glories:

Monday, June 2d, we visited the battlefield and rode from place to place on the scene of conflict. We have often wished that we could efface from our memory the observations of that day. Details were burying the dead in trenches or heaping the earth upon them where they lay. The ground was saturated with gore. The intrenchments, the slashing, the rifle-pits, the thicket, many of the tents, were filled with dead. In the Fair Oaks farmhouse the dead, the dying, and the severely wounded lay together. Along the Williamsburg road, on each side of it, was a long Confederate grave. An old barn, near where the 104th Pennsylvania volunteers first formed, was filled with our dead and wounded; and farther to the right, near the station, beside an old building, lay thirteen Michigan soldiers with their blankets over them and their names pinned on their caps. Near the railroad, by a log house, the dead and wounded were packed together. Both were motionless, but you could distinguish them by the livid blackness of the dead. We could trace the path of our regiment, from the wood-pile around by the intrenchments to its camp, by the dead still unburied. Those that had died immediately could not be

touched, but were covered with earth where they lay. The wounded who crawled or were carried to the barns, tents, and houses, and who died subsequently, were buried in trenches. Our little tent was still standing, though pierced by several bullets. Beside it lay two dead men of the 98th whom we could not identify; for the sun, rain, and wind had changed their countenances. On the bed lay a dead Confederate. At the left of our camp, in the wood, where the 81st, 85th, and 92d New York volunteers and Peck's brigade fought with Huger, the dead were promiscuously mixed together and lay in sickening and frightful proximity—strong and weak, old and young, officer and private, horse and man—dead or wounded and in the agonies of death, lay where they fell, and furnished, excepting the swaths on the Williamsburg road, the darkest corner of that day's panorama.

Colonel William Kreutzer, commanding the 98th New York regiment, which went into that battle with 385 men, and lost 85, gives a vivid description of some of its incidents:

The whole of Company A went to work on the road near the Grapevine bridge. Details were made for men to make abatis and work on the breastworks. Company A left its rifles in camp, and lost them. When it rejoined the regiment, on the 1st of June, it appeared like a company of pioneers, or sappers and miners, carrying axes, shovels, and picks. Soon after one o'clock our pickets began to come in sight, retiring through the woods and slashing before the enemy. The skirmish line of the enemy pursued them. We could see both parties jumping over the logs and making their way through the bushes, and hear at intervals the sharp report of their rifles. A little later a dense mass of men, about two rods wide, headed by half a dozen horsemen, is seen marching toward us on the Williamsburg road.

The Campaign on the Peninsula III

They move in quick time, carry their arms on their shoulders, have flags and banners, and drummers to beat the step. Our three batteries open simultaneously with all their power. Our regiment pours its volleys into the slashing and into the column as fast as it can load and fire. The 104th Pennsylvania volunteers aims at the column and at the skirmishers approaching its right front and flank. That regiment has no slashings in its front. The cleared field allowed the enemy to concentrate his fire upon it; while that regiment, being too near the column of attack, interfered with the range and efficiency of our batteries behind. As the light troops pressed upon it, Colonel Davis ordered it to charge them at the double-quick. The regiment rushed forward with spirit and jumped over a rail fence with a shout. But it was met so resolutely and with such a galling fire that it fell back in disorder and did not appear on the field as an organization again during the day.

When the 104th fell back it cleared the field opposite the advancing column and gave the 98th a better opportunity to fire upon the foe as he moved on deliberately. The charging column staggers, stops, resumes its march, breaks in two, fills up its gaps, and, sure and steady, moves like the tramp of fate. Thinned, scattered, broken, it yet passes our right and presses on for the batteries. As it passes we pour our volleys into it with no uncertain aim, no random fire. The gaps we make, the swaths we mow, can be seen plainly, for we are not more than a dozen rods away. The men behind press on those before, and the head of the column finally reaches the redoubt. One of the mounted leaders ascends the parapet and is shot with a pistol by an artillery officer. Then the whole column, severed, broken, staggering, sinks into the earth. With the aid of the rifle-pits and the breastworks, the 98th has cleared the road.

Up to this time the 98th has not lost a man by the enemy, but our batteries behind it have killed or wounded half a score. Now there is a lull in the battle; the coast looks

clear; the foe may not appear again. We look at the main road; it is one swath of men in grey. Down along the railroad, by Fair Oaks station, we hear but a few reports. Smith has had farther to march along the Nine-mile road, and has not yet struck our right flank. On our left, Palmer has not been attacked; Huger is not on time. Casey's division has driven back Longstreet and Hill. . . . Our batteries open. High over our heads, around us, beside us, the lead is whistling, and the iron is whizzing and hissing. Every moment has a new terror, every instant a new horror. Our men are falling fast. We leave the dead and the dying, and send the wounded to the rear. Palmer's regiment has fallen back; the enemy is on our left and rear. Colonel Durkee tries to move his regiment by the left flank back to the rifle-pits; but only a part receive the order. The enemy is getting so near, our experience in battle is so limited, our drill so imperfect, that many cannot stand upon the order of our going. Durkee passes the rifle-pits with those that follow him and goes to our old camp. The writer rallies a part of the regiment around the flag at the half-deserted intrenchments; and there we use, officers and men, the sharpshooter's practice against the enemy. We can mark the effect of our fire; no rifle is discharged in vain. Many of the men could pick a squirrel from the tallest trees in Wayne and Franklin counties, and they load and fire with merriment and good nature.

For some weeks after Fair Oaks heavy and continued rains rendered almost impossible any movement by either army. General Alexander S. Webb writes: "The ground, which consisted of alternate layers of reddish clay and quicksand, had turned into a vast swamp, and the guns in battery sank into the earth by their own weight." Even in better weather the Chickahominy was bordered by malarious swamps, which are said to have cost McClellan almost as many

men as fell by the bullets of the enemy. He kept his troops at work intrenching, while he was sending despatches to Washington, now promising an immediate movement and now calling for reinforcements. He especially desired to have McDowell's corps of forty thousand men, and the Secretary of War was willing to give it to him, if it could be sent by way of Fredericksburg and take its place on his right wing, so as to continue the protection of Washington. But he declared that he would rather not have it unless it could be absolutely under his command.

Though he was so near to Richmond that the authorities there were in fear of its capture, his army was in a seriously faulty position. His base was at White House on the Pamunkey; a part of his army was on the left bank of the Chickahominy, and the remainder on the right bank, the stream was uncertain, and its bridges could not be depended upon. The force on the right, or south, bank of the river was deemed insufficient for the capture of the city, while he feared to uncover his base by uniting to it that which was on the north bank. Just when he first contemplated correcting this error by changing his base to the James, is not known, but on the 12th of June something happened that hastened that movement.

When General Johnston was temporarily retired because of his wounds at Fair Oaks, his command devolved upon General Gustavus W. Smith, who two days later was superseded by General Robert E. Lee, who retained this command till the war ended in his surrender. The plan that he had opposed and caused President Davis to reject when Johnston was in command—bringing large bodies of troops from the Carolinas, Georgia, and the Shenandoah Valley, to form a

8

massive army before Richmond—he now adopted for himself. Johnston enumerates reënforcements that were given to him to the number of fifty-three thousand and says he then had the largest Confederate army that ever fought. Its total strength was stated officially at 80,762. This probably included only the men that actually carried muskets or worked the guns, excluding all officers, musicians, teamsters, and mechanics; for that was the method of counting and reporting in the Confederate army. McClellan's total force, including every man that drew pay, was reported, the last week in June, at 92,500.

As Lee wished to know the strength of the position of McClellan's right wing, he sent out, June 12th, General J. E. B. Stuart, with twelve hundred cavalry, to reconnoitre. This officer, popularly called "Jeb Stuart," used to sport a gay costume, with yellow sash and black plume, wore gold spurs, and rode a white horse. He was a dashing soldier, and was the hero of many notable exploits, till he was killed in the last summer of the war. He was ordered to go as far only as Hanover Old Church; but at that place he had a fight with cavalry, and as he supposed dispositions would be made to capture him he kept on and made the entire circuit of McClellan's army. He rebuilt a bridge on the Chickahominy, and reached Richmond unmolested. This exploit alarmed McClellan, who began to move toward Richmond and at the same time to make preparations for changing his base. He pushed back the Confederate forces that faced his left wing, and advanced his outposts to a position within four miles of the Confederate capital.

Lee now wrote to Jackson: "Unless McClellan can be driven out of his intrenchments, he will move by positions, under cover of his heavy guns, within shelling

distance of Richmond." To give the impression that there was to be a great movement in the Shenandoah Valley, Lee put two brigades on the cars and sent them off in that direction, taking care that the operation should be seen by some prisoners who were about to be exchanged. Of course they carried the news that Jackson was thus being reënforced. Of all who were concerned on the National side, Secretary Stanton alone saw through the trick. He telegraphed to McClellan that neither Banks, nor McDowell, nor Frémont could learn anything of Jackson's movements, but he himself believed that Jackson was going to Richmond—which was the fact. The obvious counter move was, to send McDowell's whole corps to McClellan at once, but only McCall's division was sent. This took position on his right, near Mechanicsville.

Leaving thirty thousand men in the defences of Richmond, Lee crossed the Chickahominy with the commands of Longstreet, A. P. Hill, and D. H. Hill—about thirty-five thousand—intending to be joined promptly by Jackson with twenty-five thousand more and with this overwhelming force to fall upon McClellan's right, which numbered about twenty thousand commanded by General Fitz John Porter. He then could cut off McClellan's connection with his base and either capture a large part of his army or drive him from the peninsula.

Fortunately for the Nationals, Jackson was behind time. The other Confederate commanders became impatient, believing that if the movement were known to McClellan he would at once advance his left and capture Richmond. Indeed, it was said that such a move was so feared that the Government archives were packed up ready for instant removal.

On June 26th A. P. Hill's corps drove the small force out of Mechanicsville and then advanced to McCall's position on Beaver Dam Creek. This position was too strong to be attacked in front with any prospect of success, and therefore the attacks were directed against the flanks. Desperate charges were made again and again, yet with no result but loss. McCall's artillery was so well served that the Confederates were struck down to the number of three thousand, while McCall lost fewer than three hundred men. His success may be accounted for by the fact that, besides four batteries with twenty-two guns, he had twelve regiments of Pennsylvania infantry under Generals Reynolds, Meade, and Ord, all of whom rose to high command.

That night the heavy guns and a large part of the baggage were taken across the Chickahominy as the first movement for a change of base; and the next morning Porter fell back to a strong position on a range of low hills, where he might hold back the enemy till the stores could be taken across the river. McClellan sent him five thousand more men, which gave him a total force of about twenty-four thousand with which to withstand the onset of fifty-five thousand. Longstreet and the Hills, appreciating the strength of Porter's position and warned by their experience with McCall, were not willing to attack till Jackson arrived.

Early in the afternoon A. P. Hill attacked Porter's centre, and after two hours of fighting was driven off with heavy loss. Two assaults on his right wing were equally unsuccessful. The failure was due partly to the fact that the attack was made largely with new and untried troops who had been brought up hurriedly from the coast. The Confederate General W. H. C. Whiting, of Jackson's command, in his report tells what

met his observation as they came upon the scene: "Men were leaving the field in every direction and in great disorder. Two regiments, one from South Carolina and one from Louisiana, were actually marching back from the fire. Men were skulking from the front in a shameful manner."

When Jackson's men arrived—they were mostly seasoned troops—a heavy assault was made on Porter's entire line at once. The Confederates formed in the woods and then advanced to the attack in strong columns, giving the Confederate yell, which was answered by the Union cheer and the welcome of deadly volleys. The National troops, not yet in the habit of throwing up effective intrenchments quickly, as they learned to do later in the war, had only such frail breastworks as could be made from rails, logs, and heaps of knapsacks. Yet they stood up to the bloody task, while guns were captured and recaptured, cannoneers being shot down beside them, and the musketry was doing its deadly work on both sides. The line was not broken till sunset, when the left centre gave way and then the whole force slowly retired. Two regiments were captured, and twenty-two guns were finally lost. In the night Porter crossed the river and destroyed the bridges.

The strange fact that one corps was left alone to fight the greater part of Lee's army—probably three times its numbers—is accounted for by movements on the south side of the Chickahominy. General Magruder, left in command of the immediate defences of Richmond, had troops enough to make a demonstration that appeared to portend a serious attack on that side of the river. This had its intended effect, and both Sumner and Franklin were unwilling to send any considerable reinforcements across to Porter. At the same time,

Magruder felt that the Confederate capital was in imminent peril. He writes:

I received instructions enjoining the utmost vigilance. I passed the night without sleep. Had McClellan massed his whole force in column and advanced it against any point in our line of battle, though the head of his column would have suffered greatly, its momentum would have insured him success, and the occupation of our works about Richmond, and consequently of the city, might have been his reward.

This action gets its best known name from Gaines's Mills, which stood near the field. The total National loss was six thousand men. The Confederate loss, probably at least as large, never was properly reported. Some of the wounded lay four days uncared for. Two years later Grant and Lee contended over this same ground, in what is called the battle of Cold Harbor; hence the action described above is sometimes called the first battle of Cold Harbor.

Lee and Jackson now made two mistakes, one of which was especially fortunate for McClellan. They supposed they had been fighting his whole army, and they assumed that in retreating he would simply retrace the route by which he had marched up the peninsula. They did not dream that he would strike across to the James and establish there a new base. Hence in the pursuit they took the wrong road and lost a day, which was a valuable gain for him. While they remained on the left bank of the Chickahominy, he, on the right bank, got through the swamp roads with his five thousand loaded wagons and twenty-five hundred head of cattle. General Casey's division, which had charge of the stores at White House and

West Point, after all the wagons were loaded, destroyed the immense remainder of the supplies, except such as could be hurriedly put upon transports. Trains of cars filled with provisions and ammunition were put under full head of steam and run off the tracks into the river. Great quantities also were burned. Millions of rations and hundreds of tons of fixed ammunition were thus lost. Casey then embarked his men and steamed down York River and up the James to the new base.

When General Magruder learned that the National army was crossing to the James, he moved out to attack it and struck the rear-guard at Allen's farm. Here the corps of Sumner and Heintzelman had taken position fronting Richmond, their lines crossing the railroad, and they had a battery of four guns. Magruder had a heavy rifled gun mounted on a platform car, with some armoured protection; and attacking with this, a battery of field artillery, and all his infantry, he was confident of success. But his men met unexpectedly a very hot reception and a stubborn resistance. He then went personally in search of reënforcements, but could not get them, as the great body of Lee's army was still moving down the north bank of the river, thinking to overtake McClellan. Magruder's troops were unsuccessful in three attacks, and he then withdrew, complaining that he might have achieved victory if Lee had given him more men.

Sumner and Franklin next fell back to Savage's Station, where they occupied the approach to the only road through White Oak Swamp, which they must use to follow the main body of the army. Here, in the afternoon, Magruder attacked again. But the fire of six well served batteries met every charge and broke it. At last he attacked along the whole line, rushing

his entire force against a heavy fire of musketry and artillery and continuing his attempt for half an hour, but without success. Then the Nationals assumed the offensive, made several charges and broke the Confederate line, which gave way in confusion. They had lost about four thousand men, while the Nationals lost about three thousand.

Hasty preparations were then made for continuing the retreat to the James. A large quantity of food and clothing was burned, and the hospital containing about twenty-five hundred sick or wounded men, together with the hospital staff and an abundance of supplies, was left for the enemy. Jackson arrived and took possession of them the next morning. He had been delayed by the necessity of building a bridge. He then joined in the pursuit of McClellan's army.

In the night of the 29th General Keyes's corps went forward and prepared a position near Malvern Hill, where the gunboats could assist in defence. The passage from Savage's Station to the James was the most critical part of the retreat, as the moving column was liable to attack from both sides as well as from the rear. But a skilful disposition of McClellan's forces, so as to guard every road of approach, prevented serious disaster there. Jackson had got into the road through the swamp, but could not emerge from it till he had rebuilt another bridge that had been destroyed. Keyes had discovered a parallel road that served to send forward the trains while the whole column of troops was between them and the enemy. Stuart's cavalry had not yet crossed the river, while Heintzelman's corps crossed that night and took position on a large clearing known as Glendale, at Charles City Crossroads. Porter's troops had followed Keyes to the James; but the

remainder of the army was brought together in this new position.

Here, on June 30th, Longstreet and A. P. Hill came within striking distance, and a stubborn fight took place. Of ten batteries used by the Nationals, most were placed in front of the infantry, and these were largely relied on to break the charges of the enemy. The attack fell most heavily upon McCall's division, which, after its bloody fight at Gaines's Mills, had but six thousand effective men and five batteries. Here the battle began about half-past two and was continued with great fury for hours. Two batteries were driven to the rear, and when General McCall sent them forward again the guns were soon abandoned. Six companies of a Pennsylvania regiment were in advanced position, occupying two log houses and a breastwork. They were subjected first to an artillery fire and then saw a detachment of the enemy coming up a ravine in their rear, whereupon they retreated precipitately. They had lost sixty-five men. Several charges by the Confederates were repelled, while one counter-charge overran a battery and captured one hundred men of its supports; then the charging column was driven back, but it carried its prisoners with it.

A whole brigade now charged Randol's battery, going forward in wedge shape, with little order but much enthusiasm. Captain Randol was so confident of breaking it with his guns alone that he requested his supports not to fire. Every shot from the battery tore a great gap in the column, but the gaps were closed up at once and the enemy moved on with swifter step and increasing yells. They reached the battery, killed the horses, overturned the guns, and put to flight all the supports except one company. General McCall, in his report, says:

Similar charges had been previously made on Cooper's and Kern's batteries by single regiments, without success, they having recoiled before the storm of canister hurled against them. A like result was anticipated by Randol's battery, and the 4th Regiment was requested not to fire until the battery had done with them. Its gallant commander did not doubt his ability to repel the attack, and his guns did indeed mow down the advancing host; but still the gaps were closed, and the enemy came in upon a run to the very muzzles of his guns. It was a perfect torrent of men, and they were in his battery before the guns could be removed.

The one company that stood its ground when the rest of the supports were driven back was joined by men of other commands and met the onrushing enemy in a hand-to-hand fight with bayonets and clubbed muskets. But the Confederates were too many for them, bore them back by sheer weight of numbers, and then, in their enthusiasm and excitement, so far lost sight of them that the gallant company slipped through an opening in a fence and escaped capture.

At this point, General McCall, trying to rally his men, inadvertently rode into the enemy's lines and was made a prisoner. He was carried away to Richmond and was confined for several weeks in Libby Prison. He was a graduate of West Point Military Academy, and at this time was sixty years of age.

General Philip Kearny brought up his division to fill the gap made by the defeat of McCall, and succeeded in placing it properly across the road, but not till after some confusion and loss from mistaken firing among his own men. He had a good position, with sloping ground in his front, where the enemy, as they charged over it, were swept mercilessly by the shot from Thompson's

battery. Yet they closed up their ranks and pressed forward. Then the 63d Pennsylvania regiment and the 37th New York advanced to the guns and delivered such volleys as stopped the charging line. Three times this desperate attempt was made, and three times it was foiled. General Ambrose P. Hill wrote:

The charge which broke McCall's line was made by Field and Pender's divisions. The 60th and 55th Virginia captured two batteries of Napoleon guns, and the 60th crossed bayonets with the enemy, who obstinately contested their possession. About dark the enemy pressed us so hard along the whole line that my last reserve was directed to advance cautiously. It seemed that a tremendous effort was being made to turn the fortune of the battle. The volume of fire that, approaching, rolled along the line was terrific. In five minutes all firing ceased.

In the night McClellan continued his retreat to Malvern Hill, where a strong position had been prepared by his advance guard. The battle described above has five names: Charles City Crossroads, Frazier's Farm, Glendale, Nelson's Farm, and Newmarket. The Nationals captured two stands of colours, and lost two, and also lost fourteen guns. The losses in men are not known exactly.

It was Sykes's brigade of regulars, with a part of Hunt's reserve artillery, that had gone forward to occupy the position on Malvern Hill. Here, in the afternoon of June 30th, while the battle of Glendale was in progress, they were attacked by the troops of Generals Holmes and Wise. They came forward with seven thousand men and several batteries, and advanced one battery to a point within eight hundred yards of the hill. But before it could fairly begin work

about thirty of Hunt's guns concentrated their fire on it and knocked it to pieces. At the same time, a gunboat sent great shells among the infantry supports. Two caissons were exploded, and a part of the cavalry and the gunners turned in panic and rode through the infantry. The two generals agreed that it would be hopeless to send their infantry against such a position, and accordingly ordered a retreat. They did not appear again on that field.

Malvern Hill is a plateau with an altitude of about sixty feet above the surrounding plain. It is about a mile and a half long, by half a mile broad, and is bordered by swamps and a small river, with some thick patches of forest. On July 1st McClellan had his whole army in position there, disposed in a great semicircle, with the right prolonged in a broad sweep to Haxall's Landing; and his whole front bristled with artillery. Under ordinary circumstances any commander would hesitate to send his troops directly against such a formidable position. But when Lee came up both he and his army were elated from pursuing a retreating enemy and confident of victory over every obstacle. McClellan had no intrenchments; but there were inequalities of the ground that afforded considerable protection.

An artillery duel was kept up throughout the forenoon, which resulted in disabling the Confederate batteries one after another, while those on the hill suffered no serious damage.

General Webb, describing the concentration of McClellan's army for the battle of Malvern Hill, writes:

During the battle of Glendale, when McCall's division broke, many fugitives did not rejoin their command, but

passed to the rear as rapidly as possible, joining the ever-increasing column that led the way to the river and the shelter of the gunboats. These cast away everything that might impede their flight, save their arms and ammunition, and, while intent on safety, were not unprepared for resistance. When they reached a point from which the waters of the James were brought into view, and they saw the gunboats swinging at anchor, their spirits revived, discipline asserted its power, and they sought to join their commands. All through the long morning dusty and powder-stained men in close column climbed the steep Quaker road, under direction of staff officers who had carefully examined the ground.

Again he writes:

From the Crew house McClellan could overlook the movements of the enemy and see the divisions of Longstreet and Hill filing into position in the rear of Jackson. These troops had been so roughly handled the day before, and their numbers so diminished, that they required rest and took no active part in the movements of the first day. Lee, whose army was as weary with the labour of the past week as our own, felt it a necessity incumbent upon him to attack, although he was urged by some of his best officers not to press McClellan further. He and his staff were more ignorant of the roads and the approaches to the hill than our own men, who had studied the topography of the region assiduously with a view to this movement.

The signal for attack by the infantry was to be the usual yell, given by Armistead's brigade, which took the lead. But the extent of the Confederate line, on the outer circle, and the intervals in it where there were thick woods or swamps, prevented several of the organizations from hearing the signal, while others met such

a fire as stopped their advance at the very outset. Consequently, while there were gallant charges by several brigades, there was no concerted action. D. H. Hill told Jackson that the fire of isolated batteries was worse than useless, only exposing them to be destroyed in detail, and urged that a hundred guns be concentrated in firing on the National lines. Jackson ignored the suggestion and simply repeated the order to advance when the signal was given. When Hill heard shouting and heavy firing he thought that must be the signal, and ordered his men forward. They obeyed courageously, but before they could reach the crest of the hill their ranks were so shattered that they turned and fled in disorder, taking refuge in the woods. Two brigades that were sent to their assistance met the same fate.

The heaviest of the National batteries were about the Crew house, which was the key of the position—so far as any key was needed in such a situation. Here also were some rifle-pits, with slashings in front, and a strong force of infantry. This part of the line was assailed by the troops of Magruder and Armistead, who did all that men could do against such a position; but, like those of D. H. Hill, they were mowed down, demoralized, and routed in panic. The rank and file of the Confederates recognized the hopelessness of their task before their officers would admit it. "Come on, come on, my men," shouted one Confederate colonel, with the grim humour of a soldier; "do you want to live for ever?"—a question that was susceptible of two interpretations. A ravine near the left centre of McClellan's line promised something in the way of a practicable approach for the Confederates; but here also they were met by more resistance than they could overcome. The brunt of the most serious attacks had

been borne by the divisions of Couch and Morell, of the corps of Keyes and Porter; and General Webb, who was an eye-witness, asserts that "never for one instant was the Union line broken or their guns in danger." The result of the battle was due first to the advantageous position held by McClellan, and second to the abundance of his artillery and the masterly way in which it was handled. As soon as any battery exhausted its ammunition another was ready to take its place; and to this was added a steady fire of the infantry.

Darkness put an end to the fighting, when the Confederates withdrew; and in the night McClellan moved his army seven miles farther back, to Harrison's Landing, where the river was wider and the gunboats could give better protection from batteries on the other side.

Here ended the campaign on the Peninsula. The losses in the Seven Days' Battles—as they are commonly called—were 15,249 for the Nationals, and somewhat more than 19,000 for the Confederates.

Pope's Campaign in Virginia

August, 1862

WHILE McClellan was still before Richmond the Government determined to unite in one command the corps of Banks, Frémont, and McDowell, which were moving about ineffectually between Washington and the Shenandoah Valley. General John Pope, who had captured Island No. 10, was called from the West and made commander of the new organization, which was named the Army of Virginia. Frémont refused to serve under a commander who had once been his subordinate, and his corps was then given to General Franz Sigel.

This army contained about thirty-eight thousand men, besides those in the fortifications of Washington. On assuming the command General Pope issued a most unfortunate general order. It had three capital defects: it boasted of his own prowess at the West, it underrated the enemy, and it contained a touch of sarcasm pointed at McClellan, with whose army his own was to coöperate. When it became evident that these two commanders could not act in harmony, or support each other heartily, the President called General Henry W. Halleck from the West to be General-in-chief and command them both. This appointment was probably the most serious mistake ever made by Mr. Lincoln.

Halleck had an abundance of military learning, and there could be no doubt of his patriotic intentions; but in practical warfare he proved to be little more than an habitual obstructor. He had been the bane of the Western armies, preventing them from following up their victories, and he had almost driven General Grant out of the service. From the day he assumed command at Washington (July 12th) the troubles at the East became more complicated.

McClellan had a strong position at Harrison's Landing, where if he accomplished nothing else, he was at least such a menace to Richmond that Lee dared not withdraw his army for service elsewhere. McClellan planned to cross the James and strike at Richmond's southern communications—as Grant did two years later—and for this he asked to be heavily reënforced and was promised the troops of Burnside and Hunter, which were on the Carolina coast. Lee's great desire was to get McClellan off the peninsula, so that he might move out toward Washington. To effect this he sent a detachment to bombard the National camp from the opposite side of the James; but McClellan threw across a force that swept it out of the way. Then he sent Jackson to demonstrate against Pope and create alarm at Washington. The dull-witted Halleck, only too ready to coöperate with the enemy, then ordered McClellan to withdraw from the peninsula; and Burnside's troops, arriving on transports, were forwarded up the Potomac and sent to Pope. McClellan marched to Fort Monroe and embarked his army by divisions for Washington.

Pope intended to move southward and cut off Lee's communications with the Shenandoah Valley. He began by ordering Banks to send his whole cavalry

force to destroy the railroads and bridges near Gordonsville. But General John P. Hatch, commanding the cavalry, took with him artillery, infantry, and a wagon-train, and consequently his progress was so slow that Jackson reached Gordonsville before he could get there, and the plan was thwarted. Hatch was therefore relieved, and General John Buford, an able cavalry leader, succeeded to the command.

When Jackson came in contact with Pope's advance he asked for reënforcements, received them, and on August 8th crossed the Rapidan and moved toward Culpeper. Pope tried to concentrate the corps of Banks and Sigel at Culpeper, and Banks arrived there promptly, but Sigel sent a note asking by what road he should march. Pope writes: "As there was but one road, and that a broad stone turnpike, I was at a loss to understand how General Sigel could entertain any doubt as to the road by which he should march."

On the 9th, Banks, with eight thousand men, marched out to Cedar Mountain, where he met Jackson with twice as many. He first struck Jackson's right wing, and then furiously attacked the left, rolled up the flank, opened a fire in the rear, and threw the whole Confederate line into confusion. It was as if the two commanders had exchanged characters and Banks had assumed the part that Jackson was always supposed to play. If Sigel had been on hand, there might have been a complete victory. But Banks's line had become somewhat broken by an advance through woods, and at the same time the Confederates were reënforced, so that Jackson was able to rally his men and check the movement. In the evening Sigel's troops arrived, relieved Banks's, and prepared to renew the battle in

the morning. But when daylight came they saw that Jackson had fallen back about two miles to a strong position, and two days later he fell back still farther to Gordonsville. Considering the numbers engaged, this action was one of the fiercest and most rapid of the war. The Confederates lost about thirteen hundred men, and the Nationals about eighteen hundred. Besides this, the cavalry, under Buford and Bayard, pursued the enemy promptly and captured many stragglers. The Confederate General Charles S. Winder, leading his division, was struck by a shell and killed. On the other hand, General Pope writes: "Fully one thousand men straggled back to Culpeper Court House and beyond, and never entirely returned to their commands."

The cavalry now took position along the Rapidan, from Raccoon Ford to the mountains; and on the 14th Pope, reënforced by eight thousand men under General Jesse L. Reno, moved his entire army forward to the Rapidan and established a line with his right on Robertson's River, his centre on the slopes of Cedar Mountain, and his left at Raccoon Ford. From this position he sent out cavalry expeditions to break the enemy's communications with Richmond. One of these captured General Stuart's adjutant and found on him a letter from General Lee to Stuart, dated August 15th, which revealed Lee's plans, the principal item being that he intended to turn Pope's left flank, and fall upon him with his entire army before he could receive reinforcements from the Army of the Potomac. Stuart's biographer writes:

Stuart and his staff imprudently passed the night on the porch of an old house on the plank road. At daybreak he was aroused by the noise of approaching horsemen and,

sending Mosby and Gibson, two of his aides, to ascertain who was coming, he himself walked out bareheaded to the gate to greet Fitz Lee, whom he was expecting. The result did not justify his expectations. In another instant pistol shots were heard, and Mosby and Gibson were seen running back, pursued by a party of the enemy. Stuart, Von Borcke, and Dabney had their horses inside the yard. Von Borcke gained the gate and escaped unhurt after a long and hard run. Stuart and Dabney were compelled to leap the fence and take across the fields to the nearest woods. They were pursued but a short distance. Returning to a post of observation, Stuart saw the enemy depart in triumph with his hat and cloak, which he had been compelled to leave on the porch where he had slept.

On the 18th and 19th Pope's army recrossed the Rappahannock, the several corps using different routes, and was united and posted behind that stream, with its left at Kelly's Ford and its right about three miles above Rappahannock Station. The Confederates came up on the 20th and attempted to cross at Kelly's Ford, but a powerful artillery fire prevented them. Lee therefore sent Jackson's corps to cross at Sulphur Springs and turn Pope's right flank; but here again the movement was thwarted, for there was a strong force there to dispute the crossing. Jackson then went farther up the river, crossed at its headwaters, passed through Thoroughfare Gap in the Bull Run Mountains, destroyed Bristoe Station, and sent Stuart's cavalry to Manassas Junction, where they captured some prisoners and commissary stores.

Meanwhile, Stuart had performed a more important service in the dark and stormy night of the 22d. With fifteen hundred men he rode around Pope's position, struck his headquarters at Catlett's Station, and cap-

tured his personal baggage, which included the papers setting forth his plans.

Pope knew exactly the size of Jackson's force and where it was marching; for Colonel J. S. Clark, of Banks's staff, had found a place where he could see the whole column and count the regiments and batteries as they passed. As Pope knew Lee's plans, and that he had divided his forces, now widely separated, while his own entire army was between them, it appeared plain that he now had the game in his own hands. But about this time he evidently lost his military wits. He had not received all the reënforcements he was promised, but he had received seven thousand commanded by Generals Reynolds and Kearny.


On the 27th Pope sent McDowell with forty thousand men to occupy the road by which Longstreet was coming to join Jackson, and at the same time he moved with the rest of his army to strike Jackson at Bristoe Station. His advance-guard struck the rear-guard of Jackson, who then retired to Manassas Junction. Thereupon Pope, thinking he had an opportunity for a great success, ordered McDowell to return, saying, "If you will march promptly and rapidly, at the earliest dawn, upon Manassas Junction, we shall bag the whole crowd!" McDowell obeyed the order, and this left unobstructed the road by which the two parts of Lee's army could unite. Jackson promptly took advantage of the opportunity and moved his forces to the high land around Groveton, near the old battlefield of Bull Run.

Here King's division, of McDowell's corps, came in contact with the enemy and a sharp fight ensued, with considerable loss on each side. At night King's men retired to Manassas, and at the same time the last of

McDowell's men retired from the road that passed through Thoroughfare Gap, which left everything as the enemy would wish it. An abandoned railroad cut offered a ready-made intrenchment, of which Jackson took advantage, placing his left at Sudley Mill and his right on the turnpike by which Longstreet was to join him.

Pope estimated his entire force at 55,500 men, and represented them as tired out with almost continuous marching and fighting, some of them also having but a small supply of ammunition. Longstreet reached the field in the forenoon of the 29th, and took position at Jackson's right. In the afternoon Pope ordered Hooker to make a front attack on Jackson. Hooker, who was always ready to fight when he saw a chance of success, objected to this order; but Pope insisted, and the attack was made. Hooker's men charged with the bayonet, and there was a fierce hand-to-hand fight at the railroad cut. Jackson's line was broken; but reënforcements reached him, while those supporting Hooker came too late, and thus the advantage was lost and Hooker was driven back.

An hour or two later (the exact time is disputed) Pope, who did not know that Longstreet had arrived and was in place on Jackson's right, ordered General Porter to attack Jackson on that flank. This it was impossible for Porter to do without exposing his own flank to Longstreet. And when Pope thought the attack he had ordered Porter to make must be in progress, he ordered another attack on Jackson's left. In the first rush this was successful, and Jackson's extreme left was doubled back and broken by Kearny's men, who seized the cut and held it till Jackson was reënforced by troops brought over from the right, when Kearny



was driven back. In this fight at the cut a Confederate regiment that had exhausted its ammunition fought with stones, of which there were plenty on the ground, and several men were killed by them. The action of this day is called the battle of Groveton.

The next day (August 30th) Pope, who had reformed his lines in the night, renewed the attack. At the same time, Lee had drawn back his left, strengthened his right, and was prepared to assume the offensive. Each commander intended to attack the left flank of his enemy.

When Pope moved out against Lee's left and found it withdrawn he supposed that army was in retreat, and he ordered McDowell to follow up and press the enemy vigorously. Porter's corps, which formed the advance of McDowell's command, began this movement, struck the foe in a strong position, and met with a heavy artillery fire. Then a cloud of dust was seen, which indicated that Lee was pushing a force around the flank, and McDowell sent Reynolds to meet it. Porter now tried to execute his orders. He made charge after charge against Jackson's right, but every time was repelled with serious loss. Longstreet found a hill that commanded a part of Porter's line, placed a battery there, and threw in an enfilading fire. No troops could withstand this, and Porter's corps soon fell back defeated. The whole Confederate line was then advanced, and its right extended in an attempt to cut off retreat. But the brigades of Warren, Meade, and Seymour firmly held the key-points, and the army was withdrawn in good order from the field that it had left precipitately a year before. In the evening it crossed the stone bridge over Bull Run and encamped on the heights around Centreville. Here it was joined by the corps of Sumner

and Franklin, and then the whole army fell back still farther, to a position around Germantown and Fairfax Court House.

Meanwhile, Lee had ordered another of the flank marches of which Jackson was fond, to strike the right of Pope's army and interrupt his connection with Washington. The blow fell, in the evening of September 1st, at Chantilly, about four miles north-west of Germantown. The rush of Jackson's men was met and broken by the commands of Hooker and Reno, assisted by detachments from McDowell and Kearny. General Isaac I. Stevens was killed, and his men, having exhausted their ammunition, fell back. Kearny put forward Birney's brigade to fill the gap in the line, and brought up a battery. In the gathering twilight he rode forward to reconnoitre, suddenly found himself in contact with a squad of Confederates, and attempted to ride away. But they sent a volley after him and shot him dead. Kearny was one of the most enthusiastic and efficient soldiers in the service. He had lost his left arm in the war with Mexico (1847), had been with the French at Solferino and Magenta (1859), and had just passed through the Peninsula campaign. When General Howard was undergoing the amputation of his right arm, at Fair Oaks, he called out to General Kearny who was passing, "We'll buy our gloves together hereafter."

Lee made no further attempt against Pope's army, and on September 2d, by Halleck's orders, it was withdrawn to the fortifications of the capital and united with the Army of the Potomac.

The movements of this campaign were more complicated than those of any other in the war, and it appears to have been carried on with little of definite

plan and connected or continuous purpose on either side. On the part of Pope's army it was a disastrous failure. Whether the whole blame should rest upon him, has been warmly disputed. On the part of Lee's army, it resulted in tactical successes, but it did not seriously menace Washington, and it led him on to his first great failure in an attempted invasion of the North.

Captain Henry N. Blake, of the 11th Massachusetts regiment, gives a clear picture of some of the strange movements and fierce fighting in this battle:

Some soldiers were in a destitute condition and suffered from blistered feet, having no shoes, while others lacked necessary garments; but all gladly pursued Jackson, and his capture was considered certain. . . . The stream was forded, and the graves and bones of the dead, the rusty fragments of iron, and the weather-beaten débris reminded the men that they were again in the midst of the familiar scenes of the first battle of Bull Run.

The cannonading was brisk during the day. Large tracts of the field were black and smoking from the burning grass which the shells ignited, and a small force was occasionally engaged upon the right. The brigade took the position assigned to it, on the slope of a hill, to support a battery which was attached to Sigel's corps, and no infantry was visible in any direction, although objects within half a mile were readily seen. At four o'clock the enemy opened with solid shot upon the battery, which did not discharge one piece in response. The drivers mounted their horses, rushed pellmell through the ranks of the fearless and enraged support, and did not halt within the range of the artillery from which they fled so cowardly.

A member of the staff arrived and gave a verbal order to the brigade commander, after which the regiments were marched, unmindful of the cannon balls, toward the right of the line and halted in the border of a thick forest in which

many skirmishes had taken place. "What does the General want me to do now?" General Grover asked the aide who again rode up to the brigade. "Go into the woods and charge," was the answer. "Where is my support?" the commander inquired, for there were no troops near the position. "It is coming." After we had waited fifteen minutes for that body to appear, the officer returned and said the General was much displeased because the charge had not been made. At once the order was issued, "Fix bayonets." Every man was inspired by these words, great enthusiasm arose when the command was passed from company to company, and the soldiers, led by their brave General, advanced upon a hidden foe through tangled woods which constantly interfered with the formation of the ranks.

"Colonel, do you know what we are going to charge on?" a private inquired. "Yes, a good dinner," was the answer. The rebel skirmishers were driven in upon their reserve behind the bank of an unfinished railroad, where detachments from five brigades were massed in three lines, under the command of Ewell, to resist the onset of the inferior force that menaced them. The awful volleys did not impede the storming party, which pressed on over the bodies of the dead and dying; while the thousands of bullets seemed to create a breeze that made the leaves of the trees rustle, and a shower of small boughs and twigs fell upon the ground. The balls penetrated the barrels or shattered the stocks of many muskets; but the soldiers who carried them picked up those that had been dropped by helpless comrades, and allowed no slight accident of this character to interrupt them in the work.

The railroad bank was gained, and the column with cheers passed over it and advanced over the groups of slain and mangled rebels who had rolled down the declivity. The second line was broken; both were scattered through the woods; and victory appeared to be certain—until the last support, who had rested upon their breasts on the ground, suddenly rose and delivered a destructive volley,

which forced the brigade, that had already lost more than one third of its number, to retreat. Ewell, suffering from a shattered knee, was borne to the rear in a blanket, and the leg was amputated. While General Grover was encouraging the men to go forward, his horse was shot on the railroad bank, and he had barely time to dismount before the animal, mad with pain, dashed into the ranks of the enemy.

The woods always concealed the movements of the troops and at one point a part of the foe fell back while the others remained. The forces sometimes met face to face, and the bayonet and the sword were used with deadly effect in several instances. In the din of this combat a corporal exclaimed, "Dish ish no blace for de mens!" and fled to the rear with the speed of the fabled Flying Dutchman. In one company, a son was killed by the side of his father, who continued to perform his duty with stoic firmness, remarking to his amazed comrades, in a tone that showed how a strong patriotic ardour can triumph over the deepest emotion, "I had rather see him shot dead as he was than see him run away."

The victors rallied their fugitives after this repulse, and their superior force enabled them to assault in front and on both flanks the line which had been contracted by the severe losses in the charge, and the brigade fell back to its first position under a fire of grape and canister added to the musketry. In passing through the forest, the regimental flag was torn from its staff by contact with low-hanging limbs, and the eagle that surmounted it was shot off in the contest. The commander of the colour company saved these precious emblems, and earnestly shouted, "Eleventh, rally round the pole!"

In this campaign the numbers engaged on either side, and the losses, are matters in dispute, and the exact truth is unknown. Lee declared that he had captured

nine thousand prisoners and thirty guns. Pope's total loss has been estimated as high as fifteen thousand.

A painful sequel appeared when General Pope declared that he would have won the battle of Groveton, and made a successful campaign, if General Fitz John Porter had obeyed his orders and attacked Jackson's right flank while Pope with the larger part of his army was attacking in front. For this alleged disobedience General Porter was tried by court-martial in January, 1863, and was condemned, dismissed from the service, and disqualified for holding any office of trust or profit under the Government of the United States. In the controversy that followed, thousands of pages were written and printed. In 1882 General Grant reviewed the case in a magazine article, and arrived at the conclusion that Porter was innocent because (from a situation on that flank unknown at the time to Pope) it was impossible for him to obey the order; and Grant remarks significantly, "If he was guilty, the punishment awarded was not commensurate with the offence committed." A bill to relieve him of the penalty was vetoed by President Arthur; but the same bill, passed in 1886, was signed by President Cleveland. It restored General Porter to his place as Colonel in the regular army, and retired him with that rank, but with no compensation for the intervening years.

The Maryland Campaign

September, 1862

ON September 2d General Lee pushed northward into Maryland with his whole army. His advance arrived at Frederick City on the 8th; and he issued a proclamation to the people of Maryland, in which he recited the alleged wrongs they had suffered at the hands of the National Government, and told them: "The people of the South have long wished to aid you in throwing off this foreign yoke, to enable you again to enjoy the inalienable rights of freemen and restore the independence and sovereignty of your State." At the same time he opened recruiting offices and appointed a provost-marshal of Frederick. Perhaps the reader of the classics will be reminded of the shrewd advice that Demosthenes gave the Athenians, when he counselled them not to ask the assistance of the Thebans against Philip of Macedon, but to bring about an alliance by offering to help them against him.

When the Confederate army marched into the State singing *My Maryland* they were received with closed doors, drawn blinds, and the silence of a graveyard. In Frederick all places of business were shut. Not more than two or three hundred Marylanders presented themselves at Lee's recruiting offices, while, on the other hand, he wrote in his report that he lost many

times that number from straggling. Several reasons have been assigned for the failure of that people to respond to his call. One was that it had always been easy enough for Marylanders to go to the Confederate armies, and those that wished to enlist in that cause had done so already. Another, probably the principal, reason was that Maryland was largely true to the Union, especially in the western counties, and she furnished almost fifty thousand good soldiers to its armies. Still another reason was that the appearance of the Southern veterans was not such as to entice the men or excite the enthusiasm of the women. The Confederate General David R. Jones writes: "Never had the army been so dirty, ragged, and ill provided for as on this march," and General Lee complained of their want of shoes. It is difficult to understand how an army that captured immense supplies late in August could be so destitute early in September.

Whittier's famous poem locates in this city of Frederick the exploit of the old heroine Barbara Frietchie—if there ever was any Barbara Frietchie, and if she did wave the flag, and if Jackson did say let her alone—all of which has been shown to be very doubtful.

On the same day that Lee began his march for Maryland (September 2d) President Lincoln asked General McClellan to take command of the Army of the Potomac, in which Pope's army had been merged, and authorized him to do so at once. On assuming the command, McClellan asked that the force of about eleven thousand men at Harpers Ferry under General Dixon S. Miles be sent to him at once, saying that it was useless and helpless where it was. In this all authorities agree that McClellan was unquestionably right. Harpers Ferry had no strategic value. But

Halleck, blundering as usual, ordered that Miles continue to hold the place, because so much money had been invested there; and Miles, interpreting Halleck's order literally, remained in the town instead of placing his troops on the heights that command it.

When it was discovered that Lee had entered Maryland, McClellan moved his army to cover Washington and Baltimore and find and fight the enemy. On the 12th his advance arrived in Frederick and met with a hearty reception. Nearly every house displayed the Stars and Stripes, all the business places were open, the streets were thronged, and the boys in blue were welcomed everywhere. To all this was added an unusual piece of good fortune. A despatch sent by General Lee to General D. H. Hill, in which the location and destination of each corps of his army was set forth, was lost by some carelessness and was picked up and put into McClellan's hands. By this order Jackson was instructed to march through Sharpsburg, cross the Potomac, capture the force at Martinsburg, and assist in the capture of Harpers Ferry; Longstreet was ordered to halt at Boonsborough with the trains; McLaws was to march to Harpers Ferry, occupy the heights, and capture the place as soon as possible; Walker was to invest the Ferry from the other side, assisting McLaws; D. H. Hill's command was to be the rear-guard. When Lee began his march he supposed that, as he progressed, Martinsburg and Harpers Ferry would be evacuated—as they should have been. And when he found that they were still held he sent back a large part of his army to capture them, so as not to leave a hostile force in his rear.

When Jackson approached Martinsburg, General Julius White, who commanded there, left with his

two thousand men and joined Miles at Harpers Ferry. Miles sent a small detachment to the heights on the north side of the Potomac, and with the rest of his troops remained in the town. McLaws with a heavy force climbed the mountain three or four miles north, marched along the crest, easily drove away Miles's detachment, and the next day bombarded the town and compelled its surrender just as Jackson was about to attack it from the other side. One of the last shots mortally wounded General Miles. He was a graduate of West Point, was now fifty-eight years of age, and had had a long and honourable military career. His stupid conduct at Harpers Ferry is unaccountable.

Colonel Benjamin F. Davis, commanding a cavalry force of two thousand, who was with Miles, escaped the night before the surrender, crossed the Potomac, and reached Greencastle the next morning. On the way he captured a Confederate ammunition train of ninety-seven wagons.

Jackson left A. P. Hill to arrange the terms and receive the surrender, while he, with the greater part of his force, hurried away and on the morning of the 16th rejoined Lee at Sharpsburg.

The range called South Mountain is a continuation of the Blue Ridge north of the Potomac. It is a thousand feet high, with several passes. The principal of these are Turner's and Crampton's, each four hundred feet high, with hills rising six hundred feet above it.

When McClellan, reading the lost despatch, learned the plans and situation of his antagonist, he set his army in motion accordingly. He ordered Franklin's corps to pass through Crampton's Gap and go to the relief of Harpers Ferry. Burnside's command, which included the corps of Hooker and Reno, was to pass

through Turner's Gap and strike Longstreet to cut off him and the trains he was guarding. These troops might have passed through the gaps on the 13th with little opposition, thus being interposed between Lee's divided forces and having every chance of defeating him disastrously. But McClellan, who appeared never to realize the value of time, did not make the move till the 14th, and then he found the passage of Turner's Gap disputed by Hill and Longstreet, and Crampton's by McLaws.

There were two old roads over the mountain, a mile north and south of Turner's Gap. The one on the south passed through Fox's Gap. While Gibbon's brigade pushed slowly up the turnpike into the gap, Hooker's men followed the road north of it, Reno's the road south of it, all climbing from rock to rock, annoyed by Confederate sharpshooters behind the trees and ledges. Reno was directly opposed by Garland's Confederate brigade, and both these commanders were killed. There was stubborn fighting all day, with slow but steady gain by the Union forces, and at sunset they had won the field. In the night the Confederates retired, and in the morning of the 15th the Nationals passed through to the western side of the mountain. Among the wounded was the lieutenant-colonel of the 23d Ohio, Rutherford B. Hayes, afterward President.

McLaws sent back a part of his force from Harpers Ferry to dispute the passage of Crampton's Gap. General Franklin's corps attacked here, and after a fight of three hours reached the crest and cleared the pass.

At Turner's Gap the National loss was fifteen hundred killed or wounded. The Confederate loss was about the same, besides fifteen hundred Confederates cap-

tured. At Crampton's Gap the Nationals lost 532 men, and the Confederates about the same number, killed or wounded, while Franklin captured four hundred prisoners, one gun, and three battle-flags. These two actions together are called the battle of South Mountain.

As the passes were cleared and used this action was a victory for McClellan. But as it delayed his advance a whole day and gave Lee time to bring together some of his scattered forces, it was strategically a Confederate victory, though a costly one, as that army, none too large for the task before it, had here been deprived of about four thousand good troops.

On the morning of the 15th McClellan had his forces west of the mountain range, in the space between that and Antietam Creek. Lee, in retiring his left wing from Turner's Gap, had crossed the Antietam and taken a position on high ground between that stream and the village of Sharpsburg. With a commander like Grant, there would have been no thought of anything but following immediately and attacking the enemy that very day, before the greater part of the right wing could arrive from Harpers Ferry. But McClellan never was swift to grasp a great opportunity. He was more an engineer than a commander in the field. On the 15th he did nothing but reconnoitre—which might have been done in one hour. If he had even made an attack in full force on the 16th, he would still have had an advantage, for A. P. Hill's troops did not arrive from Harpers Ferry till the 17th, though Jackson's were there, and were placed on Lee's left, in the morning of the 16th. On that day McClellan developed his plan of attack. This was, to throw his right wing across the Antietam by the upper bridge and strike the enemy's



left, then cross over with his left and centre by the lower bridges and attack Lee's main line. There was an artillery duel that lasted all day, in which, General Hill says, the Confederate batteries were no match for their opponents. Late in the afternoon Hooker's corps crossed by the upper bridge, and struck Lee's left flank, which was held by two of Hood's brigades, but only a slight action followed. Then all rested for the night.

Not only had McClellan failed to take advantage of the information conveyed by the lost despatch, but by this movement on the afternoon of the 16th he plainly told his opponent what was his plan for the battle of the next day, and Lee promptly prepared for it.

Roughly speaking, the ground where the Confederate army stood at bay may be described as a triangle, the Potomac making one side, the Antietam another, and the line of battle the third. Lee had a strong position, with his left at or near the Potomac, his right protected by the Antietam, and in his rear the Shepherdstown Ferry, by which he escaped after the battle. He complained that his army was "ruined by straggling," and General D. H. Hill, in his report, wrote: "Had all our stragglers been up, McClellan's army would have been completely crushed or annihilated. Thousands of thievish poltroons had kept away from sheer cowardice." The General, no doubt, was justly angry, but probably he overestimated the effect; for McClellan had fully seventy thousand men, and though he used but little more than half of them in attack, there is no reason to believe he would not have used them all in a defence. The stories of straggling are corroborated by Mrs. Mary B. Mitchell, who lived in Shepherdstown. She writes:

Suddenly on Saturday the 13th of September, early in the morning, we found ourselves surrounded by a hungry horde of lean and dusty tatterdemalions, who seemed to rise from the ground at our feet. . . . They were stragglers—professional, some of them, but some worn out by the incessant strain of that summer. When I say they were hungry, I convey no impression of the gaunt starvation that looked from their cavernous eyes. All day they crowded to the doors of our houses, with always the same drawling complaint: "I've been a-marchin' an' a-fightin' for six weeks stiddy, and I ain't had n-a-r-thin' to eat 'cept green apples an' green cawn, an' I wish you'd please to gimme a bite to eat." Their looks bore out their statements, and when they told us they had "clean gin out" we believed them and went to get what we had. They could be seen afterward asleep in every fence corner and under every tree; but after a night's rest they "pulled themselves together" somehow and disappeared as suddenly as they had come. . . . There are always stragglers, of course, but never before or after did I see anything comparable to the demoralized state of the Confederates at this time. Never were want and exhaustion more vividly put before my eyes, and that they could march or fight at all seemed incredible. Perhaps, after all, the poor fellows were excusable.

Lee says he had fewer than forty thousand men in the battle, and he had no reserves.¹

As Jackson's troops were the freshest, Lee placed them on the left, or western, end of his line, where he

¹ In any comparison of numbers, it should be remembered that there were two different methods of counting in the two armies. In the Confederate army a report of the number present for duty excluded all commissioned officers, all musicians, teamsters, and mechanics, the medical corps, and any that were on detached service, including only those that carried muskets or sabres or handled the guns. In the National army a corresponding report included every man that drew pay.

knew the heaviest blow was to fall. Before morning Mansfield's corps crossed the stream and joined Hooker, and Sumner's was ready to follow soon. All but about two thousand of Lee's forces had come up and were in place. Thus at the dawn of September 17th everything in that hitherto peaceful little corner was in readiness for a fierce conflict in which there could be no surprises and death for death was to be dealt out more abundantly than in any other single day of that great war. All this was to be done in the fields that were owned and cultivated by a simple sect who knew little of any but Scriptural history and nothing of politics or war. Their homely little church, which the soldiers mistook for a country schoolhouse, became the centre of the fiercest fighting.

In that vicinity the main road was bordered on both sides by woods, with intervening fields of corn. At sunrise Hooker advanced by this road to assail Jackson. As he approached a large field of corn he saw the glint of bayonets here and there among the tasselled stalks, and knew its meaning—a concealed force ready, as soon as his columns should have passed, to come out and attack them in the rear. Instantly calling up two or three batteries, he ordered them to rake the field of corn, point blank, with canister. In a few minutes hardly a stalk was left standing, and the field was full of dead and dying Confederate soldiers.

Then there was hard fighting for an hour, when Jackson was not only heavily pressed by Hooker but was enfiladed by the fire from batteries on the other side of the Antietam. This broke the lines somewhat and drove them back; but when Hooker tried to advance far enough to hold the road and occupy the woods west of it he met fresh masses of troops brought over from

Lee's centre, and these and a fierce artillery fire stopped him. Mansfield's corps was coming to his support, when that General fell mortally wounded; yet his troops moved on steadily, gained a position in the west woods, and held it, not without hard fighting and heavy loss. Here, again, Hooker was seriously wounded and was carried to the rear.

Meanwhile Sumner's corps had crossed the Antietam, and it came quickly upon the field, drove back the enemy, and held the ground around the little church. It was advancing triumphantly when two divisions were brought over from the Confederate right and were pushed into a gap in the line. Sedgwick's division, which formed the right of Sumner's line, was thus attacked on its left flank. It was soon driven out of the woods, when it crossed the clearing and took refuge in the east woods. Then the Confederates retired to their former position.

Such fighting as this was continued through the forenoon, with no permanent advantage to either side. One of the episodes was a race between the 5th New Hampshire regiment and a Confederate force for a high point that commanded a part of the field. The contestants ran in parallel lines, firing at each other as they went. The New Hampshire men reached the hill first, the 81st Pennsylvania joined them, and they poured a destructive fire into the regiment that they had outrun.

So fierce was the fighting around the Dunker Church, and so much artillery fire was directed at that spot, that when the woods were cut down, years afterward, and the logs taken to the sawmill, the saws were torn to pieces by the metal that had lodged in the trees and was hidden when the scars were overgrown.

A short distance south and east of the church there was a sunken road, which followed an irregular zigzag line, crossing the Confederate line at one point and parallel with it at other points. This served as a ready-made rifle-pit, and a strong Confederate force was posted in it. When the National troops approached this road there was lively work on both sides; but the heaviest loss fell upon the Confederates despite their shelter from musketry, for batteries on high ground east of the Antietam enfiladed parts of the road, and when the battle ended it was filled with dead soldiers. Thenceforth it was called Bloody Lane.

While this struggle continued on McClellan's right, his centre under Porter and his left under Burnside rendered no assistance. Porter's troops were kept as a reserve, and McClellan refused to send any of them forward, even when parts of his line were in urgent need of assistance. He and Porter agreed that the reserves must in no circumstances take part in the actual battle. Burnside was ordered to cross a stone bridge and strike at Lee's right and rear. He had been ordered at seven o'clock to be ready for this move, and he immediately made ready. The order to move was issued at eight o'clock, but it did not reach him till nine o'clock. Perhaps if McClellan had been present on the battleground all the movements would have been more prompt; but he had stationed himself at the Pry house, on high ground east of the Antietam, and with telescopes strapped to the fence directed the battle from that point.

The task assigned to Burnside was more easily ordered than executed. At the eastern end of the bridge, where his corps was, the ground was low. At the western end it was high and precipitous, so that when the roadway reached that end it turned at once

at right angles and for some distance passed along under the cliff. Confederate batteries on the high ground were ready to rake the narrow bridge; so that if any force could cross at all it could do so only at great loss. Crook's brigade, ordered to lead in the attempt, missed its way, arrived at the stream some distance above the bridge, and was at once subjected to a heavy fire. Then the 6th New Hampshire and 2d Maryland regiments were ordered to charge across the bridge at double-quick; but the fire that they met was too much for them, and they retired.

Meanwhile the search for a ford below the bridge was at last successful, and a force was thrown across by means of it. Now a new storming-party at the bridge was made up of the 51st New York and 51st Pennsylvania regiments, led by Colonels Robert B. Potter and John F. Hartranft, and assisted by two heavy guns that had been got into position where they could reach the defenders of the bridge. With this help these two regiments succeeded in crossing, driving away the immediate opposing force, and they were followed closely by Sturgis's division and Crook's brigade.

These operations had occupied four hours, being completed about one o'clock. If they had been accomplished in half that time, it is difficult to see how Lee's army could have escaped destruction. But by the time when Burnside's men had crossed the stream, captured a battery, and occupied the heights overlooking Sharpsburg, the fighting at the western end of the battle line was over, and Lee hurried reinforcements across to his imperilled right. At the same time the last division of his forces (A. P. Hill's, two thousand strong) arrived from Harpers Ferry and joined with the other reinforcements assuming the offensive. They recap-

tured the battery and then quickly drove Burnside's men from the crest.

This ended the battle, because both sides had lost so much that neither was inclined to continue the fight. Every man of Lee's army had been actively engaged, but not more than two thirds of McClellan's. Burnside had lost about 500 men at the bridge. The 51st New York regiment lost 87, and the 51st Pennsylvania lost 120. The result was due to the fact that the attacks of the National forces were made in driblets, instead of by heavy masses simultaneously on both wings. This left the Confederate commander at liberty, with his short interior lines, to reënforce promptly any part of his line that was in peril and meet each attack with at least equal force at the point of actual contact. It was the most destructive single day's work in the war; and, whatever may have been the extent of straggling before the battle, the men that took part in the contest, on both sides, stood up to the bloody work without flinching. The National Administration, after the battles on the Peninsula, had called for more troops, and the call met with a prompt and generous response. Men of all classes rushed to the recruiting-offices to be enrolled, and it was a common occurrence for a regiment of one thousand men to be raised, equipped, and sent to the front within three weeks. Some of these new regiments got their first experience of war at Antietam, and suffered heavily. The 12th Massachusetts regiment lost 224 men out of 334; the 15th Massachusetts lost 318 out of 606; the 47th New York lost 181; the 59th New York, which fought around the Dunker Church, lost 224, including nine officers killed; in the 69th New York, which charged at Bloody Lane, eight colour-bearers were shot down in

succession; the 82d New York lost 138 out of 339; the 72d Pennsylvania lost 237; and the 1st Delaware lost 230 out of 650. On the Confederate side the losses were quite as severe. In Bloody Lane the 16th Mississippi regiment lost 144 men out of 228. Of the situation there, an officer of the 50th Georgia regiment writes:

The 50th were posted in a narrow path washed out into a regular gully, and were fired into from front, rear, and left flank. The men stood their ground nobly, returning the fire, until nearly two-thirds of their number lay dead or wounded in that lane. Out of 210 carried into the fight, more than 125 were killed or wounded within twenty minutes. When ordered to retreat, I could hardly extricate myself from the dead and wounded around me. A man could have walked from the head of our line to the foot on their bodies. Anderson's brigade suffered terribly. James's South Carolina battalion was nearly annihilated. The 50th Georgia lost nearly all its commissioned officers.

The 1st South Carolina regiment went in with 106 men and when the fight was over it had but fifteen men and one officer. At the crisis of the battle a battery that had lost nearly all its men by the fire of sharpshooters was worked by General Longstreet and members of his staff acting as gunners. On each side three generals were killed or mortally wounded: of the Nationals, Mansfield, Richardson, and Rodman; of the Confederates, Branch, Starke, and George B. Anderson. The generals that were wounded included, on the National side, Hooker, Sedgwick, Dana, Crawford, and Meagher; on the Confederate side, R. H. Anderson, Wright, Lawton, Armistead, Toombs, Rhodes, Gregg, Ransom, and Ripley.

McClellan reported his total loss as 12,469, of whom

2010 were killed. Lee reported his total loss in the Maryland battles as 1567 killed and 8724 wounded, making no mention of the missing. But his division commanders give returns that foot up 1842 killed, 9399 wounded, and 2292 missing—total, 13,533. If McClellan's report is correct, even this falls short of the truth. He says: "About 2700 of the enemy's dead were counted and buried upon the field of Antietam. A portion of their dead had been previously buried by the enemy."

General Lee asked for a day's truce, in which to care for the wounded and bury the dead, and this was granted by General McClellan. While Lee's men performed a part of that task, he took advantage of the truce to remove his army to a place of safety beyond the Potomac. When McClellan set out to renew the attack, on the 19th, he found that his enemy had crossed by the ford at Shepherdstown. He reported that he had captured six thousand prisoners, thirteen guns, and thirty-nine battle-flags, and that he had not lost a gun or a colour.

Emancipation

September 22, 1862; January 1, 1863

NO person born since the Civil War can be expected to comprehend fully the peculiar status of slavery in the Southern States at that period. The inherent incompatibility between free labour and slave labour was distinctly recognized in the convention that framed the Federal Constitution in 1787. That Constitution could not have been ratified without its three great compromises, and two of these relate to the institution of slavery. One provided that the African slave trade should not be prohibited earlier than 1808; the other, that in the basis of representation five slaves should count as three persons. The fiercest debates were over these provisions. John Rutledge, of South Carolina, put one side with unmistakable distinctness when he declared that if the Convention thought the Carolinas and Georgia would ever ratify the proposed Constitution unless their right to import slaves were untouched, the expectation was vain, for the people of those States never would be such fools as to give up so important an interest. On the other side, Gouverneur Morris, of Pennsylvania, made one of the most forcible and impassioned pleas. He said:

Upon what principle is it that the slaves shall be computed in the representation? Are they men? Then make them

citizens, and let them vote. Are they property? Why then is no other property included? The houses in this city [Philadelphia] are worth more than all the wretched slaves that cover the rice swamps of South Carolina. The admission of slaves into the representation, when fairly explained, comes to this: that the inhabitant of Georgia or South Carolina who goes to the coast of Africa and, in defiance of the most sacred laws of humanity, tears away his fellow creatures from their dearest connections and damns them to the most cruel bondage, shall have more votes in a government instituted for protection of the rights of mankind than the citizen of Pennsylvania or New Jersey who views with a laudable horror so nefarious a practice.

Several times, in the course of the debates, Mr. Madison (afterward President) repeated his opinion that the most dangerous difference of interests was likely to lie between the North and the South, saying, "The institution of slavery and its consequences form the line of discrimination." After George Mason, of Virginia, had denounced the African slave trade, Charles C. Pinckney, of South Carolina, retorted that "Virginia would gain by stopping the importations, for her slaves would rise in value, and she had more than she wanted."

The discussion did not end with the formation of the Constitution, but was continued with increasing fervour for seventy years. At the end of that time William H. Seward, in a famous speech, characterized it as "an irrepressible conflict between opposing and enduring forces." And in the same year Abraham Lincoln, in another famous speech, reminded his countrymen that a house divided against itself cannot stand.

So our government cannot endure permanently half slave and half free. Either the opponents of slavery will arrest the

further spread of it, and place it where the public mind shall rest in the belief that it is in the course of ultimate extinction, or its advocates will push it forward till it shall become alike lawful in all the States, old as well as new, North as well as South.

The long debate developed something closely akin to fanaticism on both sides. In the South there were clergymen who declared that "the institution of slavery had received the sanction of the Almighty in the patriarchal age; that its legality was recognized by Jesus Christ; and that it was full of mercy." In the North there was a small sect of abolitionists, some of whom were so violent in their denunciation of slaveholders and the Constitution as to neutralize all the logic that lay in their arguments; the ablest man among them declared himself no longer a citizen of the United States; and one section of them refused to vote or do anything that could have a practical effect toward abolishing the institution. It was noticeable that when finally emancipation was an accomplished fact, these, whose persistent denunciation had only made the Southerners cling more closely to their peculiar institution, coolly stepped forward to claim the larger share of the credit.

Aside from the extremists, the mass of citizens had constantly cherished the belief that the trouble could be cured by the successive compromises that were arranged by their leaders in Congress, backed by a spirit of conciliation. And every compromise on this subject necessarily first ruled out any question of the morality of slavery, and then led to a tacit assumption that the institution was preëminently entitled to have its integrity guaranteed. All else could be freely overhauled, altered, or reversed; but this one subject was taboo.

Congress would acknowledge the Constitutional right of petition as exercised on any other subject, but it made a rule to lay on the table, without reading, all petitions that were unfavourable to slavery.

This almost unanimous recognition of the great taboo showed itself at once when the war began. The most eminent of the early Union commanders, taking the field in West Virginia, issued a proclamation in which he said: "Understand one thing clearly: not only will we abstain from all interference [with the slaves], but we will, on the contrary, with an iron hand crush any attempt at insurrection on their part." In pursuance of this he returned to their masters all slaves that escaped and sought refuge within his lines. It was an everyday occurrence for men who were in active rebellion against the government that he was serving to come to his camps with a flag of truce and demand and receive their runaway slaves.

Some other commanders adopted a similar policy. General Thomas Williams, commanding in the Department of the Gulf, ordered that all fugitive slaves be expelled from his camps and sent beyond the lines. Colonel Halbert E. Paine, of the 4th Wisconsin regiment, refused to obey that order, for the reason that it was "a violation of law for the purpose of returning fugitives to rebels." This was in 1862, and the law referred to, which provided for confiscation of slaves whose masters were in rebellion, had been enacted in August, 1861. Colonel Paine was at once deprived of his command and placed under arrest. General Williams might have been called to account for his order, but he was killed not long afterward when leading a charge at Baton Rouge.

Colonel Daniel R. Anthony, of the 7th Kansas regi-

ment, serving in Tennessee, ordered that men demanding the privilege of searching for fugitive slaves in his camps should be turned out, and that no member of his regiment should engage in the arrest and delivery of fugitives to their masters. For this, Colonel Anthony's superior officer subjected him to the same treatment that Colonel Paine had received.

The ideas and prejudices entertained by those commanders were shared largely by the rank and file. When the National armies were on the soil of the insurgent States, the soldiers had no compunction about tearing down fences, trampling crops, burning bridges, destroying railroads, and helping themselves to horses, cattle, and provisions; but the sacred right of property in slaves must be carefully respected. If, at the beginning of the war, it had been proposed to enlist coloured soldiers for the National army, probably most of the whites would have refused to serve with them; but before the bloody task was finished they felt differently.

There were a few notable exceptions among the commanders. As early as May 26, 1861, three slaves belonging to a Colonel Mallory, who commanded a Confederate force near Hampton, Virginia, came into General Benjamin F. Butler's lines, at Fort Monroe, saying they had run away because they were about to be sent south. The Colonel claimed their return in accordance with the Fugitive-Slave Law, but was told by the General that, as slaves were useful in various ways to a belligerent, they were contraband of war, like powder, lead, or any war material, and therefore these could not be returned. He offered to return them, however, if Colonel Mallory would come to his headquarters and take an oath to obey the laws of the United States.

This was the first practical blow that was struck at the institution, and from that time fugitive slaves were commonly called "contrabands."

In August, 1861, it was enacted by Congress that property, including slaves, employed in the service of the rebellion with the consent of the owner should be confiscated wherever found. Slaves thus confiscated were not to be freed at once, but held for future action by the courts or by Congress.

In that same month General Frémont, commanding in Missouri, placed the whole State under martial law and declared a confiscation of the property of all citizens who should aid the rebellion, and that the slaves of such citizens were freed. The President called on the General to modify his proclamation, as the clause relating to slaves did not conform to the law recently enacted by Congress. The General asked for an open order to that effect, and the President gave it.

In March, 1862, President Lincoln, in a special message to Congress, recommended the adoption of a joint resolution to the effect that the United States ought to coöperate with, and render pecuniary aid to, any State that should enter upon a gradual abolition of slavery; and Congress adopted such a resolution by a large majority. Several suggestions for getting rid of the troublesome institution had been put forth and urged from time to time, but none of these met the approval of the slaveholders. One proposal was, to stop the war by paying for all the slaves and liberating them. This looked like a fair offer, and in fact the cost of the war, in the end, was equal to more than a thousand dollars for every slave that was liberated; while the blacks, young and old together, never had been worth more than half that price. The failure of all such proposals was due to

the fact that the slaveholders were not so much concerned for their individual holdings as for the perpetuation of the institution itself. Helper's *Impending Crisis of the South* (1857), which demonstrated the unthriftness of slavery, economically considered, was denounced quite as violently as *Uncle Tom's Cabin* had been, though its author was a North-Carolinian and was not friendly to the coloured race.

In May, 1862, General David Hunter, commanding at Hilton Head, S. C., issued an order declaring free all the slaves in South Carolina, Georgia, and Florida. Ten days later the President countermanded this, as he had done with Frémont's in Missouri, adding that he reserved to himself the subject of emancipation. General Hunter also organized a regiment of coloured troops, which created a serious alarm and gave rise to indignant questioning in Congress.

In this matter the President was beset with complicated difficulties. He was obliged to consider the so-called border States—Delaware, Maryland, Kentucky, and Missouri—all of which were slave States, but they did not secede, and they supplied many good soldiers to the National army. A strong party in the North steadily opposed and mercilessly criticized him, as a party, though thousands of its individual members were good patriotic soldiers. Even the war, continued for more than a year in grim earnestness, had not taught everybody the futility of looking for conciliation with slavery protected. Finally there was a good representation of those statesmen and jurists—no doubt honest and certainly of good repute—who have a genius for finding high constitutional reasons for reaching conclusions the practical effect of which is vicious.

Therefore it was not strange that Mr. Lincoln, who

had hated slavery ever since, as a young man, he saw it in its worst aspects on the lower Mississippi, should delay the stroke of emancipation till a large part of his people should have their eyes open to the fact that the institution itself was the real insurgent, as was plainly set forth by Alexander H. Stephens and other Southern leaders.

Under date of August 19, 1862, Horace Greeley published in his *Tribune* an open letter addressed to Mr. Lincoln, entitling it "The Prayer of Twenty Millions," in which he said:

On the face of this wide earth, Mr. President, there is not one disinterested, determined, intelligent champion of the Union cause who does not feel that all attempts to put down the rebellion, and at the same time uphold its exciting cause, are preposterous and futile; that the rebellion, if crushed out tomorrow, would be renewed within a year if slavery were left in full vigour; that army officers who remain to this day devoted to slavery can at best be but halfway loyal to the Union; and that every hour of deference to slavery is an hour of added and deepened peril to the Union.

In his answer the President wrote:

If there be perceptible in it [Mr. Greeley's letter] an impatient and dictatorial tone, I waive it in deference to an old friend whose heart I have always supposed to be right. . . . As to the policy I "seem to be pursuing," as you say, I have not meant to leave any one in doubt. . . . My paramount object is to save the Union, and not either to save or destroy slavery. If I could save the Union without freeing any slave, I would do it; if I could save it by freeing all the slaves, I would do it; and if I could do it by freeing some and leaving others alone, I would also do that. I have here stated my purpose according to my views of

official duty; and I intend no modification of my oft-expressed personal wish that all men everywhere could be free.

As a matter of fact, Mr. Lincoln was already contemplating emancipation as a war measure; but he wished not to issue the Proclamation till it could follow a National victory, lest it lose force and fail of approval by appearing to be a measure of desperation. Pope's defeat in August had set it back; but McClellan's success at Antietam, though not the decisive victory that was wanted, gave as good an opportunity as was likely to occur very soon, and five days later (September 22d) the Proclamation was issued. This declared that the President, at the next session of Congress, would renew his suggestion of pecuniary aid to States that might be disposed to abolish slavery; and it gave notice that on the first day of January, 1863, he would declare for ever free all persons held as slaves within any State, or designated part of a State, the people whereof should then be in rebellion against the United States. On that day he issued the final and decisive Proclamation; and in this he also announced that coloured men would be received into the military and naval service of the Republic. As a result of this, 180,000 coloured men were enlisted, and their percentage of losses in battle was quite as high as that of the white troops.

The immediate effect of the Proclamation was just what was expected. The friends of liberty and most of the supporters of the administration rejoiced heartily, saying that the true issue was acknowledged at last—by which was meant, not emancipation as an end in itself, but as a means to the greater end of a secure peace and a stable republic. One of these wrote: "The true and

fit question is whether, without a flagrant violation of official duty, the President had the right to refrain from doing it." The Proclamation gained for the National cause many friends in England, where approbation had been withheld on account of the continued existence of slavery. In Manchester a mass-meeting of factory operatives adopted resolutions of sympathy for the Union and an address to President Lincoln. When we remember that these men were largely idle for want of the cotton that could not reach them on account of the blockade of our Southern ports, we realize the full significance of their action. The Confederate journals chose to interpret the Proclamation as simply an attempt to excite a servile insurrection, ignoring the fact that, if any such insurrection were possible, the Confederates themselves had furnished the most complete incentive to it by putting all their able-bodied whites into the army and leaving their property and their families at the mercy of the slaves. Many editors in the North assailed Mr. Lincoln with every verbal weapon that a vocabulary of vituperation affords. These, however, had somewhat lost their edge; for he had already been freely called a usurper, a despot, a destroyer of the Constitution, and a keeper of bastilles. They declared sorrowfully that the Proclamation had "changed the whole character of the war"; and this was true in a nobler sense than they conceived; it had changed the contest from a war for a temporary peace into a war for a permanent peace. The failure of the campaign on the Peninsula, the defeat of Pope, the escape of the Confederate army after Antietam, and the Proclamation, all in rapid sequence, produced a feeling of depression and caused the November elections to go largely against the administration. But this did not

shake Mr. Lincoln's faith in the justice and wisdom of his act. When he issued the final Proclamation, on New Year's day, he said: "I told them in September that if they did not return to their allegiance and cease murdering our soldiers, I would strike at this pillar of their strength. And now the promise shall be kept, and not one word of it will I ever recall."

A bill passed by Congress and signed by the President had abolished slavery in the District of Columbia in April, 1862, with compensation of \$300 for each slave of a loyal owner. And in October, 1864, Maryland adopted a new constitution, in which slavery was prohibited.

The President's right to proclaim emancipation was denied or questioned not alone by his political opponents but also by a considerable number of his supporters. For instance, Congressman Wickliffe, of Kentucky, a firm friend of the Union, introduced resolutions declaring that the President had no right whatever to interfere with slavery, even during a rebellion. William Whiting, in his *War Powers under the Constitution*, sets forth the case in this way:

The liberation of slaves is looked upon as a means of embarrassing or weakening the enemy, or of strengthening the military power of our army. If slaves be treated as contraband of war, on the ground that they may be used by their masters to aid in prosecuting the war, as employees upon military works, or as labourers furnishing the means of carrying on hostilities; or if they be treated as, in law, belligerents following the legal condition of their owners; or if they be deemed loyal subjects having a just claim upon the government to be released from their obligations to give aid and service to disloyal and belligerent masters, in order that they may be free to perform their higher duty of allegiance and

loyalty to the United States; or if they be regarded as subjects of the United States, liable to do military duty; or if they be made citizens of the United States, and soldiers; or if the authority of the masters over their slaves is the means of aiding and comforting the enemy, or of throwing impediments in the way of the government, or depriving it of such aid and assistance, in successful prosecution of the war, as slaves would and could afford if released from the control of the enemy; or if releasing the slaves would embarrass the enemy and make it more difficult for them to collect and maintain large armies—in any of these cases the taking away of these slaves from the aid and service of the enemy, and putting them to the aid and service of the United States, is justifiable as an act of war. The ordinary way of depriving the enemy of his slaves is by declaring emancipation.

Whiting cites many precedents and authorities from British, French, South-American, and other sources. One of the most striking of these is this quotation from Thomas Jefferson's letter to Dr. Gordon, complaining of the injury done to his estates by Cornwallis:

He destroyed all my growing crops and tobacco; he burned all my barns containing the same articles of last year. Having first taken what corn he wanted, he used, as was to be expected, all my stock of cattle, sheep, and hogs for the sustenance of his army, and carried off all the horses capable of service. He carried off also about thirty slaves. Had this been to give them freedom, he would have done right. From an estimate made at the time, on the best information I could collect, I suppose the State of Virginia lost, under Lord Cornwallis's hands, that year, about thirty thousand slaves.

In the nineteenth century there were three great acts of emancipation—by Alexander II. of Russia, by Presi-

dent Lincoln, and by Dom Pedro II. of Brazil; and it is a notable fact, quite consonant with some others in history, that of the three emancipators two were assassinated and the third was dethroned. Despotism, in whatever form, always dies hard.

The slowness with which the war against secession arrived at its true issue has a close parallel in our own history. The first battle of the Revolution was fought in April, 1775, but the Declaration of Independence was not issued till July, 1776—a period of nearly fifteen months. The first battle in the War of Secession took place in April, 1861, and the Emancipation Proclamation was issued in September, 1862,—seventeen months. In each case there were, in the interval, doubt, hesitation, and divided counsels. Lincoln's reluctance was matched by Washington's confession, when he took command of the army at Cambridge, that he still abhorred the idea of independence.

The Battle of Fredericksburg

December 13, 1862

AFTER the battle of the Antietam more than a month passed away while the President was urging McClellan to follow the Confederate army and attack it, and that General was offering one excuse after another for his inaction. At last, on October 26, 1862, he began to cross the Potomac. He left one corps at Harpers Ferry, and was moving southward on the eastern side of the Blue Ridge, guarding the passes as he went, while the Confederate army was moving in the same direction on the western side of the mountains, when, by an order of November 7th, the President relieved him of the command and gave it to General Burnside. He had refused it before, on the ground that he was not able to lead so large an army; but now his nearest associates urged that it was his duty to obey the order. He and McClellan had been close friends ever since they were at West Point, and McClellan remained a few days to give him information as to the condition of the forces and the plans for continuing the movement. McClellan had been seeking an opportunity to interpose his army between the divided forces of Lee and defeat them in detail. At this time the Confederate right wing, under Longstreet, was near Culpeper, and the left, under Jackson, was in the Shenandoah

Valley. It would require a march of two days for one to reach the other.

But Burnside abandoned the plan that made the Confederate army the objective, and entered upon a campaign that assumed Richmond as its objective. He spent ten days in reorganizing his army in three grand divisions, under Sumner, Hooker, and Franklin. He then marched for Falmouth, which is opposite Fredericksburg, and by the 20th had his whole army there. It had been arranged that a pontoon train would meet him there, but, for some undiscovered reason, it was delayed a week.

This movement showed Lee where the blow was to fall, and the delay gave him time to fortify the heights back of Fredericksburg. His line, five and a half miles long, had a strong natural position, made stronger by earthworks and artillery. He could not prevent Burnside from crossing the stream, for the heights on the left bank rose close to it and commanded the interval, and on those heights Burnside had placed nearly 150 guns.

As the National army waited for supplies as well as for the pontoons, it was not ready for crossing till December 10th. Burnside planned to throw five bridges over the river—three opposite the city, and two farther down; the artillery on the heights to protect the engineers. The work was begun before sunrise on the 11th, in a thick fog; but before it was finished the fog lifted and disclosed to the enemy what was going on. At once, riflemen were posted behind stone walls, in the cellars, and in other sheltered places to pick off the men that were at work on the bridges. At the lower bridges the sharpshooters had no shelter but rifle-pits in the open field, and they were soon dislodged, and the bridges were completed. Opposite the city, however,

the guns on the heights could not be depressed enough to reach them, and the losses of the engineers were so serious that the work was stopped. Burnside then threw seventy tons of iron into the town, and set it on fire; but the sharpshooters clung to their places; and when the engineers attempted to resume their work they were stopped as before. General Henry J. Hunt, chief of artillery, suggested a way to meet the difficulty. Four regiments—the 7th Michigan, the 89th New York, and the 19th and 20th Massachusetts—volunteered to cross the river in pontoons and dispose of the riflemen. They landed quickly, drove them out of their fastnesses, and captured a hundred, while the others escaped. But this was not accomplished without loss during the crossing. The bridges were then completed, the crossing was begun at once, and by the evening of the 12th the army was on the south side of the river. Lee had his whole army on the fortified heights, every man in his place, and was quite as ready to receive battle as was Burnside to give it.

Franklin, with about half of the National army, formed the left wing and was below the city, where there was abundant room to deploy his forces, and where the hills were not so high. Burnside's plan was to make the principal attack here; but at the last moment he suddenly changed it unaccountably, and ordered Franklin merely to push forward one or two divisions and hold the rest of his troops "for a rapid movement down the old Richmond road." Sumner, on the right wing, was ordered to send two divisions to occupy the heights back of the city. What was to be done next, if these movements were successful, nobody knows. It can only be conjectured that Burnside supposed that Lee, finding his left flank turned, would retreat down the road

toward Richmond, and there Franklin was to intercept him. But there was an important element in the problem which neither General Burnside nor any man in his army knew or suspected. Near the foot of Marye's Hill, where the Confederate army awaited attack, there was an old sunken road skirting the base of the hill, with a stone wall on its outer side. There could not be a more perfect intrenchment; and the road was so filled with Confederate soldiers that every man at the wall had three or four behind him to load muskets and hand them to him as rapidly as he could fire them.

Sumner's attack against this impregnable hill was made with the divisions of Hancock and French. They were deployed in columns and passed through the town under the fire of the Confederate batteries. And when they rushed across the open ground between the town and the hill, still subject to fire from the batteries, they met a continuous sheet of flame and lead from the sunken road. No troops that ever charged could stand it; and when nearly half of French's men were struck down, the others fell back. Hancock's men, five thousand strong, charged as boldly, and some of them got within twenty yards of the wall; but within fifteen minutes two thousand of them were down, and the remainder fell back. The costly and useless attempt was made by three other divisions, and then all remained in a position where they could not be reached by the musketry, but were still within range of the artillery.

Burnside now became frantic, appeared to lose his head, and ordered Hooker to attack. With three divisions Hooker made a reconnoissance and then returned and advised Burnside to give up the useless attempt. But the General insisted, and Hooker's four thousand, with fixed bayonets, rushed forward to



the sacrifice. They soon returned, like the others, leaving seventeen hundred of their number on the field.

Meanwhile, on the left, where Franklin commanded, and where there was a possibility of reaching the enemy, Meade's division was chosen to lead the attack. They moved forward, preceded by a heavy line of skirmishers, while their batteries, firing over their heads, shelled the Confederate position. They crossed the railroad under a heavy fire, passed into a gap between two divisions of the Confederate line, doubled back the flanks of both, and took many prisoners and a few battle-flags. Then they marched up the heights and met the enemy's second line. This was too strong for them and by firing on their flanks drove them back. Gibbon and Doubleday had followed with their divisions; and when all were returning somewhat broken and confused, Birney's division went forward and stopped pursuit by the enemy.

Burnside intended to make another attempt at the heights the next day, leading in person the Ninth Corps (his old command). But General Sumner persuaded him to give up the plan. In the night of the 15th, in a heavy storm, the army withdrew to the north side of the river.

The entire National loss in this battle was 12,353; but some of the missing afterward rejoined their commands. Hancock's division lost 156 officers, and one of his regiments lost two thirds of its number. The Confederate loss was 5309. The gain—so far as there was any gain in the sorrowful campaign—lay in the demonstration of the perfect discipline and unfailing courage of the Army of the Potomac, with the inference that it could hardly fail to accomplish its mission when it should have a competent commander.

The Battle of Chancellorsville

May 1-3, 1863

GENERAL JOSEPH HOOKER, who had commanded one of the grand divisions of the Army of the Potomac, succeeded General Burnside as commander of that army, January 25, 1863. He was a graduate of West Point, had seen service in Mexico and in Florida, as well as in the Civil War, was notable for the energy he had displayed in subordinate stations, and was called by the soldiers "fighting Joe Hooker." On giving him this high promotion, President Lincoln wrote him a remarkable letter. He said:

I have placed you at the head of the Army of the Potomac. Of course I have done this upon what appear to me sufficient reasons, and yet I think it best for you to know there are some things in regard to which I am not quite satisfied with you. I believe you to be a brave and skilful soldier, which of course I like. I also believe you do not mix politics with your profession, in which you are right. You have confidence in yourself, which is a valuable if not indispensable quality. You are ambitious, which, within reasonable bounds, does good rather than harm; but I think that during General Burnside's command of the army you have taken counsel of your ambition, and thwarted him as much as you could, in which you did a great wrong to the country and to a most meritorious and honourable brother

officer. I have heard, in such a way as to believe it, of your recently saying that both the army and the government needed a dictator. Of course it was not for this, but in spite of it, that I have given you the command. Only those generals who gain successes can set up dictators. What I now ask of you is military success, and I will risk the dictatorship. The government will support you to the utmost of its ability, which is neither more nor less than it has done and will do for all commanders. I much fear that the spirit which you have aided to infuse into the army, of criticizing their commander and withholding confidence from him, will now turn upon you. I shall assist you as far as I can to put it down. Neither you nor Napoleon, were he alive again, could get any good out of any army while such a spirit prevails in it. And now, beware of rashness! Beware of rashness! But with energy and sleepless vigilance go forward and give us victories.

Hooker reorganized the corps and restored the somewhat impaired discipline of the army. It consisted of seven corps, as follow: First, General Reynolds; Second, General Couch; Third, General Sickles; Fifth, General Meade; Sixth, General Sedgwick; Eleventh, General Howard; Twelfth, General Slocum. With the exception of Sickles, all these corps commanders were graduates of West Point.


All entered upon the spring campaign with enthusiasm and high hope—all except the many men of German blood in the Eleventh Corps. These were displeased because the command of that corps had been taken from General Franz Sigel and given to General Howard.

The army was still on the line of the Rappahannock, opposite Fredericksburg. Hooker planned to have Sedgwick with the Sixth Corps cross the stream below

the city and either attack or demonstrate heavily against Lee's right, where Meade had attacked in the battle of Fredericksburg, while the bulk of the army should move upstream, cross just east of the Wilderness, and come down upon Lee's left in full force.

As a preliminary move that would greatly assist this plan, the cavalry under Pleasonton was to march about two weeks in advance, cross the river several miles upstream, and make a raid around the Confederate army to break its connections and destroy or delay its supplies. Pleasonton attempted to do this; but torrential rains set in, raising the river beyond any depth that could be forded, producing a stream in every gully, and making most of the roads impassable. This delayed the cavalry a fortnight, when Hooker became impatient, gave up the plan of the raid, and as soon as the waters subsided set his whole army across. The place was about nine miles west of Fredericksburg, very near the eastern edge of the Wilderness, and it has since been called Chancellorsville, though the assumed village was only one large farmhouse, named for its owner.

Between this locality and Fredericksburg there was open country, and evidently the one proper thing for Hooker to do was to advance at once and strike the Confederate flank. But for some unaccountable reason he passed a whole day doing nothing; and this gave Lee time to learn what he was about and to make preparations to meet any blow from that quarter. He detached a small force from his right to delay or check Sedgwick, and with all the rest of his army moved toward Hooker, and made tentative attacks on his line at several points, seeking for the weakest spot. This was on May 1st, and at the close of that day



Hooker suddenly lost confidence in himself and his plan, to all appearance, at least. His usual audacity and energy were gone, and instead of assuming a tactical offensive he drew back from his more advanced positions, formed his army in a semicircle, and stood on the defensive. While his left and centre had a strong position, somewhat intrenched, his right, held by Howard with the Eleventh Corps, was "in the air," facing the Wilderness.

In the morning of the 2d, Lee discovered this weak spot, and sent Jackson with twenty-six thousand men to make a wide detour, pass through the Wilderness, and descend in full force upon the exposed flank, creating a surprise if possible. Jackson's column, as it passed over the crest of a hill, was seen from a point in the line of Sickles's corps, and his troops were actually counted; whereupon Hooker sent word to Howard to strengthen his position, advance his pickets, and take every precaution against a surprise. But Howard disregarded the warning and made practically no preparation to meet an attack. The reason appears to have been that he felt sure no organization or considerable force could pass through the seemingly impenetrable thicket of the Wilderness that was before him, and hence it was practically a great wall guarding his flank. Otherwise he had abundant time to draw back a certain distance, refuse his flank, intrench, and bring up an abundance of artillery. This would have thwarted Jackson's scheme, and perhaps destroyed his column.

General Howard was awakened from his dream of security when he saw large numbers of frightened wild animals rushing out of the Wilderness. Very soon the advancing battle-line of the enemy emerged from

the woods and bore down upon him, doubling up his flank and routing his corps.

The key-point of this part of the field was a bit of high ground known as Hazel Grove, and Sickles sent Pleasonton with two regiments of cavalry and a battery to occupy it. He arrived just in time to secure it, and quickly saw that there was but one way to save the army. The oncoming enemy must be held back till he could get a sufficient number of guns into position to meet them. He ordered Major Peter Keenan with the 8th Pennsylvania Cavalry, four hundred strong, to charge immediately the ten thousand exultant Confederate infantry. Keenan answered: "It is the same as saying we must be killed, but we'll do it." The charge was made, and Keenan and most of his command were slain; but the onset of the enemy was halted, for they supposed there must be a large force behind the cavalry. Thus a little precious time was gained, and Pleasonton brought together twenty-two guns. These were loaded with double charges of canister and depressed enough to make the shot strike the ground halfway between his own line and that of the enemy, so that when the charge was resumed the Confederates were struck by a storm of iron that no troops could face and live. Supports for the guns were brought up quickly, and some batteries that the Confederates advanced were knocked to pieces.

About dusk General Jackson rode forward to reconnoitre, telling the pickets to be careful not to fire on him and his aids as they returned. While he was gone, the pickets were changed, and the caution was not passed on to the new men. When the party rode back they were mistaken for National cavalymen, and

a volley was fired at them. Nearly every man in his escort was either killed or wounded, and Jackson himself received three balls, one in his right hand and two in his left arm. He thus lost control of his horse, which was frightened and turned into the woods, dashing him against the trees. By the time he reached the Confederate lines the National artillery began a destructive fire down the road, which struck down two bearers of the litter on which he had been laid, and he fell heavily to the ground. He was removed with much difficulty to the Wilderness Tavern, and thence, for fear of capture by Averell's cavalry, to Guiney's Station, where he died a week later. General A. P. Hill, who would have succeeded to the command of Jackson's corps, was wounded by the artillery fire, and the corps was placed under the leadership of General J. E. B. Stuart.

Sickles's corps, at Hazel Grove, had been separated from the rest of the army, and after dark it turned to strike Jackson's right flank and fight its way back to the main line. General Doubleday describes the strange midnight battle:


He [Sickles] determined to force his way back, and with the coöperation of Williams's and Berry's divisions retake the plank road with the bayonet. Ward's brigade was posted in the front line, and Hayman's and Graham's brigades a hundred yards in rear. A special column under Colonel Egan of the 40th New York was formed on the extreme left. The muskets were uncapped, and at midnight the command moved silently against the enemy. In spite of a terrific outburst of musketry and artillery from the open space at Dowdall's Tavern, the plank road and the works which Buschbeck had defended were regained. Berry at once moved forward his line to hold them. Many

guns and caissons taken from Howard's corps, and Whipple's train of pack mules, were also recovered. The confusion into which the enemy were thrown by this assault against their right enabled Berry to repulse the attack on him, and he continued to hold the position. The result of this brilliant movement was the reoccupation of a great part of the works Howard had lost and the capture of two guns and three caissons from the enemy.

Reynolds's corps (the First), which was coming to the field but had halted for the night four miles away, was summoned to take the place of the routed Eleventh Corps on the right of the line. It marched at once, the men singing the John Brown song, and in the early morning was in place, with its right thrown back behind Hunting Creek.

Hooker resolved to continue the battle the next day (May 3d), but first to draw back his lines nearer to Chancellorsville. Pleasonton still held the high ground at Hazel Grove and had fortified it and placed forty guns in position. This was the key-point of the field, and whichever combatant held it could, with his artillery, enfilade the lines of the other. But it lay outside the new line to which Hooker had ordered his army withdrawn. Sickles sent a request to be allowed to retain this all-important position, instead of drawing back and thus leaving it to the enemy. But the messenger found Hooker asleep, and the green and stupid staff officer on watch refused to awaken him before morning. In the morning it was too late, for the order to retract the lines was then in process of execution.

Early in the day the Confederates captured the height at Hazel Grove and placed there thirty guns to play upon Sickles's line, and a little later upon Slocum's. But Sickles had a battery on Fairview, a



somewhat higher hill within his lines, which played effectively upon the charging enemy. The retirement from Hazel Grove had been made in good order, but almost immediately came a tremendous onslaught upon Sickles, by infantry yelling "Remember Jackson!" This was checked by Mott's brigade, which had just arrived on the field, and a counter charge brought in many prisoners and some battle-flags. The struggle all along the line grew rapidly in desperation and intensity, and the Confederate General Mahone said afterward that "the Federals fought like devils." The tide swayed back and forth, as one battery after another, and one section of intrenchments after another, were taken, retaken, and lost again; and in these movements much life was sacrificed and many prisoners were captured.

As thirty-seven thousand men of the National army, standing ready to take part in the battle, were not sent in at all and did not fire a shot, while the Confederate troops were rushed forward in masses, the result was inevitable. Sickles's men were driven from their first line, then from their second, and finally from their third, when they slowly retired. At the same time Slocum's men made an equally desperate fight, but were obliged to retreat when their ammunition was nearly exhausted and their line was enfiladed. Hancock's division of the Second Corps and Geary's of the Twelfth held out the longest and then retired in good order. Hancock's line had been taken in reverse. The final charge of Geary's men was made in response to a personal appeal from Hooker and was successful, but very soon they were subjected to a fire from sixty guns and, in danger of being surrounded, were obliged to fall back again.

In this desperate fighting, which lasted several hours, General Berry was killed, General Gershom Mott, who succeeded him, was wounded, and Colonel Miles, of the 61st New York regiment, was shot down. And now a new horror appeared such as was seen several times in the course of the war. The woods on each side of the plank road took fire, and some of the wounded lay where they could not be rescued before the flames reached them.

The army in retiring took up a new and very strong line, where the confluence of the Rapidan and the Rapahannock was at its back, the right resting on the former and the left on the latter, with some intrenchments and artillery so placed as to guard the approaches. The Confederates reconnoitred the position, but did not attack, as they were obliged to turn and meet Sedgwick's advance against their right wing. Hooker had been standing on the veranda of the Chancellor house, leaning against a pillar, when a cannon ball struck the pillar just above his head and stunned him. It was some time before he recovered sufficiently to turn over the command to Couch, and when he did do so that General was unwilling to make any decisive move, lest Hooker, who had already shown unaccountable vacillation, should revive enough to countermand anything that might be done. Thus was lost the opportunity to resume the offensive against Lee when his energies were demanded to meet his foe at the other end of the line.

From a point three miles below Fredericksburg, on the south side of the river, Sedgwick marched at midnight, had a fight at the bridge over Hazel Run, and reached the city at three o'clock in the morning. General Jubal Early's command was there to defend the

heights, and at dawn Sedgwick prepared to attack him. The assault was made at ten o'clock, a part of the troops making their way through rough gullies under a severe fire. The intrenchments, or sunken road, at the foot of the hill were captured and the columns pressed on until they occupied the heights.

Sedgwick then halted to re-form his lines and sent for Brooks's division, which had been left in the position three miles away. This delay enabled Early to obtain strong reinforcements and take up a good position near Salem Church, across Sedgwick's road to Chancellorsville. Here there was fierce fighting when Brooks's division attacked McLaws, at first with considerable success, but finally was driven back. Newton planned to make a fresh assault with his whole division, supported by that of Howe, but was obliged to relinquish it when he found that Howe, without orders, had gone into camp. Sedgwick had now lost about twenty-five hundred men, and he was unwilling to undertake any further offensive movement until he could be assured of the active coöperation of Hooker. General Warren went back to Hooker's headquarters to report the conditions on Sedgwick's front and urge immediate action to relieve him. He found Hooker asleep and still suffering from the concussion produced by the cannon-shot, and could get nothing from him except an intimation that Sedgwick must take care of himself. One brigade of the Second Corps, however, crossed by a newly laid bridge and promptly went to Sedgwick, with about two thousand men. Sedgwick now formed three sides of a square, with his flanks resting on the river and enclosing the ford and the bridge. Lee had sent against him enough additional troops to surround his position,

and the next day (May 4th), these made several attempts to break his lines, but without success and with considerable loss to themselves, the National artillery being specially well handled and effective. Darkness ended the battle, and then Sedgwick's whole command was withdrawn across the river, the movement having been facilitated by the laying of a second bridge at the ford.

That evening General Hooker called a council of war; and though a majority of his generals voted for remaining and renewing the battle, he decided to retreat across the river. He left behind his killed and wounded and had lost fourteen guns.

Thus ended the most pitiful tragedy of errors that was enacted in the four years of the war. The salient points of the story present one blunder after another in astonishing succession, the blunders alternated almost regularly with untoward accidents. It had cost the National army seventeen thousand men, and the Confederate thirteen thousand.

The Battle of Gettysburg

July 1-3, 1863

IT was not long after the battle of Chancellorsville when General Hooker had recovered from the effects of the cannon-shot over his head and was alert and eager to try conclusions again with the Army of Northern Virginia. He had plans for assuming a bold offensive against that army, and even for capturing Richmond; but Halleck, General-in-chief, sitting at Washington, would consent to nothing that appeared to involve any risk, especially the contingency of uncovering the capital. Hooker asked that all the detached forces within the eastern theatre of war be placed under his command; he specifically wanted ten thousand men that were at Harpers Ferry to be withdrawn from that place and added to his immediate army. But all these requests were denied, and finally, in disgust, he asked to be relieved of the command (June 27th), and his request was granted. General George G. Meade was appointed to succeed him.

Meanwhile, Lee, impelled by public opinion in the South and by pressure from his government, had set out to invade the North. He moved his army to Culpeper, then sent a part of it into the Shenandoah Valley, where it did some hard but successful fighting around Winchester, and thence down to the Potomac,

and the other part to skirt the Blue Ridge along its eastern base and guard the passes. They all crossed the Potomac and pushed out in different directions—to Chambersburg, Carlisle, and York, gathering supplies and levying indemnities. Hooker kept close watch of the movement, knew every step of it, and moved his own army on a parallel route, crossing the Potomac not long after Lee. Stuart, with all the Confederate cavalry, had set out in an endeavour to ride once more around the National army, and Lee, thus deprived of the services of that arm, was ignorant of Hooker's movements until, on the 28th, he was surprised to learn that Hooker, with a large part of his army, was at Frederick, Maryland. Fear for his communications with Richmond caused him to take measures at once for concentration of his forces. Roads radiating from Gettysburg offered a ready means for this, and the various corps were ordered to march on that village at once.

President Lincoln had asked the governors of New York, Pennsylvania, Maryland, and West Virginia to raise and forward 120,000 militiamen for immediate service. For this purpose there was no difficulty in getting men, but much difficulty in supplying them with arms. This call was filled as far as possible, and the service of those men is known as "the emergency campaign."

General Meade continued the pursuit begun by Hooker to get in contact with the enemy, pushing northward and westward. He did at once that which Hooker had been forbidden to do: he ordered the garrison at Harpers Ferry to evacuate that place and remove to Frederick, to be stationed there as a reserve. If any argument on the wisdom of this were necessary,

it was furnished by the fact that when an equal number of men were kept at the Ferry the year before, by Halleck's orders in refusal of McClellan's request, they were all captured, with the place, by a detachment from the Confederate army.

The day that Meade assumed command of the Army of the Potomac (June 28th), one part of the Confederate army was at Chambersburg, or between that place and Gettysburg, another was at York, another at Carlisle, and a part of the cavalry was within sight of the spires of Harrisburg. Meade necessarily moved somewhat more slowly, because his task was to find the enemy and fight him. He had an advantage over Lee in that his cavalry, under General Alfred Pleasonton, was doing him good service. One division of the cavalry, under General John Buford, was advanced to Gettysburg on the 29th, with orders to delay the enemy till the infantry could come up. The First Corps, under General John F. Reynolds, followed rapidly, and on July 1st met the enemy coming in from Chambersburg.

Meade had contemplated occupying a line on Pipe Creek, about twelve miles south-east of Gettysburg, where he could receive battle to advantage. But Reynolds, a trained and skilful soldier, saw quickly that the battleground must be around Gettysburg, and he ordered the Eleventh Corps under General Howard to come up to the support of his own. Two roads—one from Chambersburg, and one from Hagerstown—met at the west end of the village. The surface, in that region, is broken into ridges, roughly parallel and running mainly north and south. The first of these west of the village is called Seminary Ridge, because a theological seminary is located thereon, and between

that and the ridge next west is a small stream called Willoughby Run. Here, between the two converging roads, the battle began. Buford mounted to the belfry of the Seminary, whence he could see the Confederates approaching from the west, while he anxiously awaited the coming of Reynolds's men from the east. With his cavalry he held the ridges till the infantry arrived, when Reynolds placed his troops, as they came up, so as to meet the enemy on both roads. The key-point of the situation was a piece of high ground in the angle between the roads, partly covered with timber, and the advance of both sides pushed for it. Here General Reynolds, going forward to survey the ground, was killed by a sharpshooter. General Doubleday succeeded him in command of the corps.

The Confederate force contending for the key-point was General James J. Archer's brigade of A. P. Hill's corps. Their immediate opponent was General Solomon Meredith's Iron Brigade. Archer's men had been told that they would meet militia only, which they expected to brush away with ease. But when they came near some of them were overheard saying: "'Taint no militia; there are those——black-hatted fellows again. It's the Army of the Potomac." Meredith's men secured the coveted ground, captured General Archer and a large part of his brigade, and advanced to the next ridge. But Meredith, who was six feet six inches tall, was so severely wounded that he was for a time retired from service; and Colonel Lucius Fairchild, afterward eminent in civil office, leading the 2d Wisconsin regiment, lost his left arm.



On the right of the National line the action was less regular and satisfactory. Some of the regiments were posted unfortunately, and there was no concert of

GETTYSBURG POSITIONS OF TROOPS

JULY 1 A.M.

-  FEDERAL
-  CONFEDERATE

0 500 1000 1500 2000 2500 3000 FEET



action. Two were driven from the field, and one gun was lost. On the other hand, a detachment of Confederates was driven into a railroad cut and there subjected to an enfilading fire, large numbers of them being captured and the remainder dispersed.

Both sides were promptly and heavily reënforced, and both fought obstinately. The Confederates planted batteries to sweep the Chambersburg road, but the Nationals clung to it and fought for it as long as possible. The men of Roy Stone's brigade, as they came into line to support a battery, shouted: "We have come to stay!" and that brigade lost more than eight hundred men. One division of Ewell's corps came down from Carlisle and struck the extreme right of the line. Then General John C. Robinson's division, which was resting on Seminary Ridge, was quickly pushed forward to meet Ewell's men and captured three North-Carolina regiments.

When the Eleventh Corps arrived on the field, about one o'clock, its commander, General Howard, being the ranking officer, assumed command of that wing of the army. He placed his corps on the right and prolonged its line far around north of the village. This great extension made it weak at some points; and as fresh divisions of the Confederate army were constantly arriving from the north and east they soon became strong enough to break through. They rolled back the right of the First Corps and the left of the Eleventh, and threw into confusion everything but the left of the First. That retired in good order, protecting its artillery and its ambulances. The fugitives ran into and through the town, and about five thousand of them became prisoners. But this success was gained by the Confederates only at heavy cost. At one point in the

fight General Alfred Iverson's brigade rushed up to a stone fence where General Henry Baxter's brigade was sheltered. Baxter's men suddenly rose and delivered a volley that struck down nearly five hundred men, and the others, subjected to a cross-fire, surrendered—all but one regiment, which escaped by raising a white flag. Iverson lost more than eight hundred men.

An occurrence at this point, which recalls Browning's *Incident of the French Camp*, is related by General Doubleday:

After the sharp fight in the railroad cut an officer of the 6th Wisconsin approached Lieutenant-Colonel Dawes, commander of the regiment. The Colonel supposed, from the firm and erect attitude of the man, that he came to report for orders; but the compressed lips told a different story. With a great effort the officer said, "Tell them at home I died like a man and a soldier." He threw open his breast, displayed a ghastly wound, and dropped dead at the Colonel's feet.

It is related that Colonel Charles Wheelock, of the 97th New York regiment, on the retreat of Robinson's division, took refuge in a house. A Confederate lieutenant entered and demanded his sword, which the Colonel declined to surrender. The lieutenant then called in a file of men, took out his watch, and said: "You are an old, grey-headed man, and I dislike to kill you; but if you don't give up that sword in five minutes I shall order these men to blow your brains out." The five minutes expired, and the Colonel still refused. A sudden tumult at the door called off the lieutenant, and when he returned the Colonel had given his sword to a girl who asked for it, and she secreted it in a bed. He was marched away a

prisoner, but in the night he escaped and returned to his regiment.

In the midst of the confusion General Hancock arrived, with orders from Meade to take command of that wing and choose the place for the army to make its stand and receive battle. South of the town, and about a mile east of Seminary Ridge, was Cemetery Hill, which is part of a ridge that runs south to the Round Tops and at its northern end curves round to the east. Here Steinwehr's division had taken a strong position behind stone fences, with skirmishers in houses in advance of the line. The retreating men of the First Corps formed on his left and those of the Eleventh Corps on his right. As the batteries came up they were placed advantageously, and by Hancock's orders General James S. Wadsworth's division occupied Culp's Hill, which is at the end of the curve. This made too strong a line to be attacked by that part of the Confederate army that faced it; and at sunset General Henry W. Slocum's Twelfth Corps arrived, with General George J. Stannard's Vermont brigade of the First Corps. The Third Corps, commanded by General Daniel E. Sickles, was on the way, and its advance had already arrived. Here ended the operations of the first day of the greatest battle of the war.

That night Ewell's corps occupied a line running through the town of Gettysburg; Hill's corps was on Seminary Ridge, and in the morning it was extended far southward along that ridge. Longstreet's corps came into position in the forenoon of the 2d, on the right of Hill's, extending far enough south to face the Round Tops. A large part of the National army was still on the march for the field of battle. The Second Corps, Hancock's, arrived about 7 A.M., and went into

position on Cemetery Ridge, forming what would be the centre of the line when all were up. Two divisions of the Fifth Corps, Sykes's, arrived at the same hour, and the remainder came later. The Third Corps, Sickles's, began to arrive at 9 o'clock. The 6th Corps, Sedgwick's, which had been thirty-four miles away, made a forced march and arrived at 4 P.M.

The two main ridges—Seminary and Cemetery—are about a mile apart. Between them is an imperfect ridge running diagonally. To the west of Little Round Top is an irregular mass of boulders called Devil's Den.

Sickles's corps advanced to the midway ridge, and was obliged to turn its left backward through a peach-orchard and a wheat-field, thus presenting a salient angle to the enemy—which is always a weak point. Whether this occupation of the midway ridge was a skilful move or a blunder is a disputed question with military critics. Longstreet attacked the salient heavily, and his right, composed of Hood's division, stretched out toward Little Round Top, where it just missed securing a position from which it could have enfiladed the National line.

General Gouverneur K. Warren, who at this time was chief engineer on Meade's staff, was ordered by Meade to examine the situation at the left of the line, and in doing so ascended Little Round Top. He saw that Hood's Texans were moving toward the hill, which was occupied only as a signal station, and that something must be done at once. He told the signal men to continue waving their flags, to give the impression that the position was occupied, while he hurried down to find troops that could be placed there. The Fifth Corps had been held in reserve at the left of the line, and Warren found General Strong Vincent's

brigade, of that corps, just going out to reënforce Sickles. Closely following it was one regiment, the 140th New York, of General Stephen H. Weed's brigade. These troops and Lieutenant Charles E. Hazlett's battery he ordered up the slope. They went up at once, over the rough ground among the rocks, the regiment lifting the guns of the battery with enormous labour. The remainder of Weed's brigade followed soon, and they were just in time to meet and thwart the advance of the Texans. Captain Porter Farley, at that time adjutant of the 140th regiment, has vividly described the situation and the conflict on that historic hill:

As we reached the crest a never-to-be-forgotten scene burst upon us. A great basin lay before us full of smoke and fire and literally swarming with riderless horses and fighting, fleeing, and pursuing men. The air was saturated with the sulphurous fumes of battle and was ringing with the shouts and groans of the combatants. The wild cries of charging lines, the rattle of musketry, the booming of artillery, and the shrieks of the wounded were the orchestral accompaniments of a scene like very hell itself—as terrific as the warring of Milton's fiends in pandemonium. The whole of Sickles's corps and many other troops that had been sent to its support in that ill-chosen hollow were being slaughtered and driven before the impetuous advance of Longstreet. But, fascinating as was this terrible scene, we had no time to spend upon it. Bloody work was ready for us at our very feet.

Round Top, a conical hill several hundred feet in height, lay just to the south of us and was separated from Little Round Top, on whose crest we were now moving, by a broad ravine leading down into the basin where the great fight was raging. Right up this ravine, which offered the easiest place of ascent, a rebel force, outflanking all our troops in the plain below, was advancing at the very mo-

ment when we reached the crest of the hill. Vincent's brigade had come up through the woods on the eastern slope of the hill, had deployed and taken position on its southern slope, and were at the moment of our arrival hotly engaged with a superior and aggressive force of the enemy. As soon as we reached the crest bullets came flying in among us. We were moving with the right in front, and not a musket was loaded, a fact which Warren of course knew nothing about when he rushed us up there. The enemy were coming from our right, and to face them would bring our file-closers in front. The order "On the right, by file into line" would have brought us into proper position, but there was no time to execute it. Colonel O'Rorke did not hesitate a moment. "Dismount," said he to me, for the ground was too rough to ride over. We sprang from our horses and gave them to the sergeant-major. O'Rorke shouted, "Down this way, boys!" and following him we rushed down the rocky slope with all the same moral effect upon the rebels, who saw us coming, as if our bayonets had been fixed and we ready to charge upon them.

Coming abreast of Vincent's brigade, and taking advantage of such shelter as the huge rocks lying about there afforded, the men loaded and fired, and in less time than it takes to write it the onslaught of the rebels was fairly checked, and in a few minutes the woods in front of us were cleared except of the dead and wounded. Such of them as had approached so near as to make escape almost impossible dropped their guns, threw up their hands, and upon a slight slackening of our fire rushed in upon us and gave themselves up as prisoners, while those not so near took advantage of the chance left them and retreated in disorder.

The firing for a few minutes was very rapid, and the execution on both sides was fearful. Captain Starks received four wounds, but with splendid pluck stayed by his men till the affair was over. Captain Sibley was shot through both legs and lay helpless till carried off. O'Rorke exposed himself with the greatest gallantry, not taking the

least advantage of the partial shelter that the rocks afforded. Here he was shot in the neck and dropped instantly dead without a word. Captain Spies was shot through the body. Lieutenant Charles P. Klein and Lieutenant Hugh McGraw were both wounded in the leg and died in consequence. Of the enlisted men, twenty-five were killed and eighty-four wounded. . . . After our fight was over and we had secured pretty good shelter behind the rocks on the western slope, Hazlett's cannoneers were much exposed, and many fell by the bullets of the sharpshooters who seemed swarming in the tree-tops and behind the rocks over in the direction of the peach-orchard.

The Texans came on, in the face of everything, and very soon there was a furious struggle for the coveted position. From the rocky fastnesses of Devil's Den the Confederate sharpshooters picked off valuable officers in rapid succession. General Vincent and General Weed were mortally wounded and as Lieutenant Hazlett leaned over Weed to catch his last words he also was struck by a fatal bullet. Those last words were: "I would rather die here than that the rebels should gain an inch of this ground." The battle ended with victory for the Nationals; but everywhere among the rocks on that rugged height lay dead and wounded men of either army. Hood's men returned to the work by creeping up the ravine between the two Round Tops. But the vigilant forces on Little Round Top were ready for them. The 20th Maine regiment, led by Colonel Joshua L. Chamberlain, made a peculiar movement. Charging with the bayonet, the centre moved faster than the flanks, thus gradually developing a wedge-like formation, which pierced the enemy's line, cutting off five hundred men, who were made prisoners, with seventeen officers.

It was evident that General Lee supposed the salient at the peach-orchard was the end of Meade's main line, for he assailed it furiously and persistently, while it was as gallantly defended. The fighting was terrific, and the losses on both sides were appalling. Several batteries were at work, with destructive effect. For instance, a single shell from one of the National guns struck down thirty men in a company of thirty-seven. Here the Second Corps, as well as the Third, lost heavily. Of Caldwell's division, the 1st brigade lost 330 men, including its commander, Colonel Edward E. Cross of the 5th New Hampshire, a famous fighting regiment, who was killed (as he himself had predicted). The 3d brigade lost 358, including its commander, General Samuel K. Zook, who was killed. In Hays's division the 3d brigade lost 714, including its successive commanders, Colonel George L. Willard and Colonel Eliakim Sherrill—both killed. In the Third Corps, the commander, General Sickles, was carried from the field wounded and lost a leg. He was succeeded in the command by General David Bell Birney, a son of James G. Birney, who was one of the original abolitionists, had emancipated his slaves in Alabama in 1834, and was the candidate of the Liberty party for President in 1840 and 1844. Of his six sons, five were in the National army, and four of these died in the service or soon after the war of disease contracted therein. In this corps the 1st division, commanded by General J. H. Hobart Ward, lost 2011; and the 2d division, commanded by General Andrew A. Humphreys, lost 2198.

On the other side, the two divisions of Longstreet's corps that fought here lost 4466 men. General William Barksdale, who had been an active secessionist, and here commanded a brigade, was mortally wounded

and died a prisoner. Two other brigade commanders were wounded.

Both sides were repeatedly reënforced, and there were fierce charges and counter charges, with many bloody incidents. But the weakness of the position held by the National troops finally caused the tide to turn against them, and their line was broken and forced back to Cemetery Ridge, where some military authorities say it should have been at the beginning. The guns and troops that crowned the two Round Tops made any flank movement against the new line impossible, and the Confederates tried in vain to dislodge it by a frontal attack. Yet General Ambrose R. Wright, of Hill's corps, penetrated the line with his brigade and held his place there for a little time, when he was driven back by a volley and a charge by two of Webb's regiments. General Hancock, who was placed in command of the First, Second, and Third Corps, was ubiquitous, looking sharply after many details as well as the general movements, and "patching" the line by moving detachments into places that had been weakened. Here occurred one of the most heroic incidents of the war. Hancock saw that the brigade of General Cadmus M. Wilcox, charging at the same time with Wright's, was making for a gap in the National line, and if they gained it the consequences would be serious. Looking about for troops to close the gap, Hancock saw nothing immediately available except the 1st Minnesota regiment. Riding up to Colonel William Colvill, he said: "Do you see those colours?" pointing to the Confederate flag. "Take them!" Instantly the regiment dashed forward and charged the brigade. There was a short, fierce fight, the onset of the enemy was stayed until other troops were brought up to fill the gap, and

the intrepid regiment even captured and brought off the colours. But it had lost eighty-two per cent. of its men, killed or wounded. The much-lauded charge of the Light Brigade at Balaclava sinks into insignificance in comparison with this exploit of the Minnesotians. In that case the order for the charge was a blunder, blunderingly obeyed; nothing was accomplished but the sabring of a few gunners; and the loss to the assailants was thirty-seven per cent.

The most complicated tactical movements of the whole war, and some of the deadliest fighting, took place on the second day of this battle in the space between the peach-orchard and Little Round Top, which is about one mile long. There is no better summary of them than General Doubleday's:

The batteries under Major McGilvery, which lined the cross-road below the peach-orchard, were very effective but were very much shattered. Kershaw captured them at one time, but was driven off by a gallant charge of the 141st Pennsylvania of Graham's brigade, who retook the guns, which were brought off by hand. Bigelow was ordered to sacrifice his battery, to give the others time to form a new line. He fought, with fixed prolonge, till the enemy were within six feet of him, and then retired with the loss of three officers and twenty-eight men. Phillips's battery, which adjoined his, had a similar experience. McLaws bears testimony to the admirable manner in which this artillery was served.

While the peach-orchard was assailed, several combats took place in the vicinity which had a general relation to the defence of Sickles's line. A little stream runs through a ravine parallel to the cross-road and about five hundred yards south of it, and then turns sharply to the south at the corner of a wheat-field, passing through a rocky wooded

country to flow into Plum Run. De Trobriand's brigade held the north bank of this stream, and his contest with Semmes's brigade in front and Kershaw's on his right was at very close range and very destructive. At the same time when Ward's left was turned the enemy came in on the left and rear of De Trobriand, and occupied the wheat-field. Barnes's division of the Fifth Corps, composed of Sweitzer's and Tilton's brigades, soon came to his assistance. The former, by wheeling to the left and retaining several lines kept up the fight successfully against the enemy who came up the ravine; but the latter was flanked and gave way. De Trobriand's two regiments in front had a most determined fight. When relieved by Zook's force they fell back across the wheat-field. There Birney used them as the basis of a new line, brought up two fresh regiments, charged through the field, and drove the enemy back to the stone fence that bounded it.

Caldwell's division of Hancock's corps now came on to renew the contest. He formed the brigades of Cross and Kelly in front and those of Zook and Brooke in the rear. In the advance the front line was enfiladed in both directions and was soon cut up, and the rear line came forward in its place. Brooke made a splendid charge, turning Kershaw's right and driving Semmes back through the supporting batteries. Sweitzer came up a second time, but was useless, for there was still another line of batteries beyond. As the peach-orchard was by this time in the possession of the enemy, Brooke's advanced position was a disadvantage, for both his flanks were turned. Semmes's brigade, with parts of Benning's and Anderson's, who had rallied behind a stone wall, now came forward and re-took the batteries they had lost. Caldwell, under cover of our artillery, extricated his division with heavy loss.

Then Ayres went in with his fine division of regulars. He struck in flank the enemy pursuing Caldwell, doubled them up, and drove them back to the position that Caldwell had left. But his line was untenable, for a brigade with

ample supports had formed on his right rear, so that nothing remained but to face about and fight his way home again. This was accomplished with the tremendous loss of fifty per cent. of his command in killed and wounded. His return was aided by the artillery on Little Round Top and by the advance of a part of the Sixth Corps.

The enemy—Wofford's, Kershaw's, and Anderson's brigades—now swarmed in front of our main line between the wheat-field and Little Round Top. General S. Wiley Crawford, with two brigades of the Pennsylvania Reserve Corps, was ordered to drive them farther back. These brigades were among the most dauntless men in the army. Crawford called upon them to defend the soil of their native State, and, with the colours of one regiment in his hand, headed a charge by McCandless's brigade. The men went forward with an impetus that nothing could withstand. The enemy took shelter behind a stone fence on the hither side of the wheat-field; but McCandless stormed the position and drove them beyond the field. Then, as it was getting dark, both sides rested on their arms.

As Crawford charged, two brigades of Sedgwick's corps, those of Nevins and Eustis, formed under Wheaton on the right and below Little Round Top. The sight of the firm front presented by these fresh troops discouraged Longstreet, who went forward to reconnoitre, and he gave up all attempts at making any farther advance.

It was General Lee's intention to have both wings of the National army attacked at the same time. But Ewell, whose corps confronted the right wing, did not move till Longstreet's assaults of the left wing were over. Then, late in the afternoon, the extreme right, at Culp's Hill, held by Wadsworth's division of the First Corps and Geary's of the Twelfth, was attacked. The position was well fortified, and the enemy, being subjected to a severe artillery fire, was easily repulsed

along the greater part of the line, but made and held a lodgment in Geary's works at the extreme left.

At the same hour when this effort was made against Culp's Hill, Ewell ordered Early's division to storm Cemetery Hill. In preparation for this he opened fire from four batteries, but they were soon silenced by the return fire of the batteries on the hill. Then the infantry moved forward, Hays's brigade on the right, Hoke's on the left, and Gordon's in reserve. The enemy met the defenders first at the foot of the hill, and as they advanced they were subjected to such a destructive fire from both artillery and infantry that their left and centre were driven back. But the right, availing itself of shelter from houses and undulating ground, was for a time more fortunate. It drove Von Gilsa's brigade up the hill and with hand-to-hand work captured Wiedrick's battery and a part of Ricketts's. But its left flank then became exposed to Stevens's battery, which poured in rapid discharges of double canister, while the 33d Massachusetts regiment got in an effective oblique fire. All the artillerymen had been ordered not to retreat in any case, but fight to the last, and they obeyed. In the fight against Wiedrick and Ricketts handspikes, rammers, and stones were used. Then Carroll's brigade, with some other reinforcements, rushed to the rescue, and the Confederates were obliged to retreat down the hill under a withering fire. A part of their force consisted of an organization known as the "Louisiana Tigers," which was said never to have failed in a charge. This time they had come forward, 1750 strong, and as they went down the hill in the dusk only 150 of them escaped.

While the action of the first day was fragmentary, and that of the second day was very complicated,

that of the third day, though intense, was direct and simple.

The first day's fight had resulted in driving the right wing of the National army back to its true place on the ridge; and the second day's fight had resulted similarly for the left wing. Now the troops were all up and all in place in a strong position. General Lee considered that he had been victorious on those days, which recalls General Grant's remark that "there is no victory for any one till the battle is ended." And on this consideration Lee determined to finish his opponent by a grand charge that should pierce the centre and roll up the whole line. General Longstreet, whose troops must make the charge, remonstrated on the ground that a column of fifteen thousand men could not succeed in such a charge at that place; and if enough men were put in to make it successful, it could only be at frightful cost. He wished Lee to flank Meade's position by moving south and east around Round Top. But Lee would not listen to this, and apparently the rank and file of his army were in the same mood.

The plan was, for Ewell, early in the morning, to follow up the success of the day before on the extreme National right and capture so much of the line there as would prevent the sending thence of reënforcements to the centre, at the same time cutting off that avenue of retreat. This being done, the grand charge would be made, with Pickett's division, which had just arrived, in the lead.

But in the night the Nationals established batteries at all points on the right wing, and early in the morning they anticipated their opponents who had gained a foothold in the works of Geary's division, opening upon them furiously. The Confederate force there

had been strengthened, for Ewell was determined to carry out his orders if possible. The hill was so steep and rugged that General Edward Johnson brought no artillery, as he could not have used it. He therefore charged up the hill with his infantry. He not only met a strong force, Kane's brigade, in front, but was subjected to a flank fire from Ruger's division on his right and saw preparations for cutting off any retreat on the left. Nevertheless, his men stuck resolutely to their task till eleven o'clock, when Geary's division charged them and they gave it up, retiring slowly.

That movement having failed, Lee once more contemplated turning Meade's left. He and Longstreet rode over to that end of the line and consulted General Wofford, who commanded there. When asked whether he could carry the heights before him, he answered that though he had nearly reached the crest the day before, he could not go there now, because the enemy had had all night to intrench and reënforce.

Lee had now no alternative but to retreat or carry out the plan of assailing the centre with a grand charge, despite the fact that Ewell's attempt on Meade's right had ended in failure. It was really a forlorn hope. The time until one o'clock was spent in placing batteries and arranging the details. Pickett's men formed the centre of the column, with the divisions of Pettigrew and Pender on their right and left, the brigades of Wilcox and Wright in the rear. The main portions of the corps of Hill and Longstreet were to support the flanks and continue in a grand movement as soon as Pickett's wedge should have broken Meade's line.

About one o'clock the Confederates began firing with more than a hundred guns ranged on Seminary Ridge. This was answered by eighty guns (all there

was room for) on Cemetery Ridge, and the great artillery duel was continued for two hours. The infantry lay close under the crests of the hills, every man understanding the purpose of the bombardment, which was intended by the Confederates to silence the National batteries, that they might not play upon the charging column. Caissons were blown up, guns were dismounted, and many gravestones in the cemetery were knocked to pieces. While the artillerymen suffered, the infantry were mainly safe, though here and there a man was killed by descending fragments of a shell that burst in the air above him. On the rear slope of Cemetery Ridge many horses were killed, nearly everything that rose above the surface of the ground was struck, and at least one reserve battery had to hurry away to a place of safety. The roar of the cannonade was plainly heard forty miles away. General Doubleday says he knew of eleven caissons being blown up, one of which he was quite near, and "when the smoke went up from these explosions rebel yells of exultation could be heard along a line of several miles." The effect on the Confederates on Seminary Ridge was quite similar, but it has not been so particularly described by participants.

At three o'clock, General Hunt, chief of artillery, ordered all the batteries to cease firing. This was done to cool the guns and save some of the ammunition for the charge that would soon follow. Batteries that had been disabled were drawn off, and fresh ones were brought up to fill their places. The Confederates supposed the cessation was caused by exhaustion of the ammunition. Colonel Alexander, commanding the Confederate artillery, had been instructed to give Pickett the word to begin the charge as soon as it ap-

peared that the way was cleared by the guns. He now sent a note to Pickett saying: "If you are coming at all, you must come at once, or I cannot give you proper support; but the enemy's fire has not slackened at all—at least eighteen guns are still firing from the cemetery itself." A few minutes later he wrote again: "For God's sake, come quick. The eighteen guns are gone. Come quick, or my ammunition won't let me support you properly." Pickett took this note to Longstreet and asked, "General, shall I advance?" The General bowed, but said nothing. He felt sure that the charge would be a disastrous failure; but General Lee had overruled his objections, and he could not stop it. Pickett said: "Sir, I shall lead my division forward," remounted, and rode back to his command. General Longstreet, sitting on his horse, with his back to the afternoon sun and the sloping battleground before him, had the best possible view of the whole movement, and of course nobody could understand it better. He thus describes it:

I foresaw what my men would meet, and would gladly have given up my position rather than share in the responsibilities of that day. It was thus I felt when Pickett, at the head of 4900 brave men, marched over the crest of Seminary Ridge and began his descent of the slope. As he passed me he rode gracefully, with his jaunty cap raked well over on his right ear and his long auburn locks, nicely dressed, hanging almost to his shoulders. . . . The troops advanced in well-closed ranks and with elastic step, their faces lighted with hope. Before them lay the ground over which they were to pass to the point of attack. Intervening were several fences, a field of corn, a little swale running through it, and then a rise from that point to the Federal stronghold. As soon as Pickett passed the crest

of the hill, the Federals had a clear view and opened their batteries, and as he descended the eastern slope of the ridge his troops received a fearful fire from the batteries in front and from Round Top. The troops marched steadily, taking the fire with great coolness. As soon as they passed my batteries I ordered my artillery to turn their fire against the batteries on our right which were then raking our lines. They did so, but did not force the Federals to change the direction of their fire and relieve our infantry. As the troops were about to cross the swale I noticed a considerable force of Federal infantry moving down as if to flank the left of our line. . . . After crossing the swale the troops kept the same steady step, but met a dreadful fire at the hands of the Federal sharpshooters; and as soon as the field was open the Federal infantry poured down a terrific fire, which was kept up during the entire assault. The slaughter was terrible, the enfilade fire of the batteries on Round Top being very destructive. At times one shell would knock down five or six men. . . . As Pickett's division concentrated in making the final assault, Kemper fell severely wounded. As the division threw itself against the Federal line, Garnett fell and expired. The Confederate flag was planted in the Federal line, and immediately Armistead fell mortally wounded at the feet of the Federal soldiers. The wavering divisions then seemed appalled, broke their ranks, and retired. Immediately the Federals swarmed around Pickett, attacking on all sides, enveloped and broke up his command, having killed and wounded more than two thousand men in about thirty minutes. They then drove the fragments back upon our lines. . . . General Lee came up as our troops were falling back, and encouraged them as well as he could. It was then he used the expression, "It was all my fault. Get together, and let us do the best we can toward saving that which is left us."

Those who saw it from the other side say General Hunt had made the most perfect arrangements—

bringing up fresh batteries and replenishing the ammunition-boxes—to meet and break the charge. When the charging column, which consisted of about fifteen thousand men, appeared, it was attacked with solid shot, then with shell, and, when it drew nearer, with double canister. Thus the ranks were ploughed through and through before they came within reach of the rifles of the infantry. But the gaps were steadily closed up and the column came on. It passed over the advanced line, and a small part of it reached the main line, but not before detachments thrown out at right angles against both its flanks had poured in their enfilading volleys. Those who reached the main line met an unorganized but solid and determined mass of men, who had rushed from all sides to the point of danger. There was a short, fierce struggle, much of it hand-to-hand, and the forlorn remnants either threw themselves upon the ground and surrendered or turned and fled down the slope. A grand sally brought in many prisoners and trophies.

Pickett had lost two thirds of his command. Every brigade commander and every field-officer save one had fallen.

While this charge was in progress, there was a cavalry fight at each end of the lines, the troopers of each army attacking around the right wing of its enemy. Both attempts failed.

The next day, July 4th, there was no fighting. Lee made preparations for retreating into Virginia, started his trains in the morning, and entrusted the transportation of the badly wounded to General Imboden, who gives a sorrowful account of their journey through storm and over the worst of roads.

The National losses in this great battle were 23,190.

The Confederate losses never have been ascertained with exactness, but they are reckoned at nearly 30,000. In the numbers engaged on each side, and the respective losses, it closely parallels Waterloo. In its result, Gettysburg was not the Waterloo of the war, but it has been designated as the high tide of the rebellion. Nowhere else did the rebellion come so near to success; and after that there was no serious attempt to invade the North. On the contrary, after this the Confederates kept closely on the defensive, assuming the offensive only at the Wilderness in the East and at Chickamauga, Franklin, and Atlanta in the West. They were encouraged to continue the hopeless struggle by certain politicians who led them to believe that if they persevered till another election the Lincoln administration would be defeated, Congress changed, and the independence of the Confederacy assured.

The Siege of Vicksburg

May-July, 1863

VICKSBURG, Mississippi, is on a high bluff overlooking the Mississippi River where the stream makes one of its sharpest bends, enclosing a narrow peninsula. The railroad from Shreveport, Louisiana, reached the river at this point and by a ferry was connected with the line from Vicksburg eastward to Jackson, the State capital. The distance between the two cities is about fifty miles. About a hundred miles below Vicksburg is Port Hudson, which is similarly situated as to river and railways. Between these two points the Red River, coming from the borders of Texas, Louisiana, and Arkansas, flows into the Mississippi. As the Confederates drew a large part of their supplies from that western region, and as they had lost New Orleans, Baton Rouge, and Memphis, it was highly important to them to protect the connections of those railroads and control that stretch of the river that was between them. Farragut's fleet below and the fleet of gunboats above were powerless to reduce these strongholds, which were heavily supplied with artillery in good fortifications.

In November, 1862, General Grant was placed in command of all the troops sent to his department and was told to fight the enemy where he pleased. A few

days later he had a conference with General Sherman at Columbus, when they planned a campaign. Grant, with about thirty thousand men, was to move southward against General John C. Pemberton, who was on the Tallahatchie with an equal force. Sherman, who also had thirty thousand men, was to move down the Mississippi, assisted by Captain David D. Porter, with his gunboats, and attempt the capture of Vicksburg from the rear. If Pemberton moved toward that city, Grant was to follow and attack him as soon as possible.

Sherman and Porter set about their task very promptly and energetically. Grant moved more slowly, because he wished to keep Pemberton as far north as possible, instead of driving him down toward Vicksburg. He established his depot of supplies at Holly Springs, and placed there a garrison of fifteen hundred men. But a great cavalry raid by Van Dorn and Forrest captured Holly Springs and its garrison, destroyed \$2,000,000 worth of supplies there, and broke the railroad between Jackson, Tennessee, and Columbus, Kentucky. Grant therefore moved back toward Memphis.

Sherman's troops were embarked on transports, which moved down the river in a long procession, convoyed by the gunboats, which were at intervals in the line. At Christmas they arrived at Milliken's Bend, where one division was left, to send out a force to break the railroad from Shreveport. The other three divisions ascended the Yazoo thirteen miles and were landed opposite the bluffs north of Vicksburg. These bluffs were crowned with artillery, and the low and broken bottom-land, subject to inundation, was not very favourable for military operations.

On the 29th, careful arrangements for the attack having been made, while the gunboats made a diversion

at Haines's Bluff, and Steele's division made a feint on the right toward Vicksburg, the main force moved against the centre of the position. There was a short bombardment, then a volley of musketry, and then the men rushed forward. They were played upon by guns at the foot of the bluffs and subjected to a cross-fire from the heights, so that though one brigade reached the base of the hills it was obliged to fall back, leaving five hundred of its men. At another point the 6th Missouri regiment reached the bluff, but could not return. The men at once scooped niches in the bank in which to shelter themselves, and then the enemy on the height came to the edge of the hill and holding out their muskets vertically fired down at them. After dark the survivors of the regiment got back to their lines. This attempt cost more than eighteen hundred men, and inflicted a loss of only two hundred on the enemy. Heavy fog and rain set in, and further operations that were planned had to be given up, as Sherman saw water-marks ten feet above his head on the trees, and also saw large reënforcements moving into the intrenchments on the hill. He therefore reëmbarked his forces and steamed down the Yazoo.


Early in January General John A. McClernand, assuming command of the corps of Sherman and Morgan, went a short distance up the Arkansas River to attack Fort Hindman, also called Arkansas Post, which had a garrison of five thousand men. They landed on the 10th, and the next day attacked the fort and a fresh line of intrenchments that reached from the river to a swamp, while the gunboats moved in close and swept the bastions with a rapid fire. The men advanced steadily but cautiously, taking advantage of every little shelter and picking off the artillerymen so

fast that the guns could not be well served. Very soon the fort was surrendered. A hundred and fifty of the garrison had been killed, and McClernand had lost about one thousand. The fort was destroyed, and its stores were transferred to the fleet.

General Grant was now instructed to take command in person of all the operations on the Mississippi. He divided his forces into four corps, to be commanded by Generals McClernand, Sherman, Hurlbut, and McPherson. Hurlbut was ordered to hold the lines east of Memphis, while the other troops, reënforced, were united in the river expedition. McClernand and Sherman, with great labour, dug a channel for a canal across the peninsula opposite Vicksburg, but the river would not flow through it, and on the 7th of March there was a sudden rise in the stream which put the whole peninsula under water, and Sherman's men narrowly escaped drowning.

Another scheme was, to move through Lake Providence and bayous west of the great river, and this required the cutting of a canal from the Mississippi to one of the bayous, at which McPherson's men worked for a large part of March. But here also the result was failure.

On the eastern side there had been an opening, known as Yazoo Pass, from which an entrance could be gained to the Yazoo, above Yazoo City. But that pass was now closed by an embankment. Grant blew up the embankment and went in. The banks of the streams were heavily wooded, and the Confederates felled great trees so that they fell across the channels to stop the boats; and when many of these had been removed it was discovered that the enemy were also felling trees behind the expedition, to prevent it from



MAP OF GRANT'S CAMPAIGN IN THE REAR OF VICKSBURG, MAY, 1863.

getting out. This attempt therefore was relinquished, and one more plan was made to flank Vicksburg on the north. It was proposed to ascend the Yazoo a short distance, turn into Steele's bayou, and through that get into Big Sunflower River and descend that stream to the Yazoo just above Haines's Bluff. Porter and Sherman attempted this, but met with every possible difficulty—narrow channels, felled trees, swamps, canebrakes, lack of solid ground for troops, and annoyance from numerous hidden sharpshooters. In some places they had to light candles in order to see where they were going; and finally, in getting out, some of the boats had to back out for thirty miles through a pass that was too narrow for them to turn.

The final plan was, to ferry the army across the river and march it down to some point below Vicksburg, while the ironclad gunboats should run by the batteries in the night and ferry the army across again to the eastern bank, when it could march against Pemberton wherever he might be between Vicksburg and Jackson. And this plan succeeded, though the Confederates, when the gunboats approached, set fire to great piles of wood on the bank and made the whole scene as light as day. The gunboats went through under a heavy fire, which they returned as well as they were able, and met with little loss except one transport. The crossing to the eastern bank was made at Bruinsburg, about forty miles below Vicksburg, on the 30th. McClernand's corps, which had the advance, marched at once on Port Gibson and near that place found a Confederate force of 8000 men strongly intrenched. After an all-day fight the enemy's line was broken and they retreated, burning the bridges behind them. McClernand had lost 850 men, the Confederates 1000.

The fortifications at Grand Gulf were then abandoned, and Grant established there his new base. A bridge was rebuilt at Port Gibson, and one division was sent in pursuit of the retreating Confederates, who were overtaken at Willow Springs and driven across the Big Black River.

As soon as Sherman's corps came up, and supplies were received, Grant moved on with his entire force. He had now about 45,000 men, and Pemberton had about 50,000. Moving north-easterly, toward Jackson, the State capital, Grant came upon a force of 3000 near Raymond and swept it away after a fight in which he lost about 400 men to the enemy's 500. On May 14th he reached Jackson, where General Joseph E. Johnston had assumed command the day before with 12,000 men under his orders. Pemberton was thirty miles to the west, and Grant was between them.

That night it rained heavily, and when Sherman and McPherson marched on the city the next morning they travelled roads that were a foot deep in water. McPherson approached on the west, and Sherman on the south and south-west. The skirmishers were driven in, and while Grant was making preparations for an assault on the intrenchments it was found that Johnston was evacuating the place. The Nationals marched in at once, and ran up the Stars and Stripes at the State Capitol. They had lost nearly 300 men in the heavy skirmishing and the Confederates had lost about 850, mostly prisoners. Seventeen guns were taken, but most of the supplies had been burned. General Grant writes:

Sherman and I went together into a manufactory which had not ceased work on account of the battle nor for the

entrance of Yankee troops. Our presence did not seem to attract the attention of either the manager or the operatives, most of whom were girls. We looked on for a while to see the tent-cloth which they were making roll out of the looms, with "C. S. A." woven in each bolt. There was an immense amount of cotton, in bales, stacked outside. Finally I told Sherman I thought they had done work enough. The operatives were told they could leave and take with them what cloth they could carry. In a few minutes cotton and factory were in a blaze.

In destroying his stores Johnston had also burned the storehouses. Sherman was ordered to remain in Jackson till he had destroyed the place as a railroad centre and a manufactory of military supplies; and Grant says he did that work most effectually.

General Grant's description of the ammunition train with which he was making the march through Mississippi is amusing:

Provisions could be taken from the country; but all the ammunition that can be carried on the person is soon exhausted when there is much fighting. I directed, therefore, immediately on landing, that all the vehicles and draft animals, whether horses, mules, or oxen, in the vicinity, should be collected and loaded to their capacity with ammunition. Quite a train was collected, and a motley train it was. In it could be found fine carriages loaded nearly to the top with boxes of cartridges that had been pitched in promiscuously, drawn by mules with plough-harness, straw collars, rope-lines, etc.; long-coupled wagons with racks for cotton-bales, drawn by oxen, and everything that could be found in the way of transportation on a plantation, for either use or pleasure. The making out of provision returns was stopped for a time. No formalities were to retard our progress until a position was secured.

A despatch from Johnston to Pemberton, instructing him to come up in Sherman's rear, there to be reënforced from Johnston's troops, fell into Grant's hands, whereupon he ordered McPherson to move back to Bolton, the nearest point at which Johnston could reach the road. At the same time he ordered McClernand and Blair to concentrate on Bolton at once. He wished to meet the enemy in the open field and prevent them from getting within the fortifications of Vicksburg. A little later Sherman also was ordered to march on Bolton. All these orders were obeyed promptly, and all the trains went with the troops.

Meanwhile Pemberton, striving to get between Grant and his base—but Grant says he now had no base, carrying all his supplies with him—took up a strong position at Champion's Hill, about twenty miles east of Vicksburg and a little way east of the Big Black. He had twenty-three thousand men, and covered the three roads that led westward. Here Grant attacked him in a battle that lasted four hours (May 15th) and was the bloodiest of the campaign. The divisions of Hovey, Logan, and Crocker bore the brunt of it, and Hovey lost more than a third of his men. Logan advanced on the right, past the Confederate left flank, and held the only road by which the enemy could retreat. But this fact was not known at the time, and when Hovey called for assistance, Logan was drawn back to help him. Thus the road was uncovered and the advantage was lost. A little later Pemberton retreated by that road, leaving on the field thirty guns and all his dead and wounded. He had lost more than three thousand killed or wounded, and nearly as many were captured in the battle or on the retreat. General

Lloyd Tilghman was among the slain. Grant lost 2441 killed or wounded.

The retreating Confederates were followed up without delay and were next encountered at the Big Black River. Their main line was on high land west of the stream, while the rear-guard was disposed along the edge of a bayou that ran through low ground east of it. On the 17th this position was attacked vigorously. Here General Michael K. Lawler, conspicuous in his shirt-sleeves, led a furious charge that turned the right, and then the whole line gave way. Pemberton burned the bridge, leaving his rear-guard to their fate, and continued his retreat. Some of the poor fellows swam the stream, some were drowned, and 1750 were captured. Eighteen guns were taken here. Grant's loss was 279 men.

Sherman arrived with his corps the same day, and Grant ordered that three bridges be built—one a floating bridge, one using bales of cotton for pontoons, and one made by felling great trees on each side of the stream and letting them fall so that their boughs interlaced over the channel. These were not cut quite through, and thus they hung to the stumps as by a hinge. Planks were laid crosswise on the trees and made a very fair roadway. Sherman's men made still another bridge, farther up the stream. The work was finished by the light of pitch-pine torches; and Grant and Sherman sat on a log and watched the weird procession of blue-coated men with shining muskets filing across the swaying structures.

Pemberton hurried into Vicksburg, which had a line of strong defences on the land side as well as on the river front. Grant followed with his usual promptness and invested the place (May 19th), Sherman holding

the right of the line at Haines's Bluff, where his men were defeated in the spring, McPherson on Sherman's left, and McClernand next, reaching to the river below the town. Grant at once established a new base for supplies on the Yazoo. He also constructed roads in his rear, to facilitate the bringing up of the supplies. He had about thirty thousand men, the defences before him were seven miles long, and he expected that Johnston would come up to the relief of the place. For this reason, he ordered a grand assault on the 22d, hoping to take the works by storm. At several points the men reached the works and planted their flags on them, but it was impossible to capture them and hold them. McClernand falsely reported that he had carried two forts at his end of the line, and asked for reinforcements. These were sent to him, and the assault was renewed on other parts of the line, to assist him. This only caused additional loss of life, and when, somewhat later, he issued an unauthorized order of congratulation to his troops, and had it published in newspapers, he was relieved of his command, which was given to General E. O. C. Ord.

That assault had cost nearly twenty-five hundred men, and after it the army settled down to regular siege operations. Grant received successive reinforcements until by June 14th he had seventy-one thousand men. His line was fifteen miles long. All the time the zigzag trenches were approaching nearer and nearer to the fortifications, and there was mining and countermining. Two mines were exploded under the works, but neither produced a breach large enough to be serviceable. There was constant expectation on Pemberton's part, and apprehension on Grant's part, that Johnston would arrive with a strong force to

attack the National army in the rear and raise the siege; but he never came. The men lived largely in the trenches and at some points were near enough to speak with their opponents and even trade for tobacco. General Grant writes:

Floods of visitors began to pour in from the North. Some came to gratify curiosity; some to see sons or brothers; members of the Christian and Sanitary commissions came to minister to the wants of the sick and wounded. Often those coming to see a son or brother would bring a dozen or two of poultry. They did not know how little the gift would be appreciated. Many of the soldiers had lived so much on chickens, ducks, and turkeys, without bread, during the march, that the sight of poultry, if they could get bacon, almost took away their appetite.

Grant had no siege guns till Porter sent him some from the gunboats which answered the purpose. But his men made wooden mortars from sections of large trees, bored and hooped with iron. With these and the guns, shells were thrown into the city night and day. And hand-grenades were tossed back and forth across the intrenchments. Where the city's streets were cut through the hills, caves were scooped out of the clayey banks, and in these many families lived. The wife of an officer afterward published her experiences of that siege. Two or three passages will suggest the state of affairs in the city:

So constantly dropped the shells around the city that the inhabitants all made preparations to live underground. We seized the opportunity one evening, when the gunners were probably at their supper, for we had few moments of quiet, to go over and take possession of our cave. A friend was kind enough to offer me his camp-bed; another had his

The Battle of Chickamauga

September 19-20, 1863

AFTER the battle of Murfreesboro (or Stone's River), on December 31, 1862, and January 2, 1863, the two commanders, Rosecrans and Bragg, watched each other, both being unwilling to make any great movement. General Grant wished Rosecrans to advance against Bragg, lest he should reënforce Johnston and enable him to attack Grant in the rear while the siege of Vicksburg was in progress. But Rosecrans refused, on the ground that it was against military principles to fight two battles at once, and that the best way to hold back Bragg was by constantly menacing and never attacking. For similar reasons, Bragg would not stir, lest Rosecrans should go to Grant's assistance. But both commanders sent out detachments that had lively work in various encounters. Some of these, if in any former American war, would be recorded as historic battles; but they were overshadowed by the great and costly conflicts.

[When at last Rosecrans did move, he exhibited some of the ablest strategy of the whole war, and forced Bragg to fall back from one position to another all the way from Tullahoma to Chattanooga—eighty miles. This was not accomplished without many heavy skirmishes, all which resulted one way because of the supe-

riority of the National cavalry. Rosecrans wished to get possession of Chattanooga, and when Bragg, crossing the Tennessee, occupied that town, the next task was to manœuvre him out of it. To accomplish this, Rosecrans moved south-west, as if he intended to pass around Chattanooga and invade Georgia. Bragg then fell back thirty miles to Lafayette, Georgia, and the National troops marched into Chattanooga. These later movements had been rendered very slow by heavy rains, so that, although Rosecrans set out from Murfreesboro in June, it was now September.

Confident that Bragg was in full retreat, Rosecrans left Chattanooga to follow him. But Bragg, who had been heavily reënforced, had turned back and was planning an attack on Rosecrans. For about a week the two armies were feeling for each other; then they came within striking distance on the banks of Chickamauga Creek, in Catoosa County, Georgia, which flows north-easterly and joins the Tennessee above Chattanooga. The name Chickamauga is said to signify "River of Death." At the point where the battle took place the stream is about five miles east of Missionary Ridge. Directly opposite is Macfarland's Gap through the Ridge, and about five miles north of it, at Rossville, is another gap, through which runs the straight road to Chattanooga.


The battle began on the morning of September 19th. Rosecrans had 57,000 men; Bragg had 71,000. The general direction of the lines was with the Nationals facing south-east, and the Confederates north-west; but in the course of the battle these lines were shifted in various ways. The left of Rosecrans's line was held by the corps of General George H. Thomas; the centre by that of General Thomas L. Crittenden; the right by

that of General Alexander McD. McCook. Bragg's right wing was commanded by General Leonidas Polk; his left by General James Longstreet.

Bragg assumed the offensive. His plan was, to feint against his opponent's right, and heavily attack his left, with the purpose of crushing that wing and seizing the road that led to Chattanooga, for that town was his objective. If he could accomplish this, he would not only defeat Rosecrans decisively by cutting him off from connection with his base, but at Chattanooga control the river and the passage through the mountains. From a mountain height east of the creek the Confederates had a good view of the valley to the west and had seen the concentration of the National forces, thus knowing exactly what they had to meet and how the enemy was disposed.

At ten o'clock they crossed the stream and moved confidently against their enemy. Thomas, who held the key-point of the position, was for a slow and stubborn fight one of the best corps commanders in either army—perhaps the very best. There was not so much of concerted action as Bragg had intended, partly because Thomas delivered vigorous counter-blows whenever there was opportunity; but there was fierce and persistent fighting all along the line. Divisions and brigades charged, were repelled, and charged again. Batteries were captured and recaptured, the horses were killed, and in some instances the gunners, refusing to leave their pieces, were killed at the wheels. Thomas was forced back some distance, but he regained his first position, and when night fell the general situation had not been changed by the day's fighting.

Before morning both sides had corrected their lines, replenished their supplies, and were ready to renew



the fight. Bragg's plan was still the same, and he intended to attack at daybreak. But the morning was foggy, Polk was slow, and the action did not begin till the middle of the forenoon. It was the same story as on the day before, the tide of battle swaying back and forth between Polk and Thomas. Reënforcements were repeatedly called for by Thomas, which sometimes reached him and sometimes did not; but, with them or without them, he held stubbornly to all essential parts of the ground. On that wing the Confederates could make no permanent impression.

The weak spot of the National line was at the right centre, and there, from an unexpected cause, befell the great disaster that gave Bragg the victory. An important order was both miswritten and misinterpreted. It was addressed to General Thomas J. Wood, who commanded a division, and was written by a member of Rosecrans's staff who had no military education and did not fully understand military terms. It read: "The General commanding directs that you close up on Reynolds and support him." It was impossible to obey both clauses of this order; for "close up" means bring the ends of the lines together, so that there shall be no gap, while "support" means take a position in the rear, ready to advance when ordered. General Wood, a West-Point graduate, instead of sending to Rosecrans for better instructions, simply obeyed the second clause and withdrew his command from the line, to place it in the rear of Reynolds.

Opposite the fatal opening thus made was Longstreet, who saw his chance and instantly took advantage of it by pouring six divisions through the gap. Thus McCook's corps was quickly defeated and routed, the centre was crumbled, and Rosecrans, apparently losing

his head, galloped back to Chattanooga to make arrangements for gathering his scattered forces. He sent James A. Garfield, his chief of staff, to find Thomas, and Garfield found him where not even that disaster had moved or daunted him.

When the centre of the line was broken and the right wing routed, Thomas, finding that his right flank was exposed, swung it back to a position that was known as Horseshoe Ridge, where he still covered the important road. General Gordon Granger, who was with a reserve at Rossville Gap, seeing the situation, did not wait for orders, but went forward at once to the assistance of Thomas, coming up on his right just in time to stop Longstreet, who was pushing for that flank. Victory appeared so near to the Confederate commander that he grew reckless of the lives of his men and sent them forward in one futile charge after another, where Thomas's batteries mowed them down with canister and a steady fire of musketry increased the carnage. The last charge of the Confederates, made about dusk, was repelled with the bayonet, because ammunition was exhausted. In the night Thomas fell back in good order to Rossville, leaving the dead and wounded on the field. Sheridan, who had been on the right of the line, kept his men together, passed through Macfarland's Gap, marched around the mountain, and before morning joined Thomas. The next day they fell back to Chattanooga, where order was soon restored and the work of strengthening the defences was begun. Thomas was henceforth called "the Rock of Chickamauga."

Tactically, Chickamauga was a victory for Bragg, as he was left in possession of the field; but Chattanooga was the prize he was striving for, and that he did not

get. The National loss in this great battle was 16,179; the Confederate was 17,804. On the National side General William H. Lytle was killed, as were also three colonels who led brigades—Edward A. King, Hans C. Heg, and Philemon P. Baldwin, and three other brigade leaders were wounded. On the Confederate side, Major-Generals T. C. Hindman and John B. Hood were wounded; Brigadier-Generals James Deshler, Preston Smith, and Benjamin H. Helm were killed; Brigadier-General Daniel W. Adams was wounded and captured, and four other brigadiers were wounded.

The Battles at Chattanooga

November 24-25, 1863

WHEN Rosecrans retreated to Chattanooga, Bragg followed and took up positions on Lookout Mountain and Missionary Ridge, which overlooked the town, with a line crossing the valley between the ridges. He also occupied a position a little way down the river which gave him control of the stream and thus prevented Rosecrans from using it for transportation. Thus the National forces were put into a state of siege, their only route for supplies being a long and difficult wagon-road. In the middle of October the Departments of the Ohio, the Cumberland, and the Tennessee were united in the Military Division of the Mississippi, and General Grant was made its commander. General Thomas succeeded Rosecrans as commander of the Army of the Cumberland, and General Hooker, with two corps, was sent to Tennessee. When General Grant arrived at Chattanooga he found a sorry state of affairs, which he thus describes:

All supplies for Rosecrans had to be brought from Nashville. The railroad between this base and the army was in the possession of the Government up to Bridgeport. But Bragg, holding Lookout and Raccoon mountains west of Chattanooga, commanded the railroad, the river, and the shortest and best wagon-roads both north and south

of the Tennessee. All supplies had to be hauled sixty miles over a mountainous country. This country afforded but little fodder for the animals, nearly ten thousand of which had already starved, and none were left to draw a single piece of artillery or even the ambulances. The men had been on half-rations of bread for a considerable time, with but few other supplies except beef driven from Nashville across the country. The region along the route became so exhausted of forage for the cattle that by the time they reached Chattanooga they were much in the condition of the few animals left alive there. Indeed, the beef was so poor that the soldiers were in the habit of saying, with a faint facetiousness, that they were living on half-rations of hard bread and "beef dried on the hoof." Nothing could be transported but food, and the troops were without sufficient shoes or clothing suitable for the advancing season. What they had was well worn. The fuel within the Federal lines was exhausted, even to the stumps of trees. There were no teams to draw it from the opposite bank, where it was abundant. The only means for supplying fuel, for some time before my arrival, had been to cut trees from the north bank of the river, at a considerable distance up the stream, form rafts of it, and float it down with the current, effecting a landing on the south side within our lines. It would then be carried on the shoulders of the men to their camps.

Grant's first task was to open a better line for supplies. Steamers could come up the river as far as Bridgeport, and he ordered the construction of a road and a bridge to reach that point by way of Brown's Ferry. This was accomplished in five days. Then the "cracker line," as the soldiers called it, was opened, and thenceforth they had an abundance of everything. The Confederates attempted to prevent the work; but Hooker met them at Wauhatchie, west of Lookout

Mountain, and in a fight of three hours defeated them and drove them off.

Though the army at Chattanooga was no longer in a state of siege, it was still menaced by Bragg's army. The flanks of that army occupied the northern ends of Missionary Ridge and Lookout Mountain and the crests for some distance back of these ends, and its centre stretched across Chattanooga Valley, the whole being twelve miles long, and most of it intrenched.

Grant ordered Sherman to come to him with one corps, and Sherman set out at once; but as he had to repair the railroad as he went along, he did not reach Chattanooga till November 15th. Longstreet with 20,000 men had now been sent from Bragg's army to attack Burnside, who was at Knoxville.

With the corps that Sherman brought, Grant had about 80,000 men. He placed Hooker on his right, around the base of Lookout Mountain; Thomas in the centre, across Chattanooga Valley; and Sherman on the left, opposite the end of Missionary Ridge. His plan was to have Sherman advance against Bragg's right and capture the heights, while Thomas and Hooker should press the enemy in their front just enough to prevent any sending of reinforcements against Sherman. If this move should be successful, Bragg, thus losing his key-point, would be obliged to retreat.

In the night of November 23d Sherman laid two bridges, and the next day he crossed the river and advanced against Bragg's works. But the ground that he had to pass over was very unfavourable to the movement, and he met with but little success. Hooker, who had always had a habit of going his own way with not too strict regard for his orders, instead of merely

making a feint sufficient to prevent any reënforcement of Bragg's right, moved around the base of Lookout Mountain and boldly attacked the heights. His men climbed up the steep and rough slope of the mountain in the rain. Clouds hung around the summit, and before they reached it they had disappeared in the mist. They kept on steadily, met and routed the enemy, and captured many prisoners and guns. This action is known as "Hooker's battle above the clouds." Benjamin F. Taylor, who was there as a correspondent, and whose son was one of the soldiers that went up the mountain, gives us a picturesque view of the novel scene:


Tuesday morning broke cold and cheerless; it was a Scottish morning, and the air was dim with mist. I crossed the ground over which our boys marched so grandly on Monday afternoon, down into the valley of death and glory, where they had lain all night in line of battle. Brave hearts! They were ready and eager for a second day's journey; they had put their hands to the burning ploughshares and there was no thought of looking back. Beyond them lay the hostile camps, and Mission Ridge with its furrows of rifle-pits, and the enemy swarming like grey ants on the hills. You would have wondered at the formidable line of defence the boys had thrown up when they came to a halt. Rocks and logs had been piled in great windrows, filled in with earth.

Our wicked little battery on Orchard Knob had ceased from troubling. Fort Wood was dumb, and not a voice from the Parrott perches anywhere. Stray ambulances were making their way back to town, and soldiers were digging graves on the hillsides. Interrogation points glittered in men's eyes as they turned an ear to the north-east and listened for Sherman. By and by a little fleet of soldier-laden pontoon boats came drifting down the river,

and I hastened to meet them as they landed. The boys, in high feather, tumbled out, the inevitable coffee-kettle swinging from their bayonets. If a Federal soldier should be fellow-traveller with Bunyan's pilgrim, I almost believe that tin kettle of his would be heard tinkling after him to the very threshold of the Gate Beautiful. "Well, boys, what now?" "We've put down the pontoon, taken nineteen rebel pickets without firing a gun, run the blockade, drawn a shot, nobody hurt, Sherman's column is half over—bully for Sherman!" Those fellows had been thirty hours without rest, and were as fresh-hearted and dashing as so many thoroughbreds. They had wrought all night long with their lives in their hands, and not a trace of hardship or a breath of complaining.

It was the second day of the drama—the touch on the enemy's left. The assault upon Lookout had begun. Glancing at the mighty crest crowned with a precipice, and now hung round about, three hundred feet down, with a curtain of clouds, my heart misgave me. It was a formidable business they had in hand to carry a mountain and scale a precipice near two thousand feet high, in the teeth of a battery and the face of two intrenched brigades. Hooker ordered Cruft to move directly south along the western base of the mountain, while he would remain in the valley close under Lookout and make a grand demonstration with small arms and artillery. The enemy, roused by all this sound and fury, were to come forth far up the western side of the mountain and descend to dispute Hooker's noisy passage. Cruft, when the roar behind him deepened, was to turn upon his heel, move obliquely up the mountain upon the enemy's camps in their rear, wheel round the monster, and up to the white house, and take care of himself while he took Lookout. [The white house was a single farmhouse on the gentle slope of the mountain between the lower and the upper palisade.]

Hooker thundered, and the enemy came down like the Assyrian, while Whittaker on the right and Colonel Ireland



MAP OF THE BATTLE OF CHATTANOOGA, NOVEMBER 23-25, 1863.

REDRAWN FROM THE GOVERNMENT ATLAS.

of Geary's command on the left, having moved out from Wauhatchie at five in the morning, pushed up to Chattanooga Creek, threw over it a bridge, made for Lookout Point, and there formed the right under the shelf of the mountain, the left resting on the creek. And then the play began. The enemy's camps were seized, his pickets surprised and captured, the strong works on the Point taken, and the Federal front moved on. Charging upon him, they leaped over his works as the wicked twin Roman leaped over his brother's mud wall, the 40th Ohio capturing his artillery and taking a Mississippi regiment, and gained the white house. And there they stood, twixt heaven and —Chattanooga. But above them, grand and sullen, lifted the precipice; and they were men, not eagles.

The way was strewn with natural fortifications, and from behind rocks and trees they delivered their fire, contesting inch by inch the upward way. The sound of the battle rose and fell—now fiercely renewed, now dying away. And Hooker thundered on in the valley. That curtain of cloud was hung around the mountain by the God of battles. A captured colonel declared that had the day been clear their sharpshooters would have riddled our advance and left the command without a leader; but friend and foe were wrapped in a seamless mantle, and two hundred will include the entire Federal loss, while our brave mountaineers strewed Lookout with four hundred dead and captured a thousand prisoners.

I was waiting in painful suspense to see what would come out of the roaring caldron in the valley, when something was born out of the mist and appeared on the shorn side of the mountain, below and to the west of the white house. It was the head of the Federal column. And there it held as if it were riveted to the rock, and the line of blue, a half mile long, swung slowly around from the left like the index of a mighty dial and swept up the brown face of the mountain. The bugles of the city of camps were sounding high noon when in two parallel columns the troops moved

up the mountain, in the rear of the enemy's rifle-pits, which they swept at every fire. And there, in the centre of the columns, fluttered the blessed flag. "My God! What flag is that?" men cried. And up steadily it moved. It was a scene never to fade out. Pride and pain struggled for the mastery in my heart, but faith carried the day; I believed in the flag, and took courage. Volleys of musketry and flashes of cannon, and then those lulls in a battle even more terrible than the tempest.

Night was closing in rapidly, and the scene was growing sublime. The battery at Moccasin Point was sweeping the road to the mountain. The brave little fort at its left was playing like a heart in a fever. The cannon upon the top of Lookout were pounding away at their lowest depression. The flash of the guns fairly burned through the clouds; there was an instant of silence, here, there, yonder, and the tardy thunder leaped out after the swift light.

For the first time, perhaps, since that mountain began to burn beneath the gold and crimson sandals of the sun it was in eclipse. The cloud of the summit and the smoke of the battle met half-way and mingled. It was Sinai over again, with its thunderings and lightnings and thick darkness, and the Lord was on our side. Then the storm ceased, and occasional dropping shots told off the evening till half-past nine, and then a crashing volley and a rebel yell and a desperate charge. It was their good-night to our boys; good-night to the mountain. They had been driven a mile and a half. The Federal foot touched the hill, indeed, but above it still towered the precipice.

At ten o'clock a growing line of lights glittered obliquely across the breast of Lookout. It made our eyes dim to see it. That was the Federal autograph scored along the mountain. They were our camp-fires. Our wounded lay there all the dreary night of rain, unrepining and content. Our unharmed heroes lay there upon their arms. Our dead lay there. At dawn Captain Wilson and fifteen men of the 8th Kentucky crept up among the rocky clefts, hand-

ing their guns to one another, and stood at last upon the summit. The entire regiment pushed up after them, formed in line, threw out skirmishers, and advanced five miles to Summerton. Artillery and infantry had all fled in the night, nor left a rack behind. Just as the sun was touching up the old Department of the Cumberland, that Captain Wilson and his fifteen men waved the regimental flag in sight of Tennessee, Alabama, Georgia, and the old North State—waved it there, and the right of the Federal front, lying far below, caught a glimpse of its flutter, and a cheer arose to the top of the mountain and ran from regiment to regiment through whole brigades and divisions, till the boys away round in the face of Mission Ridge passed it along the line. "Our flag? Did I help to put it there?" murmured a poor wounded fellow, and died without the sight.

The next day (November 25th) Hooker was ordered to move down the eastern slope of Lookout Mountain, cross Chattanooga Valley, and attack the left of Bragg's position where his line now held the crest and western slope of Missionary Ridge. But the destruction of a bridge by the Confederates delayed his march four hours. Grant now saw that Bragg was weakening his centre in order to mass his forces against Sherman, who was not making much headway in his advance against the Ridge. Therefore, without waiting longer for Hooker, he ordered an immediate advance in the centre, by Thomas's troops, led by Generals Sheridan and Wood. Those troops crossed the valley, walked right into the works at the base of Missionary Ridge, followed the retreating enemy to a second line half-way up the slope, and captured this. Then, shielding themselves from the batteries at the top by immediately and closely following the retiring Confederates, they

soon reached the crest and swept all before them. Bragg's army was completely defeated and demoralized, and its own guns were turned upon it as it fled. The General himself tried to rally his men, riding among them and shouting, "Here's your commander!"—but all in vain, and he was obliged to join in the flight to escape capture.

In these battles the National loss was nearly 6000 men. The Confederate loss was about 10,000, including 6000 prisoners; and the trophies included forty-two guns. Bragg established what remained of his army in a fortified camp at Dalton, Georgia, about twenty-five miles south-east of the battlefield. He was soon superseded by General Joseph E. Johnston. The commands of Sherman and Granger were sent to Knoxville, where Burnside was besieged by Longstreet, and then the latter raised the siege and returned to Virginia. He had been sent to Knoxville to prevent Burnside from reënforcing Rosecrans.

The Red-River Expedition

March-April, 1864

EXECUTION of the grand plan of cutting the Confederacy in two and depriving the eastern part of its regular supplies from the region west of the Mississippi was begun by the capture of Vicksburg and Port Hudson, and was continued when Sherman, in February, 1864, set out from Vicksburg with 20,000 men, marched eastward a hundred miles to Meridian, Mississippi, an important railroad centre, destroyed the arsenal, machine-shops, and storehouses, and tore up many miles of track, making it irreplaceable by bending and twisting the rails around trees. These were popularly called "Sherman's hair-pins" and "Jeff Davis's neckties."

In continuance of the same plan, General Banks, in command at New Orleans, set out in March for Shreveport, which is at the head of navigation on Red River, having with him 15,000 men, expecting to be joined at Alexandria by General Andrew J. Smith, coming from Vicksburg with 10,000 men which Sherman lent for the expedition, and to be accompanied by a fleet of transports and gunboats commanded by Rear-Admiral David D. Porter.

Smith and Porter arrived promptly, captured Fort De Russey below Alexandria, and waited for Banks.

When he arrived the army moved in lines substantially parallel with the river. The column was about twenty miles long as it marched. A small cavalry force took the advance, followed by the wagon-trains and artillery, and then the infantry. Small bodies of Confederate troops appeared occasionally, but were easily brushed aside by the army or driven off by fire from the gunboats.

On April 8th the army reached Sabine Cross Roads, about fifty miles south of Shreveport. Here it was suddenly confronted by a strong Confederate force commanded by General Richard Taylor, only son of Zachary Taylor. Neither commander intended to fight a battle there. But Taylor had sent forward a detachment to drive back the advance guard, and the men on both sides became excited and fought persistently, those on the National side knowing that it rested with them to save the trains. Their skirmish line was driven back, and the Confederates advanced in force. Some of the National batteries were pushed forward, and for a time there was fierce fighting. Banks had great difficulty in getting forward with his infantry, because his trains blocked the road, and the batteries were without adequate support. Nims's battery, of the cavalry division, was doing terrible execution when a heavy force charged upon it. Orders were given to retire and save the guns from capture; but it was impossible to do this, because nearly all the horses had been killed. The gunners stood to their pieces, firing double charges of canister into the advancing enemy, which killed the leader of the charge, General Mouton, and struck down many of his men; but the assailants closed up their ranks, pushed on steadily, and captured four guns, while the other two were drawn

off by hand. Many of the wagon horses were frightened, broke loose, and dashed through the lines of infantry; while, taking notice of this confusion, the Confederates pressed closer, following up their advantage. General Banks and the corps commanders were in the thick of the fight, trying to rally the men and hold them to their work. Two horses were killed under General Franklin, and a member of his staff lost both feet by a cannon-shot.

At the end of an hour and a half the line suddenly gave way, and the cavalry and the teamsters rushed back in a disorderly mass, closely followed by the enemy. General Banks tried in vain to stem the tide, and was borne away by it. The Nineteenth Corps was drawn up in line three miles in the rear, and there the retreat was stopped. The Confederates attacked that line, but without success, and at dusk they retired. Banks had lost 3000 men, nineteen guns, and a large amount of stores. A participant, writing of the battle, gives us this picture:

General Banks personally directed the fight. Everything that man could do he did. Occupying a position so exposed that nearly every horse ridden by his staff was wounded, and many killed, he disregarded the entreaties of those around, who begged that he would retire to some less exposed position. General Stone, his chief of staff, with his sad, earnest face, was constantly at the front and by his reckless bravery did much to encourage the men. The enemy were pushing a temporary advantage. Our army was forming into position to make a sure battle. Then came one of those unaccountable events that no genius or courage can control. The musketry firing was loud and continuous, and we felt sure of the position. I was slowly riding along the edge of a wood, conversing

with a friend, and we had drawn aside to allow an ammunition-wagon to pass, when suddenly there was a rush, a shout, the crashing of trees, the breaking down of rails, and the scamper of men. It was as sudden as if a thunder-bolt had fallen among us and set the pines on fire. I turned to my companion for an explanation; but before he could reply we found ourselves swallowed up in a seething whirlpool of agitated men. If we hoped to live in that mad company, we must ride with the rest of them. General Banks took off his hat and implored the men to remain; his staff officers did the same, but it was of no avail. The rebels were shouting and advancing; their musket-balls filled the air with that strange rasping sound. The teams were abandoned, and bare-headed riders rushed back with agony in their faces. . . . We rode two miles in this way, until on the edge of a ravine we found Emory's division drawn up in line. Our retreating men fell beyond this line, Emory fired three rounds, and the rebels retreated.

That night, leaving Emory's command to bury the dead and care for the wounded before following as a rear-guard, Banks fell back fifteen miles. Here General Smith's command joined him, making his full force about 15,000 men, and he formed a strong line and waited to be attacked. The line crossed the road, and its left rested on a gentle eminence called Pleasant Hill. The Confederates spent most of the day in gathering up plunder, and at four o'clock advanced to the attack. They charged in heavy columns against the centre, which fought stubbornly for a time and then slowly fell back upon the reserves. The Confederates then attacked the right wing, when the reserves advanced and charged them vigorously, while the centre rallied and advanced so as to strike them in the flank. An eye-witness writes of this contest:

The fighting was terrific. Notwithstanding the havoc in their ranks, the enemy pressed fiercely on, pushing back the men of the Nineteenth Corps up the hill, but not breaking their line of battle. A sudden dash gave them possession of Taylor's battery and forced our line still farther back. Now came the grand *coup de main*. The Nineteenth suddenly filed off over the hill and passed through the lines of General Smith. The rebels were now in only two lines, the first line having been almost annihilated by Emory's men, and what remained of it was forced back into the second line. But those two lines came on exultant, sure of victory. The first passed over the knoll and, heedless of the long line of cannons and crouching forms, pressed on. Then the second line appeared on the crest, and the death-signal was sounded. Seven thousand rifles and several batteries of artillery, each gun loaded to the muzzle with grape and canister, were fired simultaneously, and the whole centre of the rebel line was crushed down like a field of ripe wheat through which a tornado has passed. General Smith at once ordered a charge, and his men dashed forward, those of the Nineteenth joining in. The rebels fought desperately back to the timber, on reaching which a large part of them broke and fled, fully two thousand throwing away their arms.

The Confederates were pursued nearly three miles. Their losses that day included General Thomas Green, killed. The Confederate General E. Kirby Smith, who commanded that department, wrote: "Our repulse at Pleasant Hill was so complete, and our command was so disorganized, that, had Banks followed up his success vigorously, he would have met but feeble opposition to his advance on Shreveport."

Banks fell back at once to Grand Ecore. In his official report he gives his reason for so doing. At Pleasant Hill there was no water to be had, the few

wells being exhausted; and the surplus ammunition and supplies were on board transports that had not arrived, while the falling river made it doubtful whether they could arrive. There was also another reason: Banks had been ordered to return General Smith's borrowed troops immediately. Banks's loss in the three days—April 7-9—was 3969 men, of whom about 2000 were prisoners. The Confederate loss was not reported.

But now a new difficulty appeared. At this point there was a rapid about a mile long, with a fall of about thirteen feet, and in ascending the stream the vessels had been taken up over it with great labour. The water had now fallen, exposing many jagged rocks, and nowhere among them was there a channel sufficient for the descent of the boats. It appeared that the fleet must be either captured or destroyed. Admiral Porter said: "I saw nothing before me but the destruction of the best part of the Mississippi squadron. But there seems to have been an especial Providence looking out for us, in providing a man equal to the emergency." That man was Lieutenant-Colonel Joseph Bailey, of the 4th Wisconsin, who had anticipated the difficulty even before the battle of Pleasant Hill and had proposed a solution. He would build a dam, or a series of wing dams, and raise the water enough to float down the boats over the rapids. The regular engineers had no faith in the scheme; but Bailey persisted until he received the necessary permission from General Banks. He then set to work energetically with 3000 men, in day and night relays. The river at the rapids is 700 to 1000 feet wide. Admiral Porter says: "Every man seemed to be working with a vigour I have seldom seen equalled, while perhaps not one in fifty believed

in the success of the undertaking." There was timber on the left bank of the stream, but none on the right bank. Major George Haven Putnam, in his *Memories of My Youth*, describes the plan of the dams and the work of constructing them, in which he took part:

Colonel Bailey was given by Banks full control of the men to be detailed and over the materials available. Under his instructions, the troops were first employed (working in four-hour details) in pulling down the sugar-mills, the iron and bricks from which were to be utilized for the dams. While this work was going on, other details were getting out trees of the forest for use in the cribs. These cribs were constructed like four sides of a small log house, the logs being pinned together by wooden pegs. In the work of tree-cutting and log-pinning the experience of the troops from the North-West was of course particularly valuable.


The suitable trees had to be secured for the most part from the bank opposite Alexandria, and the wood-chopping was interfered with from time to time by the rebel skirmishers. When, however, the Western men saw the clumsiness with which the New Yorkers handled their axes, they suggested that we had best take care of the skirmish line and of the bringing up of the bricks and the iron work, and that they would attend to the wood-chopping. It was interesting to see the precision with which this chopping was done, even at times when the choppers were actually themselves under fire.

The wooden cribs were sunk into the places selected in the stream by the aid of bundles of broken iron work attached to the four corners, and when so sunk they were filled up with the brick. The bottom of the river was soapstone, and it required a thorough wedging of the cribs to hold them in their places. Much of the work of filling the cribs had to be done by men standing in the water. Bailey himself was, if I remember rightly, something over

six feet tall. I recall the genial manner in which on one day at least he ordered the detail of my own battalion into the water. "It's all right, men," he said, "it's only up to your waists." This was all very well for the six-footers, but the small Adjutant, whose business it was to lead his men in, found the waist-mark of Bailey pretty well up to his own shoulders, and there was no little difficulty in maintaining footing against the fierce current. . . . In the course of the work men were swept off their feet from time to time. Most of the soldiers knew how to swim and after a ducking through the falls would come up in safety in the quiet water below. But there was an occasional loss of life through drowning.

The purpose of the dams was to throw the water into a funnel, the narrowest part of which should be at the shallowest point of the rapids. The dams were constructed in pairs, the longest pair with the narrowest passageway between being close up to the rapids, and the shorter pairs, or wing dams, extending farther up the river. Through the passageway at the lowest dam the water rushed at an incline like that of a waterfall. The river current twists sharply just below the fall, and there was the risk that the vessel accomplishing the fall in safety might drive into the bank below. To lessen this difficulty, two pairs of barges were attached to the ends of the dam and anchored at the downstream ends at such an angle that the vessel passing over the fall was bumped back into the line of the stream.


The building of the dams occupied twelve days—April 30th to May 12th. At the end of eight days some of the smaller boats went down safely. Then there was an accident to the barges, which made liable a diminution of the accumulated water. Admiral Porter ordered that the trial be made by one of the larger vessels, the *Lexington*. He says:



THE RED RIVER DAM.



TREE DAM.



BAILEY'S DAM.

She steered directly for the opening in the dam, through which the water was rushing so furiously that it seemed as if nothing but destruction awaited her. Thousands with beating hearts looked on, anxious for the result. The silence was so great as the *Lexington* approached the dam that a pin might almost be heard to fall. She entered the gap with a full head of steam on, pitched down the roaring torrent, made two or three spasmodic rolls, hung for a moment on the rocks below, was then swept into deep water by the current, and rounded-to safely into the bank. Thirty thousand voices rose in one deafening cheer, and joy seemed to pervade the faces of all present. The *Neosho* followed next, all her hatches battened down and every precaution taken against accident. She did not fare as well as the *Lexington*, her pilot having become frightened as he approached the abyss and stopped her engine, when I had particularly ordered that a full head of steam be carried. For a moment her hull disappeared under the water. She rose, however, swept along over the rocks with the current, and escaped with only one hole in her bottom, which was stopped in the course of an hour.

On the twelfth day six large vessels passed the rapids without accident; and a few hours later the whole fleet was ready to go down the river, with the transports under convoy.

For this unique service Lieutenant-Colonel Bailey was made a full colonel and brevetted brigadier-general, and received the thanks of Congress, and the officers of the fleet presented him with a sword and a purse of three thousand dollars.

Grant's Overland Campaign

May-June, 1864

WHEN the war had continued three years it was evident to everyone, as it had long been evident to experts, that something was faulty in its conduct. There had been great successes, as well as great failures; but it had consisted too much of disconnected campaigns; and this gave the Confederates a constant advantage; for with their interior lines they could shift their troops back and forth, thus presenting a strong front wherever a blow was to fall. Despite this, Lee at Antietam and Gettysburg had failed in his efforts to invade the North; while Grant had captured an army at Fort Donelson and another twice as large at Vicksburg, had turned defeat into victory at Shiloh, and had relieved the siege of Chattanooga by breaking up Bragg's army; Farragut had captured the largest and most important city in the Confederacy; and the National forces had obtained and kept a foothold somewhere in nearly every one of the seceding States. Even this process, if continued, would ultimately destroy the Confederacy; but to continue at that slow rate would increase the cost, and incur the risk of foreign interference on the one hand and of refused support at home on the other. There was a half-informed populace to be satisfied and a half-loyal party to be silenced,

and in less than another year there was to be a general election.

The time had fully come when there must be one supreme military head for all the armies in the field—not a man sitting in Washington, but a soldier sitting on his horse in the field of battle. And there was no doubt who that soldier should be. In February, 1864, Congress revived the grade of lieutenant-general (which had been held by none but Washington and Scott), and President Lincoln at once bestowed the commission upon Ulysses S. Grant. The President and the General then met for the first time. Thirteen months later the war was ended, Grant was the foremost soldier in the world, and Lincoln was in his grave.

General Sherman, a warm personal friend of Grant, urged him to make his headquarters at the West, for he feared the paralysing effect of Washington influences. Sherman, never afraid of anything else, was always in mortal terror of politicians. But Grant, braving even the politicians, fixed his headquarters with the Army of the Potomac. This was the strongest of the armies, was between the two capitals, was confronted by the Confederacy's largest army and ablest general, and nothing short of its success would reestablish the Union. Grant's unerring judgment told him, as a matter of course, that here was the place for the General-in-Chief.

He planned a grand campaign in which he considered the Army of the Potomac his centre; the Army of the James under General Butler, his left wing; the combined western armies, under General Sherman, his right wing; and the army commanded by Banks in Louisiana a force to operate in the enemy's rear. He planned that all should move simultaneously, thus preventing


any shifting of Confederate troops to strengthen threatened points successively. Butler was to move against Petersburg and seize the southern communications of Richmond; Sherman to attack Johnston's army, then at Dalton, Georgia, and capture Atlanta with its workshops and communications; Banks to lead an expedition against Mobile and close its harbour against blockade-runners; Sigel to drive the Confederates out of the Shenandoah Valley and keep them away from that important granary. For himself and the Army of the Potomac, General Grant announced that the objective was the Army of Northern Virginia, which must be followed wherever it might go, and fought relentlessly until it should be destroyed or captured.


Grant and Sherman played their parts through to success. The other three were largely failures.

Just south of the Rapidan lies a peculiar region, about fifteen miles square, known as the Wilderness. Some of the earliest iron-works were here, and much of the ground was dug over for the ore, and the woods were cut off to supply fuel for the furnaces. The mines, exhausted, were deserted, the furnaces went to ruin, a thick second growth sprang up, with tangled underbrush, and the whole region was desolate, except for a roadside tavern or two and a small clearing here and there.

The battle of Chancellorsville was fought at the eastern edge of this Wilderness in May, 1863; the Army of Northern Virginia was now in camp near its western edge; and the Army of the Potomac was in winter quarters just opposite, on the north side of the Rapidan.

The Army of the Potomac now consisted of three infantry corps—the Second, the Fifth, and the Sixth—commanded by Generals Winfield S. Hancock, Gouver-





neur K. Warren, and John Sedgwick, and a corps of cavalry commanded by General Philip H. Sheridan. General George G. Meade was retained in command of the whole army. In addition, Burnside's Ninth Corps, nearly 20,000 strong, was at Annapolis, subject, like all the others, to General Grant's orders.

The Army of Northern Virginia comprised two infantry corps, commanded by Generals Richard S. Ewell and Ambrose P. Hill, and a cavalry corps commanded by General J. E. B. Stuart. Longstreet's corps was within call. The whole army was commanded by General Robert E. Lee.

The exact number of men in either army cannot be told, as reports differ. And in any comparison the different methods of counting in the two armies should be considered. In the National armies every man borne on the payrolls was counted, whether officer, soldier, musician, teamster, mechanic, or cook, and all that were on detached duty. In the Confederate armies the reports included only the men that carried muskets or sabres or handled the guns; all officers, musicians, teamsters, and other supernumeraries and all that were on detached duty, were excluded from the count. Grant's forces for this campaign are estimated at 118,000, including all arms; besides Butler's Army of the James, about 36,000. There are no exact reports of Lee's forces; but by the best estimates he had, if they were counted after the manner of reckoning in the National armies, about 80,000 men, including all arms; and to this must be added the force under Beauregard between Richmond and Petersburg, mostly transferred thither from the Carolinas, about 30,000. As the campaign progressed, each side received reinforcements about equal to its losses.

When General Grant was about to set out on his overland campaign, President Lincoln addressed to him a letter in which he expressed his entire satisfaction with all that the General had done up to that time; declared that he neither knew nor wished to know the particulars of his plans, and would place no restraint upon him, but give him every assistance that he might ask for.

At midnight of May 3d the Army of the Potomac began crossing the Rapidan, which is there about two hundred feet wide, on five pontoon bridges which had been laid near Germania, Culpeper-Mine, and Ely's fords, and plunged at once into the Wilderness. Two roads, a mile or two apart, cross this tract in an irregular way from north to south, and two others cross it from east to west. In each case, one was a plank road. There are also many cross-roads and wood-paths. As the army had a supply-train of 4000 wagons and reserve artillery of more than one hundred guns, it could not leave the Wilderness till these had passed through, keeping itself all the time between them and the enemy. This occupied the whole of the 4th.

As Lee had not disputed the passage of the river, Grant expected to march out of the woods on the 5th, to place his army somewhere between the enemy and Richmond; but he did not fail to provide for all contingencies, and therefore had put out pickets on all the roads to the west. On the morning of the 5th he was attacked, and at first the movement was believed to be merely a feint intended to delay him in the Wilderness, while the Army of Northern Virginia should slip by to the south and secure some position covering the approach to Richmond. But the attack was developed rapidly and soon showed that Lee had resorted

to the bold device of advancing his whole army by the two east-and-west roads to strike his enemy on the march.

Under some circumstances this might have given the Confederates a great advantage; but the National army was clear of the river, all its trains had passed on to safety, and there was no surprise. Neither army could use cavalry in the Wilderness, and there was but little accommodation for artillery, while the topography hardly anywhere offered any advantage of position. In that great thicket any lines of battle must be very irregular and somewhat broken; and when these were formed large numbers of the men were unable to see what was going on a few rods away in either direction. As might have been expected, therefore, the two-days' contest that ensued was to a large extent simply a compound murdering-match. Wherever the troops of either side saw the uniform of the other side they fired at it—sometimes through comparatively open groves, sometimes through underbrush, and sometimes across little openings in the woods. A few guns swept the roads.

Hancock's corps, which had the lead in the march, was passing out of the Wilderness when the attack came, and was at once called back; Burnside's corps was hurried forward from the rear; and such line of battle as was possible was quickly formed. The firing increased steadily during the day, as more and more troops came into action. Lee's attack was strong on his left, but was weak on his right where Longstreet's corps failed to come up till the close of the day.


As soon as night fell, both sides began to prepare defences. They could hear each other cutting down trees, piling up logs for breastworks, and digging

trenches. Grant, intending to assume the initiative, gave orders to attack at five o'clock on the morning of the 6th. But Lee attacked with his left before that hour, to call attention to that flank and give him time to get Longstreet's troops in place on his right. Grant, however, recognized that this movement was a feint, and continued his movement against Lee's right.

For the second day's active operations, both commanders looked mainly to the southern end of the lines (Grant's left, Lee's right), because there was some open ground which made tactics possible, and there too was the Orange plank road, the more important of the two highways leading toward Richmond. That flank was held by Hancock's corps, and against it Lee intended to launch Longstreet's corps as soon as he could get it ready for such a movement. These were probably the troops most ably commanded in either army; but two unforeseen incidents weakened somewhat both the blow and the resistance.

General Longstreet, having ridden forward, accompanied by subordinate officers, to inspect the ground, was returning to his lines when his party were mistaken for Federal cavalry and were fired upon by his own men. Longstreet was seriously wounded, and General Micah Jenkins was killed. This was a repetition of the accident by which General Jackson lost his life, near that spot, one year before. On the other side, just as Hancock's men were ready to move came rumours of an attack upon his left flank, and he detached a part of his force to meet the enemy there. But no enemy was on his flank except Rosser's cavalry, which Sheridan defeated that day in three encounters.

Even when thus weakened, Hancock was powerful enough to drive the enemy before him more than a



MAP OF THE BATTLE OF THE WILDERNESS, VA., MAY 5-6, 1864.

mile. Then they rallied on Longstreet's corps just coming upon the field, and they were driving back Hancock when Longstreet fell and they faltered. General Lee took command of them in person, but found it impossible to rally them again for an effective assault; he therefore deferred this till afternoon. Then the assault was made, and it had some success, breaking through the National line at one point; but the Confederates were soon driven back with heavy loss. In the course of the day, Burnside's corps came into line, and there was fighting all along the front, but nowhere so fierce and persistent as at its southern end, where each commander was striving to turn the other's flank. The Confederate General E. McIvor Law, who commanded a brigade in Longstreet's corps, has vividly described the struggle there:

The ground over which Field's troops were advancing was open for a short distance, and was fringed on its farther edge with scattered pines, beyond which began the Wilderness. The Federals [Webb's brigade of Hancock's Corps] were advancing through the pines with apparently resistless force, when Gregg's eight hundred Texans, regardless of numbers, flanks, or supports, dashed directly upon them. There was a terrific crash, mingled with wild yells, which settled down into a steady roar of musketry. In less than ten minutes one half of that devoted eight hundred were lying upon the field dead or wounded; but they had delivered a staggering blow and broken the force of the Federal advance. Benning's and Law's brigades came promptly to their support, and the whole swept forward together. The tide was flowing the other way. It ebbed and flowed many times that day, strewing the Wilderness with human wrecks. Law's brigade captured a line of log breastworks in its front, but had held them only a few moments when

their former owners [Webb's brigade] came back to claim them. The Federals were driven back to a second line several hundred yards beyond, which also was taken. This advanced position was attacked in front and on the right from across the Orange plank road, and Law's Alabamians "advanced backward" without standing on the order of their going, until they reached the first line of logs, now in their rear. As their friends in blue still insisted on claiming their property and were advancing to take it, they were met by a counter-charge and again driven beyond the second line. This was held against a determined attack, in which the Federal General Wadsworth was shot from his horse as he rode up close to the right of the line on the plank road. The position again becoming untenable by reason of the movements of Federal troops on their right, Law's men retired a second time to the works they had first captured. And so, for more than two hours, the storm of battle swept to and fro, in some places passing several times over the same ground, and settling down at length almost where it had begun the day before.

In the course of this fighting some of the log breast-works that Hancock's men had constructed took fire, and the combatants could only discharge their volleys at each other through the flame and the smoke. As the wind blew toward Hancock, his men were at the greater disadvantage. A considerable piece of ground was burned over, and many wounded men perished in the fire.

When darkness came, on the 6th, the battle was ended. Some skirmishing was kept up through the 7th, but that day was spent by each side in resting and watching to see what the other would do.

It was not possible to ascertain at once the extent of the casualties from the strange conflict in that

gloomy thicket. The newspaper correspondents were on hand as usual, eager for something to write, and especially eager to hurry their reports to press as soon as possible. What they did not know, they guessed at, and they made their guesses as large as possible, which perhaps was natural from the mystery of a great battle which they could hear but could not see. Hence the exaggerated estimates, some of which declared that Grant's losses were greater than the whole of Lee's forces. When it became possible to reckon the casualties with approximate accuracy, the result was just what might have been expected from the circumstances. The losses were not far from equal, about 17,000 on each side. Lee had attempted to prevent Grant from getting through the Wilderness, but in this he failed. Grant had hoped to pass through and put his army between Lee and Richmond, but in this he failed. It was therefore a drawn battle.

George Cary Eggleston tells us that every man in Lee's army (of whom he was one) expected to see the Army of the Potomac re-cross the river next morning. And General Lee, after the battle, is reported to have remarked to his lieutenants, "Gentlemen, at last the Army of the Potomac has a head." That was a strange expectation, and that remark might have been made as well before the battle as after it. Did they not all know that the Army of the Potomac always obeyed orders, and that General Grant never ordered a retreat?

On the 7th there was a cavalry engagement at Todd's Tavern, by which Sheridan cleared the road for a southward movement; and in the afternoon Grant gave orders for a march to Spottsylvania. General Sherman said: "It was then, probably, that General Grant best displayed his greatness. Forward by the

left flank!—that settled that campaign.” Members of the Army of the Potomac have told that they all looked anxiously that day to see in which direction the next move would be; and that they felt a sudden joy when they learned that it was to be forward.

The immediate purpose was to make a rapid march to Spottsylvania Court House, fifteen miles distant, and take a strong position covering the roads that radiate from that point. The trains were started on the 7th, and Warren's corps, which had the advance, began its march at nine o'clock that evening. The distances that the two armies had to march were nearly equal; but two unforeseen circumstances determined the race and the form of the ensuing battle. One of the roads that Warren was to use was occupied by a detachment of Confederate cavalry, and the National cavalry found difficulty in clearing it away. The road, moreover, was to some extent obstructed by felled trees. After precious time had been lost, Warren's corps went forward and cleared the way for itself. Anderson's division of Longstreet's corps had the Confederate advance, and Anderson had orders to begin the march early Sunday morning, the 8th. But from the burning of the woods he found no suitable place for bivouac, and therefore he marched all night. This gave him the lead in the race. A detachment of National cavalry was at Spottsylvania Court House Sunday morning and brushed away a slight force of the enemy's cavalry. But when the Confederate infantry came down the road they had to retire. So when Warren came in sight of the Court House he found the same old foe intrenched in his front. Still, if Hancock's corps could have come up promptly the works might have been carried by a rapid movement

and held till the whole National army should arrive. But Hancock had been held back from an apprehension that the Confederates would attack in force the rear of the moving columns. So finally the remainder of Longstreet's corps, and then all the rest of Lee's troops, reached the intrenchments, and once more the Army of Northern Virginia stood at bay.

By order of General Grant, Sheridan with his cavalry set out on the 8th to make a destructive raid around Lee's army. He tore up ten miles of railroad, destroyed several trains of cars, cut the telegraph wires, and recaptured 400 prisoners that were being taken to Richmond. The Confederate cavalry set out to intercept him, and succeeded in getting between him and their capital. Sheridan encountered them at Yellow Tavern, seven miles north of the city, and in a hard fight defeated them. Their commander, General J. E. B. Stuart, was mortally wounded. Sheridan then broke through the outer defences of Richmond, and took a few prisoners, but found the inner defences too strong. He crossed the Chickahominy, and rejoined the army on the 25th.

Before the intrenchments of Spottsylvania Hancock's corps held the extreme right or western end of the line, Warren's came next, then Sedgwick's, and on the left Burnside's. Sedgwick's men, placing their batteries, were annoyed by sharpshooters, one of whom, apparently hidden in a tree, was an unerring marksman. He was said to have killed twenty men that day. When the men shrank from their work General Sedgwick reproved them, saying, "They could not hit an elephant at that distance," and as he stepped up to the line a bullet struck him in the face and he fell dead. Thus the army lost one of its best soldiers and the

country one of its purest patriots. The command of the Sixth Corps devolved upon General Horatio G. Wright.

[Four small streams, called (south to north) Mat, Ta, Po, and Ny, unite to form the Mattaponi River, which flows into the Pamunkey. Spottsylvania Court House is between the Po and the Ny.

In the evening of May 9th Hancock made a reconnoissance in force, with a view to turning the Confederate left. One brigade crossed the Po and was fiercely assailed. It met with considerable loss, but inflicted more; but it was discovered that the Confederate left rested on the stream at a point above, and therefore the brigade re-crossed and took up their bridge.

Because of the woods and underbrush, much searching was required, to learn the outline and complete location of the Confederate intrenchments. Ravines were to be scrambled through, and bypaths followed out. At last the weak point was discovered in a sharp salient at the northern side of the works, and preparations for attacking there were made at once.

Colonel Emory Upton commanded the storming party, which consisted of twelve regiments from Wright's corps, who were to be supported by Mott's division of Hancock's corps; and the remainder of Wright's and the whole of Warren's were to advance and use any opportunity that might present itself.

Upton's men formed within the woods, near the enemy's line, while a heavy battery fired rapidly into the salient, enfilading one of its sides. The instant this firing ceased, at six o'clock in the evening, Upton's men burst out with a cheer and swept over the works. There was a short hand-to-hand fight, and they captured a few guns and more than a thousand prisoners.

Upton's men broke through another line of works; but the hour was late, the ground was difficult, and it was not practicable to take advantage of the apparent opportunity to thrust in a whole corps through the gap, and then they withdrew, leaving the guns, but carrying along the prisoners and the captured battle-flags. Mott had not moved promptly and he therefore suffered some loss and effected nothing. Warren made two assaults and captured a section of the breast-works, but could not hold them after strong reinforcements had been thrown in against him.

At the same time that these operations were in progress, Burnside made a movement that gave him a position overlapping the Confederate right, which he might then have turned; but the advantage was not seen, and his troops were drawn back to close a gap between them and Wright's.

For this brilliant action Colonel Upton was made a brigadier-general on the field.

Heavy rain on the 11th prevented any movement except reconnoissances and preparations for further fighting on the morrow.

In the night Hancock's corps was moved by a wood-road to a point opposite the apex of the salient. At half-past four in the morning of the 12th it was light enough, and Hancock's men advanced through thickets of dead pines, till they reached the open ground directly in front of the salient. Halfway across this they broke out in wild cheering and rushed at the works. Though the half-surprised Confederates made a brave resistance, fighting desperately with clubbed muskets, Hancock's men were over the works in a few minutes, where they swept all before them, killing many of the defenders with the bayonet. They captured General

Edward Johnson and his entire division of nearly 4000 men, and also General Steuart. Hancock, recognizing an old army friend, extended his hand and said: "How are you, Steuart?" "I am General Steuart, of the Confederate army," was the sullen answer, "and under the circumstances I decline to take your hand." "Under any other circumstances," said Hancock, "I should not have offered it." Thirty battle-flags, many small arms, and twenty guns with their horses and caissons were captured. The guns were turned upon the enemy, who was then followed through the woods till the pursuers came upon another line of works, which had been constructed in the night across the base of the salient. When Hancock went in at the apex of the salient, Burnside and Warren assailed it at the sides; but though they reached the breastworks they got no farther.

Lee poured his men into the salient, with a determination to retake it; and when the pressure became too great Hancock's men slowly retired to the outer intrenchments, crossed them, and then used them as their own. Before, the Confederates had been at disadvantage from defending a salient angle; now they were at equal disadvantage from attacking a reëntrant angle. Five times they charged in heavy masses against the works, and five times they were repelled with serious loss. Hancock had established batteries on high ground where they could fire over the heads of his men and strike the enemy within the salient. Here and along the western face the fighting was continued all day. Field guns were run up close to the works and fired into the masses of Confederate troops, producing a sickening havoc; but in turn the gunners and the horses were certain to be shot down. There was per-



MAP OF THE BATTLE-FIELD OF SPOTTSVYLVANIA COURT-HOUSE, MAY 8-18, 1864.

sistent hand-to-hand fighting across the intrenchments, and the men crouching on either side shot and stabbed through crevices between the logs. In several instances a man mounted the works and had loaded muskets passed to him, which he fired in quick succession until a bullet ended his exploit and he tumbled into the ditch. And sometimes men were dragged over the works and made prisoners. The fighting around this "death angle" was kept up till midnight, when the Confederates withdrew to their interior line. The dead were piled in heaps, in some places four deep. Every tree and bush had been cut down by the balls. An oak tree two feet in diameter was cut through by bullets and fell. The National losses in the fighting around Spottsylvania were about 18,000. The Confederate losses—which as usual were not reported—were probably at least as great.

The list of casualties included many general officers. On the National side, besides Sedgwick, Generals J. C. Rice and T. G. Stevenson were killed, and Generals H. G. Wright and Alexander S. Webb and Colonel Samuel J. Carroll were wounded. The last-named was promoted to brigadier-general on the field. Of the Confederates Generals Daniel and Perrin were killed, R. D. Johnston, McGowan, Ramseur, and Walker wounded, and Edward Johnson and Steuart captured.

On the 11th General Grant wrote to General Halleck:

We have now ended the sixth day of very hard fighting. The result up to this time is much in our favour. But our losses have been heavy, as well as those of the enemy. I am sending back to Belle Plain all my wagons for a fresh supply of provisions and ammunition, and purpose to fight it out on this line if it takes all summer.

After a week spent in manœuvring, Grant moved again by the left flank. The Confederates had the shorter line, distanced him, and took up a strong position on the North Anna. Where that stream makes a sharp bend to the south, they established their line on the south side of it, with a great bend to the north meeting the bend of the river. If a ring were cut in two, and the two halves placed back to back, that would fairly represent the situation. While the Confederates could reënforce either wing from the other by short interior lines, the Army of the Potomac, on the other side of the river, was divided into three parts by the stream, and any force moved from one flank to the other must cross the river twice. The only point for an attack on such a position would be at the apex, where the Confederate intrenchments touched the river. But there the banks were high and steep and were covered by artillery, making an attack impossible, while any enfilading fire from the north bank was thwarted by traverses.

The corps of Wright and Hancock crossed the river above and below the Confederate position and destroyed miles of railroad; and incidental to these operations there was some sharp fighting by which each side lost about 2000 men, but there was no general battle here.

In the dark night of May 26th the Army of the Potomac withdrew the forces that had crossed the river, took up the pontoon bridges and destroyed the others, and again moved by the left flank. Sheridan's cavalry led the way and guarded the crossings of the Pamunkey, which is formed by the confluence of the North and South Annas. The march was about thirty miles to the crossing, which was about twenty miles from Richmond.

On the 28th, in the morning, at a cross-roads known as Hawes's Shop, Sheridan encountered a strong body of Confederate cavalry, which was dismounted and intrenched. A bloody fight of several hours' duration ensued. Then the troops of Gregg and Custer broke over the intrenchments, the other divisions came up promptly, the enemy was defeated, and the position was held. The loss was about two hundred and fifty on each side.

That day the Army of the Potomac crossed the Pamunkey and found its enemy in a strong position with flanks on Totopotomoy and Beaver Dam creeks, heavily reënforced, moreover, by troops sent from Richmond. There was brisk skirmishing all day, and two engagements by parts of the armies, in one of which the Confederates lost a brigadier-general and two colonels, but nothing more serious, and Grant found that the position could not be attacked with any chance of success. As he was expecting a reënforcement, from the Army of the James, of 10,000 men commanded by General William F. Smith, he extended his left toward Cold Harbor to prevent Lee from intervening and attacking Smith on the route. He also sent Sheridan, with cavalry and artillery, to Cold Harbor, where he was fiercely attacked, but he held the ground until relieved by the Sixth Corps and the reënforcement under Smith, which was designated as the Eighteenth Corps. At the same time the right of the Confederate army was extended in a parallel line, so that it covered all the roads leading to Richmond.

Early in the evening of June 1st the corps of Wright and Smith attacked the enemy and, steadily crossing a destructive fire of artillery and musketry, carried the

first line of intrenchments and captured several hundred prisoners. But they were stopped by the second line, and could only intrench and hold their advanced position. They had lost about 2000 men.

The other corps of the Army of the Potomac followed quickly, and the whole was soon in line at Cold Harbor, facing the line of the enemy. The Confederates had a very strong position. Their right rested on the Chickahominy, and their left was protected by swamps and forests. The river was between it and Richmond, but the water was so low that it could be forded at almost any point. The only chance for an attack was directly in front; but the temptation to try it was strong, for if the Confederate line could be broken at the centre and a heavy force thrust through—as was done by Longstreet at Chickamauga—Lee's whole army might be broken up and the Confederate capital would fall.

An attack was ordered for June 3d, and at four o'clock in the morning the Second, Sixth, and Eighteenth Corps advanced as rapidly as the difficult nature of the ground permitted. They were subjected to a destructive fire, but they carried the first line of works. Barlow's division of the Second Corps came upon a salient, had a fierce hand-to-hand fight, and captured it with three hundred prisoners and three guns which were at once turned upon the enemy. But all the assaulting columns, after reaching the Confederate first line, were subjected to cross-fires from artillery, and they could not advance any farther. Most of them fell back and quickly intrenched midway between the lines.

General Grant had given orders to General Meade to discontinue the attack at once if it should appear hopeless; and the serious fighting lasted not more than

an hour, but desultory firing was kept up all day, while there were minor engagements and skirmishing through the following week. The entire loss of the Army of the Potomac in the first twelve days of June was 10,058 killed, wounded, or missing. General Tyler and Colonel Brooke were wounded, and Colonels Porter, Byrnes, Meade, and Morris were killed. The Confederate loss never was reported. It was much smaller; but General Doles was killed, and Generals Finnegan, Kirkland, Lane, and Law were wounded.

For several days Grant held his army very close to the enemy, to prevent the sending of any troops against General Hunter's forces in the Shenandoah Valley; then he made another move by the left flank. The march was begun in the evening of June 12th, and on the 13th Wilson's cavalry crossed the Chickahominy fifteen miles below Cold Harbor and moved out a short distance to watch against any surprise. The Fifth Corps followed promptly, and covered the roads while the remainder of the army crossed. The Second, Sixth, and Ninth crossed a little farther down, and the Eighteenth was embarked at White House and sent round by water. By the 14th the greater part of the army was at Wilcox's landing on the James, which is there 2000 feet wide. A bridge was laid, the artillery and trains were sent over, and then the infantry in a long procession that occupied forty-eight hours. The accomplishment of such a movement by an army of more than 100,000 men, taken from trenches within a few yards of the enemy, without any serious accident or disaster, was accounted an extraordinary performance. General Ewell is reported to have remarked that when Grant's army got across the James he knew the Confederate cause was lost.

The next phase of the campaign was a movement toward and investment of Petersburg, which, for Richmond, was the centre for all railroads coming from the South.

At this point in the progress of the war the loyal North came nearest to despairing of the Republic. Grant's losses, heavy enough in fact, were greatly exaggerated in the newspaper reports, and it appeared to many that he had undertaken an impossible task. They persistently considered Richmond as the objective, and one of the most brilliant histories extant still carries that assumption, despite the fact that Grant at the outset had distinctly declared that his objective was Lee's army, which must be followed and fought until destroyed, "by a process of attrition, if in no other way." Virginia offered many strong defensive positions, and had been fought over till these were well understood; hence it was not now possible, except by attrition, to defeat any army there holding itself carefully to the defensive. And that process was steadily going on. The general feeling of depression was indicated in the money-market, when the price of gold went to 200 the day that the Army of the Potomac crossed the James, and three weeks later to 285. The popular depression was much increased by an article entitled "Where are we?—and where drifting?" written by Thurlow Weed in the *Albany Journal* and widely copied.

Sherman's Atlanta Campaign

May-August, 1864

ON the same day that Grant crossed the Rapidan to begin his overland campaign (May 5, 1864) Sherman set out from Chattanooga on his campaign toward Atlanta. He had, of all arms, about 100,000 men, and was confronted by General Joseph E. Johnston, by some considered the ablest of the Confederate generals, who had about 64,000. Sherman's force was composed of three armies—the Army of the Cumberland, commanded by General George H. Thomas; the Army of the Tennessee, commanded by General James B. McPherson; and the Army of the Ohio, commanded by General John M. Schofield.

The distance from Chattanooga to Atlanta is about one hundred miles, and the route lay through a region of hills and streams which offered many opportunities for strong lines of defence. Johnston was at Dalton, on the railroad, about twenty miles south of Chattanooga. Atlanta was to be desired as a prize of war because it was an important railroad centre and contained some of the enemy's largest foundries and arsenals for supplying the armies.

When Sherman had concentrated his forces at Chattanooga he found that to supply his army he must receive a hundred and thirty carloads of provisions

every day, but the railroad had not enough locomotives and cars for that purpose. He therefore sent orders to Louisville to have trains that arrived there from the North seized and forwarded to him, and by this means he soon had all the rolling stock that he needed.

It might be said, in common parlance, that in entering on this campaign he stripped for the work. While there was to be an abundant supply of necessities, no luxuries were allowed. Every man, whether officer or private, carried five days' provisions. Tents were taken for the sick and wounded only. A single exception was made in favour of General Thomas, who needed a tent and a small wagon-train—which the soldiers called "Thomas's Circus." General Sherman himself had no tent and no train.

Gangs of negroes had been at work constructing fortifications along the several lines of defence in Johnston's rear, some of which were very elaborate. And when it was considered that he had a friendly population behind him, while Sherman must enter a hostile country and leave detachments to guard his line of communication, it appeared that the difference in the size of the armies was fairly offset.

As Johnston's position at Dalton was so strongly guarded by fortifications at Tunnel Hill that a direct attack could hardly have any hope of success, Sherman made a feint there, and sent McPherson to march southward through the gap in the mountains, strike Resaca, and cut the railroad on which the enemy depended for supplies. McPherson set out promptly and reached Resaca; but he found there a fortified enemy, and he lacked the nerve to make at once a vigorous attack and thrust his army into a position where it might have made certain the defeat, and

perhaps the destruction, of Johnston's. Instead of doing so, he fell back to the gap and waited for the remainder of Sherman's army to join him. Thus he lost a rare opportunity for a brilliant and decisive stroke. Johnston, as a matter of course, saw at once what was intended; and when Sherman with his entire army came through the gap he found that the enemy had fallen back to Resaca and was in a strong position.

Sherman drew his lines around the place, on the north and the west, and artillery firing and heavy skirmishing followed; but there was no battle, because Johnston would not come out of his intrenchments, and Sherman would not attack them. Hooker, on the left of the line, captured a small work with four guns and some prisoners; while McPherson, on the right, extended his line and gained a position from which his guns could destroy the railroad bridge over the Oostenaula in the Confederate rear. All attempts to dislodge him resulted in bloody failure; and at the same time Sherman threw pontoon bridges over the river three miles below the town, and sent a division of cavalry to cross farther down, from which it was evident that he was preparing to send out a sufficient detachment to break the railroad. Johnston did not wait to be caught. As there were no good roads by which he might retreat eastward, he crossed the river, burned the bridges behind him, followed the railroad southward, and took up a new position at Cassville, near Kingston.

There was every indication that Johnston intended to make a stand here and accept battle; but when Sherman's columns came up, there was only skirmishing, and in the night the Confederates retreated across Etowah River. Johnston afterward said that he did

intend to fight here, but Hood and Polk told him they could not hold their lines, as the National artillery enfiladed them. Hood gave a different explanation, saying that he wished to strike out with his own corps and a part of Polk's and overwhelm Schofield, who was separated somewhat from the rest of the army.

Here Sherman delayed the pursuit for a time, to get his army well together, provision it, and repair the railroad over which he drew his supplies. He was familiar with the region, because twenty years before he, then a young lieutenant, had ridden through it, coming up from Charleston. He knew that Allatoona Pass, through which the railroad runs, offered a strong position that probably would be held by Johnston, and for this reason he left the railroad and struck out westward toward Dallas, to threaten Marietta and Atlanta, and thus draw Johnston away from Allatoona. That General at once came out to meet the movement; and the two armies, feeling out for each other in some uncertainty, at last came within reach at the cross-roads near New Hope Church. Here for six days there was continuous fighting, sometimes only in skirmishes, and sometimes with attacks by heavy detachments from one side or the other. All such attacks were costly and fruitless; but the final advantage was with Sherman, who got his lines well in order, strengthened his right, and then with his left reached out toward the railroad, secured all the wagon-roads, and sent a strong cavalry force to occupy Allatoona and repair the railroad. Johnston then retreated again, and took up a position on the slopes of Kenesaw, Pine, and Lost Mountains.

It was now the end of May. Both commanders had been skilful and cautious, and neither had lost as

many as 10,000 men. But Sherman had turned every position taken up by his antagonist and had traversed about four fifths of the distance between Chattanooga and Atlanta.

Johnston's position on the mountains overlooked every road and field by which Sherman could approach, but it had the disadvantage that his line was ten miles long and one part could not readily reinforce another.

Sherman followed Johnston closely, and intrenched whenever he made an advance. Heavy rains at this time prevented any general battle; but strong skirmish-lines kept up an incessant firing. When the rain was over, Sherman occupied an intrenched line that followed the contour of Johnston's and was close to it.

On the 14th of June General Sherman, reconnoitering, saw a battery on the crest of Pine Mountain and near it a group of officers using their field-glasses. He ordered one of his batteries to fire a few shots at them, and then rode on. Later in the day his signal-officer told him that the Confederates had signalled from Pine Mountain, "Send an ambulance for General Polk's body." The group had consisted of Generals Johnston, Hardee, and Polk and a few soldiers. When they saw that the battery was preparing to fire, Johnston told them to separate, and they all mounted; but Polk was very slow about it, and a cannon-ball struck him in the chest.

The next day when Sherman advanced to attack between Kenesaw and Pine Mountain, he found that Johnston had shortened his line by withdrawing from Pine Mountain. He occupied the ground, gathered in many prisoners, including one Alabama regiment entire, and a day later advanced between Kenesaw and Lost Mountains, and found that Lost Mountain

also was abandoned and Johnston's entire force was on Kenesaw, where his left wing protected Marietta and the roads to Atlanta.

As the Confederate positions had been fortified beforehand mainly by the work of slaves, thus relieving the soldiers of heavy labour, it occurred to General Sherman to do likewise. The gangs of negroes that came into his camp were set at work, fed from the army supplies, and paid ten dollars a month, as Congress had provided. Miles of fortifications were made, sometimes in a single night. The construction consisted generally of a framework or fence of logs and rails, covered thickly with earth thrown up from a ditch on each side. On the top was a head-log, raised enough to give an opening through which the muskets could be thrust for firing. The ends of this log rested in notches cut in logs that extended back in a slope to the ground; so that if a cannon-shot struck it, instead of falling upon the men in the trench it would roll harmlessly down the incline.

Sherman kept pushing forward his lines, with an incessant fire of artillery and musketry, all the time feeling out with his right wing for opportune flanking movements. In a general way there was a close resemblance between his campaign and Grant's; but all his flank movements were by the right, while Grant's were by the left.

On the 21st the divisions of Stanley and Wood gained a position on the southern slope of Kenesaw, where the enemy tried in vain to dislodge them; and the next day Hooker and Schofield advanced to a position within three miles of Marietta. Here Hood's corps came out and attacked them, but he could not move them and he lost about 1000 men.

The National line had now been extended as far as was prudent, and General Sherman was tempted into an experiment that proved to be the one error of his campaign—an error quite similar to Lee's in ordering Pickett's charge and Grant's at Cold Harbour, but not so costly as either of those. In the morning of the 27th, while firing was continued all along the line, he sent forward two heavy columns at points about a mile apart. He expected, or hoped at least, to break through the Confederate centre and take half of Johnston's army in reverse, while his other troops should hold the remaining half so close that it could not move. But a steady and deadly fire from the intrenchments shattered his columns, and the few men that reached the enemy's works were either killed or captured. This attempt cost Sherman more than 2500 men, and inflicted upon Johnston a loss of but a little more than 800. The sacrifice included Brigadier-Generals Charles G. Harker and Daniel McCook, both of whom were mortally wounded.

With an ordinary commander this probably would have brought affairs to an *impasse*. But Sherman was a genius, and it is one of the peculiarities of a genius, as compared with a mere scholar, that he knows when to make an exception and dares to do it. He determined to take ten days' provisions in wagons, let go his communication with his base, move his whole army southward, and seize the road below Marietta. Thus he would compel Johnston either to fall back farther toward Atlanta or to attack him in the intrenchments that he would immediately throw up. In the night of July 2d McPherson, who held the left of the line, drew out of his intrenchments and marched to the right, passing behind Thomas and Schofield. Then Thomas

drew out and passed along behind Schofield and McPherson, and so on. This was the same manoeuvre by which Grant carried his army from Spottsylvania to the James. Johnston quickly understood this movement, left his position on Kenesaw, and fell back to the Chattahoochee. There, on the north bank, were intrenchments that a thousand slaves had been at work upon for a month. Sherman says it was the strongest field fortification that he ever had seen. But he took a position on ground that overlooked it, and he held the river for several miles above and below. Thus it was possible for him to turn either of Johnston's flanks, and on July 9th Schofield crossed above and intrenched on the left bank of the stream. That night Johnston crossed with his entire army and burned the bridges.

Sherman's cavalry not only protected his flanks but performed some efficient work besides. A detachment commanded by General Kenner Garrard occupied the town of Roswell, about a dozen miles north-east of Marietta. They found there mills for manufacturing paper and weaving wool and cotton, all working to their capacity for the Confederate Government. The managers hung out a French flag and declared that the mills were owned by Frenchmen. But Garrard burned the mills and sent the managers and the operatives under guard to Marietta.

The Chattahoochee was the last natural obstruction on the way to Atlanta. Sherman spent a week in careful preparation, crossed with his whole army on the 17th, and the next day executed a grand right wheel toward the city.

Exactly at this date something happened which hastened the downfall of the Confederacy. Johnston

was removed from command, and his successor was General John B. Hood. The contrast between the two men was striking. Johnston was skilful, watchful, and cautious — perhaps too cautious. Hood was a reckless fighter and was no strategist at all. The telegram from the Confederate War Department said:

As you have failed to arrest the advance of the enemy to the vicinity of Atlanta, far in the interior of Georgia, and express no confidence that you can defeat or repel him, you are hereby relieved from the command.

Johnston said in reply:

I assert that Sherman's army is much stronger compared with that of Tennessee than Grant's compared with that of Northern Virginia. Yet the enemy has been compelled to advance much more slowly to the vicinity of Atlanta than to that of Richmond and Petersburg, and penetrated much deeper into Virginia than into Georgia. Confident language by a military commander is not usually regarded as evidence of competence.

Hood at West Point had been a classmate of Schofield and McPherson, and from their knowledge of him, and the general information as to his career thus far in the war, it was evident that the conduct of the campaign would be very different from what it had been. Sherman warned his army to expect attacks at any time, and to be prepared to meet them. This caution was very soon justified.

On the 20th, while Sherman was slowly drawing closer to the city, the Confederates came out of their intrenchments along Peachtree Creek and made a furious attack upon the right of the line, which was

held by Thomas. The blow fell most heavily upon Hooker's corps, and there the combatants came very close and there was hand-to-hand fighting. A large column attempted a flank movement, but Thomas brought several batteries where they played upon it freely, and in about two hours, after successive charges had failed, the enemy returned to his intrenchments. In this action Hood lost about 6000 men, killed, wounded, or captured. Sherman also lost heavily, as a part of his troops engaged had no intrenchments. Two days later the Confederates abandoned the works along Peachtree Creek and retired to the immediate defences of the city.

General Jacob D. Cox, who commanded a division in Schofield's corps, writes of the situation at this time:

A little more than a month had passed since the Etowah was crossed. It was a month of continuous sharp skirmishing combat, with occasional severer engagements. It was a month in which the troops had been day and night under fire, and the incessant strain on nerve and brain had never for a moment been relaxed. It was a month of continuous pouring rains, converting the camps into mire and the roads into almost impassable sloughs, making insignificant streams as obstructive as rivers, and multiplying the discomforts and perils of duty in the trenches or on picket. The ordinary experience of a year was condensed into a few weeks, and the army of veterans became consolidated by a true unity of feeling.

The left of Sherman's line, which was then north and east of the city, crossed the railroad from Atlanta to Augusta, and there was a struggle for some advantageous positions on that flank; but though these were gained by his men, it was still insufficiently protected.

Hood discovered this and proceeded to take advantage of it. With a large part of his army he marched by a road parallel to the railroad and south of it. Bits of woodland and low ridges hid him from his enemy till he passed Sherman's left and assailed it in the rear. He got possession of some of the camps and of a battery that was passing through the woods. But McPherson's men, though to a certain degree surprised, were not caught napping. They were always on the lookout for sudden attacks. Generals Logan, Charles R. Wood, and Morgan L. Smith were there, and they quickly "refused" the flank, and the men faced the enemy with steady courage. Hood made seven heavy assaults, and met with seven bloody repulses. The fighting was close, and some guns were taken and retaken. Then Wood's division made a counter attack on Hood's flank, while twenty guns fired over the heads of his men as they advanced. Before this attack the Confederates slowly retired to their defences, carrying off some captured guns. In this strangely mixed engagement one division of Sherman's men fought alternately on both sides of their works.

In this battle the National loss was 3521 men killed, wounded, or missing, and ten guns. A grievous loss was the death of General McPherson. He rode out to examine the ground on the left, and ran into an advancing skirmish line of the enemy. They shouted to him to surrender; but he only touched his hat as if saluting, wheeled his horse, and attempted to ride away. A volley was fired at once, and he fell mortally wounded. The command of the Army of the Tennessee was given to General Oliver O. Howard, who had commanded the Fourth Corps; and thereupon General Hooker, who considered that he was entitled to the

promotion, asked to be relieved, and left the army. The command of his corps was given to General Henry W. Slocum.

Hood's losses, not officially reported by him, have been fairly reckoned as amounting to about 10,000. Of his dead 1000 were delivered to him under flag of truce, more than 1100 were counted and buried by Sherman's men, besides others that were estimated, and there were 2000 prisoners.

This action, July 22d, is known as the battle of Atlanta. The weather was so severe that there were many prostrations from the heat.

Sherman once more made a grand flank movement, with the intention of breaking the enemy's communications south of Atlanta. This movement was only partly made when Hood heavily attacked his right flank, and there was hot fighting for five hours. Logan's men, who sustained the brunt of the attack, quickly threw up light breastworks and repelled six successive charges. Later in the day Hood persisted in his assaults, but with no success. Logan, in this action, lost 572 men, captured five battle flags, and buried 600 of the Confederate dead.

Sherman sent out cavalry expeditions to break the railroads, and they did destroy some miles of track, seventeen locomotives, and more than a hundred cars. At the same time Wheeler's Confederate cavalry got into Sherman's rear, broke up two miles of railroad, and captured a large drove of cattle. Kilpatrick rode entirely around Atlanta, and defeated a combined force of cavalry and infantry.

Not satisfied with the work of the troopers, Sherman swung a large part of his army around to the south of Atlanta, made thorough destruction of the railroads,

burning the ties and twisting the rails, and then advanced on the city. There was some fighting, and Govan's Confederate brigade was captured entire, with ten guns. Hood, in the night of September 1st, destroyed much of the government property in the city, and then escaped with the greater part of his army. Slocum, hearing the explosions, realized what they meant, and his troops walked into Atlanta, where Sherman fixed his headquarters a few days later.

The Battle of the "Kearsarge" and the "Alabama"

June 19, 1864

OF the cruisers that the Confederate Government sent out to prey upon American commerce the most destructive and most famous was the *Alabama*. This was a wooden ship, built at Birkenhead, opposite Liverpool, in 1862. She was 220 feet long, was rated at 1040 tons, had both steam and canvas, and was a fast sailer. She cost nearly a quarter of a million dollars. The American Minister at London notified the British Government that she was being built in violation of the neutrality laws, and demanded that she be prevented from sailing. The Government moved very slowly, and she escaped to sea. Her armament and stores had been sent to Fayal in the Azores, and she went there at once and equipped for a cruise. Her commander was Raphael Semmes, who had been an officer in the United States navy, and most of her crew were Englishmen.

For nearly two years the *Alabama* roamed the seas, and she captured sixty-nine American merchantmen, most of which she burned at sea, either putting their crews upon passing vessels or taking them to some neutral port. None of the prizes were taken into any port for adjudication. Whenever this cruiser put into

Battle of "Kearsarge" and "Alabama" 281

a British or French port she was warmly welcomed and received every attention possible, because she was destroying a rival of British and French commerce. Several war vessels were sent out by the American Government to search for her; but they were always at disadvantage because of the rule that when two hostile vessels are in a neutral port the first that leaves must have been gone twenty-four hours before the other is permitted to follow. When, in June, 1864, the sloop-of-war, *Kearsarge*, commanded by Captain John Antrim Winslow, found the *Alabama* in the harbour of Cherbourg, France, she avoided going into the port, thus escaping the twenty-four-hour rule. She lay just outside, and kept a sharp watch for her prey.

The two vessels were so nearly alike in size and armament as to be a very fair match. But the crew of the *Kearsarge* were much superior in gun-practice; and her boilers were protected by chains stoppered up and down the sides amidships, which were covered with thin boards. This was no new device; more than two years before, when Farragut passed the forts below New Orleans several of his ships were protected in the same way, and this was matter of common knowledge.

On Sunday, June 19th, it became known in Cherbourg that Semmes intended to go out that day and fight the *Kearsarge*, and every available place along the shore or on the shipping in the harbour was occupied by spectators eager to see the battle. Their number was estimated at 15,000. Nearly all of them were in sympathy with the Confederate cruiser and confident of her triumph, and they cheered wildly as she passed out.

The *Kearsarge* steamed away and drew her adversary out to sea about nine miles, so that she should not without difficulty get back to the haven if she found

that the fight was going against her. The *Kearsarge* then turned and closed in for battle. The *Alabama* began firing first; the *Kearsarge* waiting to get nearer and endeavouring to take a position for raking. This the *Alabama* avoided by sheering, and very soon the two vessels were sailing on opposite sides of a circle half a mile in diameter, each using its starboard guns. The gun-practice of the *Alabama* was bad; she fired rapidly, but her shots had little effect. As soon as the *Kearsarge* opened there was war in earnest. Her guns were handled with skill and deliberation, and every shot told. One shell burst among the crew of the *Alabama's* pivot gun, disabling half of them and dismounting the piece. The executive officer of the *Alabama* has described the scene on her deck:

After using solid shot for some time, we alternated shell and shot. The enemy's 11-inch shells were now doing severe execution upon our quarter-deck section. Three of them successively entered our 8-inch pivot-gun port. The first swept off the forward part of the gun's crew; the second killed one man and wounded several others; and the third struck the breast of the gun-carriage and spun around on the deck till one of the men picked it up and threw it overboard. Our decks were now covered with the dead and the wounded, and the ship was careening heavily to starboard from the effects of the shot-holes on her water-line. Captain Semmes ordered me to be ready to make all possible sail when the circuit of fight should put our head to the coast of France; then he would notify me at the same time to pivot and continue the action with the port battery, hoping thus to right the ship and enable us to reach the coast of France. The evolution was performed beautifully, righting the helm, hoisting the head sails, hauling aft the fore try-sail sheet, and pivoting to port, the action con-

Battle of "Kearsarge" and "Alabama" 283

tinuing almost without cessation. This exposed us to a raking fire, but, strange to say, the *Kearsarge* did not take advantage of it. The port side of the quarter-deck was so encumbered with the mangled trunks of the dead that I had to have them thrown overboard, in order to fight the after pivot-gun. . . . At this moment the chief engineer came on deck and reported the fires put out, and that he could no longer work the engines. Captain Semmes said to me, "Go below, sir, and see how long the ship can float." As I entered the ward-room the sight was indeed appalling. There stood Assistant-Surgeon Llewellyn at his post, but the table and the patient upon it had been swept away from him by an 11-inch shell, which opened in the side of the ship an aperture that was fast filling the ship with water. It took me but a moment to return to the deck and report to the Captain that we could not float ten minutes. He replied: "Then, sir, cease firing, shorten sail, and haul down the colours. It will never do in this nineteenth century for us to go down and the decks covered with our gallant wounded."

As all the boats were disabled somewhat, save one, an officer was sent in that one to inform the commander of the *Kearsarge* that the *Alabama* was sinking and to ask that boats be sent to save the wounded. At the same time a large boat that was not much damaged was launched from the *Alabama* and the wounded were put into it; then it was pushed off just in time. The remaining officers and men then jumped overboard, the Captain throwing his sword into the sea. The *Alabama* settled stern first, threw her bows high into the air, and then went down in forty-five fathoms of water.

Only two of the *Kearsarge's* boats had escaped injury, and these were lowered at once to save the men that were in the water. An Englishman had come out with

his yacht to see the fight, and Captain Winslow asked him to assist in the work of rescue. He picked up Semmes and the first officer and some others—about forty in all—and at once steamed away for Southampton. Three of Winslow's officers in succession called his attention to the Englishman's performance and suggested that a shot be sent after the yacht, but Winslow would not believe that any such trick was being played, saying: "The yacht is simply coming round," and adding that "No Englishman who carries the flag of the Royal Yacht Squadron could so act." Such however was the case, and Semmes and his men were ostentatiously received and fêted in London as if they had been the victors.

In this battle each vessel was struck about thirty times. The *Kearsarge* was not materially injured, but she would have been if a shell that lodged in her stern-post had not failed to explode. Three members of her crew were wounded, and one of these died a few days later.

The Battle of Mobile Bay

August 5, 1864

WITH all the strictness of the blockade, there were two ports where it had been impossible to make it as nearly perfect as was desired. These were Mobile, Alabama, and Wilmington, North Carolina. General Grant, when he planned his comprehensive campaign for the last year of the war, intended to have Mobile taken by a land force moving eastward from New Orleans and Port Hudson; but that, like some other of the minor features of the plan, failed of fulfilment.

The principal defences of Mobile Bay are Fort Morgan, on Mobile Point at the east side of the bay, and, three miles north-west of this, on the extremity of Dauphin Island, Fort Gaines. From this latter work extended a row of piles for about two miles. From that point there was a row of torpedoes reaching almost to Fort Morgan. The end of the line of torpedoes was marked by a red buoy, and between the buoy and the fort the channel was unobstructed, so that blockade-runners might enter.

Farragut's fleet, which was called officially the Western Gulf Blockading Squadron, had spent much time watching for blockade-runners, and had caught many, but on the other hand many had slipped through,


carrying in arms and ammunition, and taking out cotton. Of one that he caught the captain declared that he was bound for Matamoras, Mexico. "If that's the case," said Farragut, "you are a long way out of your course, and I ought to punish you for your bad seamanship."

The Confederate Government had established a rule that at least half of the cargo of every vessel that came into its ports must consist of munitions of war for that Government; otherwise the vessel and all would be confiscated.

After long and deliberate preparation, Farragut was ready to run by the forts and attack the Confederate fleet in the bay; but he wished for the coöperation of a land force to capture and hold the forts, just as he had had the coöperation of Butler's troops at New Orleans. At last this was furnished, and Gordon Granger's command was landed on Dauphin Island, August 4, 1864. Farragut had made careful preparations and issued minute instructions to his captains, and all was ready. His column consisted of four ironclad monitors and seven wooden sloops-of-war. To each sloop a gunboat was lashed on the port side, to help her out of the fight if she should be disabled. The heaviest fire was to be expected from Fort Morgan, which would be on the starboard side.

The day before the battle Farragut, with some of his officers, went up on a small boat to view the region near the forts. Lieutenant John C. Kinney, who was signal officer on the *Hartford*, describes his appearance:

The central figure was the grand old Admiral, his plans all completed, affable with all, evidently not thinking of failure as among the possibilities of the morrow, and filling every-



SKETCH MAP
OF
MOBILE BAY
SHOWING DEFENCES
AT THE ENTRANCE

0 5 10
MILES

G U L F O F M E X I C O

W. J. WILSON

one with his enthusiasm. He was sixty-three years old, of medium height, stoutly built, with a finely proportioned head and smoothly shaven face, with an expression combining overflowing kindliness with iron will and invincible determination, and with eyes that in repose were full of sweetness and light, but in emergency could flash fire and fury.

Before six o'clock in the morning of August 5th, the column was under way. The monitors formed a line abreast of the wooden ships and to the right of them. The sloop *Brooklyn* led, because she had an apparatus for picking up torpedoes. They steamed along steadily in line and came into close order as they neared the fort, so that there was a space of only a few yards between the stern of one vessel and the bow of the next.

The forts and the Confederate vessels inside of the line of torpedoes opened fire on the fleet half an hour before Farragut's guns could be brought to bear. The flagship *Hartford* was their special target, and they killed or wounded many of her crew, one ball killing ten men and wounding five, while a 120-pound ball lodged in her mainmast. The other wooden vessels also suffered; but when the fleet came abreast of the fort they poured out rapid broadsides of shells, grape-shot, and shrapnel, which silenced the batteries and cleared the bastions.

All the captains had been instructed to pass in between the red buoy and the fort. But Captain T. A. M. Craven, of the monitor *Tecumseh*, disregarded this and steered straight for the ram *Tennessee*, which lay behind the line of torpedoes. No satisfactory reason for this action ever has been given. As good a conjecture as any is, that he considered it probable that if he went in as directed the ram would steam ahead,

strike him amidships, and sink him as soon as he had passed within the bay. Therefore he would take his chances of running over the torpedoes, and if he passed them safely he could strike the ram amidships. However, there was no such good luck for the *Tecumseh*. She struck a torpedo, which exploded, and she went down almost instantly. As the deck of a monitor was almost awash when she was in perfect trim, she must inevitably sink quickly when there was any break in her hull. Captain Craven and John Collins, his pilot, met at the foot of the ladder that led to the only escape from the ship. Considering that it was by his orders that they had run upon the fatal ground, the Captain stepped aside, saying, "After you, pilot." "There was nothing after me," says Collins; "for when I reached the upmost round of the ladder the vessel seemed to drop from under me." The *Tecumseh's* officers and men numbered 114, of whom only 21 were saved.

At this critical moment the *Brooklyn*, which led the line of wooden ships, stopped, and there was great danger that the whole fleet would be thrown into confusion. Lieutenant Kinney writes:

It was during these few perilous moments that the most fatal work of the day was done to the fleet. Owing to the *Hartford's* position, only her few bow guns could be used, while a deadly rain of shot and shell was falling on her, and her men were being cut down by scores, unable to make reply. The sight on deck was sickening beyond the power of words to portray. Shot after shot came through the side, mowing down the men, deluging the decks with blood, and scattering mangled fragments of humanity so thickly that it was difficult to stand on the deck, so slippery was it. The bodies of the dead were placed in a long row on the

port side, while the wounded were sent below until the surgeon's quarters would hold no more. A solid shot coming through the bow struck a gunner on the neck, completely severing head from body. One poor fellow lost both legs by a cannon-ball; as he fell he threw up both arms just in time to have them also carried away by another shot. [Yet he survived.] At one gun, all the crew on one side were swept down by a shot which came crashing through the bulwarks. A shell burst between the two forward guns in charge of Lieutenant Tyson, killing and wounding fifteen men.

When Farragut asked by signal why the *Brooklyn* had stopped, the answer was, "Torpedoes." At which he exclaimed, "Damn the torpedoes!" and ordered that more steam be put on and the *Hartford* to pass the *Brooklyn* and take the lead. She was so near to the *Brooklyn* that while she steamed ahead, the *Metacomet*, her running mate, had to back water, to secure a short turn to the left of the *Brooklyn's* stern. This sent them across the line of torpedoes. The primers of some of these were heard snapping under the ships, but the torpedoes failed to explode. The Confederate ship *Selma* kept in front of the *Hartford* and raked her, thus doing more damage than all the rest of the Confederate fleet. Two other gunboats were well taken care of by the *Hartford's* broadsides.

When the fleet was about a mile inside the bay the *Metacomet*, which was the fastest vessel there, was cast loose from the *Hartford* and, commanded by Captain James E. Jouett, soon overhauled the *Selma*, which was retreating before her. One shot wounded the *Selma's* captain and killed her first officer, and thereupon she surrendered. The gunboat *Gaines*, smashed by the gunfire of the *Hartford*, was run ashore and set

on fire by her crew. Another, the *Morgan*, escaped by running into shallow water.

The fleet came to anchor in the bay; and a little later the ram *Tennessee*, leaving the shelter of Fort Morgan, made straight for her enemies—three monitors and ten wooden vessels. She had the advantage over them from the fact that almost any shot rolled off harmlessly from her thick, sloping iron sides, and especially from the fact that she was alone and at liberty to fire in any direction, while they must avoid firing into one another. Yet she had vulnerable points. But they all up anchor and rushed at her, trying to run her down. The monitors were slow in turning, and two of the wooden vessels got at the ram first, ramming her amidships, but without harming her in the least, while they were badly damaged themselves. She drove toward the flagship as if to run her down, but suddenly changed her course and the bows of the two vessels just grazed as they passed. The *Hartford* poured out a whole broadside at the ram, but to no effect, while she herself received a shell that killed five men and wounded eight. In the general rush to get at the ram the *Lackawanna* struck the *Hartford* amidships and cut into her so deeply as almost to create a panic. But the Admiral, finding that there was no damage down to the water-line, ordered his ship to drive again, full speed, at the ram. The *Lackawanna*, coming up for a second blow at the ram, was in imminent danger of striking the flagship again; whereat the Admiral said to the signal officer: "Can you say 'for God's sake' by signal?" The signal officer informed him that he could. "Then say to the *Lackawanna*, 'For God's sake get out of our way and anchor.'"

Though no shot that the fleet could send would

pierce the side of the ram, the many that it did send found spots for execution after a while. The smoke-stack was entirely shot away, as was also the flag-staff, and a shot from one of the monitors cut the rudder chains. The monitor *Chickasaw* hung close at her stern and hammered away with 11-inch solid shot, which loosened the plates and, according to the *Tennessee's* pilot, sent some of them flying into the air. Admiral Buchanan, her commander, was severely wounded, and she ran out a white flag and surrendered. Two of her men had been killed, and nine wounded. The total casualties in the Confederate fleet were twelve killed and twenty wounded. In Farragut's fleet fifty-two were killed, and one hundred and seventy wounded.

Fort Gaines surrendered the next day, and Fort Morgan about a fortnight later.

Much has been said about Admiral Farragut being "lashed to the mast" in this battle, as if it were an act of bravado, like nailing the colours. The simple truth is, that as the smoke thickened he ascended into the rigging to get a view; and because a shot might cause him to fall an officer had a ratlin passed around him and tied to the rigging.

Brownell's masterpiece describing this battle, in which he took part, has many noble passages:

" Fear? A forgotten form!
Death? A dream of the eyes!
We were atoms in God's great storm
That roared through the angry skies.

" O Mother Land, this weary life
We led, we lead, is 'long of thee:
Thine the strong agony of strife,
And thine the lonely sea.

" Nor shalt thou want one willing breath,
Though, ever smiling round the brave,
The blue sea bear us on to death.
The green were one wide grave."

The Battle of Cedar Creek

October 19, 1864

OF all the elements that entered into the great problem of the Civil War, the Shenandoah Valley (or Valley of Virginia, as it is also called) was one of the most important and most puzzling. It was like a lane down which at almost any time a Confederate detachment could be sent to threaten Washington; but it could not be used conversely to threaten Richmond, for the farther a force marched up the valley the farther it was from that capital. Then, too, the fertility of the valley made it a granary, from which the Confederate army drew great supplies, and it was also a direct road to the best farming lands of Maryland.

When, in 1864, General Grant assumed command of all the National forces, and undertook his campaign in Virginia, he wished to have this element eliminated from the problem. When Early's raid, in which he fought the battle of the Monocacy, had culminated in the burning of Chambersburg, Pennsylvania (July 30th), Grant took up the subject in earnest. His solution, stated briefly, was, that if the enemy traversed the valley again he must find it necessary to carry his provisions with him. Grant would have been satisfied to retain General David Hunter in command there; but Hunter, believing that he did not possess the con-

fidence of the authorities at Washington, resigned for the good of the service. Grant then chose General Philip H. Sheridan, though Secretary Stanton objected to him as too young for so important a command. He was then in his thirty-fourth year. Sheridan, who was to have a force of about 30,000 men, distinctly understood his instructions and was exactly the man to carry them out. He received the Sixth, Nineteenth, and Eighth Corps of infantry—commanded by Generals Wright, Emory, and Crook—and the cavalry divisions of Torbert, Merritt, Custer, and Lowell.

Early was still on the Potomac above Harpers Ferry, loading his wagons with wheat on the battlefield of Antietam when he learned that Sheridan was moving southward toward Winchester to cut off his communications, whereupon he hastily retreated and took a position to cover that place. Sheridan's position was on Opequan Creek, facing west toward the town. Here he was attacked, August 21st, and after a fight in which he lost 260 men he fell back to Halltown, and waited for a proper opportunity; Early meanwhile making various raids in the lower valley. The opportunity came in the middle of September, when Lee had called away a large part of Early's force, and another part was at Martinsburg, twenty miles away. Sheridan set his army in motion early on September 19th, and battle was joined by noon and continued till dark. After some varying fortune, he drove everything before him. The enemy, though in rout and confusion, escaped up the valley in the darkness, leaving their wounded behind and losing five guns and nine battle-flags. The popular account of this action in all the newspapers was summed up in the declaration that Early "was sent whirling through Winchester."

Early's next position was at Fisher's Hill, very near the point where the North Fork of the Shenandoah turns eastward and after a course of ten miles joins the South Fork. The valley there, between the North Mountain and the Massanutten Mountain, is only about four miles wide; the river flows close by the precipitous hill; and the Confederates constructed their works entirely across the valley. But their left flank was weakly protected. Sheridan gained an eminence where his batteries could be used effectively, and sent Crook's command to make a detour and come in on the enemy's left. This movement surprised that part of the Confederate line and threw it into confusion; then Sheridan's whole force swept forward successively, right to left, and Early's whole line was broken up and fled southward, leaving sixteen guns behind. This battle took place September 22d, and the enemy was pursued for three days till he reached Port Republic, where he received reënforcements from Lee's army.

Sheridan stopped with his main force at Harrisonburg, but sent Torbert with his cavalry as far as Staunton. Then began the work of rendering the valley unprofitable to the Confederates. Not only was the railroad effectively broken and a large quantity of arms and ammunition captured, but from that point to Strasburg, about eighty miles, almost everything was destroyed except the dwellings—more than seventy mills and more than 2000 barns, all with their contents—
—with 4000 head of cattle and 3000 sheep driven off.

Early turned and pursued, and at Tom's Brook, October 7th, there was a cavalry fight in which Torbert captured 300 prisoners, eleven guns, and many wagons, summed up in "Everything they had on wheels."

At Cedar Creek, a little north of Strasburg, Sheridan

put his army into camp and was, on October 15th, summoned to meet Grant at Washington for consultation. This creek, from the slopes of North Mountain, flows into the North Fork just below the turn, where the peaks of Massanutten overlook the entire field. It was assumed that Early had been so completely defeated that he was not likely to be heard from again; and the Sixth Corps was ordered to join the army before Petersburg. It had made a day's march, when Sheridan overtook it. As he still had some apprehension of trouble, he countermanded the order, sending it back to its place on the line of Cedar Creek, while he proceeded to Washington.

The turnpike laid out by George Washington in 1750 runs through the valley, and was the road by which Sheridan received his supplies. The line faced Cedar Creek. The Eighth Corps held the ground from the river (just below the mouth of the creek) to the turnpike; the Nineteenth was to the right and rear of the Eighth; and the Sixth was to the right and rear of the Nineteenth.

As Early could no longer subsist on anything found in the valley, he was driven to the alternative of withdrawing from it entirely or making one more bold attack in the hope of defeating Sheridan and capturing supplies. Being an energetic commander and a fearless fighter, he chose the latter. As his observers on the mountain had seen the departure of the Sixth Corps, a grand opportunity appeared to be presented. He had asked Lee for two additional divisions, promising that with them he would defeat the enemy and regain all the lost ground; and these, numbering 5000 men, were sent to him. Though the Confederates had just witnessed the departure of the Sixth Corps, they pro-


bably did not know of its return, as it arrived in the evening of the 18th.

The left of the National line appeared to be secure, because the river there flows close to the foot of the mountain; while the right was not similarly protected and there the cavalry was massed. For the first two years of the war the Confederates were superior in this arm of the service; but their mounted forces had now been largely worn down; on the National side able leaders had come to the front and the cavalymen had become veterans; and the balance was decidedly turned. Early appreciated this, and was unwilling to make an attempt against that flank. General John B. Gordon, who had come with the reënforcements, was full of daring resources, and it was probably he who devised the attack on the left. The arrangements were made and carried out in the night of the 18th and early morning of the 19th. Major George Haven Putnam, who was serving in the Nineteenth Corps, writes in his account of this battle:

I recall the interest with which, from our bivouac in the fields, we looked up through the evening hours at the flashes of the signal lights on Massanutten, and wondered what the Rebs were up to. These were the signals that were guiding Kershaw's columns into their positions.


The plan was to cross the river near Fisher's Hill, march down stream by the narrow, rugged path between the water and the mountain, recross below the mouth of Cedar Creek and attack the Eighth Corps from the rear of their picket line. Secrecy and silence being necessary, all swords and canteens were left behind. After the first crossing, Gordon, who led the

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THE BATTLEFIELD OF CEDAR CREEK.

MAP OF CALIFORNIA



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attack, gave his men a few hours' rest and then resumed the march. At five o'clock in the foggy morning of the 19th they succeeded in silencing most of the sentinels and then burst into the camp where the unsuspecting Eighth was asleep. Many men were shot or stabbed as they tried to rise, get their eyes open, and comprehend the situation. The whole corps was broken up and lost its formation, so that it fought no more as an organization that day. But many of its men escaped and joined the colours of the other corps.

If this were all, it would not have been much of a triumph; for the hungry Confederates fell to plundering the camps and were largely demoralized. But Early had the rest of his troops well in hand and ready for the opportunity that had been created. They promptly made a frontal attack and for a time pushed everything before them, while Kershaw, pushing across the pike, curled up the left of the line of the Nineteenth Corps. But Wright was equal to the occasion. He faced about the two remaining corps, and executed a great right wheel, to the east. What had been the left of the Nineteenth Corps, at the turnpike, was the pivot, and what was now the left of the Sixth Corps traversed the circumference of the arc. This threw his army across the pike, several miles in the rear of the morning position, just south of Middletown. Major Putnam gives a lively description of the operations at the pivot as seen by a participant:

We peered down the slope southward toward the bridge across the creek, but could trace neither by sight nor by sound any approach from the only direction in which the enemy could properly be expected. In the course of a few minutes round shot came bowling into our line of intrench-

ment directly from the eastern slope on the other side of the pike. My own battalion was as promptly as possible gotten out of the trenches and faced to the left on the crest of the slope. For a moment, a moment extending possibly to half an hour, the 176th New York [his own regiment] was the pivot of the wheeling operation. The force of Early's attack was directed against this pivot; and the Rebel divisions led by Gordon and Kershaw outnumbered very considerably the troops that were at first opposed to them. The men of the Nineteenth Corps had gotten under arms before the attack reached their position. They were, however, confused and perplexed. Our own brigade was for a time under fire from three directions. Toward seven o'clock, however, the fog became thinner, and as it lifted the strength of the attack became evident. The troops were coming across the pike in masses with a view of occupying it and cutting off the retreat of our division. . . . When the Rebel infantry line got its musketry to bear, the position of the battery in front of the 176th became untenable. The horses were killed or disabled, and the captain used his men to drag back the guns. One gun was left on the slope, and Colonel Macauley called for volunteers to drag it in. I was probably the officer nearest in line to it, and with a group of men I dashed across the space to get the gun. As we moved forward, the slope between us and the road was suddenly covered by the lines of men in butternut; and the slope itself for a few moments was peppered most uncomfortably with shots from either side. I ordered the men to lie down, and I remember having a feeling as I lay face downward on the turf that I must be about the size of an elephant. I felt a keen desire to be as thin as the knave of spades. . . . Within a very few minutes after the cessation of the fire, the second line of the enemy ran over us. We were promptly disarmed and were relieved not only of weapons but of certain portions of our equipment which the Rebels thought we could spare and which doubtless they needed.

These men were a part of the 1400 that Early secured and carried off to Richmond.

Though the commands had been badly broken, and the losses were heavy, General Wright got his troops into a satisfactory line extending across the pike and repelled Kershaw's last attack, while the Confederate cavalry had failed to effect anything. Sheridan, on his return from Washington, had slept at Winchester. The sound of the firing reached him there, and he rode to the front as fast as his horse could carry him. The masses of defeated and discouraged men whom he met as they were going to the rear he passionately exhorted to turn about, promising to attack the enemy and defeat them. A half day remained for the fighting; and Sheridan's presence and voice were a powerful inspiration to the whole army. Many of the stragglers rejoined the colours, and the army assumed the offensive, in turn driving the enemy before them.

Near Fisher's Hill there was a stream known as Tumbling Creek, the banks of which were so steep that nothing on wheels could pass it except by the turnpike bridge. A detachment of National cavalry, finding itself isolated, took a position south of the bridge and disputed the passage. This caused a piling up of guns, wagons, and troops on the bridge till it broke down, and consequently Sheridan's men were enabled to recover the twenty-four guns they had lost and capture as many of Early's, with caissons, wagons, and prisoners.

Sheridan's loss in this battle is reckoned at 5764, including several valuable officers. Early's loss is put at about 3300.

The Destruction of the "Albemarle"

October 27, 1864

AT the beginning of the year 1864 three places in North Carolina were held by National forces—Plymouth on Albemarle Sound, Washington on Pamlico River, and New Berne on Neuse River. When General Grant took command in the East he ordered the evacuation of Plymouth and Washington, which he did not consider essential to the campaign, but that New Berne be held because it was a port for blockade-runners. The Confederate Government had been planning the capture of these places, and at Plymouth Grant's orders were anticipated by General Robert F. Hoke, who with 5000 men surrounded the place, which was held by General Henry W. Wessels with 1600. Hoke's men made five determined assaults, and each time were driven back with heavy loss; but when the ironclad ram *Albemarle* came to their assistance, Wessels was obliged to surrender, April 19th.

The *Albemarle* did not differ essentially from the other ironclads built by the Confederates. She was built at Edward's Ferry, thirty miles below Weldon, on the Roanoke. The hull was of pine timbers, eight by ten inches, dovetailed together and sheathed in two-inch planks. This was 122 feet long, 45 feet beam, with an overhang. She drew eight feet of water. On

The Destruction of the "Albemarle" 301

this hull was erected the usual "shield" with sloping sides, sixty feet long, covered with two layers of two-inch iron. She had a prow or ram of solid oak, brought to an edge and covered with iron. She carried six heavy guns. In the battle at Plymouth she not only bombarded the fortifications but rammed and sank the *Southfield* and injured and drove off the *Miami*—two wooden vessels that had gallantly attacked her but with their heaviest shot could make no impression against her iron sides.

A fortnight later (May 5th) she came down the river, and seven wooden vessels attacked her. They rammed her, and fired heavy rifled guns at close quarters; but with no appreciable effect, while a shot from the ram passed through the boiler of the *Sassacus*, fearfully scalding some of the crew, and the fleet lost in all twenty-nine men. Their fight, however, was to some purpose; for the ram was on its way to assist in an attack on New Berne, but it now returned up the river, and that attack failed.

At this time the Government had no ironclad that could cross Hatteras bar and get into the sounds, though some light-draft monitors were being built. In this emergency, Lieutenant William Barker Cushing, of the navy, who was already the hero of several daring exploits, proposed to attempt the capture or destruction of the *Albemarle*. He submitted two plans—one that called for a boarding-party of one hundred men, to capture the ram, and one that involved her destruction by a torpedo. He favoured the latter, which was approved, and the Department authorized him to carry it out.

At New York he found two launches just being finished, which suited his purpose. They were open

boats with screw propeller and a small engine, drawing about forty inches. A 12-pound howitzer was mounted in the bow, and a boom fourteen feet long was swung to the bluff of the bow by a goose-neck hinge. A torpedo was fastened to an iron slide at the end of the boom. There was tackle to raise or lower the boom to any extent, and the torpedo was to be fired by the pulling of a lanyard. The difficulties that were encountered in getting to the scene of the proposed exploit are related briefly by Lieutenant Cushing:

Everything being completed, we started to the southward, taking the boats through the canals to Chesapeake Bay. My best boat having been lost in going down to Norfolk, I proceeded with the other through the Chesapeake and Albemarle Canal. Halfway through, the canal was filled up; but finding a small creek that flowed into it below the obstruction, I endeavoured to feel my way through. Encountering a small mill-dam, we waited for high water, and ran the launch over it. Below she grounded; but I got a flat-boat, and, taking out gun and coal, succeeded in two days in getting her through. Passing with but seven men through the canal where for thirty miles there was no guard or Union inhabitant, I reached the Sound and ran before a gale of wind to Roanoke Island.

In the night he steamed up the Sound to the fleet, which was anchored off the mouth of Roanoke River. Here he told his seven men what was his plan, and gave them their choice, to continue with him or remain with the fleet. They all volunteered for the enterprise, and he took on enough more to increase his company to twenty. The ram was moored at the town of Plymouth, eight miles above the mouth of the river, which is there about 150 yards wide and very deep. A mile

The Destruction of the "Albemarle" 303

below the ram lay the wreck of the *Southfield* with her hurricane deck above water, and a guard was stationed on it. The strong Confederate garrison occupied both banks of the river.

In the night of October 27th he put a few of his men into a small cutter and taking this in tow he steamed up toward the ram. In case they were hailed by the guard on the *Southfield* the men in the cutter were to board the wreck, overcome the guard, and prevent them from firing a rocket to give the alarm. However, they passed it without being noticed; but were hailed from the ram. The moment for quick and decisive action had come, and Cushing ordered full steam on and steered straight for the monster. Guns opened on him and a great fire was lighted on the bank. This showed him that the ram was protected by a boom of logs, maintained at some distance from her sides. After examining this, he drew off a hundred yards or more, and then, under full steam, drove at right angles to the boom. The logs were slimy, as he had hoped, and the boat slid over them and came up under the enemy's quarter. All this had been done under fire, both from the ram and from the shore; the back of Cushing's coat was torn out by buckshot, and the sole of his shoe was torn off. He stood in the bow with a line in each hand, and ordered the boom lowered until the progress of the launch carried the torpedo under the overhang of the ram. One line detached the torpedo and let it rise under the hull, and then a pull at the other caused it to explode. At the same time a mass of grapeshot was fired into the small boat, and a great weight of water, thrown up by the explosion, came down upon it.

Refusing to surrender, Cushing told his men to save

themselves. He threw off his sword, revolver, coat, and shoes, and swam for the opposite shore; but turned down-stream to avoid the boats that came out to pick up and capture the men. With great difficulty he landed below the town, and took refuge in a swamp. Beyond this he came upon a negro, whose confidence he gained with a few texts of Scripture and then with twenty dollars induced him to go into the city and find out for him how it had fared with the ram. The man returned with the welcome news that it was ruined and had sunk. After passing through another swamp Cushing succeeded in stealing a small boat, paddled down-stream, and at the end of ten hours reached the picket vessel of the fleet and was taken on board. One member of his crew also escaped; all the others were either killed, drowned, or captured.

The ram being disposed of, the fleet, under Commander William H. Macomb, was enabled to recapture Plymouth.

Sherman's March to the Sea

November 15—December 23, 1864

WHEN General Sherman had fought his way from Chattanooga to Atlanta, and was in full possession of the Gate City, the next question necessarily was, "What will he do with it?" To remain there "protecting the interests of a hostile population" as he said, and sending out detachments to guard the long railroad over which he drew his supplies, which could be broken at almost any time by roving bands of Confederates, was simply to paralyze his splendid army, which might be used to advantage elsewhere.

He first sent away all the inhabitants of the city, giving them their choice to go north or south, and furnishing transportation for a certain distance. There were signs in Georgia of considerable disaffection toward the Confederacy, and Governor Joseph E. Brown had recalled the militia of that State from Hood's army. Sherman sent word to the Governor that if all the Georgia troops were withdrawn from the Confederate service he would pass across the State as harmlessly as possible and would pay for everything that he took; but, if not, he would devastate the State from end to end. In North Carolina, also, there was weariness of the war and a proposal to secede from the

Confederacy; but it was negated at a popular election by a vote of 54,000 against 20,000.

Georgia did not withdraw from the Confederacy, and Hood attacked Sherman's communications. Sherman went out after him, and from Kenesaw Mountain looked down upon Hood's men tearing up rails and burning ties. As he expected Allatoona to be attacked he signalled, over the heads of the enemy, to General John M. Corse, who was at Rome, to reënforce the little garrison there. The distance was about thirty miles by rail; Corse obeyed the order without the loss of a minute, and at midnight he was at Allatoona, with all the men he could get transportation for. In the morning the garrison, now numbering 2000, was summoned to surrender, "to avoid a needless effusion of blood." Corse's answer was, "We are prepared for the needless effusion of blood whenever it is agreeable to you." The attack followed immediately. The garrison were driven into their redoubts, where they made a firm stand, and after five hours of heavy fighting the Confederates gave up the contest and withdrew, leaving on the field their dead and many of their wounded. Corse had lost 707 men, including Colonel Redfield of the 39th Iowa regiment, who was killed. He himself had lost one ear and a cheekbone shot away. The Confederate loss is unknown; but the victors buried 231 and took 411 prisoners. That gallant defence of Allatoona is one of the memorable episodes of the war.

Sherman found it useless to pursue Hood through north-western Georgia, as he could not bring him to battle. In September he began to think of a march to the sea. His first definite proposal of it was in a telegram to General Thomas, October 9th, in which he said, "I want to destroy all the road below Chatta-

nooga, including Atlanta, and to make for the sea-coast." Thomas had been sent to Nashville with two divisions. When the plan of the march was presented to the President and General Grant, there was some hesitation, but finally Grant consented to it with the proviso that enough troops should be left with Thomas to enable him to take care of Hood. Sherman sent him the Fourth and Twenty-third Corps, commanded by Generals David S. Stanley and John M. Schofield—two most efficient officers. Thomas received also two divisions from Missouri, several of the garrisons of points on the railroad, and some recruits from the North. When all these were organized into an army under Thomas they constituted a force that won a great victory in December.


Sherman now sent back to the North all his sick and disabled men and all baggage that could be spared. Commissioners came and took the votes of the soldiers for the Presidential election, and paymasters came and paid off all the troops. Then wagons were loaded and made ready for the march; every organization in the army had its specific orders what to do in the way of preparation. When the last train had steamed away to the North, the remaining garrisons were called in, the track was torn up, the bridges were burned, and the wires were cut. This last was Sherman's precaution to prevent any countermand or other embarrassing order reaching him from Washington.

He now destroyed the depot, the locomotive-house, and the machine-shops in which ammunition was manufactured for the Confederate armies. All night the shells were exploding in the ruins, and the fire communicated with a block of stores and was not stopped till it had burned out the heart of the city.

The army that was to make the march consisted entirely of veteran soldiers, all sound, healthy men. There were 55,329 in the infantry, 5063 in the cavalry, and 1812 in the artillery with sixty-five guns. To each gun, with caisson and forge, there were four teams, to each of the 600 ambulances two horses, and to each of the 2500 wagons six mules. Every soldier carried forty cartridges and provisions for five days, and the wagons were loaded with supplies including 1,200,000 rations and oats and corn. Probably a more completely appointed and organized army never existed.

On the 15th of November this army began its march to the sea, three hundred miles distant. The General gave specific instructions for the conduct of the march. The Fifteenth and Seventeenth Corps formed the right wing or column, commanded by General Oliver O. Howard; the Fourteenth and Twentieth Corps the left column, commanded by General Henry W. Slocum. The cavalry was commanded by General Judson Kilpatrick.

The habitual order of march will be, wherever practicable, by four roads as nearly parallel as possible. The separate columns will start habitually at seven A.M. and make about fifteen miles a day. Behind each regiment should follow one wagon and one ambulance. The army will forage liberally on the country; to this end each brigade commander will organize a good and sufficient foraging-party, who will aim at all times to keep in the wagons at least ten days' provisions. Soldiers must not enter dwellings or commit any trespass; but during a halt or camp they may be permitted to gather turnips, potatoes, and other vegetables and to drive in stock in sight of their camp. To corps commanders alone is entrusted the power to destroy mills,



houses, cotton-gins, etc. Where the army is unmolested no destruction of such property should be permitted; but should guerillas or bushwhackers molest our march, or should the inhabitants burn bridges, obstruct roads, or otherwise manifest local hostility, then army commanders should order and enforce a devastation more or less relentless, according to the measure of such hostility. As for horses, mules, wagons, etc., the cavalry and artillery may appropriate freely; discriminating, however, between the rich, who are usually hostile, and the poor and industrious, usually neutral or friendly. In all foraging the parties engaged will endeavour to leave with each family a reasonable portion for their maintenance.

The army moved steadily, day after day, cutting through the State a swath from forty to sixty miles wide. The foraging parties went out for miles on each side of the route, in advance of the organizations to which they belonged, brought the provisions to the line of march, and when their own wagons came along loaded them up without halting them. Flankers passed along in thin lines through the woods on each side to prevent any surprise. Wheeler's cavalry hung on the flanks of the army and was able to cut off a few foragers now and then, but Kilpatrick's encountered it occasionally, and usually defeated it. No doubt the foragers exceeded their instructions in some instances, and they were popularly called "Sherman's bummers."

A force of Georgia militia was organized, which under the command of General Gustavus W. Smith attempted to impede Sherman's march. At Griswoldville it gave battle to Charles R. Woods's division, of Howard's column, and was badly defeated. Woods lost 84 men, killed, wounded, or missing; the Confed-

erates lost more than 600. General Hardee, who had 15,000 troops at Savannah, sent out detachments to meet Sherman and delay him, but with no success.

Nearly all of the Georgia Central Railroad was destroyed. The soldiers had learned that a rail merely bent could be straightened and used again. Therefore a tool was invented by which, when a rail had been made red hot on a pile of burning ties, it could be twisted like an auger and rendered for ever useless. All the depot buildings were burned as soon as the column reached them. And as bloodhounds had been used to track escaped prisoners, the soldiers killed all those beasts that they could find.

The wealthier inhabitants fled before the approach of the troops; but the negroes, in great numbers, flocked after the army, believing that the promised day of jubilee had come. Some of them appeared to understand the movement, while others had only vague notions about it. One coloured woman, with a child in her arms, was walking beside the horses when an officer asked her, "Where are you going, aunty?" "I'se gwine whar you's gwine, massa," was her answer.

Many interesting and significant incidents of the march are told by those who participated in it. Major George Ward Nichols tells of seeing an aged coloured couple in a hut near Milledgeville. The old woman pointed her long finger at the old man, who was in the corner, and hissed out: "What fer you sit dar? You s'pose I wait sixty years for nutten? Don't yer see de door open? I'se follow my child—I not stay—I walks till I drops in my tracks." General Sherman wrote:

Many and many a person in Georgia asked me why I did not go to South Carolina, and when I answered that we were

en route for that State the invariable reply was, "Well, if you will make those people feel the utmost severities of war we will pardon you for your desolation of Georgia."

Captain Daniel Okey, of the 2d Massachusetts regiment, writes:

Cock-fighting became one of the pastimes of the flying column. Many fine birds were brought in by our foragers. Those found deficient in courage and skill quickly went to the stew-pan in company with the modest barnyard fowl, but those of redoubtable valour won an honoured place and name, and were to be seen riding proudly on the front seat of an artillery caisson, or carried tenderly under the arm of an infantry soldier.

In some places there were no practicable roads, and they were obliged to construct rude corduroy roads, to get their guns and wagons across miry places; and on some occasions thousands of the men were thus employed; but, as usual, many hands made light work. On the whole, the march was not really difficult, because it lay parallel with the streams.

When the right wing neared Savannah its progress was opposed by the force under General Hardee, so disposed as to prevent any crossing of the river. But a brigade was sent over in boats a half mile above, and this, marching down, drove away the Confederates. A bridge was then laid, and the troops and trains went over. At the same time an officer went down the river in a boat, eluding the guards, and out to sea, where he was picked up by a vessel of the fleet and thus was enabled to deliver General Sherman's message to the admiral of the fleet that was there waiting for him. There was still one serious obstruction, Fort McAllister,

at the mouth of the Ogeechee. Hazen's division, sent against this, took it by assault, losing 24 men killed and 110 wounded.

Sherman entered the city December 23d, and sent this dispatch to President Lincoln: "I beg to present to you, as a Christmas gift, the city of Savannah, with 150 heavy guns and plenty of ammunition, and also about 25,000 bales of cotton."

The great march to the sea had cost that army 764 men—killed, wounded, or missing—a fraction more than one per cent.

The Battles of Franklin and Nashville

November 30 and December 15-16, 1864

WHEN Hood failed in his attempts to draw Sherman away from Atlanta far enough to release that city, he turned his attention toward Nashville, having orders from Richmond to destroy the army that Thomas was organizing there. He was hindered by heavy rains and other circumstances, and when, late in November, he had arrived at Duck River, which is about forty miles south of the city, he found there a force under General John M. Schofield. This he flanked easily by crossing the river, and then Schofield fell back to Franklin, which is on Harpeth River, eighteen miles south of Nashville. Here he intrenched a curved line south and west of the town, with the flanks resting on bends of the river. He put his trains and artillery across the stream, and placed his twenty-six guns where they could play on any attacking force. He had about 25,000 men, and Hood had somewhat more than 40,000.

The rains were over, and the skies cleared, when, on November 30, 1864, Hood made his attack. Schofield's rear guard, which was Wagner's brigade, instead of falling back at once, to the main body, attempted to withstand the onset of Hood's whole force. It is said in explanation that the attack was so sudden that they

could not do otherwise. However that may be, when they were forced back the enemy were so close upon their heels, and in fact to some extent intermingled, that the men in the works could not fire without striking Wagner's men as well as Hood's. The Confederates, who were all veterans, knew well how to take advantage of this, and shouting, "Let's go into the works with them!" they rushed on in headlong haste and in a wild mass. Near the centre of Schofield's line was a green regiment which never had been under fire and was not accustomed to the rebel yell. This regiment at once turned and fled, leaving a gap in the line, through which the Confederates poured, capturing some hastily abandoned guns. But the reserves rushed forward to meet the intruders, and in a fierce struggle, much of it hand to hand, drove back the enemy and reoccupied the works. Many officers of high rank, on both sides, were in the thick of the fight, encouraging the men.

On Schofield's left the attack was made by Stewart's corps, which time and again charged up to the works, but never crossed them, and was shot through and through by artillery and musketry. Some of the officers say there were thirteen successive attacks. Owing to a peculiarity in the ground, the left of Stewart's line was mingled with the right of Cheatham's, producing a thick mass of men, through which the artillerists fired as rapidly as possible. Colonel Henry Stone, of Thomas's staff, writes:

More than one colour-bearer was shot down on the parapet. It is impossible to exaggerate the fierce energy with which the Confederate soldiers, that short November afternoon, threw themselves against the works, fighting with what seemed the very madness of despair. There was not a breath of wind, and the dense smoke settled down

The Battles of Franklin and Nashville 315

upon the field, so that, after the first assault, it was impossible to see any distance. Through this blinding medium assault after assault was made. Between the gin-house and the Columbia pike the fighting was fiercest and the Confederate losses the greatest. Here fell most of the Confederate generals who madly gave up their lives.

These generals included Adams, Cleburne, Gist, Granbery, and Strahl—all killed, Brown, Cockerell, and Quarles severely wounded, and G. W. Gordon captured. When Adams fell, his horse, also killed, was astride of the breastworks. On the Union side the 44th Missouri regiment lost 163 men, killed, wounded, or missing; and the 72d Illinois lost 151, the entire colour-guard being shot down, and every field officer wounded. Forrest with his cavalry crossed the river east of the position, intent on capturing the wagon-train in the rear; but he was met and defeated by the cavalry of Hatch and Croxton. At dusk Hood retired from the contest. He had lost 6300 men and thirty-three colours. Schofield had lost 2500 men.

Under orders from Thomas, Schofield crossed the river at midnight, and with all his trains fell back to Nashville.

Hood followed up promptly, and established his lines before Nashville, intrenching, and then waited to be attacked. But Thomas was not ready to give battle at once. Some of his troops were still arriving. A. J. Smith came from Missouri with 12,000 veterans. Steedman came from Chattanooga with 5200, including two coloured brigades. A force of 8000 was placed under Rousseau at Murfreesboro, thirty-five miles southeast of Nashville. And returning men, joined with convalescents who had been sent back by Sherman,

made a division of about 5000, under General Cruft. Thomas's entire force numbered about 55,000, including 12,000 cavalry commanded by General James Harrison Wilson. Hood had about 38,000 men, and he was hoping for reinforcements from Texas (which never came), and to raise recruits from the population of western Tennessee (which he was not able to do).

Though Thomas had men enough, they had been brought together hastily and were far from forming a homogeneous army. And there was a lamentable lack of equipment—horses, mules, wagons, and pontoons were sorely needed; and these were gathered from every available source in several counties. General Wilson writes that farmers, circuses, street-car companies, and even Governor Andrew Johnson, were called upon to give up their horses, which they did with apparent cheerfulness. Thomas planned an aggressive campaign, which, if successful, should make an end of Hood; and he was resolved not to begin it till he could command the means of success. He took one week to set things in order, and would have moved then, but on December 9th a heavy storm set in—freezing rain, which made any movement impossible. Not till the 14th was the ice melted and the ground cleared sufficiently for his purpose.

Meanwhile he was distracted by impatient and peremptory orders to attack Hood, from General Grant and from the War Department, based on ignorance of the conditions in Tennessee and a fear that Hood would get away from Thomas with his whole army and hinder or defeat Sherman's operations. It was even determined to remove Thomas, and General Logan was on the way with authority to supersede him, when the ice

The Battles of Franklin and Nashville 317

melted away and the battle began. Thomas had said privately to General Wilson:

They treat me as though I were a boy and incapable of planning a campaign or fighting a battle. If they will let me alone I will fight this battle just as soon as it can be done, and will surely win it; but I will not throw the victory away nor sacrifice the brave men of this army by moving till the thaw begins. I will surrender my command without a murmur, if they wish it; but I will not act against my judgment when I know I am right, and in such a grave emergency.

And on the very day that the storm began General Halleck telegraphed to him that Grant expressed much dissatisfaction at his delay in attacking the enemy, to which Thomas answered: "I feel conscious I have done everything in my power, and that the troops could not have been gotten ready before this. If General Grant should order me to be relieved, I will submit without a murmur."

In forming his line on the hills south-east of the city, Hood placed S. D. Lee's troops in the centre, with Cheatham on the right and Stewart on the left, and Forrest's cavalry between Stewart and the river. Thomas, on heights facing him, nearer the city, put Wood's Fourth Corps in the centre, Schofield's Twenty-third Corps on the left, and A. J. Smith's divisions on the right, with Steedman afterward extending Schofield's line, and Wilson's cavalry on the north bank of the river, in the rear of Schofield.

The day after his arrival (December 2d) Hood sent Bate's division to destroy the railroad between Nashville and Murfreesboro. Reënforced by a division of Forrest's cavalry and other troops, he tore up several

miles of track, burned bridges and blockhouses, and moved against Murfreesboro. But Rousseau sent out General Milroy with seven regiments, who vigorously attacked and defeated the Confederates, taking two guns and 200 prisoners. The casualties were about 200 on each side.

In the afternoon of December 14th General Thomas gave to each of his corps commanders a written order in which the plans for the next day were fully set forth, and then he reviewed the whole subject with them and answered all their questions. In the evening he telegraphed to General Halleck: "The ice having melted away today, the enemy will be attacked tomorrow morning." The cavalry, brought back across the river, was transferred to the rear of the right wing, and various changes were made among the division commanders. Colonel Stone says the General then "drew a deep sigh of relief, and for the first time in a week showed again something of his natural buoyancy and cheerfulness." Colonel Stone also mentions an important element in the success that was to follow despite the lack of homogeneity in the army:

[The feeling in the ranks was one of absolute and enthusiastic confidence in their general. Some had served with him since his opening triumph at Mill Springs [January 19, 1862]; some had never seen his face till two weeks before. But there was that in his bearing, as well as in the confidence of his old soldiers, which inspired the newcomers with as absolute a sense of reliance upon him as was felt by the oldest of his veterans.

The plan, as finally determined, was for Steedman, on the extreme left, to advance far enough to threaten seriously Hood's right; then the entire right wing—

The Battles of Franklin and Nashville 319

Smith's corps and the cavalry—pivoting on Wood's position, was to execute a grand left wheel, enveloping and attacking Hood's left; while Wood should threaten the position known as Montgomery Hill, a salient at Hood's centre, and Schofield was in reserve, ready to move where he might be wanted.

December 15th was a sunny winter day; the army was roused at four o'clock, and two hours later it was ready to move against the enemy. The fog that at first obscured the movements had rolled away by nine o'clock. Steedman played his part promptly, and did it so vigorously that it appeared more like an attack than a feint, and with two of his divisions he kept Cheatham's corps busy, while he held the other in reserve. Similarly S. D. Lee's corps was held by Wood so closely that, while two of its brigades were sent to the assistance of the endangered left, the remainder could not stir and did not fire a shot that day.

The cavalry had to cross much swampy and otherwise difficult ground, and hence its movement, though steady, was comparatively slow. Smith's men kept pace, with the skirmishers at work, and by noon they were near enough for an assault on the works. Smith's command was formed with General John McArthur's division on his right, General Kenner Garrard's division on his left, where it connected with Wood's Fourth Corps, and with Colonel Jonathan B. Moore's division in reserve.

They first struck the cavalry division of General James R. Chalmers and Ector's infantry brigade (under Colonel Coleman), both of which were steadily driven back, and Chalmers lost his train and his headquarters baggage. Then they came upon a detached work that mounted four guns, and after it was heavily bom-

barded the brigades of McMillan and Hubbard, with Coon's dismounted cavalry, carried it by storm. The captured guns were promptly turned upon the flying enemy. The retreating Confederates were rallied under General Walthall, whose division had taken advantage of a stone wall along the Hillsboro turnpike. But this left a series of redoubts imperfectly defended. One mounting two guns was easily taken; the next, four guns, was stormed by the cavalry; and the next, two guns, by Colonel Sylvester G. Hill's brigade, he falling at the head of his men.

Smith's corps, still swinging to the left, struck Walthall's flank and broke up Reynolds's brigade; while Schofield, who by Thomas's orders was following closely, pushed Couch's division forward, which, moving eastward across a valley half a mile wide, carried by assault a series of hills parallel to the Granny White turnpike; and Cox's division, swinging out still farther to the right, occupied a line of hills along Richland Creek. It was now nightfall, and here ended the operations on that flank.

There was a salient on Wood's line, and directly opposite to this, half a mile distant, on Montgomery Hill, was the salient of Hood's line. At one o'clock the artillery opened against the works on the hill, and then General Sidney Post's brigade moved to the assault. There was firm resistance, but the movement was not checked; and General Nathan Kimball's division was sent against the angle in Hood's line where Walthall's right joined Loring. The Confederates gave way; and Elliott's division of Wood's corps and Garrard's of Smith's promptly moved out, and several guns and many prisoners were captured. When disaster began to overtake him on the left, Hood ordered troops trans-

The Battles of Franklin and Nashville 321

ferred thither from his right, but to little purpose except that they made safer the withdrawal of the whole line to a new and strong position on a range of hills about two miles to the south, where, on some of the hills, intrenchments had been already prepared. Steedman, on Thomas's left, had kept up his activity all day, capturing an earthwork and harassing the troops that were being withdrawn from his front.

Here ends the story of the first day's battle. Its result was the capture of sixteen guns and 1200 prisoners and the driving back of the Confederates a distance of two miles, with much the greater losses on their side.

In the night Thomas rectified his lines somewhat. Hood made extensive changes in his, contracting it to about half the length that it had the day before, and fortifying as strongly as the time and circumstances permitted. His right was on a rounded hill known as Overton's and his left on a steeper one that was afterward called Shy's from the Confederate Colonel T. M. Shy, who fell there. And from this hill the line turned sharply back, reaching to the Brentwood Hills. The ground between Shy's Hill and Overton's was low; several small streams ran through it, and stone walls in many places afforded cover for the defenders. As the left flank was the weakest point in the Confederate line, Cheatham's whole corps was placed there. The weakness was increased by the mistake of placing the intrenchments too far back from the brow of the hill.

Thomas gave no orders for the day, except the general one that the movement of the preceding day was to be continued, the details being left to the corps commanders.

The forenoon was passed in moving forward to new positions preparatory to the attack. Wilson's cavalry, making a wide detour to the west, passed Hood's left

and secured a position in its rear on the Granny White Pike.

About this hour, three o'clock in the afternoon, some of Wilson's men captured a dispatch from Hood to Chalmers, which read: "For God's sake drive the Yankee cavalry from our left and rear, or all is lost." Colonel Post reconnoitred the position on Overton's Hill and reported to General Wood that he could carry it with his brigade. Troops were brought up to support him and follow him as soon as he should gain the enemy's works. The order was given, and the brigade set forward on a run, Post himself leading. Some of the skirmishers reached the parapet, and the main line got within twenty paces of it; but there they were checked by a terrible fire of artillery and musketry, Colonel Post was seriously wounded, the assault was evidently a failure, and the men retired to their own works.

Thompson's brigade of coloured troops, in Steedman's corps, which there went into action for the first time, was ordered to make a demonstration against the extreme right flank, as an assistance to Post's advance. They became so excited that they quickly developed their movement into an actual assault; but they struck a large fallen tree which broke their line, then they were subjected to an enfilading fire, which was increased when Post had been checked, and they made an orderly retreat, leaving 467 of their men on the field.

On Thomas's right, McArthur asked and received permission to attack the enemy on Shy's Hill. He drew McMillan's brigade out of the trenches, and gave it orders to fix bayonets and go forward without firing or cheering. When the charge was sounded they rushed for the hill, climbed its steep side, captured the

The Battles of Franklin and Nashville 323

works, waved their flags, and broke into a wild cheer. At the same time, Hatch's division of the cavalry, dismounted, had passed through the woods, dragged two guns to the tops of two hills in the rear of the enemy's works, and opened fire on the hill up the front of which McMillan's men were climbing. Then Coon's brigade, of Hatch's division, armed with repeating rifles, poured such volleys into Bate's men as nothing could withstand, and they broke from their works and ran down the hill to their right and rear. An eye-witness of this somewhat complicated and perfectly successful movement tells us that the scene was so picturesque and so exciting that the troops who looked on clapped their hands as if it were a theatrical performance.

When this apparently strong position was thus carried, Thomas's troops all along the line attacked the works in their front, hardly waiting for orders, and everywhere carried them. General Edward Johnson—who in May of this year had been captured, with a large number of his men, in the Spottsylvania salient—was here captured again, with nearly his whole division and his artillery. The same troops that had been repulsed when they attacked Overton's Hill now charged again and captured a thousand prisoners and fourteen guns, the coloured troops sharing in the exploit. Thus the whole Confederate line had crumbled away, and those who escaped capture fled southward, leaving all their artillery.

The cavalry were at once ordered to pursue the broken and retreating enemy. General Wilson writes:

Everyone obeyed orders with alacrity, but darkness and distance were against them. Hatch's column had not

gone more than two miles when its advance under Colonel Spalding encountered Chalmers's cavalry strongly posted across the road behind a fence-rail barricade. They charged it at once, and a spirited hand-to-hand *mêlée* ensued in which many men were killed or wounded on each side. Colonel Spalding had the honour of capturing Brigadier-General Rucker in a personal encounter in which each had seized and wrested the other's sabre from him and used it against its owner. It was a scene of pandemonium, in which every challenge was answered by a sabre-stroke or a pistol-shot, and the flash of the carbine was the only light by which the combatants could recognize each other's position.

Chalmers's men retired slowly, and a running fight continued till about midnight. Such of the Confederate infantry as got away organized a rear-guard and gave their retreat some semblance of order. Wilson tells us that Thomas rode up to him and exclaimed in a memorable tone of exultation: "Didn't I tell you we could lick 'em? Didn't I tell you we could lick 'em if they [the Washington authorities] would only let us alone?" Coming from a man usually so calm and imperturbable as Thomas, this was very significant.

Pursuit of the flying enemy was begun at sunrise of the 17th, and the cavalry got near enough for several engagements, in all which they were victorious. In the evening the Confederates took up a strong position a mile north of West Harpeth River and planted a battery to command the turnpike; but Wilson's cavalry, promptly charging both flanks and the centre at once, swept all before them and captured some of their guns. Then a detachment under General Hammond forded the river, passed around the enemy's left, and after a sharp hand-to-hand fight captured the remaining guns

The Battles of Franklin and Nashville 325

and disorganized and scattered the troops. The pursuit was resumed early the next day; but heavy rain and the condition of the ground impeded it, and when Rutherford Creek was reached it was found to be at full banks and the bridge destroyed. After a day's delay a floating bridge was constructed and Hatch's command crossed; but a few miles farther Duck River was found to be in flood, and the retreating enemy had again destroyed the bridges behind them. A pontoon bridge was laid by the evening of the 23d, and the pursuit continued relentlessly, with various short encounters. On the 25th Forrest's men made a determined last stand, fighting desperately, and were so far successful as to capture and carry away one gun. When the Tennessee was reached, in Alabama, it was found that the light-draught gunboats had failed to ascend the river and destroy Hood's pontoon bridge; and the advance guard of the cavalry reached the north bank just in time to see the bridge swung over to the south bank and the last of the Confederates disappearing in the distance. Nevertheless, a detachment under Generals Steedman and W. J. Palmer, crossing at Decatur, overtook the remnant of them, destroyed their wagons and their pontoon train, and took several hundred prisoners.

Thus General Hood's army, as an organization, disappeared. About 5000 of his men were with General Johnston in North Carolina in the spring, and the other survivors were sent elsewhere, but effected nothing. General Thomas reported that his entire losses in the campaign did not exceed 10,000; and General Hood put his losses at the same figure; but Thomas declared in his official report that he captured 13,189 prisoners and received more than 2000 deserters.

Hood now asked to be relieved, and his command, what there was of it, was turned over to General Johnston, whom he had superseded in July.

With the fortified line between Kentucky and Tennessee swept away in February, 1862; Beauregard's army defeated at Shiloh in April; New Orleans captured the same month; Vicksburg and Port Hudson taken in July, 1863; Bragg's army before Chattanooga defeated and scattered in November; Mobile Bay closed to blockade-runners in August, 1864; Sherman capturing Atlanta and marching through Georgia later in the year; and this complete and crowning victory of Thomas in December—the whole area of the Confederacy between the Alleghanies and the Mississippi was reclaimed by the National forces. General Grant and the authorities at Washington who had troubled and grieved General Thomas with their impatience and distrust, were prompt to congratulate him on the completeness and importance of his victory.

Through the Carolinas

February-April, 1865

GENERAL SHERMAN knew, from the outset, that Savannah could not be a finality for the campaign. To a question from General Howard he answered that he hoped to get to Goldsboro, North Carolina. This would give him connection by rail with the coast at New Berne and also (after the reduction of Fort Fisher) with Wilmington.

But the march northward through the Carolinas was a much more difficult and hazardous affair than the march from Atlanta to Savannah. Large rivers were to be crossed, some of them now in a state of flood and overflow, and more serious military opposition was to be expected.

The object of the march was twofold. It was evident that the Confederates, having lost the territory beyond the mountains, would concentrate in the Atlantic States all the forces that they could gather, and these must be prevented from attacking Grant in the rear while he still had Lee in a strong position before him. And, if the rebellion was to be completely subdued, it was necessary to bring home the realities of war to the people of the Carolinas, as they had been brought home to the people of Georgia.¹ General

¹ The Confederate Government had persistently followed the policy of concealing disasters from the people, calling drawn battles victories,

Sherman is reported to have said to General Grant, when the march was planned, that every step he could take northward would be "as much a direct attack upon Lee's army as if he were within the sound of its guns."

The characteristic element in the strategy of the campaign in the Carolinas consisted in so threatening two cities as to cause the enemy to dispose his forces for their defence and then passing the columns on between them without attacking either. This course had been pursued in Georgia, and its first use in the northward movement was between Charleston and Augusta. The line of march ran midway of those cities and bore off for Columbia, the capital of the State.

The right wing, which moved by way of Hilton Head to Beaufort, was commanded by General Howard; the left, by General Slocum, moved forty miles up the Savannah River to Sister's Ferry, and there crossed by a pontoon bridge, but not till after a delay of several days caused by the heavy rains which had caused the stream to overflow and spread far out over the lowlands. In fact, nearly the whole march through the State was made in persistent rains that swelled all the streams. General Slocum tells us that:

Each regiment as it entered South Carolina gave three cheers. The men seemed to realize that at last they had set foot on the State which had done more than all others to bring upon the country the horrors of civil war. In the narrow road leading from the ferry on the South Carolina

exaggerating real victories, and promoting a belief that ultimate success depended solely on perseverance. The principal of a school for young ladies in the village of Appomattox told the writer of this that until the very day of the surrender she was made to believe that the Confederate armies were progressing steadily toward a complete triumph

side torpedoes had been planted, so that several of our men were killed or wounded treading upon them.

He adds suggestively: "This was unfortunate for that section of the State."

The great march, for which orders were issued on January 18th, was not fairly under way till February 1st. General Sherman was merciless as to all public structures, but gave strict orders for protection of the homes of the people. Not much was to be gained by foraging in the southern part of the State; but abundant supplies for the army had been brought by sea. The chief work of both wings, as they progressed, was tearing up the railroads, effectually destroying the ties and the rails, and burning the stations. One object of this was to hinder the concentration of Confederate forces in their path.

By February 9th the two wings came together at the village of Branchville, which is about eighty miles north of Savannah and forty-five miles south of Columbia. Its importance lay in the fact that here the railroad from Augusta joined the Charleston and Columbia road. About sixty miles of the roads that met here were destroyed, and then the whole army set out for Columbia, each corps taking a different road. On the way, the right wing destroyed more of the railroad about Orangeburg.

Meanwhile General Johnston had been recalled to the service, to take command of the remnant of Hood's army and such other troops as could be brought together, and impede Sherman's march in such ways as were practicable. As Wheeler's cavalry, which had hung on the flanks through Georgia, was largely used up, Wade Hampton's was sent down from Virginia.

They burned bridges, felled trees across the roads, and attacked isolated detachments whenever there was opportunity. But nothing could stop those sixty thousand veterans, who knew they were delivering the finishing stroke in the long war. The severe contest was with the natural difficulties. General Cox gives a picture of them:

The fitness of the name swamp for even the rivers will be felt when it is remembered that at the crossing of the Salkehatchie at Beaufort's Bridge the stream had fifteen separate channels, each of which had to be bridged before Logan's corps could get over. Whoever will consider the effect of dragging the artillery and hundreds of loaded army wagons over mud roads in such a country, and of the infinite labour required to pave these roads with logs, levelling the surface with smaller poles in the hollows between, adding to the structure as the mass sinks in the ooze, and continuing this till the miles of train have pulled through, will get a constantly growing idea of the work and a steadily increasing wonder that it was done at all.

General Slocum writes that in the march through South Carolina more than half of the way had to be corduroyed before the trains could be moved. And General Johnston declared that, when he heard of it, he "made up his mind that there had been no such army since the days of Julius Cæsar." The men had been supplied with axes for the work, and the region afforded an abundance of timber.

The heads of the columns arrived in the vicinity of Columbia on the 16th, and that night the Fourteenth Corps built a bridge over the Saluda. The Confederate cavalry, retiring from Columbia, had put tar and resin on the bridges and set fire to them. They also burned the railroad stations at either end of the city

and set fire to long, narrow piles of baled cotton that were in the middle of some of the streets. Before entering the city, General Sherman repeated his orders that no damage should be done to libraries, hospitals, or private houses. He writes in his *Memoirs*:

The night of the 16th I camped near an old prison bivouac opposite Columbia, known to our prisoners of war as "Camp Sorghum," where remained the mud hovels and holes in the ground which our prisoners had made to shelter themselves from the winter's cold and the summer's heat. . . . The next morning I rode to the head of General Howard's column and found that during the night he had ferried Colonel G. A. Stone's brigade across by rafts made of the pontoons, and that brigade was then deployed on the opposite bank to cover the construction of a pontoon bridge nearly finished. I sat with General Howard on a log, watching the men lay this bridge; and about 10 A.M. a messenger came from Colonel Stone on the other side, saying that the Mayor of Columbia had come out of the city to surrender the place. . . . Entering the city, we found seemingly all its population, white and black, in the streets. A high and boisterous wind was prevailing from the north, and flakes of cotton were flying about in the air and lodging in the limbs of trees, reminding us of a northern snowstorm. Near the market square we found Stone's brigade with arms stacked, and a large detail of his men, along with some citizens, engaged with an old fire-engine, trying to put out the fire in a long pile of burning cotton bales, which I was told had been fired by the rebel cavalry on withdrawing from the city that morning. In the market square had collected a large crowd of whites and blacks, among whom was the Mayor, Dr. Goodwin, quite a respectable old gentleman, who was extremely anxious to protect the interests of the citizens. I told him not to be uneasy; that we did not intend to stay long, and had no purpose to injure the private

citizens or private property. About this time I noticed several men trying to get through the crowd to speak with me, and called to some black people to make room for them. They explained that they were officers of our army who had been prisoners, had escaped from the rebel prison and guard, and were of course overjoyed to find themselves safe with us. One of them handed me a paper, asking me to read it at my leisure. I put it in my breast pocket and rode on.

This proved to be the now well-known poem, "Sherman's March to the Sea," by Samuel H. M. Byers, Adjutant of the 5th Iowa Infantry, "arranged and sung by the prisoners in Columbia prison."

The Fifteenth Corps passed through the city that day, but the Seventeenth crossed directly over to the Winnsboro road. In the evening the fire from the burning cotton spread to some houses, and soon two whole divisions were at work trying to get it under control. General Sherman was notified, and about eleven o'clock he left his headquarters and went downtown. He says:

I could see the flames rising high in the air, and could hear the roaring of the fire. The whole air was full of sparks and of flying masses of cotton, shingles, etc., some of which were carried four or five blocks and started new fires. The men seemed generally under good control, and certainly laboured hard to girdle the fire; but so long as the high wind prevailed it was simply beyond human possibility.

By four o'clock in the morning the wind had moderated, and gradually the fire was got under control, but not till it had burned out the heart of the city.²

² This fire gave rise to an acrimonious controversy as to the responsibility for it. General Sherman appears to settle the question when

General Sherman gave the Mayor five hundred beef cattle and other provisions to feed the homeless people, and also gave him a hundred muskets with which to arm a guard and maintain order after the troops should leave. The 18th and 19th were spent in destroying the railroad toward the Wateree, the State arsenal, several foundries, and the factory in which Confederate money was printed. The soldiers carried off a great quantity of this, and amused themselves gambling with it. The mass of ammunition in the arsenal was hauled to the river in wagons and thrown into deep water. By some carelessness a percussion shell was exploded, the flames reached others, and there was an explosion that killed sixteen men and destroyed several wagons and their mule teams.

The march was resumed on February 20th, and both wings reached Winnsboro (thirty-five miles) the next day. Thence they would bear away to the north-east, crossing the Catawba, in the direction of Cheraw, and Fayetteville, North Carolina; while Kilpatrick's cavalry was sent directly north toward Lancaster, to deceive the enemy, a part of whose forces were marching parallel to Sherman's course. General Hardee had evacuated Charleston the day that Columbia was captured, and a brigade of Foster's troops marched in as he marched out. But the heavy rains suddenly came on again, swelled the river, and carried away a pontoon bridge, leaving the Fourteenth Corps on the western bank. This delayed the march of the left

he writes: "This whole subject has been thoroughly and judicially investigated, in some cotton cases, by the mixed commission on American and British claims, which failed to award a verdict in favour of the English claimants, and thereby settled the fact that the destruction of property in Columbia, during that night, did not result from the acts of the Government of the United States—that is to say, from my army."

wing till the Fourteenth Corps got across, on the 27th. Two days later they were delayed again by the necessity for corduroying the road. But on March 2d they reached Chesterfield, while the right wing had reached Cheraw, twenty miles farther on the route. In Cheraw were discovered enough fine old wines—sent there for safety by Charleston families—to load eight wagons; and they were distributed to the army. Here also had been sent many other articles, including a large quantity of rugs and blankets. Sherman's men found, besides, twenty-four guns, 2000 muskets, and 3600 barrels of gunpowder. Not warned sufficiently by the accident at Columbia, some soldier was careless enough to explode a large part of the powder, which shook the town and killed or injured several men.

Kilpatrick with his cavalry, protecting the left flank, had an engagement with Hampton's cavalry, lost two hundred men captured, and narrowly escaped capture himself. And when Sherman, on the 11th, reached Fayetteville, at the head of navigation on Cape Fear River, Hampton had just passed over the river and destroyed the bridge. The next day a delightful commotion arose when a steamer arrived from Wilmington (ninety miles) with the news that General Terry had captured that city, after the reduction of Fort Fisher, and bringing a large mail.

General Schofield, with the Twenty-third Corps, had been brought from the West after participating in Thomas's victory, had landed at New Berne, and after an engagement near Kinston had reached Goldsboro.

The steamer was to return in the evening, and General Sherman sent long letters to Secretary Stanton and Generals Grant and Terry. Besides reciting what his

army had done in the Carolinas, he told Stanton that he should utterly destroy the great Fayetteville arsenal; told Grant that he thought Johnston would concentrate his scattered forces at Raleigh and he should go straight at him there as soon as he could reclothe his men and load his wagons; told Terry what supplies he specially needed, and that he should send down to him more than 20,000 refugees who had persisted in accompanying his army.

The arsenal was destroyed, two pontoon bridges were laid, and on the 13th and 14th the army crossed the river and pushed on for Goldsboro, on the Neuse, fifty-five miles to the north-east.

The left wing (Slocum's), instead of striking directly across country for Goldsboro, moved more nearly north, because for twenty-five miles the road ran practically parallel with and near the Cape Fear River where it makes a great bend. The stream therefore was a protection to the left flank. But at the same time Hardee's forces, facing and opposing the march, were protected by that stream on their right and by a smaller one, called North River, on their left; so that, at each encounter, Slocum's men had to attack in front. The plan was to drive Hardee beyond Averasboro (twenty-five miles), then turn to the right, passing through Bentonville (twenty miles), and so to Goldsboro (about twenty more).

Near Averasboro Hardee took a strong position (March 16th), which was attacked by the divisions of Ward and Jackson, with Kilpatrick on the right, while a brigade made a wide detour and came in on Hardee's right flank. This movement was completely successful, and Slocum's men captured three guns and 217 men and buried 108 Confederate dead. Their own loss

was 12 officers and 65 men killed and 477 men wounded. Sixty-eight wounded Confederate soldiers, left on the field when Hardee retreated to Smithfield, were cared for by Sherman's surgeons and then an officer and four men of the prisoners were paroled and left with them.

The column then turned eastward, headed for Goldsboro, about sixty miles, the Fourteenth Corps leading. But Johnston, with nearly or quite his whole army, had taken up a position somewhat in the form of the letter V. The flanks rested on Mill Creek, with the village of Bentonville between them, and the centre or angle was on the road from Averasboro to Goldsboro. Slocum encountered the western wing of the enemy, and Sherman ordered him to fight defensively till reinforcements could be brought up from Howard's column. The Fifteenth Corps (Logan's) and the Seventeenth (Blair's) were turned toward Bentonville. Other intrenchments were encountered, and the 20th was spent in deploying and connecting the lines. Sherman was in no hurry to bring on a battle, as he wished to send back for supplies and to gain time for Schofield and Terry to reach him. This because he did not know the size of Johnston's army, and in fact overestimated it.

About noon of the 21st, however, General Mower, commanding the Twentieth Corps—"ever rash," says Sherman—broke through the Confederate line on his left flank and was pushing for Bentonville and the bridge over the creek, when Sherman called him back, and, to protect him, ordered a strong skirmish fire along the whole line. General Sherman acknowledges that this was a mistake, for if Mower's lead had been followed promptly it must have resulted in victory.

That night Johnston retreated to Smithfield, on the road to Raleigh, and Sherman continued his march to Goldsboro.

The hardest fighting in this battle was on the 19th, when Slocum was attacked, but held his ground with the Fourteenth and Twentieth Corps. He lost 9 officers and 145 men killed, 816 wounded, and 226 missing. He reported that he buried 167 of the enemy's dead and took 338 prisoners. The right wing (Howard's) lost 2 officers and 35 men killed, 289 wounded, and 70 missing; buried 100 of the enemy's dead and took 1287 prisoners. This made a total loss of 1581. Johnston reported his total loss as 2348. But these figures are disputed, as they include only 658 missing, while Sherman captured 1625.

On the 23d and 24th of March Sherman's whole army, including the troops of Schofield and Terry, was assembled at Goldsboro, the railroad from New Berne was repaired, a locomotive arrived on the 25th, and the work of replenishing the supplies was begun.

Thus with fine skill, immense labour, some hard fighting, and limitless endurance was accomplished the greatest march ever made in a civilized country. To the Army of Northern Virginia it was a heavier blow in the rear than any that thus far the Army of the Potomac had been able to strike in front. Perhaps, in its entirety, that march, from Atlanta to Goldsboro, was the most decisive victory of the war. Not only did it take the food out of the mouths of Confederate armies, but to the inhabitants of three great States it gave an ocular demonstration—as the long lines of steel-bearing blue passed by their doors and through their villages—of the power with which they were hopelessly contending.

The Final Campaign in Virginia

June, 1864–April, 1865

WHEN Grant crossed the Rapidan, General Butler, commanding at Fort Monroe a force that was called the Army of the James, embarked his troops on transports, made a feint of going up York River, and in the night turned back and steamed up the James. The next day (May 6, 1864) a landing was made at City Point, where the Appomattox flows into the James, and intrenchments were thrown up. Butler was under orders to secure a position as far up the James as possible, and he advanced to Drury's Bluff, about fifteen miles, but was attacked by a force under General Beauregard and was driven back to Bermuda Hundred. There the curves that bring the two rivers within three miles of each other offered a favourable place for defence and a line of intrenchments was constructed across the neck of land, the right resting on the James at Dutch Gap, and the left on the Appomattox at Point of Rocks. This was a very strong position; but Beauregard had only to throw up parallel intrenchments across the same ground, to the west, and Butler could not move forward in that direction. Afterward an attempt was made by him to open a way to the upper reaches of the James by digging a canal across the narrow neck of Dutch Gap; but the current refused

to flow through it. Yet the position that had been secured protected City Point when Grant crossed the James, and made it a safe landing-place for supplies throughout the campaign.

Any attempt to invest Richmond directly from the south would be useless, even if a position could be gained there; for the broad river intervenes, and the ground on that side is lower than the city. The railroads coming from the South centre in Petersburg, which is twenty-two miles south of Richmond and twelve miles south-west of City Point. It was not Richmond that Grant desired to capture (except incidentally), but the Army of Northern Virginia; and the strategic philosophy of his campaign was, to hold that army to the defence of the Confederate capital, and there fight it out or wear it out. The attempt to do this north of the city had not succeeded; because the topography of Virginia is admirably adapted for defence, the ground had been fought over and all its positions were well known, and Lee had the advantage of always moving on interior and therefore shorter lines. The campaign "found itself" when Grant crossed the James and proceeded to invest Petersburg, thus severing the lines over which the capital and its protecting army drew their supplies.

Grant had reënforced Butler with troops commanded by General William F. Smith and ordered an advance on Petersburg while he was crossing the James. Smith expected to get close to the enemy's works in the night, and carry them at daybreak; but he came upon fortifications sooner than he anticipated, and had a hard fight, which he won. Grant hurried Hancock's Second Corps across the river, to follow Smith; but it was delayed waiting for rations, and then went on without them.

It appears that Hancock did not understand what he was expected to do—a strange thing for Hancock!—until Smith urged him to hurry forward. They found and carried a weak part of the lines, and in the morning of the 16th an additional part. Then General Hancock, troubled by the serious wound that he had received at Gettysburg, had to be relieved, for ten days, and General David B. Birney succeeded temporarily to the command of the corps. General Meade ordered a fresh assault, and with hard fighting still another part was carried. The struggle was continued through the 17th, and that night the Confederates fell back to an inner line, and the National line was moved forward. In these preliminary operations before Petersburg the National loss was nearly ten thousand. There is no official statement of the Confederate loss, which was probably about the same.

When Lee learned where Grant was going he moved eastward of Richmond, crossed the James at Drury's Bluff, and put his army into trenches east and south of Petersburg. These were elaborate and very strong. Grant now moved by the left to sever the railroads. The first that he reached, the Norfolk road, was easily cut, and then the Army of the Potomac, after its long season of almost continuous marching and fighting, had a comparative rest for a few days.

The nearest approach of the hostile lines was opposite a salient of the Confederate works, where they were not more than a hundred and thirty yards apart. This was in front of the Ninth Corps; and in the rear of its line at this point the ground fell off into a deep hollow, which suggested to Colonel Henry Pleasants the plan of running a mine under the enemy's fortifications. His regiment, the 48th Pennsylvania, was



largely made up of miners, who would be expert at the task. General Burnside approved the scheme, and the work was begun June 25th. General Grant, while not forbidding, did not approve, because he had seen the same thing tried without success at Vicksburg. The affair was kept secret, as far as possible, not only from the enemy but from all who were not engaged in it. The enemy did learn what was going on, but they never were able to locate the tunnel exactly, or in any way interfere with it by countermining. It is said that the inhabitants of Petersburg were troubled by stories, repeated with all the confidence usually attained by baseless rumours, that the whole city was undermined by the Yankees. Beginning at the bottom of the hollow, the tunnel ran nearly half its distance at that level, and then rose gradually to a higher level, that there might not be too thick a covering of earth over the mine. It was not difficult to dig through strata of clay and sand, but all that was dug had to be carried out in cracker-boxes at night, and before morning the pile of fresh earth was covered with bushes, lest the enemy, looking from a tree-top, should see it. Colonel Pleasants complained that he laboured under every possible difficulty; could not get tools that he needed, and for lumber had to tear an old bridge to pieces and send a wagon some distance to a sawmill. No general officer except Burnside appeared to have any faith in the enterprise. However, the work was completed and ready for the powder by July 23d. The tunnel was 510 feet long, and at its end was a cross-gallery seventy feet long. Into this was carried the powder—four tons—which was placed in pockets in the gallery, all connected by time fuses.

The choice of troops to lead the assault when the

mine should be sprung was determined by lot, and it fell upon James H. Ledlie's division, the most unfortunate in all respects that could have happened. July 30th the mine was exploded. Major Charles H. Houghton, of the assaulting force, describes the effect:

The earth around us trembled and heaved so violently that I was lifted to my feet. Then the earth along the enemy's lines opened, and fire and smoke shot upward seventy-five or a hundred feet. The air was filled with earth, cannon, caissons, sand-bags, and living men, and with everything else within the exploded fort. One huge lump of clay, as large as a haystack or a small cottage, was thrown out and left on the ground toward our own works. Our orders were to charge immediately after the explosion; but the effect produced by the falling of earth and the fragments sent heavenward that appeared to be coming right down upon us caused the first line to waver and fall back, and the situation was one to demoralize most troops. [The crater produced by the explosion was about 170 feet long, 60 feet wide, and 30 feet deep.] I gave the command, "Forward," but at the outset a serious difficulty had to be surmounted. Our own works, which were very high at this point, had not been prepared for scaling. Ladders were improvised by the men placing their bayonets between the logs in the works, and holding the other end at their hip or on shoulders, thus forming steps over which men climbed.

The fort that was blown up by the mine was occupied by a South Carolina regiment, and nearly all its men were killed. Major William H. Powell writes:

Little did our men anticipate what they would see: an enormous hole in the ground, filled with dust, great blocks of clay, guns, broken carriages, projecting timbers, and men buried in various ways—some up to their necks, others to

their waists, and some with only their feet and legs protruding from the earth. One of these near me was pulled out, and proved to be a second lieutenant of the battery that had been blown up. The whole scene struck everyone dumb with astonishment as we arrived at the crest. It was impossible for the First Brigade to move forward in line as they had advanced; and, owing to the broken state they were in, every man crowding up to look into the hole, and being pressed by the Second Brigade, which was immediately in rear, it was equally impossible for it to move by the flank, by any command, around the crater. Before the brigade commanders could realize the situation, the two brigades became inextricably mixed, in their desire to look into the hole.

Quoting again from Major Houghton:

We hauled back the pieces of artillery to get a range, over the top of the works, on a Confederate gun on our left that was throwing canister and grape into us. We silenced the gun, and at our first fire forty-five prisoners came in, whom I sent back to our lines. A charge was made upon us; but the fire from our second gun did terrible execution, and with the fire of our men the charge was repulsed.

The New York 14th Heavy Artillery, serving as infantry, had charged upon the works behind the crater and captured them. But prompt support was not forthcoming. The coloured troops, which had been sent in, would not at first pass beyond the crater, and when finally they did advance the Confederates had rallied after their surprise, and they were driven back. In anticipation of the explosion under their advanced line, the Confederates had constructed a strong interior line of defence.

General Henry G. Thomas, who commanded the

344 The Fight for the Republic

second brigade of Ferrero's division of coloured troops, writes:

About 7.30 A.M. we got the order for the coloured division to charge. My brigade followed Sigfried's (the first) at the double quick. Arrived at the crater, a part of the first brigade entered; but the crater was already too full. I swung my column to the right and charged over the enemy's rifle-pits connecting with the crater. A deadly enfilade from eight guns on our right and a cross-fire of musketry met us. The first officer to fall was Fessenden of the 23d regiment, and Ayres and Woodruff dropped within a few feet of him. Liscomb of the 23d then fell, and Heckhiser of the 28th and Flint and Aiken of the 29th. Major Rockwood of the 19th then mounted the crest, and fell back dead with a cheer on his lips. At the instant of leaving the works Lieutenant-Colonel Ross, leading the 31st regiment, was shot down, and Captain Wright was shot as he stooped over him. The men were now largely without leaders, and their organization was destroyed. Lieutenant Pennell, taking a guidon from a wounded orderly, hastened down the line outside the pits. With uplifted sword in his right hand and the flag in his left, he sought to call out the men along the whole line of the parapet. In a moment a musketry fire was focused upon him, whirling him round and round several times before he fell. . . . The men of the 31st were being mowed down like grass. So I ordered them to scatter and run back. Of those who left the works for that charge, Captain Dempsey and I were the only officers that returned unharmed.

A second charge was ordered, and it met the same fate as the first, being opposed by an overwhelming force of Confederates.

Many of the coloured troops were pushed into the crater and mingled with the white troops. If shovels

could have been got to the men trapped there, they might have dug a covered way very quickly and escaped; but not a tool of any kind was at hand; and the enemy was rapidly closing in for slaughter. Nor was it possible to get food or water to the men.

About two o'clock the Confederates advanced in force. As they approached the crater they came within sight of the National artillerists, who opened a destructive fire on them, but could not stop them. They went right over the crest, into the crater, and there was fierce hand-to-hand work, in which the disorganized troops, who had suffered all the morning from a terribly hot day and from hunger, were at a pitiful disadvantage. Some escaped and got back to the lines from which they had advanced, but most were killed or captured. It was intended that the Fifth and Eighteenth Corps should follow up the movement, but they did not stir. General John W. Turner's division, of Birney's Tenth Corps, however, participated in the attack.

In the fortnight before the explosion the Ninth Corps, fighting to obtain and hold its position there, lost about four thousand men. The total loss at the mine is put at 3798.

The blame for this disaster is widely distributed. The work on the tunnel was prolonged by lack of proper facilities; there was discouragement in high quarters; for the assaulting column the lot fell upon the least effective and worst commanded division in the Ninth Corps; no preparations were made for a prompt and orderly exit from the works; there was no following up of the advantage gained by the explosion, till the Confederates had time to move their troops for a strong defence; and, with the exception of General Robert B. Potter, there was not a division commander in the

crater or in the connecting lines, and not a corps commander on the scene of action. Those who devised the schémé appear to have imagined that when the mine was sprung it would leave a nearly level, though of course somewhat roughened, surface for the attacking columns to charge across. They never dreamed of a ragged hole thirty feet deep.

Soon afterward General John G. Parke succeeded General Burnside in the command of the Ninth Corps.

Lee's most important line of communication was the railroad running directly south from Petersburg to Weldon, North Carolina, where it connects with other roads; and Grant's next effort was to intercept this line and hold it permanently. In June a raiding cavalry force had struck the road and damaged it somewhat.

In August Hancock's Second Corps and a part of the Army of the James were crossed to the north side of the James, to attack the works at Chaffin's farm and threaten Richmond. The chief purpose of this movement was to prevent Lee from sending additional forces against Sheridan in the Shenandoah Valley. It also created a favourable opportunity for a movement against the Weldon Railroad. Early in the morning of August 18th the Fifth Corps, commanded by General G. K. Warren, with Kautz's division of cavalry, commanded by Colonel Samuel P. Spear, moved out with orders to gain a lodgment across the railroad as near the enemy's works as possible and then destroy the track from that point southward.

The day was frightfully hot, and the ground was drenched with rain, so that the movement of the artillery was very difficult. Griffin's division, with the

cavalry, had the lead, and on nearing the road turned south and west, and began tearing up the rails. The division of Ayres, following, wheeled toward the city, with Crawford's on the right and Cutler's in reserve. Ayres came upon Heth's division of Hill's corps, in position with artillery; and with the help of Hoffman's brigade of Cutler's division, by hard fighting he drove Heth back, with his dead and wounded left on the field. A position was gained within a mile of the point where the Vaughn road crosses the railroad. This was the point that was specially desired. Meade then sent forward Gregg's cavalry brigade and three divisions of infantry—Willcox's, White's, and Potter's. At the same time, Heth was joined by three brigades under Mahone, Pegram's artillery, and W. H. F. Lee's cavalry, all commanded by General A. P. Hill. These were concentrated at the crossing, for an attack the next afternoon. The region was largely covered with thick woods and underbrush, making every movement of the troops difficult.

In the afternoon of the 19th Heth attacked Ayres, while Mahone, working around through the woods, came upon Crawford's right flank and rear. Crawford's skirmish line fell back in confusion and masked the fire of the battle line, making it necessary for that also to fall back, and a part of Ayres's right was carried back with it. Warren re-formed the parts of Crawford's and Ayres's divisions that were broken, then advanced the line and regained the lost ground, capturing two flags and a few prisoners. Willcox and White came up and attacked Colquitt and Mahone, who were obliged to retire to their intrenchments, but carried some prisoners with them.

Thus far, in the contest for the railroad, Warren had

lost 382 men killed or wounded, and 2518 missing. General Joseph Hayes was captured. The Confederate loss is unknown, except that it was heavy in killed and wounded.

The next day Warren moved to a position a mile or more farther south on the road, where there was open ground and a good place for artillery, and intrenched. There, in the morning of the 21st, his right flank and front were attacked by Hill, who opened on him with thirty guns and about ten o'clock sent forward his infantry. But all along the line the attack was repulsed. Then Mahone moved against the left flank; but Warren's guns smashed his line before it came within reach of the musketry. Hagood's Confederate brigade narrowly escaped capture entire, and a large part of it did become prisoners. In this affair Warren lost 301 men, killed, wounded and missing. Colonel Dushane was killed, and General Cutler was wounded. Warren's men buried 211 of the enemy, whose entire loss was unknown. General J. C. C. Sanders, of Mahone's division, was among the killed.

Grant's intrenchments were now extended westward from the Jerusalem plank road till the Ninth Corps connected with Warren at the railroad. Then Hancock was sent with two of his divisions and Gregg's cavalry, to destroy the railroad from Warren's position southward to Rowanty Creek, thirteen miles. By the evening of the 24th they had destroyed eight miles of the road, and the infantry were at Reams Station for the night.

This railroad was too valuable for the Confederates to give it up as long as there was any chance of getting it again. On the 25th of August they came down in heavy force to attack Hancock. His troops occupied

works that faced the railroad (on the east side), with both wings turned sharply back almost at right angles. This was in anticipation of possible flank attacks; but a frontal attack would take the wings in reverse, and Hill made a frontal attack, strong and determined. After cavalry skirmishes in the forenoon, the infantry advanced at two o'clock and attacked Miles and Barlow, who held the right flank. They made two vigorous charges, but met with repulse each time and left their killed and wounded within a few yards of the works.

Mott's division of the Fifth Corps and Willcox's of the Ninth were ordered to reinforce Hancock; and if they had been sent directly down along the line of the railroad, they would have reached him in time to be of material service. But Meade made the mistake of sending them by a road farther east, with orders to report to Hancock when they should arrive at the intersection of a road that ran to Reams Station four miles distant.

Heavy skirmishing was resumed at four o'clock, and an hour later came the grand assault, preceded by artillery fire. For some time the fire from Miles's men baffled the assailants, and there appeared to be every probability that the result would be as before. But suddenly a part of the line that was held by recruits, who had had little training, and some of whose officers could not speak a word of English, gave way. Miles had a small reserve, which he ordered up, but the men would neither go forward again nor fire. McKnight's battery was turned on the breach and kept back the enemy till they crept along the rifle-pits, captured the guns, and turned one of them on the men inside the works. Then Murphy's brigade was driven back, and the Confederates captured two more batteries. Gib-

bon's division, which held the left flank, was ordered to retake the works on the right; but the men did not respond with any enthusiasm, and presently, annoyed by the fire of the captured guns, they sheltered themselves by going over their own works and taking position on the outside.

Then General Miles rallied the 61st New York regiment, formed it in line at right angles, and moving down recaptured McKnight's battery and much of the lost ground. Then he threw two hundred men across the railroad to threaten the enemy's rear, but Gibbon's men, ordered to reinforce them, refused to obey. Soon afterward Gibbon's line was attacked by dismounted cavalry and driven from the works; but Gregg's and Spear's men, dismounted, drove off the enemy. Gibbon's men were rallied behind the right wing and threw up new intrenchments a little distance in the rear. By this time Willcox's division arrived, and all further assaults by the Confederates were repelled. Miles and Gregg offered to assume the offensive; but Hancock held that as the purpose of the movement had been accomplished in the destruction of the railroad, it was not worth while to sacrifice any more men. He had lost 2400 of whom 1700 were prisoners.

A railroad had been constructed in the rear of Grant's lines, from City Point, and now it was extended as far as the Weldon road. This was for the moving of troops and supplies, and was built with a picturesque disregard of engineering principles. It simply followed the natural contour of the ground. Thenceforth the Weldon Road was lost to the Confederates, and supplies that would have come over it had to be hauled thirty miles in wagons.

The lines of both armies around Petersburg were so

elaborately intrenched that neither commander could hope for any success by a direct attack in force. And the men were constantly on the alert. In daylight a head or even a hand could seldom be raised above the parapet without being instantly pierced by a bullet. Grant's apprehension was that Lee might slip out of his fortifications and get away, either joining Johnston or going into the mountains. He was constantly bombarding the Confederate lines and wearing away the force behind them, while occasionally sending detachments north of the James to make either feints or real attacks against the works there. General Lee is reported to have remarked: "General Grant's policy will destroy this army."

There was a startling episode in midsummer, when Lee sent Early's corps into the Shenandoah Valley, partly to check Hunter's movements, but mainly to attack or threaten Washington and cause Grant to loose his hold on Petersburg. As Hunter was out of ammunition, he could do nothing, and Early swept down the valley to the Potomac, crossed that river, and turned toward Washington. He got as far as the Monocacy, near Frederick, Maryland, which is about thirty-five miles north-west of the National capital. There he was stopped by General Lew Wallace, who was in command at Baltimore. That General set out July 9th, with Ricketts's division of the Sixth Corps and a body of recruits hastily brought together, and took up a position on the left bank of the Monocacy, covering the roads that lead to Washington. His only hope was to detain the enemy till sufficient forces could be sent from the Army of the Potomac. He had six field guns and a small force of cavalry, and he held the fords and the bridges as long as possible. With a strong skirmish

line and sixteen guns, Early first attacked in front, and there was desperate fighting at one of the bridges. Not being able to carry that, he sent a large force to cross at a ferry downstream and come up against Wallace's left flank. Ricketts changed front and met the attack bravely, assisted by such reinforcements as Wallace could spare. Two assaults were repulsed, and then, seeing another and heavier one coming, Wallace, not getting reinforcements which he had expected, retreated. The bridges were destroyed, and there was no pursuit. The dilatory reinforcements were met on the way. The loss was about 1400 men, half of whom were captured. Early admitted a loss of six hundred. He then marched on Washington, and was within six miles of it when he was stopped by a force under General C. C. Augur. And now veteran troops from Grant's army were arriving rapidly, and he retired. All the clerks in the departments had been placed under arms for defence of the city.

Early sent into Pennsylvania a cavalry detachment under General John McCausland, who entered Chambersburg, July 30th, and demanded \$200,000 in gold or \$500,000 in currency. As the money was not forthcoming, he set fire to the town and destroyed about two thirds of it, causing a loss of \$1,000,000 and rendering 2500 persons homeless. Early said this was in retaliation for the burning of houses of secessionists in Virginia.

The Southside railroad was still open to Lee, and Grant was endeavouring to devise a way to break it or occupy it. As fast as he could, he extended his lines westward, to outflank Lee.

Late in September the Eighteenth and Tenth Corps, under Ord and Birney, were ordered to threaten Richmond, in order to retain Lee in his position. They

crossed the James and captured Fort Harrison, with sixteen guns and many prisoners, but not without hard fighting, in which General Hiram Burnham was killed. Then some of the connecting works were carried, with more guns and more prisoners. Lee reënforced the troops there with eight brigades from Petersburg and attempted to recapture the works, with heavy loss but without success. The new line thus established by the National forces was held till the end of the war. It had cost 394 men killed, 1554 wounded, and 324 missing. The Confederate loss is not known.

In the winter of 1864-5 there was no important battle around Petersburg. When spring came, Grant looked anxiously for the drying of the roads and made preparations for a quick move at the first opportunity, all the while apprehensive that Lee might get the start and slip away from him.

Late in February Sheridan, with ten thousand cavalry, moved up the Shenandoah Valley. His third division, commanded by General George A. Custer, met Early at Waynesboro, March 2d, and defeated him so completely that he captured 1500 men and everything that Early had on wheels. Sheridan destroyed parts of the railroads toward Lynchburg and Gordonsville, destroyed the locks of the James River canal, and then rode around Richmond and down the peninsula and crossed over to Grant, who on the 29th posted him on the extreme left of the army.

Lee, looking for a chance to escape, wished to compel Grant to draw back his left. To effect this, a plan was devised which General John B. Gordon claims to have originated, and the execution of it was entrusted to him. Near the eastern end of the lines, where they were not more than a hundred yards apart, many deserters from

the Confederate army had boldly walked across, carrying their arms with them. Taking advantage of this, some of Gordon's men walked out in the night of March 24th, as if they were deserters, and seized and sent back the unsuspecting pickets. Then a column charged through the gap, surprised the main line, and captured the work known as Fort Steadman. Three companies were sent forward to capture three forts that were known to be in the rear; but in the darkness they failed to find them and passed beyond them, and in the morning they were all made prisoners. With the fort Gordon had secured about six hundred prisoners, whom he hurried back to his own lines. The alarm spread, and at daybreak two works on the flanks of Fort Steadman and three in its rear all opened upon it with a destructive artillery fire. Reënforcements that Gordon expected did not reach him, and in the afternoon he gave up the fort and got his men back to their own lines as well as he could under a heavy fire from both artillery and musketry. He lost in this attempt about four thousand men, and the National loss was about two thousand. It did not, as was intended, cause Grant to draw back his left and open a door for Lee's escape. On the contrary, as recorded above, he placed Sheridan there to extend it; and he brought three of General Ord's divisions from the other side of the James, and placed them also on his left. Heavy rains softened the roads, which had to be corduroyed for the passage of the artillery; but the soldiers were experts at that work and it was executed rapidly.

By Grant's orders, Sheridan marched through Dinwiddie Court House on the 31st and struck the extreme right of the Confederate line at Five Forks.. He drove off the cavalry easily enough; but a strong

body of infantry advanced upon him and forced him back. He called for help, and Grant sent him Warren's Fifth Corps. This was slow in getting forward, partly because a bridge had to be rebuilt at Gravelly Run; but Sheridan got it in hand about noon of April 1st. The force that held Five Forks had been increased, but Sheridan determined to take the position that day, and with his forces all up he began the battle late in the afternoon. His plan was to engage the enemy in front with his cavalry dismounted, and with a great left wheel swing the Fifth Corps around so as to envelope and crush the Confederate line. That corps worked somewhat slowly, because it reached too far, but it struck one after another of the enemy's positions and organizations, defeating them all, and the movement was a complete success. More than five thousand prisoners were taken, and Five Forks was secured. Sheridan's loss was about one thousand. From some distrust of Warren, Grant had given Sheridan authority to remove him, if it became necessary; and in the hour of victory he did relieve him, on the ground that he had been inexcusably slow in bringing his troops to the attack. Thereby hangs a controversy.

Knowing that Lee had weakened some parts of his line to strengthen his right, Grant attacked his centre at daybreak the next morning. Wright's Sixth Corps and Parke's Ninth broke through the Confederate lines, turned and took large parts of them in reverse, and captured more than three thousand prisoners. The Second Corps, under Humphreys, and the three remaining divisions of Ord's made the same movement and met with similar success. Sheridan moved up on the left, and then the outer defences were in the possession of the National army, which had a continuous line

from one point on the river to another, thus encircling Petersburg. Two strong works that were salients of the inner line were still held; but Foster's division of the Twenty-fourth Corps carried one by assault, and then the other surrendered. In the fighting this day the Confederate General A. P. Hill was killed.

General Lee sent a telegram to Mr. Davis, telling him that the lines were broken and Richmond must be evacuated. It found Davis in church, and on reading it he at once walked out. The citizens soon saw the preparations for evacuation and then there was a rush for vehicles of every kind, and masses of property were brought out into the streets for removal. The City Council appointed committees to destroy liquor, and hundreds of barrels of it were poured into the gutters. The ironclads in the river were blown up, and the tobacco warehouses were set on fire. Parties of drunken soldiers set out for pillaging; the flames spread; there was terror, panic, and confusion everywhere. Mr. Davis and his cabinet got away, carrying some of the records and a considerable amount of gold coin.

The next morning, April 3d, a detachment of coloured troops from General Godfrey Weitzel's command entered the city, and the flag of the 12th Maine regiment was raised over the Capitol. General Devens's division marched in, and set at work to put out the fires, while Parsons's engineer company assisted by blowing up some houses. While this was going on Capitol Square was full of people who had gone there to be out of reach of the flames. Captain Thomas T. Graves writes:

We were the first troops to arrive before Libby Prison. Not a guard, not an inmate remained; the doors were wide

open, and a few negroes greeted us with "Dey's all gone, massa." The next day after our entry I saw a crowd coming, headed by President Lincoln, who was walking with his usual long, careless stride, and was looking about with an interested air, taking in everything. Upon my saluting, he said, "Is it far to President Davis's house?" I accompanied him to the house, which was occupied by General Weitzel as headquarters. He had arrived on Admiral Porter's flagship, and had at once walked ashore without ceremony. When the Admiral learned of it he sent a body of marines as an escort and guard; but they marched two miles and never saw him. He was guided by negroes.

Mr. Lincoln showed a boyish curiosity about the mansion, and with Captain Graves went all over it. Judge Campbell, General J. R. Anderson, and other Confederates called, and the President gave them an interview behind closed doors. With General Weitzel he visited Libby Prison and Castle Thunder. When the General asked what he should do with regard to the conquered people, Mr. Lincoln said he did not wish to give any orders on that subject, but he added, "If I were in your place, I'd let 'em up easy."

It was Sunday, April 2d, when Lee's lines were broken and the Confederate Government fled from Richmond; and that night Lee's army was drawn out from the trenches, crossed the river, and hurriedly marched westward. Grant's army moved as rapidly in pursuit, determined not to let the foe escape. Following mainly a parallel route south of Lee's, it attacked vigorously whenever there was opportunity—at Jetersville, Detonville, Deep Creek, Sailor's Creek, Paine's Cross-roads, and Farmville. Some of these actions were very sharp. As might be expected when two veteran armies were drawn away from all intrenchments and fighting in

the open—one with the desperation of a forlorn hope, the other with the near prospect of a final victory—the contests were deadly in the extreme. The most important of these actions was at Sailor's Creek, April 6th, where Custer's cavalry broke the Confederate line, taking sixteen guns, four hundred wagons, and many prisoners, and then the Sixth Corps came up and captured Ewell's corps entire, including its commander and five other generals. Another wagon train had been destroyed, and several guns captured, at Paine's Cross-roads the day before.

These captures were materially aided by the sacrifice of a little detachment of six hundred men, infantry and cavalry, commanded by Brigadier-General Theodore Read, near Farmville. They had been sent out to destroy High Bridge, and were cut off from their corps by the advance of Lee's army. Instead of surrendering at once, Read made charge after charge to delay the enemy, till he was killed and most of his men were shot down.

The seventy miles of the race was one long track of blood; and besides its losses in battle Lee's army was steadily depleted by desertion and straggling. The men were famished, a provision train was lost; and a day had to be spent in an endeavour to collect food from the surrounding country.

On the National side Sheridan's cavalry had the lead, and everything was pushed to the utmost speed. On the 7th Lee crossed to the north side of the river on High Bridge, and set fire to that structure. But the Second Corps was close at hand, extinguished the fire, and crossed in pursuit.

At five o'clock in the afternoon of that day General Grant, being at Farmville, addressed a note to General

Lee, saying that the results of the week must convince him of the hopelessness of further resistance, and asking for the surrender of the Army of Northern Virginia. Lee answered that he did not agree as to the hopelessness, but asked what terms would be offered. Probably he felt somewhat strengthened by the fact that just then his cavalry was having the best of it in an engagement with Crook's, and the Second Corps was contending alone with the whole of his infantry. When Grant learned this he ordered Wright's Sixth Corps to cross at once and make a night march to the support of the Second. General Horace Porter writes:

Notwithstanding their long march that day, the men sprang to their feet with a spirit that made everyone marvel at their pluck, and came swinging through the main street of the village with a step that seemed as elastic as on the first day of their toilsome tramp. It was now dark. . . . Then was witnessed one of the most inspiring scenes of the campaign. Bonfires were lighted on the sides of the street, the men seized straw and pine knots, and improvised torches; cheers arose from throats already hoarse with shouts of victory, bands played, banners waved, arms were tossed high in air and caught again. The night march had become a grand review, with Grant as the reviewing officer.

And while this was taking place a train of provisions intended for the Confederate army was captured and held at Appomattox station. The next morning, April 8th, Grant replied to Lee, saying: "There is but one condition I would insist upon, namely, that the men and officers surrendered shall be disqualified for taking up arms against the Government of the United States until properly exchanged." At midnight he received another letter from Lee, in which he declined to surrender,

but proposed to meet Grant the next day, between the picket lines, to discuss terms of peace. In the morning Grant answered that he had no authority to treat on the subject of peace, and the proposed meeting could lead to no ood.

The pursuit was pushed relentlessly, and when Lee's army arrived at Appomattox Court House, with the enemy on its flank and rear, it saw Sheridan's cavalry squarely across its front, and advanced confidently to brush it away. But the cavalry drew aside and revealed a strong line of blue-coated infantry, the Fifth Corps, now commanded by General Charles Griffin. Before this the weary and starving Confederates recoiled, and there was no more fighting; for a white flag was displayed by the Confederates, with information that negotiations for surrender were in progress. Lee had asked for an interview in accordance with Grant's offer, which reached him at 11.50 A.M., and Grant set out at once for the meeting. He had been suffering with a headache for two days, and when a member of his staff asked how he felt, he answered: "The pain in my head seemed to leave me the moment I got Lee's letter."

The two commanders, accompanied by some members of their staffs and other officers, met in the house of Wilmer McLean, about 1.30 P.M., April 9th. General Porter describes their appearance on this occasion:

They sat ten feet apart, facing each other. General Grant, then nearly forty-three years of age, was five feet eight inches in height, with shoulders slightly stooped. His hair and full beard were a nut-brown, without a trace of grey in them. He had on a single-breasted blouse, made of dark blue flannel, unbuttoned in front, and showing a waistcoat underneath. He wore an ordinary pair of top-boots, with



GENERAL ULYSSES S. GRANT.
FROM A PHOTOGRAPH TAKEN IN 1860.

his trousers inside, and was without spurs. The boots and portions of his clothes were spattered with mud. His felt "sugar-loaf" stiff-brimmed hat was thrown on the table beside him. He had no sword, and a pair of shoulder-straps was all there was about him to designate his rank. Lee, on the other hand, was fully six feet in height and quite erect for one of his age, for he was Grant's senior by fifteen years. His hair and full beard were a silver-grey and quite thick, except that the hair had become a little thin in front. He wore a new uniform of Confederate grey, buttoned up to the throat, and carried a long sword of exceedingly fine workmanship, the hilt studded with jewels. It was said to be the sword that had been presented to him by the State of Virginia. His top-boots were comparatively new, and seemed to have on them some ornamental stitching of red silk. Like his uniform, they were singularly clean and but little travel-stained. On the boots were handsome spurs, with large rowels. A felt hat, which in colour matched pretty closely that of his uniform, and a pair of long buckskin gauntlets, lay beside him on the table.

With but little preliminary conversation, the business in hand was taken up, and the proposed terms were recited and agreed to. General Grant wrote them out in the form of a letter, and added the specification that the side-arms and private horses and baggage of the officers were not to be surrendered. His letter also specified the ceremony to be observed in the surrender and paroling, and added the significant sentence: "This done, each officer and man will be allowed to return to his home, not to be disturbed by the United States authorities so long as they observe their paroles and the laws in force where they may reside."

General Lee expressed satisfaction with the terms, saying: "This will have a very happy effect upon my army." But he mentioned the fact that the cavalry-

men and artillerymen in his army owned their horses. This was news to Grant, who said he supposed most of the men in the ranks were small farmers and would need their horses for the spring ploughing, and therefore he would instruct the parole officers to let the men take any horses that they claimed as their own. Lee wrote a short letter accepting the terms, and both letters were copied and duly signed.

Lee then announced that he held about a thousand prisoners, and that he had no food for them or for his own men, who had been living for several days on parched corn. Grant answered that he would supply rations, and asked how many men Lee had. "Indeed, I am not able to say," said Lee. "My losses in killed and wounded have been exceedingly heavy, and there have been many stragglers and some deserters. . . . Many companies are entirely without officers, and I have not seen any returns for several days." Grant said: "Suppose I send over twenty-five thousand rations, do you think that will be sufficient?" and Lee answered: "I think it will be ample, and it will be a great relief, I assure you."

At four o'clock Lee shook hands with Grant, bowed to the other officers, and with his aide, Colonel Marshall, left the house.

The officers and men surrendered numbered somewhat more than twenty-eight thousand. General Grant forbade any firing of salutes or other demonstrations of rejoicing over the victory.

At Durham Station, North Carolina, April 26th, after some negotiations that were disapproved by the President and the Secretary of War, General Johnston surrendered his immediate army of nearly thirty-seven thousand men to General Sherman. To these were



GENERAL ROBERT E. LEE, IN MAY, 1865.

added more than fifty-two thousand in Georgia and Florida, subject to Johnston's orders. The last force to surrender was General Kirby Smith's at Shreveport, Louisiana, May 26th.

When General Grant forbade the firing of salutes he added his reason: "The war is over; the rebels are again our countrymen, and the best sign of rejoicing after the victory will be to abstain from all demonstrations in the field."

The number of Confederate soldiers immediately paroled was 28,356. There were about 30,000 others that had been captured that week or that came in and surrendered themselves. The losses on both sides had been heavy. Grant's total losses in the entire campaign, including those of the Army of the James, were 82,720. His captures numbered 66,512. It was characteristic of him that his chief rejoicing always was, not over the disabled, but over the captured. After nearly every battle his first inquiry was, "How many prisoners have we taken?" There are no accurate reports of the Confederate losses.

Those who are disposed to disparage General Grant's achievement may compare this campaign with a famous European campaign and siege only ten years earlier. In that, there were four nations against one; the troops on each side numbered between 140,000 and 150,000; the besiegers got Sebastopol, but no surrender of an army; and the siege had occupied eleven months. Grant's entire campaign—the Wilderness to Appomattox—had exactly the same duration.

The Grand Review

May 23-24, 1865

GENERAL GRANT did not remain to witness the surrender and paroling of the Army of Northern Virginia, nor did he enter Richmond. He went to Washington as soon as possible, to facilitate the disbandment of his own armies and the return of the soldiers to their homes and the pursuits of civil life, both as due to them and as an economy for the Government in saving further war expenses.

On May 18th orders were issued for a grand review in Washington of the armies commanded by Meade and Sherman. This was held on the 23d and 24th. On the grand stand in front of the White House were the President and his cabinet with officers of high rank and others. The first day was given to the Army of the Potomac, which marched in close column around the Capitol and down Pennsylvania Avenue, their colours displayed, their bands playing, and their arms glistening in the sunlight. The march occupied more than six hours. As they came to the stand the officers saluted the President with their swords, and commanders of divisions dismounted and went upon the stand.

Sherman's army, waiting for its turn, was in camp on the south side of the Potomac. In the night it crossed over and bivouacked near the Capitol; and next

day it made the same march, in the same style, as the Army of the Potomac.

This was at once the grandest and most significant pageant ever seen in our country, before or since. But amid all the rejoicing, all the patriotic pride, all the thankfulness, there was consciousness of one great shadow. For in the hour of triumph the head of the nation, sprung from the rude life of the West, who had progressed steadily to the proudest place on earth, where he lost none of his native humility and gained the love as well as the admiration of his people, had been struck down by a cowardly assassin. In the seat that he should have occupied was an untried man, whose future was problematical.

General Grant wrote in his *Memoirs*:

Sherman's army made a different appearance from that of the Army of the Potomac. This army was a body of sixty-five thousand well drilled, well disciplined, and orderly soldiers, inured to hardship, but without the experience of gathering their own food and supplies in an enemy's country, and of being ever on the watch. Sherman's army was not so well dressed as the Army of the Potomac, but their marching could not be excelled. They gave the appearance of men who had been thoroughly drilled to endure hardships, either by long and continuous marches or through exposure to any climate, without the ordinary shelter of a camp. They exhibited also some of the order of march through Georgia. In the rear of a company there would be a captured horse or mule loaded with small cooking utensils, captured chickens, and other food picked up for the use of the men. Negro families who had followed the army would sometimes come along in the rear of a company, with three or four children packed upon a single mule, and the mother leading it. . . . The National flag was flying from almost every house and store; the windows were filled with

spectators; the doorsteps and sidewalks were crowded with coloured people and poor whites who did not succeed in securing better quarters from which to get a view of the grand armies.

Whatever anticipations there had been—and certainly there were some—that the thousands of men who had spent four years in the field waging vigorous warfare could not at once return to peaceful and orderly civil life, were most happily disappointed. These men were only too glad to return to their homes and legitimate occupations. At the North, very soon the only remaining indications of the great contest were the battle-flags in the State-houses and arsenals, the framed portraits of President Lincoln and his ablest Generals, the occasional cannon-trophies in village greens and city squares, and the more than occasional crutches and empty sleeves. These outwardly; but within thousands of homes there were vacant chairs and sacred memories of those that came no more. Not all the consciousness of established freedom, nor all the glory of great victories, could restore the slaughtered sons and banish the domestic sorrow. At the South were equal bereavements, with trampled fields, bridgeless streams, ruined mills, homes in ashes, worthless money, and universal poverty, without any immediately apparent compensation; for years had to pass before most of that people comprehended and acknowledged that the result of the war was exactly what it should have been; that they were immeasurably benefited by losing that for which they had fought so devotedly; and that the great Republic, strengthened and made perpetual, was their own most precious heritage.

The Measure of Valour

SOME commentators on the war have declared that the Confederate troops were better led than the National, and that this is proved by their greater loss of officers of high rank. But the statistics do not bear out such assertion. On each side one commander of an army was killed—Generals Albert Sidney Johnston and James B. McPherson. On each side three corps commanders were killed—National, Generals Mansfield, Reynolds, and Sedgwick; Confederate, Jackson, Polk, and A. P. Hill. On the National side fourteen division commanders were killed, and on the Confederate seven. In comparing losses of brigade commanders, it should be explained that in the Confederate service as soon as a man commanded a brigade he was made a brigadier-general; but the National Government often left a colonel or lieutenant-colonel for a long time at the head of a brigade. Counting all who fell at the head of brigades as brigadiers, eighty-five were killed on the National side, and seventy-three on the Confederate.

There were thirteen battles in which one side or the other (in most instances each) lost more than 10,000 men, taking no account of the great capitulations like Fort Donelson and Vicksburg. And in the least of these nearly 1900 men were shot dead on the field. The greatest losses on both sides were sustained at

Gettysburg. Next in order (aggregating the losses on both sides¹) come Spottsylvania, 36,800; the Wilderness, 35,300; Chickamauga, 34,600; and Chancellorsville, 30,000. But each of these battles occupied more than one day. The bloodiest single day was September 17, 1862, at the Antietam, where the National army lost 2010 men killed and 9549 wounded, with about 800 missing. The Confederate loss cannot be stated with exactness. General Lee's report gives only consolidated figures for the whole campaign, including Harpers Ferry and South Mountain, as well as the main battle; and these figures fall short by a thousand (for killed and wounded alone) of those given by his division commanders, who also report more than 2000 missing. On the other hand, McClellan says that "about 2700 of the enemy's dead were counted and buried upon the battlefield of Antietam," while "a portion of their dead had been previously buried by the enemy." Averaging these discrepant figures, and bearing in mind that there were no intrenchments at the Antietam, we may fairly put down the losses as equal on the two sides, which would give a total, on that field in one day, of 4200 killed and 19,000 wounded. The number of prisoners was not large.

The heaviest actual loss that fell upon any one regiment in the National service in a single engagement was that sustained by the First Maine Heavy Artillery (acting as infantry) in the assault on the defences of Petersburg, June 18, 1864, when 210 of its men were killed or mortally wounded, the whole number of casualties being 632 out of about 900 men. This regiment was also the one that suffered most in aggre-

¹ As there are discrepancies in all the counts, only the round numbers are given here.

gate losses in battle during the war, its killed and wounded amounting to 1283. More than nineteen per cent. were killed. Another famous fighting regiment was the Fifth New Hampshire Infantry, which had 295 men killed or mortally wounded in battle, the greatest loss, 69, occurring at Cold Harbor, June 1, 1864. Its first colonel, Edward E. Cross, was killed while leading it in the thickest of the second day's fight at Gettysburg. Another was the One Hundred and Forty-first Pennsylvania, which lost three quarters of its men at Gettysburg, and at Chancellorsville lost 235 out of 419. At the second Bull Run (called also Manassas), the One Hundred and First New York lost 124 out of 168; the Nineteenth Indiana lost 259 out of 423; the Fifth New York lost 297 out of 490; the Second Wisconsin lost 298 out of 511; and the First Michigan lost 178 out of 320. At Antietam the Twelfth Massachusetts lost 224 out of 334. It had lost heavily also at Manassas, where Col. Fletcher Webster (only son of Daniel Webster) was killed at its head. It lost, altogether, 18 officers in action. Another famous Massachusetts regiment was the Fifteenth, which at Gettysburg lost 148 men out of 239, and at the Antietam, 318 out of 606, and, out of a total enrolment of 1701, lost during the war in killed and wounded 879. Still another Massachusetts regiment distinguished by hard fighting was the Twentieth. Its greatest loss, in killed (48), was at Fredericksburg, where it was in the brigade that crossed the river in boats, to clear the rifle-pits of the sharpshooters that were making it impossible to lay the pontoon bridges. This regiment had the task of clearing the streets of the town, and as it swept through them it was fired upon from windows and house-tops. The other regiments that participated in this exploit

were the Seventh Michigan, the Nineteenth Massachusetts, and the Eighty-ninth New York.

The Twentieth lost 44 men killed at Gettysburg, 38 at Ball's Bluff, 36 in the Wilderness, 20 at Spottsylvania, and 20 at the Antietam. During its whole service it had 17 officers killed, including a colonel, a lieutenant-colonel, two majors, an adjutant, and a surgeon.

Among the Vermont regiments, the one that suffered most in a single action was the Eighth, which at Cedar Creek lost sixty-eight per cent. of its numbers engaged. The First Heavy Artillery from that State, acting most of the time as infantry, with a total enrolment of 2280, lost in killed and wounded 583. The Second Infantry, with a total enrolment of 1811, lost 887. Its heaviest loss was at the Wilderness, where, out of 700 engaged, 348 (about half) were disabled, including the colonel and lieutenant-colonel killed. And a week later, at Spottsylvania, nearly half of the remainder (123) were killed or wounded. The Fourth Infantry, at the Wilderness, went into the fight with fewer than 600 men, and lost 268, including seven officers killed and ten wounded. In the fight at Savage Station, the Fifth Vermont walked over a regiment that had thrown itself on the ground and refused to advance any farther, pressed close to the enemy, and was taken by a flank fire of artillery that struck down 44 out of the 59 men in one company. Yet the regiment held its ground, faced about, and silenced the battery. It lost 188 men out of 428.

In the second and third years of the war, several regiments of heavy artillery were raised. It was said that they were intended only to garrison the forts, and there was a popular belief that their purpose was to get into the service a large number of men who were not

quite willing to subject themselves to the greater risks incurred by infantry of the line. But after a short period of service as heavy artillery, most of them were armed with rifles and sent to the front as infantry, and many of them ranked among the best fighting regiments, and sustained notable losses. The First Maine and First Vermont have been mentioned already. The Second Connecticut Heavy Artillery, the first time it went into action, stormed the intrenchments at Cold Harbor with the bayonet, and lost 325 men out of 1400, including the colonel. At the Opequan it lost 138, including the major and five line officers, and at Cedar Creek, 190. The Seventh, Eighth, Ninth, and Fourteenth New York Heavy Artillery regiments all distinguished themselves similarly. The Seventh, during one hundred days' service in the field as infantry (Grant's overland campaign), lost 1254 men, only a few of whom were captured. The Eighth lost 207 killed or mortally wounded at Cold Harbor alone, with more than 200 others wounded. Among the killed were eight officers, including Col. Peter A. Porter (grandson of Col. Peter B. Porter, of the War of 1812), who fell in advance of his men. Its total loss in the war was 1010 out of an enrolment of 2575. The Ninth had 64 men killed at Cedar Creek, 51 at the Monocacy, 43 at Cold Harbor, and 22 at the Opequan. Its total loss in killed and wounded was 824 in an enrolment of 3227. The Fourteenth had 57 men killed in the assault on Petersburg, 43 at Cold Harbor, 30 in the trenches before Petersburg, 26 at Fort Stedman, 22 at the mine explosion, and 16 at Spottsylvania. It led the assault after the mine explosion, and planted its colours on the captured works. Its total loss in killed and wounded was 861, in an enrolment of 2506.

In comparing these with other regiments, it must be remembered that their terms of service were generally shorter, because they were enlisted late in the war. The Fourteenth, for instance, was organized in January, 1864, which gave it but fifteen months of service, and it spent its first three months in the forts of New York harbour; so that its actual experience in the field covered somewhat less than a year. In that time one third of all the men enrolled in it were disabled; and if it had served through the war at this rate, nothing would have been left of it. This explanation applies equally to several other regiments.

The State of New York furnished one sixth of all the men called for by the National Government. Of Fox's "Three Hundred Fighting Regiments" (those that had more than 130 men killed during the war), New York has 59—nine more than its proportion. The Fifth Infantry, known as Duryea's Zouaves, met with its heaviest loss, 297 out of 490, at Manassas, and lost 162 at Gaines's Mill. This regiment was commanded at one time by Gouverneur K. Warren, afterward famous as a corps commander. The Fortieth had 238 men killed in battle, and lost in all 1217. Its heaviest losses were, in the Seven Days' battles, 100; Fredericksburg, 123; Gettysburg, 150; and the Wilderness, 213. The Forty-second lost 718 out of 1210 enrolled, its heaviest loss, 181, being at the Antietam. The Forty-third lost 138 at Salem Church, and 198 in the Wilderness, its colonel, lieutenant-colonel, and major all being killed there. The Forty-fourth, originally called "Ellsworth Avengers," was composed of picked men from every county in the State. It lost over 700 out of 1585 enrolled. At Manassas, out of 148 men in action, it lost 71. It was a part of

the force that seized Little Round Top at Gettysburg. The Forty-eighth was raised and commanded by a Methodist minister, James H. Perry, D.D., who had been educated at West Point. He died in the service in 1862. The regiment participated in the assault on Fort Wagner, and lost there 242 men. At Olustee it lost 244. Its total loss was 859 out of an enrolment of 2173. The Forty-ninth had two colonels, a lieutenant-colonel, and a major killed in action. The Fifty-first New York and Fifty-first Pennsylvania carried the stone bridge at the Antietam, the New York regiment losing 87 men, and the Pennsylvanians 120. The Fifty-second New York lost 122 men at Fair Oaks, 121 in the siege of Petersburg, and 86 at Spottsylvania. It was a German regiment, and two Prussian officers on leave of absence fought with it as line officers at Spottsylvania and were killed in the terrible struggle at the bloody angle. The Fifty-ninth went into the battle of the Antietam with 321 men, fought around the Dunker Church, and lost 224, killed or wounded, including nine officers killed. The Sixty-first lost 110 killed or wounded at Fair Oaks, out of 432; 106 in the siege of Petersburg, and 79 at Glendale. Francis C. Barlow and Nelson A. Miles were two of its four successive colonels. One company was composed entirely of students from Madison University. The Sixty-third, an Irish regiment, lost 173 men at Fair Oaks, 98 at Gettysburg, and 59 at Spottsylvania. The Sixty-ninth, another Irish regiment, lost more men killed and wounded than any other from New York. At the Antietam, where it contended at Bloody Lane, eight colour-bearers were shot. The Seventieth lost 666 men in a total enrolment of 1462. Its heaviest loss, 330, was at Williamsburg. Daniel E. Sickles was its

first colonel. The Seventy-sixth lost 234 men out of 375 in thirty minutes at Gettysburg. In the Wilderness it lost 282. The Seventy-ninth was largely composed of Scotchmen. It lost 198 men at Bull Run, where Colonel Cameron (brother of the Secretary of War) fell at its head. At Chantilly six colour-bearers were shot down, when General Stevens (who had been formerly its colonel) seized the flag and led the regiment to victory, but was shot dead. The Eighty-first lost 215 men at Cold Harbor, about half the number engaged. The Eighty-second at the Antietam lost 128 men out of 339, and at Gettysburg 192 out of 305, including its colonel. The Eighty-third lost 114 men at the Antietam, 125 at Fredericksburg, 115 in the Wilderness, and 128 at Spottsylvania. The Eighty-fourth, a Brooklyn zouave regiment, lost 142 men at Bull Run, 120 at Manassas, and 217 at Gettysburg, where, with the Ninety-fifth, it captured a Mississippi brigade. The Eighty-sixth lost 96 men at Po River, and over 200 in the Wilderness campaign. The Eighty-eighth, an Irish regiment, lost 102 men at the Antietam, and 127 at Fredericksburg. The Ninety-third lost 260 men in the Wilderness, out of 433. The Ninety-seventh at Gettysburg lost 99 men, and captured the colours and 382 men of a North Carolina regiment. The One Hundredth lost 176 men at Fair Oaks, 175 at Fort Wagner, and 259 at Drewry's Bluff. The One Hundred and Ninth lost 140 men at Spottsylvania, and 127 in the assault on Petersburg. Benjamin F. Tracy, Secretary of the Navy in President Harrison's cabinet, was its first colonel. The One Hundred and Eleventh lost 249 men at Gettysburg, out of 390, and again at the Wilderness it lost more than half of the number engaged. The One Hundred and Twelfth lost

180 men at Cold Harbor, including its colonel killed, and it lost another colonel in the assault on Fort Fisher. The One Hundred and Twentieth at Gettysburg lost 203 men, including seventeen officers killed or wounded. The One Hundred and Twenty-first at Salem Church lost 276 out of 453, and at Spottsylvania it lost 155. On both occasions it was led by Emory Upton, afterward general. Its total of killed and wounded in the war was 839, out of an enrolment of 1426. The One Hundred and Twenty-fourth lost at Chancellorsville 204 out of 550, and at Gettysburg 90 out of 290. The One Hundred and Twenty-sixth lost at Gettysburg 231 men, including the colonel, who was killed, and another colonel was killed before Petersburg. The One Hundred and Thirty-seventh lost 137 at Gettysburg, where it formed a part of the brigade that held Culp's Hill. At Wauhatchie it lost 90, and in the Battle above the Clouds 38 more. The One Hundred and Fortieth lost 133 men at Gettysburg, where it formed part of the force that occupied Little Round Top at the critical moment, and helped to drag up Hazlett's battery. Its colonel was killed in this struggle. In the Wilderness it lost 255, and at Spottsylvania another colonel and the major were killed. The One Hundred and Forty-seventh was in the brigade that opened the battle of Gettysburg, and there lost 301 out of 380 men. The One Hundred and Forty-ninth was one of the regiments that saw service both at the East and the West. It lost 186 men at Chancellorsville, and at Lookout Mountain lost 74 and captured five flags. In the Atlanta campaign it lost 136 out of 380 men. The One Hundred and Sixty-fourth, an Irish regiment, participated in the assault at Cold Harbor and carried the works in its

front, but at the cost of 157 men, including the colonel and six other officers killed. The One Hundred and Seventieth, another Irish regiment, lost 99 men at the North Anna and 136 in the early assaults on Petersburg. Its total of killed and wounded during the war was 481 out of 1002 enrolled.

Thus runs the record to the end. These regiments are not exceptional so far as the State or the section is concerned. Quite as vivid a picture of the perils and the heroism of that great struggle could have been presented with statistics concerning the troops of any other States. Looking over all the records, one discovers no difference in the endurance or fighting qualities of the men from different States. For instance the Eighth New Jersey lost, at Chancellorsville, 125 men out of 268; and in the same battle the Twelfth New Jersey lost 178; while at Gettysburg less than half of the regiment made a charge on a barn filled with sharpshooters, and captured 99 men. The Fifteenth New Jersey had 116 men killed, out of 444, at Spottsylvania. The Eleventh Pennsylvania at Fredericksburg lost 211 killed or wounded out of 394, and in its whole term of service it had 681 men disabled in an enrolment of 1179; and the Twenty-eighth lost 266 men at the Antietam. The Forty-ninth Pennsylvania had 736 men disabled, in an enrolment of 1313, its heaviest loss being at Spottsylvania, where it participated in the charge at the bloody angle and lost 260 men, including its colonel and lieutenant-colonel killed. The Seventy-second lost 237 at the Antietam, and 191 at Gettysburg, where it was in that part of the line aimed at by Pickett's charge. The Eighty-third Pennsylvania suffered heavier losses in action than any other regiment, save one, in the National service. At Gaines's Mill it lost

196, at Malvern Hill 166, at Manassas 97, and at Spottsylvania 164. At Gettysburg it formed part of the force that seized Little Round Top. Its total losses were 971 in an enrolment of 1808. The Ninety-third, like a regiment previously mentioned, was raised and commanded by a Methodist minister. It rendered specially gallant service at Fair Oaks, the Wilderness, and Spottsylvania. The One Hundred and Nineteenth made a gallant charge at Rappahannock Station, capturing guns, flags, and many prisoners, and losing 43 men. It fought at the bloody angle of Spottsylvania, and there and in the Wilderness lost 231 out of 400, including two regimental commanders killed. The One Hundred and Fortieth was in the wheatfield at Gettysburg, and there lost 241 men out of 589. Its total killed and wounded numbered 732 in an enrolment of 1132.

Delaware, a slave State, contributed its quota to the armies that fought for the Union. At the Antietam its First Regiment lost 230 men out of 650. At Gettysburg it was among the troops that met Pickett's charge.

Maryland, another slave State, contributed many good troops to the Union cause. Its Sixth Regiment lost 174 men at Winchester, and 170 in the Wilderness.

The Seventh West Virginia lost 522 men killed or wounded, in an enrolment of 1008.

The Seventh Ohio lost, at Cedar Mountain, 182 out of 307 men. At Ringgold all its officers except one were either killed or wounded. At Chickamauga the Fourteenth lost 245 men out of 449. At Jonesboro it carried the works in front of it by a brilliant charge, but at heavy loss. The Twenty-third, at South Mountain and Antietam, lost 199 men. Two of its four successive colonels were William S. Rosecrans and Rutherford B. Hayes.

It was not in the famous battles alone that heavy regimental losses were sustained. At Honey Hill, an action seldom mentioned, the Twenty-fifth Ohio had 35 men killed, with the usual proportion of wounded; and at Pickett's Mills, hardly recorded in any history, the Eighty-ninth Illinois lost 154.

The Fifth Kentucky, at Stone River, lost 125, out of 320 men, and at Chickamauga 125. It was commanded by Lovell H. Rousseau, an eminent soldier. Its total loss was 581, in an enrolment of 1020. The Fifteenth, at Perryville, lost 196 men, including all its field officers killed. Its "boy colonel," James B. Forman, was killed at Stone River. Its total killed and wounded numbered 516, in an enrolment of 952.

The Fourteenth Indiana lost 181 men at the Antietam, out of 320. At Gettysburg it formed part of the brigade that annihilated the Louisiana Tigers. The Nineteenth suffered, during its whole term of service, a loss of 712 killed and wounded, in an enrolment of 1246. The Twenty-seventh lost 616 from an enrolment of 1101.

The Eleventh Illinois lost, at Fort Donelson, 339 men out of 500. It was commanded by W. H. L. Wallace, who was afterward a brigadier-general and fell at Shiloh. The Twenty-first lost 303 men at Stone River, and 238 at Chickamauga. Its first colonel was Ulysses S. Grant. The Thirty-first lost 176 at Fort Donelson. Its first colonel was John A. Logan. The Thirty-sixth lost 212 at Stone River. The Fortieth lost 216 at Shiloh, and gained special credit for keeping its place in the line after its ammunition was exhausted. The Fifty-fifth lost 275 at Shiloh out of 512. The Ninety-third lost 162 at Champion Hill, and 89, including its colonel, at Mission Ridge.

The First Michigan lost, at Manassas, 178 out of 240 men, including the colonel and fifteen other officers. The Fourth lost 164 at Malvern Hill, including its colonel. At Gettysburg it was in the wheatfield, and lost 165 men. Here a Confederate officer seized the regimental colours and was shot by the colonel, who the next moment was bayoneted by a Confederate soldier, who in his turn was instantly killed by the major. This regiment had three colonels killed in action. The Twenty-fourth, at Gettysburg, lost 363 men, including the colonel and twenty-one other officers, out of 496.

The Second Wisconsin lost 112 men at the first Bull Run and 298 at the second, including its colonel killed; and the Seventh had a total loss in killed and wounded of 1016 from an enrolment of 1,630; and the Twenty-sixth lost 503 from an enrolment of 1089.

The Fifth Iowa lost 217 men at Iuka, and the Seventh, at Belmont, lost 227 out of 410. At Pea Ridge the Ninth lost 218 out of 560. In the assault on Vicksburg the Twenty-second lost 164, and was the only regiment that gained and held any portion of the works. Of a squad of twenty-one men that leaped inside and waged a hand-to-hand fight, nineteen were killed.

The Eleventh Missouri had a total loss of 495 from an enrolment of 945. Its heaviest loss was in the assault on Vicksburg, 92. Joseph A. Mower, afterward eminent as a general, was at one time its colonel. The Twelfth Missouri lost 108 in the assault on Vicksburg, and the Fifteenth lost 100 at Chickamauga. General Osterhaus was the first colonel of the Twelfth.

The First Kansas lost 106 men killed and wounded at Wilson's Creek.

The losses in the cavalry were not so striking as those

of the infantry, because they were seldom so heavy in any one engagement. But the cavalry were engaged oftener, sometimes in a constant running fight, and the average aggregate of casualties was about the same as in other arms of the service.

In the artillery there were occasionally heavy losses when the enemy charged upon a battery and the gunners stood by their pieces. At Iuka, Sands's Ohio battery had 105 men, including drivers. It was doing very effective service when two Texas regiments charged it, and 51 of its men were killed or wounded. It was captured and recaptured. Seeley's battery at Chancellorsville lost 45 men, and at Gettysburg 25. Campbell's lost 40 at the Antietam, and Cushing's 38 at Gettysburg. The Fifth Maine battery lost 28 at Chancellorsville, 28 at Cedar Creek, and 23 at Gettysburg.

The coloured regiments, which were not taken into the service till the third year of the war, suffered quite as heavily as the white ones. They lost over 2700 men killed in battle (not including the mortality among their white officers), and, with the usual proportion of wounded, this would make their total of casualties at least 12,000.

The regimental losses in the Confederate army were at least equal to those in the National, and were probably greater, for the reason that for them "there was no discharge in that war." Every organization in the National service was enlisted on a distinct contract to serve for a definite term—three months, nine months, two years, or three years—and when the term expired, the men were sent home and mustered out. But when a man was once mustered into the Confederate army, he was there till the end of the war, unless he deserted or was disabled. But no records are available from

which complete statistics can be compiled. And in May, 1863, General Lee issued an order forbidding commanders to include in their reports of casualties in battle any wounds except such as disabled the men for further service, and also forbidding them to mention the number of men engaged in an action. This makes any mathematical comparison with the casualties in the National armies impossible; and without information as to the number engaged, the percentage of loss, which is the true test, cannot be computed. Still, there were a considerable number of regiments the statistics of which were recorded and have been preserved. The heaviest loss known in any Confederate regiment was that of the Twenty-sixth North Carolina at Gettysburg. It went into the fight with somewhat more than 800 men, and lost 588 killed or wounded, besides 120 missing. One company went into the first day's battle with three officers and 84 men, and all but one man were either killed or wounded. Another North Carolina regiment, the Eleventh, went in on the first day with three officers and 38 men, and two of the officers and 34 men were killed or wounded. At Fair Oaks, the Sixth Alabama lost 373 out of 632, and the Fourth North Carolina, 369 out of 687. At Gaines's Mill the First South Carolina lost 319 out of 537; and at Stone River the Eighth Tennessee lost 306 out of 444. The heaviest percentage of loss, so far as known, was that of the First Texas, at the Antietam, 82 per cent. In that same battle the Sixteenth Mississippi lost 63 per cent.; the Twenty-seventh North Carolina, 61 per cent.; the Eighteenth and Tenth Georgia, each 57 per cent.; the Seventeenth Virginia, 56 per cent.; the Fourth Texas, 53 per cent.; the Seventh South Carolina, 52 per cent.; the Thirty-second Virginia, 45

per cent.; and the Eighteenth Mississippi, 45 per cent. Some of the losses at Chickamauga were equally appalling. The Tenth Tennessee lost 68 per cent.; the Fifth Georgia, 61 per cent.; the Second and Fifteenth Tennessee, 60 per cent.; the Sixteenth Alabama and the Sixth and Ninth Tennessee, each 58 per cent.; the Eighteenth Alabama, 56 per cent.; the Twenty-second Alabama, 55 per cent.; the Twenty-third Tennessee, 54 per cent.; the Twenty-ninth Mississippi and the Fifty-eighth Alabama, each 52 per cent.; the Thirty-seventh Georgia and the Sixty-third Tennessee, each 50 per cent.; the Forty-first Alabama, 49 per cent.; the Twentieth and Thirty-second Tennessee, each 48 per cent.; and the First Arkansas, 45 per cent.; and these losses include very few prisoners. At Gettysburg, besides the regiments already mentioned, the heaviest losers among the Confederates were: the Second North Carolina, 64 per cent.; the Ninth Georgia, 55 per cent.; the Fifteenth Georgia, 51 per cent.; and the First Maryland, 48 per cent. At Shiloh the Sixth Mississippi lost 70 per cent. At Manassas the Twenty-first Georgia lost 76 per cent.; the Seventeenth South Carolina, 67 per cent.; the Twenty-third South Carolina, 66 per cent.; the Twelfth South Carolina and the Fourth Virginia, each 54 per cent.; and the Seventeenth Georgia, 50 per cent. At Stone River the Eighth Tennessee lost 68 per cent.; the Twelfth Tennessee, 56 per cent., and the Eighth Mississippi, 47 per cent. At Mechanicsville the Forty-fourth Georgia lost 65 per cent. At Malvern Hill the Third Alabama lost 56 per cent.; the Forty-fourth Georgia, 46 per cent.; and the Twenty-sixth Alabama, 40 per cent.

No comparison can be made with the losses in the great European war of 1914-, because both the weapons

used and the methods of attack are widely different. In the War of Secession there were no machine guns, no cannon so powerful as those now in use, and only a very few repeating arms or even breech-loaders. The use of wire entanglements was invented in that war, but was resorted to only to a limited extent. No poisonous gases were thrown against the enemy, and airships had not been invented. There were submerged torpedoes, some of which wrought damage; but the only submarine torpedo-boat was sent out by the Confederates against the ships blockading Charleston harbour. This made three futile attempts, sinking to the bottom with its crew each time. Still there were volunteers, and when it was once more recovered and sent out it reached its mark, but it went down with its victim.

If losses are the measure of valour, no European war previous to that of 1914 equalled in this respect the Civil War in the United States. In the Franco-German War of 1870, which is accounted one of the most deadly, the highest loss sustained by any German regiment was 49 per cent.

The Federal Finances

WHEN James Buchanan's term as President ended and Abraham Lincoln's began (March 4, 1861) the public debt was more than \$76,000,000, the treasury was empty, and the Government was borrowing money at 12 per cent. per annum. In December, 1860, Congress had authorized the issue of one-year treasury notes to the amount of \$10,000,000. An advertisement for half of these brought offers at rates of discount varying from 12 to 36 per cent. The offers at 12 per cent. were accepted, and subsequently the other \$5,000,000 were sold at 11 per cent. In February, 1861, Congress authorized a loan of \$25,000,000, to bear interest at 6 per cent., to be repaid not sooner than five years nor later than twenty. The Secretary of the Treasury succeeded in disposing of about one third of the bonds at ninety to ninety-six.

In President Lincoln's Cabinet Salmon P. Chase, who had been successively United States Senator and Governor of Ohio, was Secretary of the Treasury. Under the existing acts he borrowed, in March, \$8,000,000, rejecting all offers under ninety-four, and early in April he issued at par nearly \$5,000,000 in two-year treasury notes, which were receivable for public dues and were also convertible into six per cent. bonds. In May \$7,000,000 more of the six per cent. loan were issued, at rates from eighty-five to ninety-three, and also \$2,500,000 in treasury notes at par.

These transactions were considered remarkably successful, in view of the fact that many, even of the most loyal citizens, seriously doubted whether the Republic would survive the heavy blow that was aimed at its life and be able to redeem its obligations at all. The existing tariff produced an annual income of not more than \$30,000,000.

At the call of the President, Congress convened in extra session on July 4th, and on the 17th, with but five dissenting votes in the House, it passed a bill for the issue of bonds and treasury notes to the amount of \$250,000,000. It also increased the duty on many articles of import, decreed confiscation of the property of rebels, and levied a direct tax of \$20,000,000. This tax was apportioned to the States and Territories according to their population, as provided by the Constitution (Article I., Section 9). The insurrectionary States of course did not respond, neither did Colorado, Delaware, Oregon, Utah, or the District of Columbia. All the others paid. This law provided for collection of the tax by United States officials wherever the States refused or neglected to collect it themselves. Under this clause, lands worth about \$70,000, in some of the seceding States, were seized and sold for non-payment. Subsequently the money was refunded to the States that had paid.

In August, 1861, demand notes were issued as currency and were paid to department clerks for their salaries. Although these were convertible into gold, they were at first received with reluctance; but they soon became popular, and in five months they were in circulation to the extent of \$33,000,000.

Secretary Chase now had a conference with bankers of New York, Boston, and Philadelphia, proposing to

negotiate a large loan. Most of the bankers declared that they desired to sustain the Government, but they objected to the terms and the rates of interest. The Secretary then told them that if they could not take the loan on his terms he would issue notes for circulation, adding, "It is certain that the war must go on until the rebellion is put down, if we have to put out paper till it takes a thousand dollars to buy a breakfast." The bankers finally formed a syndicate to lend the Government \$50,000,000 in coin, for which the Treasury would give them three-year notes bearing interest at seven and three tenths per cent. and convertible into six per cent. twenty-year bonds. That unusual rate of interest was intended as a special inducement and for ease of calculation. The interest was two cents a day on a hundred dollars; the notes were issued in denominations as low as fifty dollars, so that citizens of limited means could take them; they were called "seven-thirties," and became very popular. The coupon and registered bonds that were to run from five to twenty years were called "five-twenties." Subscription-books were opened in every city, and the response was so prompt that very soon the Government was able to repay the banks and make another loan. When a third loan was refused, the Secretary issued \$50,000,000 of five-twenties at six per cent., sold at such a discount as to make a seven per cent. investment. The agents that handled these bonds were paid one fifth of one per cent. on the first \$100,000, and one eighth of one per cent. on all above that amount. The most successful of these agents was Jay Cooke of Philadelphia.

At this time the amount of coin in circulation in the United States was estimated at \$210,000,000. Before

the war had been in progress a year the operations of the Government were so extensive that there was not a sufficient volume of currency, and coin began to be hoarded by many who feared that the paper never would be redeemed. On December 31, 1861, the banks suspended specie payments, and then the Government was obliged to do likewise. More than half a million men were now in the field, and the navy had been increased from forty-two vessels to two hundred and sixty-four, with a corresponding increase of the crews. In the Military Academy at West Point and the Naval Academy at Annapolis the classes had been advanced, so that each of those institutions graduated two classes in 1861. The pay of a private soldier was raised from \$13 to \$17 a month, with food and clothing, and the total cost to the Government for each soldier in the field was about \$1000 a year, in currency. This was two and a half times the cost of a British soldier, and ten times the cost of a French soldier.

Early in 1862 all coin, except cents, disappeared from circulation, and some kinds of business were paralysed for want of small change. All sorts of expedients were resorted to; private firms issued tokens and fractional notes; and postage stamps in various small amounts were enclosed in little envelopes, which were labelled and passed at their face value as money. Specie payments were not resumed by the Government till 1879.

Thaddeus Stevens, member of Congress from Pennsylvania, proposed that the Government issue notes for circulation, to any necessary amount, making them legal tender for all debts, public or private. Secretary Chase opposed this, and offered instead a plan for a

national banking system. The State banks opposed him, and he reluctantly consented to Mr. Stevens's plan; but later his own was adopted. The new notes were popularly called "greenbacks," and were receivable for everything except duties on imports. They were popular from the first, and it appeared that their plentifulness led to much extravagance; but probably the freedom with which they were expended arose to some extent from a still lingering doubt as to their ultimate value and a desire to turn them into something substantial. The stories about the old Continental currency had not been wholly forgotten. In the insurrectionary States the greenbacks at first were treated with contempt. In one instance a Confederate soldier was found sitting on the bank of a stream, tearing up and throwing into the water a large number of them which he had somewhere found or captured. When questioned, he answered that he was determined to destroy everything that belonged to "that damned Yankee Government." But before long the Confederates recognized the fact that these greenbacks were far more valuable than the notes issued by their own Government, which were to be redeemed "six months after the ratification of a treaty of peace with the United States." When National soldiers were made prisoners, their captors were not more eager to take their watches, their boots, and their best garments than to possess themselves of whatever greenbacks might be in their pockets; and they made a show of fairness by exchanging Confederate currency, never at a smaller discount than seven to one. The Federal Government also issued fractional currency, called postal currency, in denominations of fifty, twenty-five, ten, five, and three cents.

As the paper currency gradually decreased in value, the decline was measured indirectly by the rise in the price of gold, which had to be bought for payment of duties and some other purposes. Gold was therefore treated as a stock, and its price appeared from day to day in the reports of the Exchange. At the beginning of 1862 the premium was about two per cent. After much fluctuation but a general upward tendency, at the close of 1863 it reached 151—that is, the premium was 51 per cent. After the Army of the Potomac had crossed the James, June 21, 1864, it reached 200; and on the 11th of the next month it was at its highest point, 285. Confederate paper money was at par till November, 1861. Then it steadily declined until at the close of 1864 five hundred dollars of it were worth but one dollar in gold.

Most of the funded debt of the United States was in five-twenty bonds. An act was passed authorizing the issue of ten-forty bonds; but these were not popular, and few were taken.

By the census of 1860 the total assessed value of all property in the United States, real and personal, was somewhat more than \$16,000,000,000. The cost of the war, to the Government, was nearly half that amount. The size of the Confederate debt is unknown. Much of it was held in Europe; and after the war occasional conferences of European bondholders were held there, to learn what might be the prospect of securing payment. The meetings were in a gloomy hall in London, the gloom of which never was lightened by any encouragement. The Fourteenth Amendment to the Federal Constitution, ratified in 1868, provides, on the one hand, that the validity of the public debt shall not be questioned, and, on the other, that "neither the United

States nor any State shall assume or pay any debt or obligation incurred in aid of insurrection or rebellion against the United States, or any claim for the loss or emancipation of any slave."

The Sanitary and Christian Commissions did a great work for the welfare of the soldiers, supplying nurses, clothing, surgical appliances, reading matter, etc. The former raised in cash \$4,900,000 and received articles to the value of \$15,000,000 more. And there never was any deficit or irregularity in its finances. It was assisted by 7,000 local societies organized by women; and it furnished 4,500,000 meals to sick and hungry soldiers. The Christian Commission had 6,000 delegates all serving without pay. Besides its general welfare work it distributed much religious literature, including 100,000 Bibles. The funds for these organizations were raised largely by fairs or bazaars. Many who could not give money gave articles that could be sold. California, which contributed no men to the army, sent \$1,300,000 in gold.

Everything possible was done to keep the soldiers in touch with their homes. Nurses and volunteer women wrote thousands of letters for those in hospital. If one in the field was without stamps, he had only to write "soldier's letter" on the envelope, and the postage would be collected on delivery. Northern families could write to relatives in the South a short letter, leave it unsealed, for inspection, enclose a silver ten-cent piece for Confederate postage, and it would go through the lines and be delivered.

INDEX

- Adams, General Daniel W., wounded and captured, 227
 Adams, General John, killed, 315
Alabama, the, her captures, 280; fights the *Kearsarge*, 281; surrendered and sunk, 283
Albemarle, the, destroyed, 300 *et seq.*
 Alexander, Colonel E. P., at Gettysburg, 204
 Allatoona, defence of, 306
 Allen's Farm, battle of, 119
 Ammunition, careless handling of, 333, 334
 Ammunition train, a strange, 215
 Anderson, General Geo. E., killed, 154
 Anderson, General J. R., march to Spottsylvania, 256; calls on President Lincoln, 357
 Anderson, Major Robert, commands at Fort Sumter, 13 *et seq.*; made Brigadier-General, 24
 Anthony, Colonel Daniel R., arrested, 160
 Antietam, battle of the, 146 *et seq.*
 Appomattox Court House, ceremony of surrender at, 360
 Archer, General James J., captured, 188
 Arkansas Post captured, 211
 Armistead, General L. A., at Malvern Hill, 125; killed, 206
 Atlanta, campaign to, 267 *et seq.*; battle of, 277; great fire in, 307
 Augur, General Christopher C., in defence of Washington, 352
 Aversboro, battle of, 335
 Ayres, General Romeyn B., at Gettysburg, 199; in fight for Weldon Railroad, 347
 Bailey, Colonel Joseph, rescues Porter's fleet, 242
 Bailey, Captain Theodorus, in expedition against New Orleans, 95
 Baker, Edward D., introduces Lincoln, 10
 Baldwin, Colonel P. P., killed, 227
 Baltimore, riots in, 9; how Colonel Quinby's regiment went through, 9
 Banks, General N. P., defeats Jackson, 130; commands Red River expedition, 237 *et seq.*
 Barksdale, General Wm., killed, 196
 Barlow, General Francis C., in fight for the Weldon Railroad, 349
 Barron, Captain S., quoted, 43
 Bartow, General F. S., killed, 36
 Bayard, General Geo. D., at Cedar Mountain, 131
 Beauregard, General G. P. T., commands in attack on Sumter, 20; at Bull Run, 29; in command at Shiloh, 84; besieged at Corinth, 87; before Petersburg, 338
 Beaver Dam Creek, battle of, 116
 Bee, General Bernard E., killed, 36
 Bell, Captain H. H., in expedition against New Orleans, 98
 Bell, John, nominated for President, 3
 Bentonville, battle of, 336
 Berry, General Hiram G., killed, 182
 Big Black River, battle at the, 217
 Birney, General D. B., succeeds to command of Third Corps, 196; in command of Second Corps, 340
 Bissell, Colonel J. W., cuts a canal, 79

- Blair, General Francis P., in Vicksburg campaign, 216
- Blake, Captain Henry N., quoted, 137
- Blockade-runners, Confederate rule for, 286
- Bloodiest day of the war, 153
- Bloody Lane, 151; losses there, 153, 154
- Bombardment, incessant, 351
- Border States, the, position of, 27
- Bragg, General Braxton, at battle of Shiloh, 81; opposed to Rosecrans in Tennessee, 222; fights at Chickamauga, 223; menaces Chattanooga, 230; defeated by Grant, 235
- Branch, General L. O' B., in command at New Berne, 49; killed, 154
- Breckinridge, John C., nominated for President, 3
- Bridge, Burnside's, carried, 152
- Brooke, General John R., at Gettysburg, 199
- Brown, Colonel Harvey, at Fort Barrancas, 12
- Brown, Governor Joseph E., recalls Georgia's militia, 305
- Brownell, Henry Howard, called "our battle laureate," 101; stanzas from his *Bay Fight*, 291
- Buchanan, Captain Franklin, commands the *Merrimac*, 69; wounded and captured, 291
- Buchanan, President James, his paradoxical position, 5; changes in his Cabinet, 19
- Buckner, General S. B., in command at Fort Donelson, 56
- Buell, General D. C., at battle of Shiloh, 80
- Buford, General John, commands cavalry in the valley, 130; at Gettysburg, 187
- Bull Run, first battle of, 28 *et seq.*; second battle of, 133 *et seq.*; described by Captain Blake, 137
- Burnham, General Hiram, killed, 353
- Burnside, General A. E., commands an expedition, 45; in the Maryland campaign, 144 *et seq.*; commands the Army of the Potomac, 169; fights battle of Fredericksburg, 170; besieged at Knoxville, 236; in Overland campaign, 249 *et seq.*; relieved, 346
- Butler, General B. F., in expedition to Carolina coast, 42; in expedition against New Orleans, 92; governs that city, 101; declares slaves contraband, 160; intrenched at Bermuda Hundred, 338
- Byers, Captain S. H. M., his poem presented to General Sherman, 332
- Byrnes, Colonel, killed, 265
- Caldwell, Lieutenant C. H. B., in expedition against New Orleans, 95
- Caldwell, General John C., at Gettysburg, 199
- Calhoun, John C., sets forth doctrine of nullification, iv
- California admitted to the Union, iv
- Calls for troops, successive, 28
- Cameron, Colonel James, killed, 36
- Canals—to pass Island No. 10, 79; a fruitless attempt to cut, 212; Dutch Gap, 338
- Carolinas, the march through the, 327-337
- Carroll, General Samuel S., at Gettysburg, 201; wounded and promoted on the field, 261
- Casey, General Silas, in peninsula campaign, 108 *et seq.*
- Cassville, the position at, 269
- Causes of the war may be limited to three men, iii
- Cedar Creek, the battle of, 292 *et seq.*; surprise and slaughter, 295; Sheridan arrives and stops the rout, 299
- Cedar Mountain, battle of, 130
- Chalmers, General James R., in battle of Nashville, 319
- Chamberlain, Colonel J. L., charge at Gettysburg, 195
- Chambersburg burned, 292, 352
- Champion's Hill, battle of, 216
- Chancellorsville, battle of, 174 *et seq.*
- Charleston, S. C., evacuated by the Confederates, 333

- Chattahoochee, crossing of the, 274
 Chattanooga, battles at, 228 *et seq.*
 Cheatham, General B. F., in battle of Nashville, 319
 Cheraw, captures in, 334
 Chickamauga, battle of, 222 *et seq.*; effect of an ambiguous order, 225
 Civil life, return of soldiers to, 366
 Cleburne, General Patrick R., killed, 315
 Cock-fighting, 311
 Cold Harbor, battle of, 263
 Colored people following the army, 310
 Colored troops, in battle of Nashville, 322
 Colquitt, General Alfred H., in fight for the Weldon Railroad, 347
 Columbia, S. C., Sherman's army at, 330-333; controversy as to the burning, 332, note
 Colvill, Colonel Wm., his regiment's charge at Gettysburg, 197
 Compromises—the Missouri, iv; of 1850, iv; the three, of the Constitution, v; nature of, 158
 Confederacy, the, how formed, 27
 Confederate Government removed to Richmond, 28; flies from its capital, 327
 Constitution, the Federal, debates in convention, v *et seq.*
 Coon's brigade, in battle of Nashville, 323
 Corcoran, Colonel Michael, captured, 38
 Corduroying roads, 311, 330
 Corinth, besieged, 87
 Corse, General John M., defends Allatoona, 306
 "Cotton is King," Christy's declaration, 6
 Couch, General Darius N., commands Second Corps, 175; temporarily succeeds Hooker at Chancellorsville, 182; in battle of Nashville, 320
 Counting, different modes of, 148 note
 Cox, Rev. Henry, his timely advice, 41
 Cox, General Jacob D., describes a month of campaigning, 270; in battle of Nashville, 320; describes natural impediments, 330
 "Cracker line" opened, 229
 Crater. *See* Mine
 Craven, Captain T. A. M., goes down with his monitor in Mobile Bay, 288
 Crawford, General S. W., at Fort Sumter, 14; at Gettysburg, 200; in fight for the Weldon Railroad, 347
 Crittenden, General Geo. B., defeated at Mill Springs, 55
 Crittenden, General Thos. L., at Chickamauga, 223
 Crocker, General Marcellus M., in Vicksburg campaign, 216
 Crook, General George, in Shenandoah Valley, 293; at High Bridge, 359
 Cross, Colonel Edward E., killed, 196
 Croxton, General John T., in the battle of Franklin, 315
 Cruft, General Charles, at Look-out Mountain, 232; joins Thomas at Nashville, 316
 Cushing, Lieutenant Wm. B., destroys the *Albemarle*, 302
 Custer, General Geo. A., at Hawes's Shop, 263; in Shenandoah Valley, 293; defeats Early, 353; at Sailor's Creek, 358
 Cutler, General Lysander, wounded, 348
 Dam, Bailey's, in Red River, 242
 Daniel, General Junius, killed, 261
 Davis, Colonel B. F., captures a train, 144
 Davis, Jefferson, President of the Confederacy, 17; first call for troops, 27; remarks at Bull Run, 38; flies from Richmond, 356; Lincoln inquires for his house, 357
 Davis, Lieutenant J. C. (afterward General) at Fort Sumter, 14
 Democratic convention of 1860, 3
 Demosthenes quoted, 141
 Dempsey, Captain, at the crater, 344

- Deshler, General James, killed, 227
 Despatch, the lost, 143; one of Hood's captured, 322
 Disasters, concealment of, 327, note
 District of Columbia, slavery abolished in, 166
 Dix, John A., his famous order, 13; in Buchanan's Cabinet, 19; resigns, 40
 Doles, General Geo., killed, 265
 Doubleday, General Abner, at Fort Sumter, 14; quoted, 179; commands the First Corps, 188; describes battle, 198
 Douglas, Stephen A., candidate for President, 3; at the inauguration ceremony, 11
 Dred-Scott decision, the, vii
 Duncan, General J. K., commands forts below New Orleans, 91
 Dunker Church, the, singular record of the fighting there, 150
 Du Pont, Captain S. F., commands expedition, 52
 Durham Station, Johnston surrenders at, 362
 Dushane, Colonel, killed, 348

 Early, General Jubal A., storms Cemetery Hill, 201; in Shenandoah Valley, 293; raid toward Washington, 351; in battle at the Monocacy, 351
 Eggleston, Geo. Cary, quoted, 255
 Election of 1860, 4
 Ely, Hon. Alfred, captured, 38
 Emancipation of the slaves, 156 *et seq.*
 Emancipators, three great, 167
 Emergency campaign, the, 186
 Emory, General Wm. H., at Sabine Cross Roads, 240; in Shenandoah Valley, 293
 Ericsson, John, builder of the *Monitor*, 71 *et seq.*
 Everett, Edward, nominated for Vice-President, 3
 Ewell, General Richard S., commands a corps at Gettysburg, 189; in the Overland campaign, 249; captured with his corps, 358
 Expeditions—to coast of Carolina, 44; to Port Royal, 52
 Fairchild, Col. Lucius, wounded, 188
 Fair Oaks and Seven Pines, battle of, 108
 Farley, Captain Porter, describes scene on Little Round Top, 139
 Farmville, fight at, 358
 Farragut, Admiral David G., commands expedition against New Orleans, 92 *et seq.*; fights battle of Mobile Bay, 285 *et seq.*; his remark to a blockade-runner, 286; defies the torpedoes, 289; not "lashed to the mast," 291
 Fayetteville arsenal destroyed, 335
 "Fight it out on this line," Grant's declaration, 261
 Finances, the Federal, 367
 First gun fired in the war, 17
 Fisher's Hill, battle of, 294
 Five Forks, battle of, 354
 Floyd, General John B., at Fort Donelson, 57
 Foote, Captain Andrew H., commands gunboats at Forts Henry and Donelson, 56; engages batteries at Island Number Ten, 78
 Foreign aid for the Confederacy, Davis's hope of, 6
 Forrest, General Nathan B., at Fort Donelson, 59; captures Holly Springs, 210; in battles at Franklin and Nashville, 315 *et seq.*
 Fortifications, how constructed, 272
 Forts—Clark, captured, 43; De Russey, captured, 237; Fisher reduced, 334; Harrison, captured, 353; Hatteras, captured, 43; Henry and Donelson, captured, 55 *et seq.*; Hindman, captured, 211; McAllister, captured, 315; Macon, captured, 51; Moultrie, history of, 13; Sumter, captured, 12 *et seq.*
 Foster, General John G., at Fort Sumter, 14; in expedition to the coast, 45 *et seq.*; occupies Charleston, 333
 Foster, General Robert S., before Petersburg, 356
 Franklin, battle of, 313 *et seq.*

- Franklin, General Wm. B., services on the peninsula, 107; in Maryland campaign, 145 *et seq.*; at Fredericksburg, 170; at Sabine Cross-roads, 239
- Fredericksburg, battle of, 169 *et seq.*
- Frémont, John C., candidate for President, 2; refuses to serve under Pope, 128; his proclamation concerning slavery, 161
- French, General Wm. H., at Fredericksburg, 172
- Frietchie, Barbara, doubt as to, 142
- Gaines's Mills, battle of, 116
- Gardner, Colonel John L., at Fort Moultrie, 13
- Garfield, General James A., wins battle of Paintsville, 55; at Chickamauga, 226
- Garland, General Samuel, killed, 145
- Garrard, General Kenner, occupies Roswell, 274; in battle of Nashville, 319
- Geary, General John W., at Chancellorsville, 181
- Georgia, disaffected toward the Confederacy, 305
- Gerdes, Lieutenant F. H., in expedition against New Orleans, 93
- Gettysburg, battle of, 185 *et seq.*
- Gibbon, General John, at South Mountain, 145; in fight for the Weldon Railroad, 350
- Gist, General S. R., killed, 315
- Gladden, General A. H., mortally wounded, 83
- Glendale, battle of, 121
- Goldsborough, Captain Louis M., in command of expedition, 45
- Goodwin, Dr., Mayor of Columbia, 331
- Gordon, General G. W., captured, 315
- Gordon, General John B., at Cedar Creek, 296; exploit at Fort Stedman, 354
- Gosport navy yard destroyed, 66
- Govan, General Daniel, his brigade captured, 279
- Granbery, General H. B., killed, 315
- Grand Boore, rapids at, 242
- Granger, General Gordon, at Chickamauga, 226; on Dauphin Island, 286
- Grant, General Ulysses S., captures Forts Henry and Donelson, 55 *et seq.*; a classmate's prediction, 57; demands unconditional surrender, 64; in battle of Shiloh, 80 *et seq.*; reviews the Fitz-John Porter case, 140; campaign against Vicksburg, 209-221; takes command at Chattanooga, 228; defeats Bragg, 235; his Overland campaign, 246 *et seq.*; made Lieutenant-General, 247; his famous declaration, 261; his campaign against Petersburg, 338 *et seq.*; pursues Lee's army, 357; accepts Lee's surrender, 361; describes the Grand Review, 365
- Graves, Captain Thos. T., in Richmond, 356
- Greeley, Horace, in a panic, 40; his letter to President Lincoln, 163
- Greene, Lieutenant S. Dana, commands the *Monitor*, 74
- Gregg, General David M., at Hawes's Shop, 263; in fight for the Weldon Railroad, 347
- Griffin, General Charles, in fight for the Weldon Railroad, 346; at Appomattox, 360
- Griswoldville, action at, 309
- Grover, General Cuvier, at Groveton, 139
- Groveton battlefield, 133
- Haines's Bluff, fight at, 211
- Hall, Lieutenant N. J., at Fort Sumter, 14
- Halleck, General Henry W., in command at the West, 55; besieges Corinth, 87; is made General-in-Chief, 128
- Hamilton, General Schuyler, suggests cutting canal, 78
- Hamlin, Hannibal, Vice-President, 2
- Hammond, General, in battle of Nashville, 324
- Hampton, General Wade, service in the Carolinas, 329 *et seq.*

- Hancock, General W. S., in battle of Williamsburg, 106; at Fredericksburg, 172; at Chancellorsville, 181; at Gettysburg, 191; in Overland campaign, 248 *et seq.*; at the salient, 260; in advance toward Petersburg, 339; at Chaffin's Farm, 346; in fight for the Weldon Railroad, 348
- Hardee, General William J., at battle of Shiloh, 81; at Savannah, 310; evacuates Charleston, 333; in battle of Averasboro, 335
- Harker, General Chas. G., killed, 273
- Harpers Ferry, surrendered, 144
- Harrison's Landing, McClellan retires to, 127
- Hartranft, General John F., at the Antietam, 152
- Hatch, General John P., failure in the valley, 130
- Hawes's Shop, action at, 263
- Hawkins, Colonel Rush C., in command at Hatteras, 43 *et seq.*
- Hayes, General Joseph, captured, 348
- Hayes, Lieutenant-Colonel Ruth-erford B., wounded, 145
- Hazlett, Lieutenant Chas. E., killed, 195
- Heg, Colonel H. C., killed, 227
- Heintzelman, General Samuel P., commands a division at Bull Run, 30; in the Peninsula campaign, 104 *et seq.*
- Helm, General Benjamin H., killed, 227
- Heth, General Henry, in fight for the Weldon Railroad, 347
- High Bridge, fight at, 359
- Hill, General Ambrose P., in the peninsula campaign, 115 *et seq.*; receives surrender of Harpers Ferry, 144; wounded, 179; in the Overland campaign, 249; in fight for the Weldon Railroad, 347; killed, 356
- Hill, General Daniel H., in the peninsula campaign, 115 *et seq.*; complains of stragglers, 147
- Hill, Colonel Sylvester G., killed, 320
- Hilton Head, forts on captured, 53
- Hoke, General Robert F., captures Plymouth, 300
- Hollins, Commander George N., in command of gunboats, 77
- Holly Springs, capture of depot at, 210
- Holt, Joseph, in Buchanan's Cabinet, 19
- Hood, General John B., in the Maryland campaign, 147; at Gettysburg, 192; in Atlanta campaign, 270; supersedes Johnston, 275; fights the battle of Atlanta, 277; fights the battle of Franklin, 313; intrenches before Nashville, 315; defeated by Thomas, 318 *et seq.*; the remnant of his army scattered, 325; asks to be relieved, 326
- Hooker, General Joseph, at Williamsburg, 106; at second Bull Run, 134; in the Maryland campaign, 145 *et seq.*; discovers an ambush, 149; wounded, 150; at Fredericksburg, 170; commands Army of the Potomac, 174; letter from the President, 174; defeated at Chancellorsville, 176; stunned by a shot, 182; relieved, 185; sent to Tennessee, 228; victory at Wauhatchie, 229; battle above the clouds, 231; in Atlanta campaign, 267; relieved, 278
- Houghton, Major Charles H., describes explosion of mine, 342, 343
- Hovey, General Alvin P., in the Vicksburg campaign, 216
- Howard, General Oliver O., commands Eleventh Corps, 175; surprised at Chancellorsville, 177; at Gettysburg, 187 *et seq.*, commands Army of the Tennessee, 277; in march to the sea, 308; through the Carolinas, 328; in battle of Bentonville, 337
- Humphreys, General Andrew A., at Gettysburg, 196; breaks Lee's lines, 355
- Hunt, General Henry J., at Fredericksburg, 171; at Gettysburg, 204
- Hunter, General David, com-

Hunter—*Continued*

- mands a division at Bull Run, 30; proclamation concerning slavery, 162; resigns, 292
- Hurlbut, General Stephen A., at battle of Shiloh, 81; in Vicksburg campaign, 212 *et seq.*
- Imboden, General John D., at Gettysburg, 207
- "Impending Crisis," Helper's book, 162
- Inauguration ceremonies, 9-11
- Ireland, Colonel, at Lookout Mountain, 232
- Iron Brigade, Meredith's, 188
- Ironclads, first battle of, 66 *et seq.*
- Irrepressible conflict, Seward's speech on the, 157
- Island Number Ten, capture of, 77 *et seq.*
- Iverson, General Alfred, his brigade at Gettysburg, 190
- Jackson, Miss., captured, 214
- Jackson, General Thomas J., named "Stonewall," 34; defeated by Shields, 105; raid in the Valley, 107; defeated at Cedar Mountain, 130; in Pope's campaign, 132; at the Antietam, 143 *et seq.*; at Fredericksburg, 169; at Chancellorsville, 177; mortally wounded, 179
- James River, crossed by Grant's army, 265
- Jasper, Sergeant, his exploit, 13
- Jefferson, Thomas, letter to Dr. Gordon, 167
- Jenkins, General Micah, killed, 252
- John Brown song, favourite, 26
- Johnson, General Edward, at Gettysburg, 203; captured, 260; captured again, 323
- Johnson, Herschel V., candidate for Vice-President, 3
- Johnston, General Albert Sidney, in command at Shiloh, 81; mortally wounded, 83
- Johnston, General Joseph E., at Bull Run, 30; before Richmond, 104; his plans thwarted by Lee, 106; wounded and retired, 109; in Vicksburg campaign, 214 *et seq.*; supersedes Bragg, 236; in Atlanta campaign, 267 *et seq.*; superseded by Hood, 275; succeeds Hood after battle of Nashville, 326; service in the Carolinas, 329; his opinion of Sherman's army, 330; fights the battle of Bentonville, 336; surrenders to Sherman, 362
- Jones, Lieutenant Catesby, commands the *Merrimac*, 70
- Jones, General David R., on the condition of Lee's army, 142
- Jouett, Captain James E., in battle of Mobile Bay, 289
- Kansas, the war in, vii
- Kansas-Nebraska act, the, vii., its absurdity, 2
- Kearny, General Philip, in battle of Glendale, 122; at Groveton, 134; killed, 136
- Kearsarge* and *Alabama*, battle of, 280
- Keenan, Major Peter, leads charge at Chancellorsville, 178
- Kelly's Ford, action at, 132
- Kenesaw Mountain, position at, 271
- Kershaw, General Joseph B., at Gettysburg, 199; at Cedar Creek, 297
- Keyes, General E. D., in the Peninsula campaign, 104 *et seq.*
- Kilpatrick, General Judson, rides around Atlanta, 278; in march to the sea, 308; in the Carolinas, 333 *et seq.*
- Kimball, General Nathan, in battle of Nashville, 320
- King, Colonel E. A., killed, 227
- King, General Rufus N., at Groveton, 133
- Kinney, Lieutenant John C., quoted, 286, 288
- Klein, Lieutenant Chas. P., mortally wounded, 195
- Know-Nothing party, in the campaign of 1856, 2
- Kreutzer, Colonel Wm., quoted, 110
- Lane, Joseph, nominated for Vice-President, 3

- Law, General E. M., describes fighting in the Wilderness, 253
- Lawler, General Michael K., leads a charge, 217
- Ledlie, General James H., at Petersburg mine, 342
- Lee, General Robert E., takes command of the Confederate army, 113; in Pope's campaign, 129; his Maryland campaign, 141; battle of Fredericksburg, 170; invades the North and fights battle of Gettysburg, 185 *et seq.*; composition of his army for the Overland campaign, 249; in the defences of Petersburg, 340; in flight, 357-360; surrenders to Grant, 361
- Lee, General S. D., in battle of Nashville, 317
- Lee, General W. H. F., in fight for the Weldon Railroad, 347
- Light Brigade's charge compared, 198
- Lincoln, Abraham, elected and inaugurated President, 1 *et seq.*; his earliest declaration as to slavery, 1; debate with Douglas, 2, 4; journey to Washington, 6 *et seq.*; conspiracy to assassinate, 7; first call for troops, 24; proposes to "borrow" the Army of the Potomac, 103; on "a house divided against itself," 157; proclaims emancipation, 164; his letter to General Hooker, 174; his letter to General Grant, 250; walks through Richmond, 357; assassinated, 365
- Logan, General John A., at Bull Run as a private, 32; Colonel at Fort Donelson, 60; in Vicksburg campaign, 216; in battles around Atlanta, 277, 278; on the way to supersede Thomas, 316
- Longstreet, General James, quoted, v; in the Peninsula campaign, 115; in Pope's campaign, 134; in the Maryland campaign, 143; works a battery, 154; at Fredericksburg, 170; at Gettysburg, 192; remonstrates against Pickett's charge, 202; describes that action, 205; at Chickamauga, 224; besieges Knoxville, 236; in the Overland campaign, 249; wounded by his own men, 252
- Lookout Mountain and Missionary Ridge, 228
- Loss of life, daily average, by the war, viii
- Louisiana Tigers, the, defeated, 201
- Lovell, General Mansfield, in command at New Orleans, 99
- Lowell, General Chas. R., in Shenandoah Valley, 293
- Lynch, Commander W. F., defeated at Roanoke Island, 48
- Lytle, General Wm. H., killed, 227
- McArthur, General John, in battle of Nashville, 319
- Macauley, Colonel, at Cedar Creek, 298
- McCall, General Geo. A., in the Peninsula campaign, 116 *et seq.*; quoted, 122; captured, 122
- McCausland, General John, burns Chambersburg, 352
- McClellan, General George B. takes command of the army, and is made General-in-Chief, 102; moves the army to Fort Monroe, 105; begins change of base, 118; resumes command and fights the battle of the Antietam, 142; his excuses for delay, 169; relieved, 169
- McClelland, John A., in Congress, 28; at Fort Donelson, 58; at Shiloh, 81; captures Arkansas Post, 211; commands a corps at Vicksburg, 212; relieved, 218
- McCook, General Alex. McD., at Chickamauga, 224
- McCook, General Daniel, killed, 273
- McDowell, General Irvin, commands in battle of Bull Run, 30 *et seq.*; commands a corps, 104; in Pope's campaign, 133
- McGraw, Lieutenant Hugh, mortally wounded, 195
- McKnight's battery, at the Weldon Railroad, 349
- McLaws, General Lafayette, bombards Harpers Ferry, 144

- McMellan, General W. L., in battle of Nashville, 322
- Macomb, Commander W. H., recaptures Plymouth, 304
- McPherson, General James B., at Shiloh, 88; in the Vicksburg campaign, 212 *et seq.*, in the Atlanta campaign, 267 *et seq.*; killed, 277
- Madison, James, on slavery, 157
- Magruder, General John B., on the Peninsula, 105; quoted, 118; at Allen's Farm, 119
- Mahone, General Wm., at Chancellorsville, 181; in the fight for the Weldon Railroad, 347
- Malvern Hill, battle of, 123 *et seq.*
- Mansfield, General J. K. F., takes the first troops across the Potomac, 29; at Antietam, 149; killed, 150
- March to the sea, Sherman's, 305 *et seq.*
- Marietta, action near, 272
- Maryland campaign, the, 141 *et seq.*
- Mason, George, on the African slave trade, 157
- Meade, Colonel, killed, 265
- Meade, General George G., at Fredericksburg, 173; commands Fifth Corps, 175; commands Army of the Potomac and fights battle of Gettysburg, 185 *et seq.*; in the Overland campaign, 249 *et seq.*
- Meade, Lieutenant R. K., at Fort Sumter, 14
- Meredith, General Solomon, at Gettysburg, 188
- Miami, the, at Plymouth, 301
- Miles, General Dixon S., commands a division at Bull Run, 30; at Harpers Ferry, 142; killed, 144
- Miles, General Nelson A., wounded, 182; in the fight for the Weldon Railroad, 349
- Mill Springs, battle of, 55
- Milroy, General Robert H., defeats Bate and Forrest, 318
- Mine at Petersburg, 341; exploded, 342; fighting at the "crater," 342-345
- Minnesota regiment, the 1st, its charge at Gettysburg, 197
- Missouri admitted to the Union, iv; compromise attacked as unconstitutional, vi
- Mitchell, Mary B., her account of stragglers, 148
- Mobile Bay, battle of, 285
- Money, Confederate, destruction of the factory, 333
- Monitor and Merrimac, battle of, 69 *et seq.*; destruction of the Merrimac, 75; loss of the Monitor, 75
- Monocacy, battle at the, 351
- Moore, Colonel Jonathan B., in battle of Nashville, 319
- Morris, Colonel, killed, 265
- Morris, Lieutenant Geo. V., commands the Cumberland, 70
- Morris, Gouverneur, on slavery, 156
- Mortar schooners, 91
- Mortars, wooden, 219
- Mott, General Gershom, wounded, 182
- Mower, General Joseph A., at Bentonville, 336
- Murphy, Colonel, in the fight for the Weldon Railroad, 349
- Mule meat, at Vicksburg, 220
- Nashville, battle of, 318 *et seq.*
- Nelson, General Wm., at Shiloh, 82
- New Hope Church, battle of, 270
- New Orleans, expedition against, 90 *et seq.*; capture of, 99
- North Anna, situation on the, 262
- North Carolina, votes on seceding from the Confederacy, 305
- Norfolk Railroad severed, 340
- Nullification, attempt at, iv
- Okey, Captain Daniel, quoted, 311
- "On to Richmond," 29
- Opequan Creek, action at, 293
- Ord, General E. O. C., in the Peninsula campaign, 116; commands a corps, 218; breaks Lee's lines, 355
- Ordinance of 1787, iv
- O'Rorke, Colonel Patrick H., killed, 195
- Overland campaign, Grant's, 247 *et seq.*

- Paine, Colonel Halbert E., arrested, 159
 Paintsville, battle of, 55
 Palmer, General W. J., in battle of Nashville, 325
 Parallel between Independence and Emancipation, 168
 Parke, General J. G., in expedition to the coast, 45 *et seq.*; commands the Ninth Corps, 346; breaks Lee's lines, 355
 Patterson, General Robert, his duty and his failure, 30 *et seq.*
 Peachtree Creek, action at, 275
 Pegram, Captain R. G., in fight for the Weldon Railroad, 347
 Pemberton, General John C., in command at Vicksburg, 210 *et seq.*
 Pender, General Wm. D., in Pickett's charge, 203
 Peninsula, campaign on the, 102 *et seq.*
 Pennell, Lieutenant, killed, 344
 Perkins, Lieutenant George H., at New Orleans, 99
 Perrin, General Abner, killed, 261
 Petersburg, importance as a railroad centre, 339; first attacks on, 340
 Pettigrew, General J. J., in Pickett's charge, 203
 Pickett's charge at Gettysburg, 203
 Pillow, General Gideon J., at Fort Donelson, 57; Wallace's opinion of, 61
 Pinckney, Chas. C., on the domestic slave trade, 157
 Pittsburg Landing, battle of, 80 *et seq.*
 Pleasant Hill, battle of, 240
 Pleasanton, General Alfred, at Chancellorsville, 176 *et seq.*
 Pleasants, Colonel Henry, plans mine at Petersburg, 340
 Plymouth, N. C., captured, 300; recaptured, 304
 Polk, General Leonidas, at Chickamauga, 224 *et seq.*; killed, 271
 Pope, General John, captures Island No. 10, 77; his campaign in Virginia, 128; his baggage captured, 132
 Popular sovereignty, invention of the term, vi
 Porter, David D., in the expedition against New Orleans, 93; on the Mississippi, 210; in the Red River expedition, 237; describes the rescue of his fleet, 245
 Porter, General Fitz-John, in the Peninsula campaign, 115 *et seq.*; at Second Bull Run, 134; condemned by court-martial, 140; restored, *ibid.*
 Porter, General Horace, describes closing scenes, 359, 360
 Porter, Colonel Peter A., killed, 265
 Port Gibson, fight at, 213
 Port Hudson, capture of, 221
 Port Royal, expedition against, 52
 Post, General Sidney, in battle of Nashville, 320
 Potomac first crossed by National troops, 29
 Potter, General Robert B., at the Antietam, 152; in the "crater," 345; in the fight for the Weldon Railroad, 347
 Poultry too plentiful, 219
 Powell, Major Wm. H., describes the "crater" at Petersburg, 342
 Proclamation of Emancipation, Lincoln's, 164
 Putnam, Colonel Douglas, Jr., quoted, 87
 Putnam, Major Geo. Haven, describes building of Bailey's dam, 243; describes battle of Cedar Creek, 296
 "Quaker guns," 106
 Quinby, Colonel Isaac F., takes his regiment through Baltimore in proper style, 9
 Railroad, a temporary, 350
 Randol, Captain Alanson M., his battery at Glendale, 121
 Rawlins, General John A., at Shiloh, 87
 Raymond, fight at, 214
 Read, General Theodore, killed, 358
 Redfield, Colonel James, killed, 306
 Red River expedition, the, 237

- Reno, General Jesse L., in expedition to the coast, 45; joins Pope, 131; killed, 145
- Republican party, rise of the, 1; in the campaign of 1856, 2
- Resaca, the situation at, 269
- Review of the victorious armies, 364; Grant's description of, 365
- Reynolds, General John F., in the Peninsula campaign, 116; at Second Bull Run, 135; commands First Corps, 175; at Chancellorsville, 180; killed, 188
- Rice, General J. C., killed, 261
- Richardson, General Israel B., mortally wounded, 154
- Richmond evacuated, and occupied by Weitzel and Devens, 356; President Lincoln walks through, 357
- Ricketts, General James B., battery at Gettysburg, 201; at the Monocacy, 351
- Roanoke Island fortified, 44; battle on, 47
- Robinson, General John C., at Gettysburg, 189
- Rockwood, Major, killed, 344
- Rodman, General Isaac P., killed, 154
- Rosecrans, General Wm. S., his strategy in Tennessee, 222; enters Chattanooga, 223; in battle of Chickamauga, 223; relieved, 228
- Ross, Lieutenant-Colonel, killed, 344
- Rosser, General Thos. L., defeated, 252
- Rousseau, General Lovell H., at Murfreesboro, 315
- Rowan, Commander Stephen C., commands in N. C. waters, 48
- Ruffin, Edmund, strange career, 21
- Ruger, General Thos. H., at Gettysburg, 203
- Runyon, General Theodore, commands a division at Bull Run, 30
- Rutledge, John, on importation of slaves, 156
- Sabine Cross Roads, battle of, 238
- Sailor's Creek, battle of, 358
- Sanders, General J. C. C., killed, 348
- Sassacus*, the, at Plymouth, 301
- Savage's Station, battle of, 119
- Schofield, General John M., in the Atlanta campaign, 267 *et seq.*; joins Thomas, 307; fights battle of Franklin, 313; in battle of Nashville, 319; joins Sherman in North Carolina, 334
- Scott, General Winfield, in command at Washington, 28; retired, 102
- Sebastopol, siege of, compared, 363
- Secession of Southern States, 4, 5
- Sedgwick, General John, at the Antietam, 150; commands the Sixth Corps, 175; fights at Salem Church, 183; in Overland campaign, 249; killed, 257
- Semmes, Raphael, commander of the *Alabama*, defeated and carried away to England, 283
- Seward, Wm. H., his famous speech, 157
- Seymour, Captain Truman, at Fort Sumter, 14
- Shenandoah Valley, the, its importance, 292; destruction of its resources, 294
- Sheridan, General Philip H., at Chickamauga, 226; at Chattanooga, 235; in the Overland campaign, 249; raid around Lee's army, 257; commands in the Shenandoah Valley, 293; his ride, 299; destroys railroads and canal locks, and rides around Richmond, 353; fights the battle of Five Forks, 354; pursues Lee's army, 358
- Sherman, General Thomas W., commands expedition, 52
- Sherman, General Wm. T., at Bull Run, 33; comments on the battle, 37; in the battle of Shiloh, 81 *et seq.*; in the campaign against Vicksburg, 210; at Chattanooga, 230; his estimate of Grant, 255; his Atlanta campaign, 267; his march to the sea, 305; instructions for the march, 308; makes President Lincoln a Christmas present of Savannah, 312; his campaign in the Carolinas, 327-337;

- Sherman—*Continued*
 reaches Goldsboro, 337; receives Johnston's surrender, 362
 "Sherman's March to the Sea," poem by Byers, 332
 Sherrill, Colonel Eliakim, killed, 196
 Shields, General James, defeats Jackson at Winchester, 105
 Shiloh, battle of, 80 *et seq.*
 Shy, Colonel T. M., killed, 321
 Sickles, General Daniel E., commands Third Corps, 175; at Chancellorsville, 179; at Gettysburg, 191 *et seq.*; wounded, 196
 Sigel, General Franz, assumes command of a corps, 128
 Sigfried, Colonel, at the crater, 344
 Slavery—first importation from Africa, iii; debates concerning, vi; discussed in the Constitutional Convention, 156; McClellan's proclamation concerning, 159
 Slemmer, Captain Adam J., at Fort Barrancas, 12
 Slocum, General Henry W., commands Twelfth Corps, 175; at Gettysburg, 191; enters Atlanta, 279; in the march to the sea, 308; through the Carolinas, 328; in battle at Averasboro, 335; at Bentonville, 336
 Smith, General Andrew J., captures Fort De Russey, 237; joins Thomas at Nashville, 315
 Smith, General Charles F., at Fort Donelson, 58 *et seq.*; death of, 81
 Smith, General E. Kirby, on battle of Pleasant Hill, 241; surrenders, 363
 Smith, General Gustavus W., temporarily commands Confederate army, 113; defeated at Griswoldville, 309
 Smith, Joseph, Jr., killed on the *Congress*, 70
 Smith, Morgan L., commands regiment at Fort Donelson, 63; in battle of Atlanta, 277
 Smith, General Preston, killed, 227
 Smith, General Wm. F., commands the Eighteenth Corps, 263; advances toward Petersburg, 339
 Snyder, Lieutenant Geo. W., at Fort Sumter, 14
 South Carolina, first State to secede, 4; feeling of soldiers toward the State, 328
 Southfield, the, sunk, 301
 South Mountain, battle of, 144 *et seq.*
 Spear, Colonel Saml. P., in fight for the Weldon Railroad, 346
 Spottsylvania, march to, 256; battle of, 257 *et seq.*; the fighting at the salient, 260
 Stanley, General David S., in the Atlanta campaign, 272; commands Fourth Corps at Nashville, 307
 Stannard, General Geo. J., at Gettysburg, 191 *et seq.*
 Stanton, Edwin M., becomes Secretary of War, 104
 Starke, General Wm. E., killed, 154
Star of the West, fired on, 17
 State rights and State sovereignty, viii
 Steedman, General J. B., joins Thomas at Nashville, 315
 Steinwehr, General Adolph, at Gettysburg, 191
 Steuart, General Geo. H., captured, 260
 Stevens, Lieutenant A. J., battery at Gettysburg, 201
 Stevens, General Isaac I., killed, 136
 Stevenson, General T. G., killed, 261
 Stone, General Chas. P., at Sabine Cross Roads, 239
 Stone, Colonel G. A., at Columbia, 331
 Stone, Colonel Henry, quoted, 314, 318
 Stone, General Roy, his brigade at Gettysburg, 189
 Strahl, General Oscar F., killed, 315
 Stringham, Captain S. H., in command of expedition, 42
 Stuart, General J. E. B., rides round the Army of the Potomac,

Stuart—*Continued*

- 114; his correspondence captured, 131; he captures Pope's, 132; at Chancellorsville, 179; in the Overland campaign, 249; killed, 257
- Sturgis, General Samuel D., at the Antietam, 152
- Sumner, General Edwin V., commands a corps on the Peninsula, 104 *et seq.*; promptness at Seven Pines, 108; at the Antietam, 150; at Fredericksburg, 170
- Surrender of Lee, numbers and losses, 363
- Sykes, General George, at Malvern Hill, 123; at Gettysburg, 192
- Taboo, the great, 159
- Talbot, Lieutenant Theodore, at Fort Sumter, 14
- Taney, Chief Justice Roger B., renders the Dred Scott decision, vii; administers the oath to President Lincoln, 11
- Taylor, Benjamin F., describes battles at Chattanooga, 231
- Taylor, General Richard, at Sabine Cross Roads, 238
- Tennessee, the ram, in Mobile Bay, 287; surrendered, 291
- Terry, General Alfred H., joins Sherman at Goldsboro, 337
- Thomas, General George H., wins battle of Mill Springs, 55; at Chickamauga, 223; his peculiar ability, 224; commands the Army of the Cumberland, 228; at Chattanooga, 230; in the Atlanta campaign, 267; organizes an army to oppose Hood, 307; on his critics, 317; fights the battle of Nashville, 318
- Thomas, General Henry G., describes fighting at the crater, 344
- Tilghman, General L., commands Fort Henry, 56; killed, 217
- Timby, Theodore R., inventor of revolving tower, 72
- Todd's Tavern, action at, 255
- Tom's Brook, action at, 294
- Torbert, General Alfred T. A., in Shenandoah Valley, 293
- Torpedoes planted in roads, 329
- Totopotomoy, situation at, 263
- Trobrland, Regis de, at Gettysburg, 199
- Tumbling Creek, disaster at, 299
- Turner, General John W., at the crater, 345
- Turret, revolving, invention of, 71, 72
- Twiggs, General David E., surrenders his command, 5
- Tyler, General Daniel, commands a division at Bull Run, 30
- "Unconditional surrender," demanded at Fort Donelson, 64; at Vicksburg, 221
- Upton, Colonel Emory, at Spottsylvania, 258
- Valour, the measure of, 367
- Van Dorn, General Earl, captures Holly Springs, 210
- Vicksburg, campaign against, 209-221; life therein described, 219
- Victory, the most decisive, 337
- Vincent, General Strong, occupies Little Round Top, 193; mortally wounded, 195
- Virginia, how taken into the Confederacy, 27
- Wadsworth, General James S., at Gettysburg, 191; killed, 254
- Wagner, General Geo. D., his brigade at Franklin, 313
- Wallace, General Lew., at Fort Donelson, 58; at battle of Shiloh, 80 *et seq.*; fights the battle of the Monocacy, 351
- Wallace, W. H. L., commands regiment at Fort Donelson, 61; mortally wounded, 83
- Walthall, General Edward C., in battle of Nashville, 320
- Ward, General J. H. H., at Gettysburg, 196
- Ward, General Wm. T., at Averasboro, 335
- War Governors, list of, 25
- Warren, General Gouverneur K., at Chancellorsville, 183; secures Little Round Top, 192; in Overland campaign, 249; moves

- Warren—*Continued*
 against the Weldon Railroad, 346; in the battle of Five Forks, 355; relieved by Sheridan, 355
 Washington, threatened by Early, 352
 Wauhatchie, battle at, 229
 Waynesboro, battle at, 353
 Webb, General Alex. S., quoted as to Fair Oaks, 112; as to Malvern Hill, 124; in the Wilderness, 253; wounded, 261
 Webster, Colonel Joseph D., at Shiloh, 84
 Weed, General Stephen H., on Little Round Top, 193; mortally wounded, 195
 Weldon Railroad, the, fighting for, 346 *et seq.*
 Wessels, General Henry W., surrenders Plymouth, 300
 Wheaton, General Frank, at Gettysburg, 200
 Wheeler, General Joseph, conducts cavalry raid, 278; commands cavalry following Sherman's march, 329
 Wheelock, Colonel Charles, his adventure, 190
 White, General Julius, at Harpers Ferry, 143
 Whiting, Wm., on "War Powers under the Constitution," 166
 Whiting, General W. H. C., quoted, 117
 Whitney, Eli, invents cotton-gin, iii
 Whittaker, Colonel, at Lookout Mountain, 232
 Wideawakes, described, 4
 Wiedrick, Captain M., battery captured, 201
 Wigfall, Louis T., at Fort Sumter, 23
 Wilderness, the, described, 248; battle of, 250; losses in, 255
 Willard, Colonel Geo. L., killed, 196
 Willcox, General Orlando B., in fight for the Weldon Railroad, 347
 Williams, General Thomas, expels fugitive slaves, 159
 Williamsburg, battle of, 106
 Wilmington captured, 334
 Wilson, Captain, at Lookout Mountain, 234
 Wilson, General Jas. Harrison, in the Overland campaign, 265; commands cavalry at Nashville, 316; quoted, 323
 Winder, General C. S., killed, 131
 Wines captured, 334
 Winslow, Captain John A., commander of the *Kearsarge*, defeats the *Alabama*, 282
 Wood, General Thos. J., receives an ambiguous order, 225; at Chattanooga, 235; in the Atlanta campaign, 272
 Woods, General Chas. R., in battle of Atlanta, 277; defeats General G. W. Smith, 309
 Worden, Captain John L., commands the *Monitor*, 73
 Wright, General Ambrose R., at Gettysburg, 197
 Wright, General Horatio G., commands the Sixth Corps in Overland campaign, 258; in Shenandoah Valley, 293; services at Cedar Creek, 297; breaks Lee's lines at Petersburg, 355
 Yellow Tavern, action at, 257
 Yorktown, siege of, 105
 Zook, General Samuel K., killed, 196

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